The New York Stock Exchange in the Crisis of 1914 Part 1

The New York Stock Exchange in the Crisis of 1914.

by Henry George Stebbins n.o.ble.

INTRODUCTION

The year 1914 has no precedent in Stock Exchange history. At the present time (1915), when the great events that have come to pa.s.s are still close to us, even their details are vivid in our minds and we need no one to rehea.r.s.e them. Time, however, is quick to dim even acute memories, and Wall Street, of all places, is the land of forgetfulness. The new happenings of all the World crowd upon each other so fast in the financial district that even the greatest and most far-reaching of them are soon driven out of sight. This being the case, it has seemed to the writer of these pages that some record should be kept among the brokerage fraternity of what was so great an epoch in their history, and that this record could best be written down by one who happened to be very favorably placed to know the story in its entirety.

Of course the archives of the Exchange will always contain the minutes of Committees and other doc.u.mentary material embodying the story of the past, but this dry chronicle is never likely to see the light except when unearthed by law courts or legislative committees. It seems worth while, therefore, to disentangle the essential thread of the tale of 1914 from the ma.s.s of unreadable detail in the minute books, and put it in a shape where those who are interested may look it over.

This is not an easy task. To differentiate the interesting and the essential from the ma.s.s of routine material is, perhaps, not very difficult, but to present this segregated matter in a form that will not be monotonous is much more of a problem. The proceedings of a Committee that has been in continuous session must, when written down, partake of the nature of a diary, and to that extent be tiresome reading. We shall, therefore, have to ask the indulgence of any one who happens to look into these pages, and beg him to pa.s.s over the form for the sake of the substance. That the substance itself is of deep interest goes without saying. It was given to the Stock Exchange to play a great part in a momentous world crisis, and it must be of profound interest to know how that part was played.

Stock Exchanges are a relatively recent product of modern civilization, and like new comers in every field they are suspected and misunderstood. The most complex of all problems are economic problems, and the functions of Stock Exchanges form a most intricate part of political economy. It has, consequently, been a noticeable phenomenon in all contemporary industrial society that the activities of the stock markets have been a constant subject of agitation and legislative meddling. Most of this meddling has been based upon ignorance and misunderstanding, but in a broad view this ignorance and misunderstanding are excusable owing to the novelty and above all the great complexity of the factors at work. One of the needs of the time, therefore, is that the public, and their representatives in the Legislatures, should be enlightened as fast as possible with regard to the immensely important uses of these inst.i.tutions, and to the operation of their very delicate machinery.

The World crisis of 1914 forced upon us an object lesson on the question of speculative exchanges in general which ought to be of lasting profit. For years agitators had been hard at work all over the country urging the suppression of the Cotton Exchanges, and claiming that they contained gamblers who depressed the price of the cotton growers' product. In the summer of 1914 the dreams of these agitators were realized. The Cotton Exchanges were all closed and the cotton grower was given an opportunity of testing the benefits of a situation where there was no reliable agency to appraise the value of cotton.

The result may be summed up in the statement that the reopening of the Cotton Exchanges met with no opposition. A similar object lesson was furnished in the case of the Stock Exchanges. They were all closed, and for a few weeks some profound thinkers in the radical press stated that the country was showing its ability to dispense with them. When the time for their reopening came, however, there was no agitation to prevent it. On the contrary it was hailed as a sign of the resumption of normal financial conditions in the United States.

This evidence that the experience of 1914 has cast a much needed light on the public value of speculative exchanges, gives a further excuse for describing in some detail how the experience was pa.s.sed through by that greatest of all these inst.i.tutions, the New York Stock Exchange.

THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE IN THE CRISIS OF 1914

The New York Stock Exchange

CHAPTER I

THE CLOSING OF THE EXCHANGE

The Stock Exchange is in the second century of its existence and in that long period of time (long relatively to the number of years during which Stock Exchanges have been known to the world) it has been forced to close its doors only twice. The first occasion was the great panic of 1873, the after effect of civil war when trading was suspended for ten days; the second came with the outbreak of the world War in the close of July, 1914. These two remarkable events differ profoundly in the gravity of the circ.u.mstances which brought them about. In 1873, although the financial disturbance was one of the greatest the United States has ever experienced, the trouble was mainly local and did not seriously involve the entire world. The Exchange was not closed in antic.i.p.ation of a catastrophe but was obliged to shut down after the crash had taken place, in order to enable Wall Street to gather up its shattered fragments. The measure of this crisis was the ten days during which trading was suspended.

Far different from these were the circ.u.mstances surrounding July 31st, 1914. On that eventful date a financial earthquake of a violence absolutely without precedent shook every great center of the civilized world, closing their markets one by one until New York, the last of all, finally suspended in order to forestall what would have surely been a ruinous collapse. The four and a half months during which this suspension continued stand to the ten days closing of 1873 in a proportion which fitly ill.u.s.trates the relative gravity of the two historic upheavals.

