The Origins Of Political Order Part 17

29.Marc Bloch, Feudal Society Feudal Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 161. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 161.

30.Joseph R. Strayer, "Feudalism in Western Europe," in Fredric L. Cheyette, ed., Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe: Selected Readings Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe: Selected Readings (New York: Holt, 1968), p. 13. (New York: Holt, 1968), p. 13.

31.Bloch, Feudal Society Feudal Society, pp. 190ff.

32.For a fuller discussion of the relationship between Zhou and European feudalism, see Feng Li, "'Feudalism' and Western Zhou China: A Criticism," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 63, no. 1 (2003): 11544. Li suggests that the Western Zhou started out as far more politically centralized than the term "feudalism" suggests. 63, no. 1 (2003): 11544. Li suggests that the Western Zhou started out as far more politically centralized than the term "feudalism" suggests.

33.Harrison, The Chinese Empire The Chinese Empire, pp. 3741; Hsu, Ancient China in Transition Ancient China in Transition, p. 53; Levenson and Schurmann, China China, pp. 3032.

34.Hsu, Ancient China in Transition Ancient China in Transition, p. 79.

35.Mark E. Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China Sanctioned Violence in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 33. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 33.

36.Ibid., p. 35.

37.Ibid., p. 17.

38.Ibid., p. 28.

39.Ibid., pp. 22, 3738.

7: WAR AND THE RISE OF THE CHINESE STATE.

1.Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States Coercion, Capital, and European States; Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1985). See also Porter, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1985). See also Porter, War and the Rise of the State War and the Rise of the State.

2.See Cameron G. Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America," American Journal of Political Science American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 45165. 49, no. 3 (2005): 45165.

3.Hsu, Ancient China in Transition Ancient China in Transition, pp. 5658.

4.Edgar Kiser and Yong Cai, "War and Bureaucratization in Qin China: Exploring an Anomalous Case," American Sociological Review American Sociological Review 68, no. 4 (2003): 51139. 68, no. 4 (2003): 51139.

5.Hsu, Ancient China in Transition Ancient China in Transition, p. 67; Kiser and Cai, "War and Bureaucratization," (2003), p. 520; Hui, War and State Formation War and State Formation, p. 87.

6.For an overview, see Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 5, pt. 7: Military Technology Military Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954).

7.Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China Sanctioned Violence in Early China, pp. 5558.

8.Ibid., p. 60; Hsu, Ancient China in Transition Ancient China in Transition, p. 71.

9.Hsu, Ancient China in Transition Ancient China in Transition, pp. 7375.

10.Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China Sanctioned Violence in Early China, pp. 5859.

11.Hsu, Ancient China in Transition Ancient China in Transition, pp. 8287.

12.Kiser and Cai, "War and Bureaucratization," pp. 51617.

13.Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization A History of Chinese Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 6465. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 6465.

14.Ibid., pp. 6773.

15.Ibid., pp. 82100.

16.Yu-ning Li, Shang Yang's Reforms and State Control in China Shang Yang's Reforms and State Control in China (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1977), pp. 3238. (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1977), pp. 3238.

17.Ibid., pp. 3839.

18.Peasant families are usually too poor to maintain lineages; the well-field system might be thought of as a poor family's alternative to an extended kinship group.

19.James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

20.Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China Sanctioned Violence in Early China, p. 63.

21.Li, Shang Yang's Reforms Shang Yang's Reforms, p. 66.

22.For background, see Burton Watson, trans., Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 115. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 115.

23.Chao, Chinese Kinship Chinese Kinship, pp. 13334.

24.Baker, Chinese Family and Kinship Chinese Family and Kinship, pp. 15261.

25.See the discussion in f.u.kuyama, Trust Trust, pp. 9394.

26.Quoted in Li, Shang Yang's Reforms Shang Yang's Reforms, p. 127.

27.Kung-chuan Hsiao, "Legalism and Autocracy in Traditional China," ibid., p. 16.

28.Loewe and Shaughnessy, Cambridge History of Ancient China Cambridge History of Ancient China, p. 1003.

29.Ibid., p. 1009.

30.Hui, War and State Formation War and State Formation, pp. 6566.

