The Old Riddle And The Newest Answer Part 16

There remains to be considered Darwin's own explanation of the admitted deficiency of palaeontological evidence.

The main cause [he writes][316] of innumerable intermediate links [between different forms] not now occurring everywhere throughout nature, depends on the very process of natural selection, through which new varieties continually take the places of and supplant their parent-forms. But just in proportion as this process of extermination has acted on an enormous scale, so must the number of intermediate varieties, which have formerly existed, be truly enormous. Why then is not every geological formation and every stratum full of such intermediate links? Geology a.s.suredly does not reveal any such finely-graduated organic chain; and this, perhaps, is the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against the theory. The explanation lies, as I believe, in the extreme imperfection of the geological record.

How imperfect this record is he proceeds to argue at length, and he has no difficulty in showing how much of it has at one time or other been defaced by natural causes, and how small a portion has been laid open to our inspection. But although his demonstration on this point is continually quoted, as though it solved the difficulty, it does not appear that it need detain us long.

It is, in the first place, obvious that the absence of evidence cannot prove the truth of the theory of Evolution or any other, and it is proof of that theory which is required. Apart from palaeontological facts, as Professor Huxley has told us, there can be no conclusive evidence one way or the other; and if the geological record be not sufficiently complete to supply such evidence, the theory cannot possibly claim to be scientifically established.

Is it not also, as M. de Quatref.a.ges has remarked, very singular that precisely that evidence must be supposed always to have perished which the Evolution theory imperatively requires, while so much remains which appears to contradict it?

But, moreover, as Mr. Carruthers says, incomplete though the record undoubtedly is, and limited as is our knowledge even of what exists,--there still remains a vast ma.s.s of information which it has actually supplied, and there seems to be no reason for denying that, as to the particular point under consideration, its testimony is ample. If, as on the principles of genetic Evolution must be the case, there were in each line of descent no successive species or genera, made up of forms cl.u.s.tered round one point in the course of development more than another, how comes it that we find always and everywhere just such isolated cl.u.s.ters, naturally forming genera and species; and that in no single instance do we find any trace of the graduated series linking them together? Is it not quite impossible to suppose, that at all points in Nature we stumble upon exactly those instances which disguise, and apparently contradict, the method upon which she invariably works?

It is likewise obvious that the practice of Evolutionists is quite inconsistent with their own plea, for their arguments are constantly unmeaning except on the a.s.sumption that the geological record is sufficiently complete for practical purposes. In the example of the Horse, for instance, which we have been considering, the whole case for his Evolution is based upon the supposition that the completed _Equus_ did not exist during the earlier periods when _Eohippus_, _Anchitherium_, _Hipparion_ and the rest of them were preparing the way for his appearance, and that none of these lived simultaneously with others more ancient still which are set down as _their_ ancestors. But on what does such a supposition rest? Simply on the absence of remains of the more developed, in the strata containing those of the less developed. If such a reason be sufficient--which we will not question--it is likewise sufficient to establish the non-existence of intermediate forms to bridge the wide breaches in the supposed pedigree, and we must accordingly conclude that such intermediate forms there never were.

It is no less evident that whatever further evidence is found, may tell the wrong way, from the evolutionary point of view, no less than the right one; either by discrediting supposed link-forms, or by introducing us to new and strange types which increase our difficulties by requiring lines of communication to be established with them. Thus, as Mr. Mivart tells us,[317] "It is undeniable that there are instances which appeared at first to indicate a _gradual transition_, which instances have been shown by further investigation and discovery not to indicate truly anything of the kind." Another example of the same sort is furnished by the recent discovery of _Arsinoetherium_, a genus of very large and heavy hoofed beasts, the relics of which have been recently discovered in the upper Eocene of Egypt. This creature was something like a large rhinoceros, but had no connexion whatever with that family. In fact, we are told, its horns, of which it has four, two on top of its head, and two smaller above the eyes, and also its teeth, make it stand quite apart _from all other mammals_.

It thus appears that when the theory of genetic Evolution comes to the bar of Palaeontology, the most favourable verdict to which it can pretend is, Not proven.

One thing is certain. All the evidence we possess in regard of Organic Evolution, leaves the question of the origin, the propagation, and the development of life exactly where it has always been. No force has been found by Science to which we may ascribe the origin of the world we know.

