The New Gresham Encyclopedia Part 6

It was a dazzling, but an illusory triumph. The Russians had been deliberately led by the Austrians--under instructions from the German Higher Command--into their hazardous Carpathian adventure as part of the secret preparations for Mackensen's mighty blow elsewhere. Von Falkenhayn, then Chief of Staff, afterwards gave the credit for the plan to the German General Head-quarters. Germany, with all her factories turning out munitions of war far in excess of anything that the Allies could then muster, had been acc.u.mulating guns and ammunition for this purpose for months past, together with poison-gas and liquid fire, and a total force of some 2,000,000 well-armed men. Russia, on the other hand, though she might oppose this force with fully as many men, was coming to the end of her resources, and her troops were ill-equipped to meet the ma.s.sed guns of the artillery brought against them when the German phalanx, after minor thrusts to left and right to cloak the real designs of the German Higher Command, began its overpowering advance on 1st May against the Dunajec lines, where Dmitrieff's Russian army believed itself securely entrenched. Mackensen's guns, opening up a way for the strongest army yet mustered under one general, blew the Dunajec lines to fragments. The Russian infantry clung to their positions to the last moment, but their rifles, often empty, were useless against high-explosive sh.e.l.ls, or the waves of poison-gas which preceded the advance of Mackensen's shock troops.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Map to ill.u.s.trate the German Attack north of Warsaw in February, 1915]

On 5th May, with its front wholly turned, Dmitrieff's shattered army withdrew as best it could from the Dunajec lines to the San River. All Russia's gains in Galicia were destined to be sacrificed in similar fashion. Brussiloff's advance through the Carpathians was at once arrested; by 14th May, when Everts' army on the Nida had also fallen back, all the pa.s.ses had been evacuated, though not without appalling losses. In the Bukovina, however, the Russian army under General Lechitsky maintained a stubborn resistance south of the Dniester until 27th June, when it fell back to the Gnila Lipa. It was high time to retreat. Przemysl had again fallen into Austro-German hands (2nd June) as the first outstanding result of Mackensen's advance; Lemberg followed suit on 22nd June; and Halicz, abandoned by Brussiloff, fell on the day on which Lechitsky's army retreated from the Dniester to the Gnila Lipa. The end of June saw these positions abandoned and a further retreat in progress towards the line of the Lublin-Cholm railway.

Not cheaply were these spectacular triumphs won by the advancing armies of Mackensen and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. Their troops had been twice thrown back on the Dniester before that river had been finally won--a pa.s.sage which cost them, all told, some 150,000 men; and in the successive retreats which followed, the Russian infantrymen turned repeatedly on their pursuers to prove that they were still capable of enforcing a price for every yard of ceded territory.

Mackensen's 'drive' was only part of the German Higher Command's plan for destroying the Russian armies in 1915. While the Austro-German phalanx was thus thrusting its way towards the Lublin-Cholm railway line, a simultaneous movement was in progress in the north, which had for its first objectives the great fortresses of the Polish salient, and Warsaw itself.

Here Hindenburg, who was still in supreme command of the Austro-German forces on the Eastern front, had no longer General Ruzsky opposing him, Ruzsky having handed over the Russian northern command to Alexieff owing to ill-health. No matter how bravely the Russian infantrymen fought, or how ably they were led, they could not stand up against the hurricane of shot and sh.e.l.l which now blasted a path for the fully-equipped armies of von Below, von Eichhorn, von Gallwitz, von Scholtz, Leopold of Bavaria, and von Woyrsch. Prasnysz was won by von Gallwitz after a fierce battle in the middle of July, the Russians retiring to the shelter of the Narew fortresses guarding Warsaw from the north-east. Mackensen's advance to the south was resumed the next day, and the Grand Duke Nicholas, foreseeing the peril of this double threat, realized that his only hope lay in flattening the Warsaw salient and thus shortening his line. This sealed the fate of Warsaw, which was entered by Prince Leopold of Bavaria on 4th Aug.