31.Consistent with his efforts to undermine the traditional kinship-based order at home, Shang Yang engaged in a Machiavellian foreign policy that overturned the aristocratic rules of engagement and norms that limited conflict. For example, he duped the ruler of his former home state, Wei, into declaring himself king in place of the Zhou monarch, a move that embroiled Wei with its neighbors Han and Qi and led to its defeat by the latter. When Qin invaded Wei in 340 B.C., Shang Yang invited the commander of Wei's forces, Prince Ang, to a peace conference in his camp and promptly took him prisoner. Like the draconian punishments being meted out at home, all of this was justified in terms of pure power politics. See ibid., pp. 7071.

32.Weber wrote about China in many places; see in particular The Religion of China The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951); and (New York: Free Press, 1951); and Economy and Society Economy and Society, Vol. 2, pp. 104751.

33.Levenson and Schurmann, China China, pp. 99100.

34.Harrison, The Chinese Empire The Chinese Empire, p. 88.

35.Levenson and Schurmann, China China, pp. 6970.

8: THE GREAT HAN SYSTEM.

1.Harrison, The Chinese Empire The Chinese Empire, pp. 8586.

2.Quoted in Levenson and Schurmann, China China, p. 87.

3.Kw.a.n.g-chih Chang et al., The Formation of Chinese Civilization The Formation of Chinese Civilization, p. 271.

4.Kiser and Cai, "War and Bureaucratization."

5.Levenson and Schurmann, China China, pp. 8081; Harrison, The Chinese Empire The Chinese Empire, pp. 9596.

6.Loewe, The Government of the Qin and Han Empires The Government of the Qin and Han Empires, p. 43.

7.Chang et al., The Formation of Chinese Civilization The Formation of Chinese Civilization, p. 276.

8.Levenson and Schurmann, China China, p. 83.

9.Loewe, The Government of the Qin and Han Empires The Government of the Qin and Han Empires, pp. 9597.

10.Levenson and Schurmann, China China, pp. 8891.

11.The full list of characteristics: a. a. Bureaucrats are personally free and subject to authority only within a defined area. Bureaucrats are personally free and subject to authority only within a defined area.b. They are organized into a clearly defined hierarchy of offices. They are organized into a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.c. Each office has a defined sphere of competence. Each office has a defined sphere of competence.d. Offices are filled by free contractual relationship. Offices are filled by free contractual relationship.e. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications.f. Bureaucrats are remunerated by fixed salaries. Bureaucrats are remunerated by fixed salaries.g. The office is treated as the sole occupation of the inc.u.mbent. The office is treated as the sole occupation of the inc.u.mbent.h. The office const.i.tutes a career. The office const.i.tutes a career.i. There is a separation between ownership and management. There is a separation between ownership and management.j. Officials are subject to strict discipline and control. Officials are subject to strict discipline and control.

Weber, Economy and Society Economy and Society, Vol. I, pp. 22021. Many observers have noted that Weber's definition applies best to the Prussian-German bureaucracy with which he was most familiar, but that it does not accurately describe many effective modern publicor private-sector bureaucracies today. For example, many instances of flat management involve delegating high degrees of autonomy to subordinates, relaxing the strict command-and-control hierarchy of cla.s.sic bureaucracy, and blurring the boundaries between different offices. It seems to me that the most essential characteristics of modern bureaucracy, such as the specificity of office, the subordination of office to higher political authority, and the separation of public and private spheres, are all still characteristic of modern public administration systems. Allen Schick argues that more recent innovations in public management need to be built on a foundation of traditional bureaucracy. See his article "Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms," World Bank Research Observer World Bank Research Observer 13, no. 8 (1998): 112331. 13, no. 8 (1998): 112331.

12.This point is made in Creel, "The Beginning of Bureaucracy in China."

13.Loewe, The Government of the Qin and Han Empires The Government of the Qin and Han Empires, pp. 7476.

14.Patrimonialism survived chiefly in the kingdoms and dependent states that had been part of the original Han political settlement. The Qin Dynasty's two-level commandery/ prefecture system was replaced by a more complex multilevel one. Commanderies and dependent kingdoms were divided into prefectures or counties, n.o.bilities, estates, and marches. By A.D. 2, there were 1,577 of these units across China. n.o.bilities were patrimonial offices that could be used to buy off or park the kinsmen of kings or powerful surviving aristocratic families, and could be held on a hereditary basis. In some cases they were used to reward imperial kinsmen. They were not, however, the bastion of an independent hereditary aristocracy as were the feudal domains of Europe. Rather, n.o.bilities appear to have been offices relatively easily created or removed by the central government as means of placating or punishing different political actors. Ibid., pp. 46, 50.