As the Count de Saporta writes:[318]

Although the problem of "creation,"--formerly thought so simple, and dated almost within human ken and the period of human history--has now been relegated to a period too distant to be imagined, it would be childish to say that on that account the problem has ceased to exist. Its limits have, it is true, been shifted; but we are bound to acknowledge that they have nowise been altered. The horizon may have broadened and receded before us more and more, but the relative position of the objects we have to investigate remains precisely the same.

So too M. Blanchard:[319]

There has never been witnessed, and it is impossible to imagine the apparition of a creature not derived from another creature: it would therefore be folly to pretend to an explanation of creation.

If, as the advocates of transformism suppose, all species sprang from some primitive types, or even from a single primordial cell, the appearance, whether of those types or of that parent cell of the living world, would be neither more explicable nor less marvellous than the appearance of a host of creatures.

And, in like manner, Darwin's great ally and admirer, Sir Charles Lyell, when he had time to realize all the bearings of his friend's theory, wrote to him,[320]--"I think the old 'creation' is almost as much required as ever."

XVIII

TO SUM UP

It is time to return to the point from which we started our whole enquiry, and to ask what has been gathered in the course of it towards a solution of the question with which we began. That the Cosmos in which we dwell, the world of law, order, and life, has not existed for ever, we saw to be a truth enforced by the researches of physical Science, no less than by the clear teaching of reason. It certainly had a beginning, and there must be a cause to which that beginning was due,--a cause capable of producing all which we find to have been actually produced.

The material Universe and the mechanism of the heavens,--organic life with all its infinite marvels and varieties--animal sensation--human intelligence--canons of beauty, the law of good and evil--all these must have existed potentially in the First Cause, as in the Source whence alone they could be derived.

The Nature of this Cause was the object of our quest. In particular we set ourselves to examine the a.s.sertion now so loudly made that Science has found a full explanation in the forces of the Universe itself as they come within her cognizance, that is to say, the material forces which she can directly observe, and upon which she can experiment. In particular we have studied the Law of Evolution, in its various significations, and other laws subsidiary to it, in order to determine, from the point of view of reason and Science alone, whether it can be said that the prime factor of which we are in search is thus supplied.

The result has been to make it evident that while modern discovery has immensely multiplied and magnified the marvels which have to be accounted for, it has disclosed nothing which can be supposed to account for them in a manner to satisfy our reason. So far as the forces of Nature are concerned, the mysteries that lie beyond are even darker than they were. The origin and nature of matter and force, the source of motion, of life, of sensation and consciousness, of rational intelligence and language, of Free-will, of the reign of law and order to which all Nature testifies,--all these are for Science utterly unsolved problems, which, as some amongst her teachers tell us, must remain for ever insoluble. Even less prospect, if possible, can there be that any mechanical forces will ever account for perception of the sublime and beautiful,--and above all--of the distinction between right and wrong.

Here, then, Science stops,--confessing that she can be our guide no farther, and lending no colour whatever to the unscientific pretensions which are so noisily advanced by some persons in her name. Her domain is the world of sense, and it is evident that nothing existing within that realm can possibly furnish an explanation which will satisfy our intellectual need for causality.

Are we therefore to say that we can know nothing concerning the First Cause to which the phenomena of the Universe are due? Such is the Agnostic's position. What we have no means of knowing, he says, we must not pretend to know. It were irrational and dishonest to do so. When Science fails us, the true wisdom is to profess ignorance,--thus only can our position still be scientific.

But is such a principle itself scientific? Is it not a gratuitous and monstrous a.s.sumption that we can know nothing but that of which our senses directly tell us? That the Universe has a cause is no less certain than that the Universe exists, for of that cause it is the monument. And, as of the whole, so of every part or element which it contains, it is absolutely certain that there must be a cause, and one adequate to the production of what has actually been produced; for as the proverb says, "Nothing is to be got out of a sack but what is in it." From such conclusions there is no escape;--and since it is impossible to find the cause required within the world of material forces and sensible phenomena, it becomes no less obvious that it must lie beyond, across the frontier which nothing material can pa.s.s.