Ivangorod fell on the following day; Kovno on the 17th; Novo Georgievsk on the 19th. These losses, though deplorable, were not vital while the Russian armies still retained power to retaliate and recoup. Hindenburg strained every nerve to crush them once and for all. Ossowiec fell on 22nd Aug., the Russians resuming their retreat from the Niemen and Bobhr. Brest-Litovsk had already been threatened by the converging movement of Mackensen and Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Seeing no hope of saving it in the face of the continued pressure, the Grand Duke Nicholas evacuated this most easterly of the Polish quadrilateral of forts on the 25th, having previously stripped it, as in the case of the other evacuated fortresses, of all war material.

Hindenburg strove to complete the discomfiture of the main Russian armies by a fresh advance on his extreme left, where von Below was ordered to push through Courland towards Riga, with Petrograd as the ultimate goal in the following year. On this front the Russians had already been forced to relinquish Memel, just across the German frontier, as well as Libau. German naval forces had shared in the operations on the Riga coast-line, and when von Below, after carrying Mitau, some 30 miles from Riga itself, met with prolonged resistance, they made an ill-fated attempt to capture the port from the sea. This was on 18th Aug., when the Russian fleet appeared on the scene while the German naval contingents were attempting to land in flat-bottomed barges at Pernau. The landing forces were annihilated, and the German ships beaten off with a loss of two cruisers and eight torpedo-boats. The Russians only lost an old gunboat in this one-sided action.

The naval operations, however, had little effect on the main issue. Russian fortresses continued for another month to fall like ninepins before the Austro-German armies. Grodno was evacuated at the beginning of September, and though General Everts escaped from Brest-Litovsk with his supplies and guns, he could not hold up Mackensen's irresistible march on Pinsk, even in the Pripet marshes, which were dry at that season of the year. Pinsk was occupied on 16th Sept. Nowhere was the pressure relaxed. In the south, where the flood-tide of the Teutonic advance had never set so strongly, the attack on the Volhynian fortresses had been vigorously opposed by Ivanoff; but Boehm-Ermolli entered Lutsk on 1st Sept., and the Austrians recaptured Brody on the same day.

The vital blow at this stage was being delivered in the north, where von Below, bent on reaching Riga for his winter quarters, was marching on the Dvina lines with the immediate object of crossing that river and turning the whole Russian front as far as Dvinsk. The extreme left flank of the Germans fought desperately for the Dvina crossing at Friedrichstadt, but failed to make it good, and the danger-point shifted towards Vilna, the ten days' battle for which was decided at Meiszagowla on 12th Sept. Though two Russian divisions of the Imperial Guard were brought up to defend this key position, they were powerless to hold it against the great weight of German artillery. With its capture on 12th Sept., Vilna's fall became merely a matter of days. Before the Vilna armies could make good their escape, Hindenburg endeavoured to crown his triumph by outflanking them on both sides, von Eichhorn's cavalry sweeping round from Vilkomir in the north, and von Scholtz pressing forward, though less rapidly, on the southern side of the salient.

[Ill.u.s.tration: The Germanic Slice out of Russian Territory at the end of the Summer Campaign of 1915.]

In this supreme crisis on the Eastern front, Ruzsky, recovered from his illness, returned to his command of the northern battlefields, and signalized his reappearance--not for the first time--by changing the whole complexion of affairs. Reinforcements enabled him in the first place methodically to evacuate the Vilna salient under their protection.

Hindenburg endeavoured to counter this by rushing up cavalry reinforcements, with 140 guns, to support his outflanking thrust in the north, which, reaching Vidzy on the 16th and Vileika on the following day--this being well to the rear of the Vilna armies--threatened irremediable disaster to the retreating Russians. They were saved by the series of flank-guard battles securing their one avenue of retreat, and Ruzsky's counter-offensive from Dvinsk--a stroke so effective that the long German cavalry arm was in itself now in danger of being cut off. Vidzy was recaptured on the 20th; Smorgon, south of Novo Grodek, on the 21st; and Vileika before the end of the month.

On 15th Sept. Lord Kitchener had publicly declared that the Germans had "shot their bolt" on the Eastern front; and, so far as the immediate destruction of the Russian army as a force in being was concerned, this was true, though it was hard to believe while the wide sweep of the German advance was in full force. Ivanoff's reaction was equally marked in the south, where Brussiloff and Lechitsky took von Bothmer and Pflanzer-Baltin by surprise. Before the end of September the Austro-Germans had not only been pushed back to the Strypa, but had also lost both Dubno and Lutsk (23rd).