15.Ibid., pp. 2430.

16.Ibid., pp. 2425.

17.Ibid., pp. 5662.

9: POLITICAL DECAY AND THE RETURN OF PATRIMONIAL GOVERNMENT.

1.Harrison, The Chinese Empire The Chinese Empire, pp. 17477.

2.Ibid., pp. 17981.

3.Ibid., p. 182. There is a great deal of controversy over historical measurement of population in China. Kent Deng, using adjusted official population data, shows China's population dropping from 56.5 million in A.D. 157 to 18.5 million in 280, a decline of 67 percent. Kent G. Deng, "Unveiling China's True Population Statistics for the PreModern Era with Official Census Data," Population Review Population Review 43, no. 2 (2004): 3269. 43, no. 2 (2004): 3269.

4.See Patricia B. Ebrey, "Patron-Client Relations in the Later Han," Journal of the American Oriental Society Journal of the American Oriental Society 103, no. 3 (1983): 53342. 103, no. 3 (1983): 53342.

5.For a contemporary example of this process unfolding in Mexico, see Flannery, "The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations."

6.Thomas R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population An Essay on the Principle of Population (New York: Penguin, 1982). (New York: Penguin, 1982).

7.See Angus Maddison, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy: The Roots of Modernity Growth and Interaction in the World Economy: The Roots of Modernity (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2001), pp. 2127. (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2001), pp. 2127.

8.This situation was characterized in China's case as a "high-level equilibrium trap." Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973). (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973).

9.etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 102103. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 102103.

10.Scott Pearce, Audrey Spiro, and Patricia Ebrey, eds., Culture and Power in the Reconst.i.tution of the Chinese Realm, 200600 Culture and Power in the Reconst.i.tution of the Chinese Realm, 200600 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 89. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 89.

11.Harrison, The Chinese Empire The Chinese Empire, p. 181.

12.Moss Roberts, "Afterword: About Three Kingdoms Three Kingdoms," in Luo Guanzhong, Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 93840. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 93840.

13.J.A.G. Roberts, A Concise History of China A Concise History of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 4044; Patricia B. Ebrey, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 4044; Patricia B. Ebrey, The Aristocratic Families of Early Imperial China: A Case Study of the Po-ling Ts'ui Family The Aristocratic Families of Early Imperial China: A Case Study of the Po-ling Ts'ui Family (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 21. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 21.

14.Ebrey, Aristocratic Families Aristocratic Families, pp. 1718.

15.Ibid., p. 21.

16.Ibid., p. 22.

17.Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy, pp. 104106.

18.Ebrey, Aristocratic Families Aristocratic Families, pp. 2526.

19.Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy, pp. 108109.

10: THE INDIAN DETOUR.

1.Romila Thapar, From Lineage to State: Social Formations in the Mid-First Millennium B.C. in the Ganga Valley From Lineage to State: Social Formations in the Mid-First Millennium B.C. in the Ganga Valley (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 157. (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 157.

2.Harold A. Gould, The Hindu Caste System The Hindu Caste System (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1987), p. 12. (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1987), p. 12.

3.See Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India A New History of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 1423. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 1423.

4.Romila Thapar, Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300 Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 11011. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 11011.

5.Ibid., pp. 11213.

6.Ibid., pp. 11416.

7.Ibid., p. 120.

8.Ibid., p. 127.

9.Maine, Ancient Law Ancient Law; Maine, Village-Communities in the East and West Village-Communities in the East and West (New York: Arno Press, 1974); Patricia Uberoi, (New York: Arno Press, 1974); Patricia Uberoi, Family, Kinship and Marriage in India Family, Kinship and Marriage in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 812. Lewis Henry Morgan's work on comparative kinship structures also pointed to similarities in kinship terminology between Dravidian tribes in India and the North American indigenous groups like the Iroquois. Uberoi, pp. 1415. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 812. Lewis Henry Morgan's work on comparative kinship structures also pointed to similarities in kinship terminology between Dravidian tribes in India and the North American indigenous groups like the Iroquois. Uberoi, pp. 1415.

10.Irawati Karve, "The Kinship Map of India," in Uberoi, Family, Kinship and Marriage Family, Kinship and Marriage, p. 50.

11.Ibid., p. 67.

12.Ibid., p. 53.

13.Ibid., pp. 6768.