In the light of these facts we are justified in a.s.serting that the events of 1914 are the most momentous that have so far const.i.tuted the life and history of the New York Stock Exchange, and consequently that some record of, and commentary upon, these facts may be of value to the present members of that body and of interest and profit to its future members.

It is in the nature of panics to be unforeseen, but the statement may be truly made that some of them can be more unforeseen than others.

The panic of 1907 was preceded by anxious forebodings in the minds of many well informed people, whereas the Venezuela panic in 1895, being due to the sudden act of an individual, came out of a clear sky. To the latter cla.s.s distinctively belongs the great convulsion of 1914.

While the standing armies of Europe were a constant reminder of possible war, and the frequent diplomatic tension between the Great Powers cast repeated war shadows over the financial markets, the American public, at least, was entirely unprepared for a world conflagration. Up to the final moment of the launching of ultimata between the European governments no one thought it possible that all our boasted bonds of civilization were to burst over night and plunge us back into mediaeval barbarism. Wall Street was therefore taken unaware, and so terrific was the rapidity with which the world pa.s.sed, in the period of about a week, from the confidence of long enduring peace to the frightful realization of strife, that no time was given for men to collect their thoughts and decide how to meet the on-rushing disaster.

Added to the paralyzing effect of this unheard of speed of action, there came the disconcerting thought that the conditions produced were absolutely without precedent. Experience, the chart on which we rely to guide ourselves through troubled waters, did not exist. No world war had ever been fought under the complex conditions of modern industry and finance, and no one could, for the moment, form any reliable idea of what would happen or of what immediate action should be taken. These circ.u.mstances should be kept clearly in mind by all who wish to form a clear conception of this great emergency, and to estimate fairly the conduct of the financial community in its efforts to save the day.

The conditions on the Stock Exchange, when the storm burst, were in some respects very helpful. Speculation for several years had been at a low ebb, so that values were not inflated nor commitments extended.

Had such a war broken out in 1906, with the level of prices then existing, one recoils at the thought of what might have happened.

Furthermore, the unsettled business outlook due to new and untried legislation had fostered a heavy short interest in the market, thereby furnishing the best safeguard against a sudden and disastrous drop.

This short interest was a leading factor in producing the extraordinary resistance of prices in New York which caused so much favorable comment during the few days before the closing. It were well if ill-informed people who deprecate short selling would note this fact.

During the week preceding July 31st, therefore, in the face of a practical suspension of dealings in the other world markets, the New York market stood its ground wonderfully. The decline in prices, though it became violent on July 30th, showed no evidence of collapse.

There was a continuous market everywhere up to the last moment, and call money was obtainable at reasonable prices. Here was a perplexing problem when the closing of foreign Bourses raised the question of how long we should strive to keep our own Exchange open.

To close the recognized public market for securities, the market which is organized and safeguarded and depended upon as a standard of values, is an undertaking of great responsibility in any community. To take this step in New York, which is one of the four preeminent financial centers of the world, involved a responsibility of a magnitude difficult adequately to estimate. Upon the continuity of this market rest the vast money loans secured by the pledge of listed securities; numberless individuals depend upon it in times of crisis to enable them to raise money rapidly by realizing on security investments and thus safeguarding other property that may be unsaleable; the possessor of ready money looks to it as the quickest and safest field in which to obtain an interest return on his funds; and the business world as a whole depends upon it as a barometer of general conditions.

Add to this the fact that speculative commitments by individuals from all over the world, which have been based upon the expectation of an uninterrupted market, are left in hopeless and critical suspense if this market is suddenly removed, and it becomes apparent that to close the Exchange is manifestly to inflict far-reaching hardship upon vast numbers of people. It is also sure to be productive of much injustice.

In bad times sound and solvent firms are anxious to enforce all their contracts promptly so as to protect themselves against those that are overextended; an obligatory suspension of business compels these solvent firms, in many cases, to help carry the risks of the insecure ones and deprives the provident man of the safety to which he is ent.i.tled.

When such facts as these are duly weighed by the agencies having the authority to close the stock market, it becomes clear that duty dictates a policy of hands off as long as a continuous market persists and purchasers continue to buy as the decline proceeds. This was well ill.u.s.trated in the acute panic of 1907 when an enormous open market never ceased to furnish the means by which needy sellers constantly liquidated, and the possessors of savings made most profitable investments. To have closed the Exchange during that crisis--a.s.suming it to have been possible--would have been an unmixed evil. The violent decline in prices was the natural and only remedy for a long period of over-speculation, and it would have been worse had it been artificially postponed.

Considerations of this general character, up to July 30th, caused the authorities of the New York Stock Exchange to take no action, although the other world markets had all virtually suspended dealings. On July 30th, the evidences of approaching panic showed themselves. An enormous business was done accompanied by very violent declines in prices, and, although money was still obtainable throughout the day, at the close of business profound uneasiness prevailed.