Therefore, also, we know something concerning that Cause,--very little, perhaps, in comparison with what we cannot know,--but still something very substantial. We know that such a Cause exists. We know that it must possess every excellence which we discover in Nature,--all that she has, and more; since what she derives from it, the Cause of Nature has of itself. In it must be all power, for except as flowing from it there is no power possible. Finally, as a capable Cause of law and order in Nature, and of Intellect and Will in man, the First Cause must be supereminently endowed with Understanding, and Freedom in the exercise of its might,--or it would be inferior to its own works.

Since there must have been something from eternity, [says Bolingbroke][321] because there is something now, the eternal Being must be an intelligent Being, because there is intelligence now; for no man will venture to a.s.sert that non-ent.i.ty can produce ent.i.ty, or non-intelligence, intelligence. And such a Being must exist necessarily, whether things have been always as they are, or whether they have been made in time: because it is no more easy to conceive an infinite than a finite progression of effects without a cause.

It is therefore not easy to understand how we can avoid the conclusion of the distinguished men of Science whom we have heard declare that they a.s.sume "as absolutely self-evident" the existence of a Deity who is the Creator and Upholder of all things.

It will probably be answered that this is mere Anthropomorphism; which formidable term appears by many to be considered sufficient to close the whole question, and to rule the idea of a personal G.o.d out of court. Did not Voltaire remark that if in the beginning G.o.d made man to His own image and likeness, man has well repaid Him ever since? And what can be more conclusive than that?

But what--after all--does "Anthropomorphism" mean in this connexion?

Simply, that being men we have to speak in human terms, even of what is superhuman. By no possibility can we do anything else. Limited as we are by the conditions of our nature, we can find no mode of expression except such as is based upon sensible experience; and although we can convince ourselves by rational inference of the existence, and to some extent of the character, of what is beyond sense, we can frame no description of it, nor even a phantasm or image by means of imagination, except so far as we are able to draw upon the phenomena of the external world. Thus it is that artists who endeavour to represent an immaterial being, as an angel, a djinn or a sprite, though the essence of the object they would depict is that it has no body, have perforce to give it one, though they make it as little gross as possible, for otherwise they could not portray it at all. But however such images may be refined and etherealized they are intended to be understood only as conventional figures to suggest to the mind its own concept, which is as different from them as the notes produced by a singer are from those on the score from which he sings. No one imagines that the genius of Music is a young woman holding a sh.e.l.l to her ear, or that the Cherubim are heads and wings and nothing more. So it is with statements of the Theistic belief concerning the First Cause, or G.o.d. To put this into words we are compelled to use the only materials within our reach, and to borrow our phraseology from that which, within our experience is the highest and n.o.blest element found in the Universe,--namely our own intelligence and will. These beyond question must be transcendentally possessed by the Cause on which they depend. So far Anthropomorphism is sound sense; that is to say, so long as it attributes all possible excellence to the source of all. It is foolish and unscientific only when it attributes to the Absolute and Unconditioned the limitations of an inferior order of being. We may truly say that a penny is contained in a pound,--but it does not follow that a sovereign must be of copper.

According to the scientific doctrine that all our familiar forms of energy are ultimately derived from the Sun, it might well be argued from observation of a farthing rushlight that Solar Energy includes heat and light; but not that it is fed on tallow. This appears to be plain and obvious enough, often as it is forgotten or ignored. As Sir Oliver Lodge has lately put the matter:[322]

Shall we possess these things and G.o.d not possess them? Let no worthy human attribute be denied to the Deity. There are many errors, but there is one truth in Anthropomorphism. Whatever worthy attribute belongs to man, be it personality or any other, its existence in the universe is thereby admitted; we can deny it no more.

Or as Professor Baden Powell expresses the same argument:[323]

That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained be but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of the student. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is the necessary connexion in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vast extent and compa.s.s of the intelligence thus partially manifested, and its reality, as existing in the immutably connected order of objects examined, independently of the mind of the investigator.