Germany's great summer offensive was over, but Hindenburg tried hard to secure good winter quarters in the north by a renewed advance on Dvinsk and Riga. A frontal attack was launched on Dvinsk on 3rd Oct. and was a costly failure. Ruzsky had defended Dvinsk with a semicircle of far-flung trenches on the Verdun model, against which the German shock-troops and guns could make practically no progress. After three weeks of vain endeavour Hindenburg shifted the attack to Riga, with no better success and heavy additional casualties. Thrust and counter-thrust succeeded one another with little change in the general situation until the end of November, when, after temporarily securing a crossing at Dahlend Island, south-east of Riga, in the River Dvina, Hindenburg was forced to abandon the attempt as futile. With the help of their fleet the Russians won their way back to Kemmern; and in their counter-offensive from Dvinsk in the same month recaptured Illutsk. All hope was then abandoned by the Germans of taking either Riga or Dvinsk that year. The German effort in the south, below the Pripet marshes, also slackened. Ivanoff not only maintained the ground he had won, but scored several notable victories in the Strypa sector; but both here and along the Styr, where Lechitsky was opposing Bothmer, there was both give and take and nothing decisive--apart from the fact that Roumania was saved by this evidence of Russia's recuperative powers from choosing the wrong side.

In order further to influence the dubious att.i.tude of Roumania, a fresh Russian offensive in the Bukovina was begun in the last days of the year, with Czernowitz as the objective; but as this rightly belongs to 1916 it will be dealt with in our summary of the operations for that year. Though Russia had not succ.u.mbed as a military power under the staggering blows she had received in 1915, she had lost 2,000,000 of her best fighting men, and the _moral_ of her army was never so high again. Falkenhayn has hinted in his _Memoirs_ that the Germans knew that the blind faith of the Russians in their rulers was already shaken before they started Mackensen's 'drive'. It could not be expected to endure in face of the criminal neglect and corruption which every day added to their hardships and losses at the front. The Russian court at that period has been described as a mixture of folly and intrigue, with 'dark forces' at work under pro-German influence, led by the impostor Rasputin. The Grand Duke Nicholas, who was above the treacherous influences now undermining all departments of the Russian system, had been transferred to the command in the Caucasus in the most critical hours of the Austro-Germanic advance, the supreme command of the Russian armies being taken over by the Tsar himself (5th Sept.), with Alexieff as Chief of Staff. The Tsar's motives were above suspicion; but he lacked the efficiency and generalship of the Grand Duke, and stood for a system which, under the searching test of war, was proving itself unworthy of the continued sacrifices of his subjects. The sacrifices were repeated in 1916, but the seeds were already sown of the red harvest which was to lead to Russia's downfall and the end of the Romanoffs.

_The Balkans, 1915_

The progress of German arms in 1915 had decided Bulgaria to throw in her lot with the Central Powers. Her price--fixed by secret treaty with Germany in July of that year--was the whole of Macedonia possessed by Serbia, and other valuable slices of territory. It was not until 12th Oct. that formal war was declared by Bulgaria against Serbia, five days after the fresh invasion of Serbia had begun under Mackensen's leadership, with two Austro-German armies, one under General Koevess, advancing west of Belgrade in a wide flanking movement along the old roads over the Save and the Drina, and the other, under General von Gallwitz, advancing east of Belgrade against the main Serbian forces. Against this new Mackensen 'drive', with fully-equipped forces larger than the whole Serbian army, organized with all the Teutonic thoroughness which marked the same leader's Galician triumph, the Serbians had no chance, though they fought, as ever, with stoic resistance, and exacted a price for every inch of ceded territory. While they were thus stubbornly retreating, Bulgaria threw in two of her armies on the Eastern front, thus threatening, with the advancing Austro-German forces, to enclose them in a wide loop. The tragedy of it was that Serbia's allies were powerless to save her; and that Greece, who by the terms of her treaty with Serbia should have gone to her a.s.sistance as soon as Bulgaria attacked her, declined through King Constantine to do so, notwithstanding the insistent advice of his Prime Minister, M. Venizelos. Convinced, like King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, that Germany was winning the war, King Constantine maintained to the end an att.i.tude which, though he chose to call it neutral, was never friendly towards the Allies. Russia had her hands too full to go to Serbia's aid, and though a Franco-British attempt was made as the net closed round the encircled Serbians, it was too late to save the situation.

