The Philippines: Past and Present Volume I Part 16

(Signed by initials which are illegible, but evidently those of the Provincial President.) [209]

On January 5, 1899, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation which contains the following statement:--

"The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is, that with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the t.i.tle of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my govermnent.

"My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the t.i.tle, 'champion of oppressed nations.' Thus it is that my government is ready to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands. I announce these rights before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may p.r.o.nounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.

"Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed." [210]

Three days later this proclamation, which was rather dangerously like a declaration of war, was reissued with a significant change in the last one of the pa.s.sages quoted, the words "attempt to take forcible possession of any part of the territory submitted to its jurisdiction"

being subst.i.tuted for the words "attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands."

On January 8, 1899, at 9.40 P.M., Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"_Note_.--In consequence of the orders of General Rios to his officers, as soon as the Filipino attack begins the Americans should be driven into the Intramuros district and the Walled city should be set on fire." [211]

Preparations for the attack, which was to begin inside the city of Manila, were now rapidly pushed to conclusion. I quote Taylor's excellent summary of them:--

"After Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 5 the number of organizations charged with an attack within the city increased rapidly and it is possible that those which had been formed during Spanish rule had never been disbanded. Sandico's clubs for athletic exercises and mutual improvement formed a nucleus for these bodies and the directing boards of the popular committees took up the work of recruiting, while some of the members became officers of the militia or sandatahan. On January 6 the commander of militia in Trozo, Manila, reported that 1130 soldiers had been enrolled by the popular committee. On January 7 Bonifacio Arevalo forwarded to the head of the central committee a list of the officers of the battalion which had just been organized in Sampaloc for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about the same time J. Limj.a.p submitted to Sandico a project for arming the prisoners in Bilibid Prison with the arms of the American soldiers quartered in the Zorrilla Theatre across the street. He said:--

"'Jacinto Limj.a.p having been proclaimed commander of the volunteers of the penitentiary, I ask you to authorize the creation of a disciplinary battalion and the provisional appointments of officers for 600 sandatahan, or militia, ready to provide themselves by force with the American rifles in the Zorrilla Theatre.'

"He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It was not difficult for him to obtain volunteers there to rob, to burn, to rape and to murder. These were the crimes for which they were serving sentences. The political prisoners had been released....

"On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first battalion organized by the committees of Sampaloc; on January 27 he approved those of the second battalion. By January 22 two battalions had been organized in Quiapo. At least one regiment of eight companies was raised in Binondo, for on January 23 its commander forwarded a roll of the officers to Aguinaldo for his approval.... On January 25 T. Sandico, at Malolos, submitted for approval the names of a number of officers of the territorial militia in the city of Manila. On January 30, 1899, a roll of four companies just organized in Malate was forwarded approved by T. Sandico, and on the same day the committee of Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for permission to recruit a body for the defence of the country. The regiment of 'Armas Blancas' had already been raised in Tondo and Binondo. It was in existence there in December, 1898, and may have been originally organized to act against Spain. On February 2 all officers of the territorial militia in Manila reported at Caloocan, in accordance with orders of Sandico, for the purpose of receiving their commissions and taking the oath to the flag. A man who took part in this ceremony wrote that a mult.i.tude of men were present in uniform, and that the oath was administered by Gen. Pantaleon Garcia. There is no reason for believing that this is a complete statement of sandatahan organized in Manila by the end of January, and yet this statement gives a force of at least 6330 men. General Otis said that this force had been reported to him as being 10,000 men. It is probably true that only a small number of them had rifles; but armed with long knives and daggers they could have inflicted much damage in a sudden night attack in the narrow and badly lighted streets of Manila. On January 9, 1899, Aguinaldo wrote his instructions for the sandatahan of Manila. Members of this body were to enter the houses of the American officers on the pretext of bringing them presents. Once in they were to kill. The sentinels at the gates of the barracks were to be approached by men dressed as women and killed. The gates of the barracks held and as many officers as possible treacherously murdered, the sandatahan were to rise throughout the city, and by attacking in the rear the United States troops on the outer line were to aid in opening a way for Aguinaldo's force. To further increase the confusion and perhaps to punish the natives who had not joined them, the sandatahan were to fire the city.

"It is a fair deduction from Luna's orders for an uprising in Manila, from Aguinaldo's instructions for the sandatahan, from other doc.u.ments among the papers of the insurgents and from what was done in Manila on February 22 that Aguinaldo and his advisers about the middle of January, 1899, drew up a plan of attack upon Manila which would, if carried out, have inflicted a severe blow upon the Americans. It was not carried out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna.

"It is true that the instructions were general; but that particular instructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for the murder of General Otis is shown by his note on the back of a doc.u.ment presented to him. [212]

"... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo and the men about him in beginning a war by the murder of the commanding general on the other side.

"... Aguinaldo and all his followers have declared that on February 4 the Americans attacked the unsuspecting Filipinos who were using their utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet here in Aguinaldo's own handwriting is the record of the fact that on January 10, 1899, he ordered the murder of the American commander.