The reluctance frequently manifested by scientific men to admit the force of so plain an argument, appears to be generally due to a fundamental misconception. It is constantly a.s.sumed that to introduce the element of purpose in Nature is to deny the continuity of Natural law, and that to speak of design in regard of a process or a structure, is equivalent to saying that a non-natural agent intervenes at that particular point and takes the work out of Nature's hands. This, it may be supposed, was Professor Huxley's idea when he spoke of "the commoner and coa.r.s.er forms of teleology," giving as an instance the supposition that eyes were constructed for the purpose of enabling their possessors to see. It might indeed be replied that, at any rate, it is less difficult to suppose this, than that eyes were constructed without any purpose of seeing, or knowledge of the laws of optics;--but evidently it is taken for granted that Theists imagine every purposive item in nature to be violently introduced from without, like the forms of lions or peac.o.c.ks into which topiarian gardeners clip their shrubs. But, as has been said, the laws of Nature are the expression of the mind of G.o.d: it is through them that He accomplishes His design. As Professor Romanes came to see at the close of his life, it is strange what jealousy there is of admitting the Creator into Creation. "It is still a.s.sumed on both sides," he wrote,[324] "that there must be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to its being divine,"--and although we must utterly demur to such a description of the position of Theists, it undoubtedly is true of their adversaries. Their objections on this head can only signify that it is with the laws of Nature as with a railway locomotive from which the driver, having got up steam and set it going, jumps off, leaving it entirely to its own devices. But, as a legislator, if rightly interpreted, speaks by the mouth of every judge who administers the law in practice, and applies it to concrete cases,--so the Author of Nature, whose laws cannot be perverted, provides through them for all that is to be operated by the forces He has inst.i.tuted.

So it is that, as Professors Stewart and Tait have told us, we must conceive of Him as not the Creator only, but likewise the Upholder of all things, while Lord Kelvin declares[325] we are unmistakably shown through Nature that she depends upon one "ever-acting Creator and Ruler." It is in this omnipresence of Divine influence that Monism finds the modic.u.m of plausibility which serves it for a foundation. It runs, indeed, into the absurdity of endeavouring to explain such Omnipresence by identifying the finite with the Infinite, and attributing to matter qualities which all experience, and very specially all scientific experience, contradicts; but, for all that, it scores a distinct point as against mere materialism, which Comte declares to be "the most illogical form of metaphysics," and the late Sir Leslie Stephen, "not so much error as sheer nonsense." Theism avoids the error of either extreme. While it teaches the essential and fundamental distinction between the Absolute and the contingent, between the Creator and His creatures, it teaches likewise that He is ever present in His works, and that in their every operation He is manifested.

And so, in the words of Rivarol, G.o.d is the explanation of the world, and the world is the demonstration of G.o.d. The acceptance of a Self-existent, All-powerful, and intelligent Being can alone serve as a basis for any system of Cosmogony which satisfies our intellectual need of causation; while, on the other hand, the nature of this Being, as necessarily beyond the scope of our senses, can be known to us only indirectly through the effects of which He is the cause.

By no one has this conclusion been more clearly stated than by Lamarck, the real father of Organic Evolutionism, whom many would therefore represent as an atheist. His words are so much to the point that with them we may conclude.[326]

Of the Supreme Being, in a word of G.o.d, to whom all infinitude is seen to belong, man has thus conceived an idea, which, though indirect, is sound, and which necessarily follows from what he observes. In the same manner, he has formed another idea, equally solid, namely of the boundless power of this Being, suggested by the consideration of His works....

Nature not being intelligent, nor even a being, but an order of things const.i.tuting a power subject to law, cannot therefore be G.o.d. She is the wondrous product of His Almighty will: and for us, of all created things she is the grandest and most admirable. Thus the will of G.o.d is everywhere expressed by the laws of Nature, since these laws originate from Him.

APPENDIX

_A._ _Evolution and the lower forms of life_ (_p. 165_).

A singularly instructive field for the study of the mutability or stability of species should be afforded by the lower forms of life, in which organization is reduced to a minimum, they being mere ma.s.ses of protoplasm without even a containing envelope, while their nourishment is of the simplest. It would therefore appear that environment should be all-potent to modify them and produce specific modifications, while the extreme rapidity with which they propagate their kind, and that unis.e.xually, ought to require no vast extent of time to make such trans.m.u.tations apparent.

It is found, however, on the contrary, that nowhere in organic nature does the type remain more rigidly persistent. Professor Macbride, for example, tells us,[327]

"The Myxomycetae may be regarded as the organic group in which the forces of heredity,--whatever these forces may be--are at their maximum: they have responded as little as possible to the influence of their environment."

To the same effect speaks Professor Paulesco of Bucharest, of other elementary organisms.[328]