The story of the Serbian disaster of 1915, when the fall of Monastir on 2nd Dec. robbed the Serbians of their last stronghold, is that of a desperate flight across the frontier and over the mountains of Albania and Montenegro to the Adriatic. Thanks to the Serbians' heroic efforts, the Austro-German armies had not been able to close the net tight, and though the Bulgarians followed hard on their heels, they could not quite complete their victory.

All told, however, the Serbians lost some 50,000 men, killed, wounded, captured, or starved, in the retreat, together with their guns and equipment. Their aged monarch shared the retreat and succeeded in reaching Brindisi.

Meanwhile the Franco-British force, which, as already related, arrived too late to prevent this final act of the Serbian tragedy, had established a strong base at Salonika, notwithstanding Greek protests on the grounds of neutrality. It was not until 14th Oct. that the combined force, under the leadership of General Sarrail--the British column being commanded by General Mahon--began to move up the Vardar valley, the British advancing on the right towards Lake Doiran, and the French towards Strumnitza. Both forces were soon in touch with the Bulgarians, and fought a number of minor engagements in their forlorn hope of effecting a junction with the hard-pressed Serbians. Besides being too late, however, the Franco-British forces were not strong enough to effect their purpose, and when the remnants of the Serbian army had been forced across the frontier towards the Adriatic, they were themselves attacked by powerful Bulgarian columns.

The object of his expedition having been eliminated, General Sarrail prepared for retreat to his base. The Bulgarians did their best to harry his retirement. They launched a determined attack, which he repulsed with heavy loss; and then endeavoured to isolate the two columns by an a.s.sault on the British force at Lake Doiran. Though some 1300 casualties were sustained in defeating this attack, the British, acting as flank-guard to the French, enabled the retreat to be made jointly. By 13th Dec. the Allied troops, having administered a severe check to the pursuing Bulgarians two days previously, were across the Greek frontier in good order, and in due course had entrenched themselves about Salonika.

With the fall of Serbia came the collapse of Montenegro, in circ.u.mstances considerably less heroic than those which marked the Serbian retreat. The key position of Mont Lovtchen was abandoned to the Austrians with little if any show of resistance, and Cettinje, the capital, similarly entered by the invaders. King Nicholas of Montenegro sought refuge in Paris; Prince Mirko of Montenegro in Vienna.

The Serbian soldiers who survived the great retreat, numbering some 100,000 in all, were met on the Adriatic coast by units of the Italian fleet and transferred to Corfu--to recoup and refit for the later campaigns which were to lead to the recovery of their country.

_Italy, 1915_

Italy, whose warships were thus instrumental in salving the Serbian army, had thrown in her lot with the Allies by declaring war against Austria-Hungary on 23rd May, 1915. Austria had refused to offer adequate 'compensation' for her disturbance of the Balkans; and, moreover, the time had obviously arrived to complete Italian unity. A few weeks previously Italy had signed the Treaty of London, under which the Allies agreed to satisfy most of her territorial ambitions when the time came to share the spoils of victory an agreement which led to some of the most difficult problems in the final peace settlement. To Italy's honour be it added that she joined forces with the Allies when their prospects were none too bright, when they were able to report little or no progress either on the Western front or in Gallipoli, and Austro-German arms, on the other hand, were beginning to carry all before them in Mackensen's great drive in Galicia.