On the afternoon of July 30th, the officers of the Stock Exchange met in consultation with a number of prominent bankers and bank presidents, and the question of closing the Exchange was anxiously discussed. While the news from abroad was most critical, and the day's decline in prices was alarming, it was also true that no collapse had taken place and no money panic had yet appeared. The bankers' opinion was unanimous that while closing was a step that might become necessary at any time, it was not clear that it would be wise to take it that afternoon, and it was agreed to await the events of the following day. Meanwhile, several members of the Governing Committee of the Exchange had become convinced that closing was inevitable and, in opposition to the opinion of the bankers, urged that immediate steps be taken to bring it about. It may seem strange to people outside of Wall Street that the night before the Exchange closed such apparent indecision and difference of opinion existed. It was, however, a perfectly natural outcome of an unprecedented situation.

The crisis had developed so suddenly, and the conditions were so utterly without historic parallel, that the best informed men found themselves at a loss for guidance.

During the evening of July 30th the conviction that closing was imperative spread with great speed among the large brokerage firms. Up to a late hour of the night the President of the Exchange was the recipient of many messages and telegrams from houses not only in New York, but all over the country, urging immediate action. The paralysis of the world's Stock Exchanges had meanwhile become general. The Bourses at Montreal, Toronto and Madrid had closed on July 28th; those at Vienna, Budapest, Brussels, Antwerp, Berlin, and Rome on July 29th; St. Petersburg and all South American countries on July 30th, and on this same day the Paris Bourse was likewise forced to suspend dealings, first on the Coulisse and then on the Bourse itself. On Friday morning, July 31st, the London Stock Exchange officially closed, so that the resumption of business on that morning would have made New York the only market in which a world panic could vent itself.

The Governing Committee of the Exchange were called to meet at nine o'clock (the earliest hour at which they could all be reached, for it was summer and many were out of town) and at that hour they a.s.sembled in the Secretary's office ready to consider what action should be taken. In addition to the Committee many members of prominent firms appeared in the room to report that orders to sell stocks at ruinous prices were pouring in upon them from all over the world and that security holders throughout the country were in a state of panic. It would be hopeless to try to describe the nervous tension and excitement of the group of perhaps fifty men who consulted together under the oppressive consciousness that within forty-five minutes (it was then a quarter past nine) an unheard of disaster might overtake them. It was determined that the Governing Committee should go into session at once as there was so little time to spare. Just as they started for their official meeting room a telephone message was received from a prominent banking house stating that the bankers and bank presidents were holding a consultation and suggesting that the Exchange authorities await the conclusion of their deliberations.

There is an employee of the Exchange whose duty it is to ring a gong upon the floor of the big board room at ten o'clock in the morning.

Until that gong has rung the market is not open and contracts are not recognized. This employee was instructed not to ring the gong until he had received personal orders to do so from the President; a permanent telephone connection was established with the office in which the bankers were conferring, and amid a horrible suspense the outcome of their conference was awaited. For twenty minutes this strain continued. It was a quarter before ten and only fifteen minutes remained in which to act. Meanwhile the brokers were fast a.s.sembling upon the board room floor, orders were piling in upon them to sell at panic prices, ten o'clock was approaching, and although all felt that the opening should not be permitted no one had a word from the Governing Committee as to what was going to be done.

At a quarter of ten, no word having come from the bankers, the receiver of the telephone which had been connected with their meeting place was hung up, and the Governing Committee were called in session to take action. As they took their seats two messages reached them.

One was brought by a prominent member of their body who had gone to the office of the President of the bank Clearing House and had been told by him, after consulting with some of his fellow officers, "We concur; under no circ.u.mstances is it our suggestion, but if the Exchange desires to close, we concur." The other was sent, through a member of the Exchange, from one of the leading bank Presidents who stated that closing would be a grave mistake and that he was opposed to it.

The roll was called and thirty-six out of the forty-two members answered to their names. The Chair having announced the purpose of the meeting, Mr. Ernest Groesbeck moved that the Exchange be closed until further notice. This motion was carried, not unanimously but by a large majority. Mr. Groesbeck then moved that the delivery of securities be suspended until further notice, and, this being carried unanimously, made a third motion that a special Committee consisting of four members of the Governing Committee and the President be appointed to consider all questions relating to the suspension of deliveries and report to the Governing Committee at the earliest possible moment. The third motion, like the second was carried unanimously and the Committee adjourned. It was then four minutes of ten. On the instant that the first motion closing the Exchange was pa.s.sed, word was sent to the ticker operators to publish the news on the tape. In this way the seething crowd of anxious brokers on the floor got word of the decision before ten o'clock struck. Immediately upon the adjournment of the Committee Mr. George W. Ely the Secretary of the Exchange ascended the Chairman's desk in the board room and made the formal announcement, which was greeted with cheers of approbation. The President promptly appointed Messrs. H. K. Pomroy, Ernest Groesbeck, Donald G. Geddes, and Samuel F. Streit to const.i.tute, with himself, the Committee of Five, and the long suspense and anxiety of four months and a half began.