"The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon and in Manila was not to be a mere raid such as the bandits of Cavite were in the habit of making upon the defenceless towns. The plan was a piece of calculated savagery in which murder and outrage were considered means to accomplish a purpose. The servants were to kill their employers; organized bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in the city of Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases employed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the barracks of the American soldiers and ma.s.sacre the inmates; all Americans in the streets were to be killed, the city was to be fired and its loot was to be the reward of loyalty to Aguinaldo. If this plan had been carried out no white man and no white woman would have escaped. The reinforcements from the United States would have arrived to find only the smoking ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned General Augustin what the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of Indians drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately planned for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capital not as it had been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take it as Count Tilly took Magdeburg.

"The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini, Sandico, and Luna, Asiatics educated in European schools, were men of trained and subtle minds. With them cruelty and a.s.sa.s.sination was not a matter of savage impulse but of deliberate calculation; with them a.s.sa.s.sination was employed as an effective addition to political propaganda, and murder as an ultimate resource in political manoeuvres." [213]

Some portions of Aguinaldo's instructions to the _sandatahan_ are particularly worthy of perpetuation, as they ill.u.s.trate his ideas as to the conduct which should be observed by cultured, patriotic, honourable and very humane men, who were not cruel:--

"_Art_. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send in first four men with a good present for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others who will make a pretence of looking for the same officer for some reason and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This wherever it is possible at the moment of attack.

"_Art_. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracks by the sandatahan should be a complete surprise and with decision and courage. One should go alone in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order to deceive the sentinel one of them should dress as a woman and must take great care that the sentinel is not able to discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those in the barracks. This will enable his companions who are approaching to a.s.sist in the general attack.

"_Art_. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan should not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who can injure them, they may take the rifles in one hand and the ammunition in the other.

"_Art_. 6. The officers shall take care that on the tops of the houses along the streets where the American forces shall pa.s.s there will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil and mola.s.ses, rags soaked in coal oil ready to be lighted and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy objects that they can throw on the pa.s.sing American troops. At the same time in the lower parts of the houses will be concealed the sandatahan, who will attack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw gla.s.s in the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers go barefooted. On these houses there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to the objects to be thrown down, a number of the sandatahan, in order to cover a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy's column, so that we may be sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces.

"_Art_. 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live on the alert to a.s.sist simultaneously the inside attack at the very moment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having a.s.surance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with their brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and I charge and order that the persons and goods of all foreigners shall be respected and that the American prisoners shall be treated well.

"_Art_. 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph 6, there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling water, tallow, mola.s.ses and other liquids, which shall be thrown as bombs on the Americans who pa.s.s in front of their houses, or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these houses shall be the sandatahan who shall hurl the liquids that shall be pa.s.sed to them by the women and children.

"_Art_. 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess the same, the sandatahan can provide themselves with lances and arrows with long sharp heads, and these should be shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well into the bodies of the enemy, and these should be so made that in withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh.

"_Art_. 12.... Neither will you forget your sacred oath and immaculate banner; nor will you forget the promises made by me to the civilized nations, whom I have a.s.sured that we Filipinos are not savages, nor thieves, nor a.s.sa.s.sins, nor are we cruel, but on the contrary, that we are men of culture and patriotism, honourable and very humane." [214]

Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates. [215]

The Filipinos were now ready to a.s.sume the offensive, but desired, if possible, to provoke the Americans into firing the first shot. They made no secret of their desire for conflict, but increased their hostile demonstrations and pushed their lines forward into forbidden territory. Their att.i.tude is well ill.u.s.trated by the following extract from a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on January 10, 1899:--

"Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell me to withdraw our forces in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall not draw back a step, and in place of withdrawing, I shall advance a little farther. He brings a letter from his general, in which he speaks to me as a friend. I said that from the day I knew that Maquinley (McKinley) opposed our independence I did not want any dealings with any American. War, war, is what we want. The Americans after this speech went off pale." [216]

Aguinaldo approved the hostile att.i.tude of Cailles, for there is a reply in his handwriting which reads:--

"I approve and applaud what you have done with the Americans, and zeal and valour always, also my beloved officers and soldiers there. I believe that they are playing us until the arrival of their reinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum and remain always on the alert.--E. A. Jan. 10, 1899." [217]

On this same day Aguinaldo commissioned Feliciano Cruz and Severino Quitiongco to a.s.sa.s.sinate General Otis. [218]

On January 13 Noriel and Cailles telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention in your telegram, and we also wish to know what reward our Government is arranging for the forces that will be able first to enter Manila."

This telegram is endorsed in Aguinaldo's handwriting:

"As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the heroes will have as their rewards a large quant.i.ty of money, extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bato, Marquis of Malate, Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the congratulations of our idolizing country on account of their being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regiments with their generals, and, if possible, the chief of them all who represents our future enemies in Manila, which (lot?) falls to you, or, better said, to General Noriel and Colonel Cailles.

"The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a few days.

(Signed) "E. A.

"_Malolos_, Jan. 14, 1899." [219]

On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted: "Death to the Americans," and held a review to celebrate the rupture of friendly relations with the United States. [220]

At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious attack upon Manila and telegraphed it to some of his officers. General Garcia replied from Caloocan on January 17 that the dream would come true as soon as the conflict with the Americans began. [221]

In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite ready, and ordered that the Filipino soldiers in the walled city keep on good terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, "since the hoped-for moment has not yet arrived." [222]