Italy was in no position to throw her whole weight into the struggle in 1915. Though her war strength was reckoned at a million men, her army was ill-equipped with guns, especially with modern heavy artillery and machine-guns, and her industrial resources were wholly inadequate to make good the deficiency. The mountainous frontier which she had to defend, too, gave every advantage to the Austrians. She succeeded in seizing three of the pa.s.ses, the Stelvio, Tonale, and Guidriari, on the east side of the Trentino, and in blocking others on the west side, as the opening moves of her campaign, the object being to secure her flank in the subsequent offensive operations which aimed at Trieste by an advance across the Isonzo. Though these operations succeeded in pinning to the Italian front considerable forces of Austro-Hungarian troops which might have been thrown into the Russian furnace, the Italian effort fell far short of its objectives. General Cadorna, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, won a number of small successes in deploying his Third Army on the right bank of the Isonzo during June and July, securing the bridge-heads at Caporetto--the scene of Italian disaster two years later--Plava, Gradisca, and Monfalcone, thus holding the western bank of the river from Tolmino down to the sea.

But the Italians were now faced with powerful defences, b.u.t.tressed by the Carso Plateau in the south, which could only be carried at that time at prohibitive cost. All attempts to capture these strongholds broke down, and though a footing was gained on the Carso, and slight gains were constantly reported from the Trentino, the operations along the Italian front settled down before the year was out to the give-and-take fighting which characterized the siege operations in the West.

_Western Front in 1915_

On the Western front neither France nor Great Britain was ready in 1915 to undertake any advance comparable with the great offensives of the Central Powers in the East. Russia in her agony complained that France was not doing enough, but all the Allies' efforts this year were crippled by their inability to supply the wholly unprecedented demands for munitions of war.

Great Britain was still struggling months behind to catch up a foe who had been preparing for years. Mr. Lloyd George subsequently related how, in the month of May, 1915, when the Germans were turning out 250,000 sh.e.l.ls a day, most of them high-explosives, Great Britain was producing a mere 2500 a day in high-explosives, and 13,000 in shrapnel. The French, accustomed to supplying the demands of armies on a Continental scale, had naturally done considerably better than this, but even their most strenuous efforts were inadequate to cope with the enormous output of the German a.r.s.enals. Mr.

Lloyd George retired from the Chancellorship of the Exchequer in order to a.s.sume control of the newly created Ministry of Munitions, which in due course more than made good all these defects. That, however, was not in 1915. Up to the end of that year, according to Lord French, "the scanty supply of munitions of war paralysed all our power of initiative, and at critical times menaced our defence with irretrievable disaster".

At the end of the first long winter of dreary trench warfare the British Commander-in-Chief deemed it necessary to undertake an offensive in order to prevent the _moral_ of his army from deteriorating. Hence the battle of Neuve Chapelle, which, begun on 10th March, was fought with a small reserve of ammunition acc.u.mulated for the purpose, and had to be broken off after three days' struggle through lack of further supplies. The troops chosen for the main a.s.sault were Rawlinson's Fourth Army Corps, with the Indian Corps on the right. Following the preliminary bombardment, they quickly overran Neuve Chapelle itself and made 1000 yards progress on a 3-mile front. But to left and right the attacks were held up, and two further days' fighting failed to add to the gains--purchased at the excessive cost of 562 officers and 12,239 men. The total German losses, including 1680 officers and men as prisoners, were estimated as rather higher than this, but the net result, though ranking as a British victory, was admittedly disappointing.

Earlier in the year Lord French had endeavoured to convince Joffre that the proper role for the British army to fulfil was an advance on the extreme north in co-operation with the British navy. Joffre was unsympathetic, though he held out hopes of co-operating in such an advance with the French army at a later date. His plan for the 1915 campaign was to break through the German line from the south at Rheims, and from the west at Arras. To do this he must ma.s.s as many French corps as possible behind these points, meanwhile keeping the enemy busy elsewhere in order to prevent him from reinforcing the threatened positions. This general strategic idea, as Lord French has pointed out, was the foundation of all the Allied efforts in the West throughout 1915. It led to numerous local successes along many parts of the line, but no real advance was made towards the main objectives.

These were not defined until the combined offensive was launched in September.