These events, which were crowded into a few feverish hours, and which seemed to those who partic.i.p.ated in them more like a nightmare than like a reality, present some aspects that are especially worthy of detailed description. It is noticeable that the vote to close the Exchange was not unanimous. This shows the immense complexity of a situation, which, even at the last moment, left some two or three conscientious men undecided. It is a fact of profound importance, and one that never should be forgotten by stock brokers or by the public, that the Exchange closed itself on its own responsibility and without either a.s.sistance or compulsion from any outside influence. Many false a.s.sertions by professional enemies of the inst.i.tution have been made to the effect that the banks forced the closing, or that its members were unwillingly coerced by outside pressure. The facts are that the influential part of the membership, the heads of the big commission houses, made up their minds on the evening of July 30th that closing was imperative, and that on the morning of July 31st their representatives in the Governing Committee took the responsibility into their own hands, the bankers having been unable as yet to reach a conclusion.

Immediately after the closing the President of the Exchange visited the prominent bank president who had served notice at the last moment of his disapproval of this procedure. He was found in his office in consultation with a member of one of the great private banking houses.

Both the bank president and the private banker agreed that, in their opinion, the closing had been a most unfortunate mistake. It was an opportunity thrown away to make New York the financial center of the world. The damage was done and would have to be made the best of, but had the market been allowed to open the banks would have come to the rescue and all would have gone well. These gentlemen admitted that the Exchange was to some extent excusable owing to the negligence of the bankers in not notifying them that they were ready to protect the money market.

It may safely be stated that within twenty-four hours after this interview neither the two bankers in question nor any one else in Wall Street entertained these opinions. The rise of exchange on London to $7--a rate never before witnessed; the marking of the Bank of England's official discount rate to 10%, accompanied by a run on that inst.i.tution which resulted in a loss of gold in one week of $52,500,000; the decline of the Bank's ratio of reserve from the low figure of 40% to the paralyzing figure of 14-5/8%; together with the fact that the surplus reserves of our New York Clearing House banks fell $50,000,000 below their legal requirements, were reasons enough in themselves to convince the most skeptical of the necessity of what had been done.

The frightful gravity of the situation which had arisen became clearer and more defined in people's minds a few days after the first of August than it was on the morning of July 31st. European selling had been proceeding for some time before the outbreak of War and in the last few days before closing had been temporarily arrested by the prohibitive level of exchange and the risk of shipment at sea. The American public itself, however, was seized with panic on the evening of July 30th, and on the morning of July 31st brokers' offices were flooded with orders to sell securities for what they would bring and without reference to values. Had the market been permitted to open on that Friday morning the familiar Wall Street tradition of "Black Friday" would have had a meaning more sinister than ever had been dreamed of before.

In all previous American panics the foreign world markets were counted upon to come to the rescue and break the fall. Imports of gold, foreign loans, and foreign buying were safeguards which in past crises had been counted upon to prevent utter disaster. On this occasion our market stood by itself unaided; an unthinkable convulsion had seized the world; panic had spread; even the bargain hunter was chilled by the unprecedented conditions; there were practically no buyers. A half hour's session of the Exchange that morning would have brought on a complete collapse in prices; a general insolvency of brokerage houses would have forced the suspension of all business; the banks, holding millions of unsaleable collateral, would have become involved; many big inst.i.tutions would have failed and a run on savings banks would have begun. It is idle to speculate upon what the final outcome might have been. Suffice it to say that these grave consequences were prevented in the nick of time by the prompt and determined action of the Stock Exchange, and by that alone.

Any decisive step whether right or wrong always finds its critics.

There were a few people who criticised the Exchange for closing too soon and thought that the feeling of panic was increased by this action. These few were mostly converted from their opinions as the situation became clearer. There was a larger number who took the ground that the Exchange had not closed soon enough, and urged that had the step been taken a few days sooner a considerable decline in values would have been prevented. It is strange that the latter critics did not stop to reflect on how great an advantage it was, all through the anxious days of August, to have had the New York market liquidated as far as it could be without disaster, and the level of closing prices relatively low. How vastly greater would have been the task of safeguarding the situation in the face of declining prices in the "New Street Market" had the closing prices on the Exchange been ten or fifteen points higher. The truth is that the Exchange was closed at the very best possible moment. The market was kept open as long as liquidation could safely be carried on (thus immensely diminishing the pressure to be withstood during the suspension) and it was closed at the very instant that a collapse was threatened.