The Germans themselves, though content to leave to the Allies most of the attacking in the West in 1915, maintained a sufficiently active offensive-defensive. While the French in Alsace were making a fresh advance on Mulhouse at the beginning of the year, they counter-attacked at Soissons, after bombarding the cathedral on 9th Jan. It was only after a week's desperate fighting and heavy French losses--including a bridge-head on the Aisne--that they were checked. In Champagne the French managed to capture Perthes (8th Jan.), and strove valiantly but vainly to wipe out the St. Mihiel salient. The most ambitious effort of the opening months of the year was the British offensive at Neuve Chapelle, which, as already pointed out, failed largely through lack of ammunition. In his report on that battle the British Commander-in-Chief referred to the pressing need of "an almost unlimited supply of ammunition"; and the lack of it was the real explanation of the Allied failure in 1915.

Germany knew well enough how matters stood in this respect, and added ruthlessly to the handicap which their own superior supplies gave them by suddenly attacking with chlorine gas--the first use of poison-gas in the war. This was on 22nd April, following a grim struggle south-east of Ypres for Hill 60, the flattened remains of which, after five days' incessant fighting, remained in British possession. Having been careful beforehand to accuse the French of using poison-gas near Verdun on the 14th--a charge without justification--the Germans launched it in dense volumes from pipes previously laid down for the purpose north-east of Ypres. The attack was preceded by a heavy bombardment, the gas-clouds following at 5 p.m. on the 22nd. The Allied line was held at this point by French Colonial and Territorial troops, with the Canadian Division on their right. All unprotected as they were against this diabolical form of warfare, the French troops, gasping for breath, broke and fled. Many fell asphyxiated.

With a gap in the Allied line 5 miles wide, the Canadians suddenly found their flank left in the air. Less affected by the gas than the French, they were chiefly instrumental in saving the situation by a valiant resistance until reinforcements could be sent to fill the gap.

The gap was evidently wider than the Germans either antic.i.p.ated or realized; otherwise the disaster might have been irretrievable. As it was, the situation remained precarious until the 27th, when a counter-attack in conjunction with the French recovered some of the ground, and a large portion of the sorely tried Canadian Division was relieved by the Lah.o.r.e Indian Division. Altogether seven British divisions were involved in this hard-fought battle, the net result of which was to bring the Germans 2 miles nearer to Ypres on a 5-mile front, and to give the Allies a worse line to hold. Eight batteries of French field-guns were lost and four British guns of position. These last were recaptured by the Canadians, but the enemy had already destroyed them. In all the Allied casualties amounted to nearly 25,000. The Germans estimated theirs at 16,000. In his report on the gas-attack Sir John French declared that protest against this form of warfare would probably be useless, and Lord Kitchener intimated in the House of Lords on 18th May that retaliation might be inevitable.

Respirators more or less effective were supplied to the troops, and the use of poison-gas, followed by liquid-fire--another German innovation--became permanent additions to the horrors of modern warfare.

Before the new battle round Ypres died down--it lasted, indeed, until the end of May--the storm centre shifted to the southern end of the British line, where it joined hands with the French left. Here General French began the battle of Festubert, undertaken to relieve the intense pressure on the troops at Ypres, but also serving as part of Joffre's general plan of attack in the direction of Lens and Lille. British and French alike were launched against the German lines on 9th May, the British taking the offensive between Rougebanc and Givenchy, and the French between Neuville St. Vaast and Notre Dame de Lorette. The renewed struggle for Ypres, however, had drawn heavily on the scanty British reserves of ammunition, and the preliminary bombardment of forty minutes proved wholly inadequate to crush the resistance offered by the enemy's numerous fortified posts when the First Army advanced to the attack. This disastrous engagement, in which the greatest bravery was displayed against overwhelming odds, cost over 12,000 casualties. It achieved nothing in the field, but the lessons which it taught led to the formation of the Coalition Government, with Mr.

Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions. The second stage of the battle of Festubert, which began at midnight on 15th May, was more successful, the enemy's front-line trenches being captured on a front of 3000 yards; but the losses incurred in winning and holding the positions were disproportionately high.

[Ill.u.s.tration: The Ypres Salient before and after the Second Battle of Ypres, 22nd April-13th May, 1915]

The French effort began more auspiciously as a result of the longer and more intense bombardment which preceded their attack on the 9th, but the series of minor successes which they won round Souchez, after weeks of incessant fighting, made little real impression on the defences of Lens.

The truth was that Germany had so expanded her war-material factories that, with the aid of the Austrians, she could turn out sufficient sh.e.l.ls and guns for her main offensive on the Eastern front, and at the same time overweight the Allies in the West.

Throughout the summer the line, though never quiescent, and often breaking out in furious bombardments, minor attacks and counter-attacks, and raids on both sides, remained little altered. The hardest fighting of all was round the war-scarred salient of Ypres, still held, as in the first gas-attack, by the Second Army, to which some of 'Kitchener's Men' were now attached. It fell to this advance-guard of the New Army to bear the brunt of the first attack on the British with liquid-fire, the Germans, who had already used this new device of the _flammenwerfer_ against the French, employing it in another desperate a.s.sault on the British lines round Hooge.

The New Army units fought with almost incredible gallantry, but were blinded by the unexpected, burning sheets of flame, and while they were still blind the enemy charged and took the first-line trenches on a front of some 500 yards. The losses were avenged on 9th Aug., when the 6th Division recovered all the captured positions, and 400 yards of German trench into the bargain.

With the arrival of the reinforcing British divisions of the New Army, General French was able to take over some 17 miles of additional front, the British line thus extending over about 50 miles, with the Belgians on the left holding the remaining 18 miles to the sea. This still left the French army 500 miles to hold, from the British right to the Alps.

The summer of 1915 pa.s.sed away without any great offensive on either side.

The Germans, now at the flood-tide of their sweeping advance against Russia, were content to continue their vigorous offensive-defensive in the West. Besides the fighting already referred to, there was incessant warfare in the Argonne Forest, where the German Crown Prince was noisily active throughout the summer, threatening Verdun, but making no serious advance.

The French continued the deadly trench-to-trench warfare in the Souchez area and the 'Labyrinth' region nearer Arras, and steadily tightened their hold on the reconquered corner of Alsace, consolidating their positions on the Hartmannsweilerkopf, which had been the scene of continuous fighting in the renewed advance towards Mulhouse. For the most part, however, the French, like the British, were now storing up reserves of ammunition and completing their dispositions for the joint offensive planned for the autumn, when the main objects of Joffre's general strategic idea for 1915 were for the first time clearly defined, though unattained.

A great Allied offensive in the West had become increasingly necessary in view of the prestige gained by the Central Powers, not only by their tremendous advance into Russia, but also by the Allies' disastrous campaign in Gallipoli, where the failure of the Suvla Bay landing--subsequently dealt with in our account of the operations against Turkey--had just given the enemy additional cause for rejoicing. Joffre's plan of attack, designed "to drive the Germans out of France", was not ripe for execution until towards the end of September. Even then, though General French had for months been gradually acc.u.mulating troops and ammunition for the blow--the British army now numbering nearly a million men--full strength in both respects was still only half developed.

There were two main a.s.saults in the combined offensive, launched on 25th Sept., 1915, the chief of which was in the French centre in Champagne, where de Castlenau, Joffre's right-hand man, attacked with Langle de Cary's Fourth Army on a 16-mile front between Auberive and Ma.s.siges, the object being to force the Germans back on the Aisne, and, if possible, cut off the army of the German Crown Prince in the Argonne. Second in importance was the Franco-British advance on the same day in Artois, General French's object being to push through between Lens and La Ba.s.see on the north, while Generals Foch and d'Urbal, on his right, stormed the Vimy heights and attacked Lens from the south. Secondary operations were carried out at various other points in order to distract the enemy's attention, feint attacks being made by Sir Herbert Plumer with the 5th Corps--part of the Second Army--east of Ypres, where Bellewarde was temporarily taken; as well as by those units of the First Army occupying the line north of the Bethune-La Ba.s.see Ca.n.a.l. Similar demonstrations were made at Bois Grenier, and along the slopes of the Aubers Ridge, where British and Indian troops alike fought heroically for ground which, though captured in the first onrush, could not be held under the powerful fire concentrated against them.

_Battle of Loos_

[Ill.u.s.tration: Map showing approximately the battle-lines of the First Army under Sir Douglas Haig at daybreak and at nightfall on 25th September, 1915]

The main British attack was delivered by the First Army under Sir Douglas Haig along a front extending from La Ba.s.see Ca.n.a.l in the north to the mining village of Grenay on the south, and is conveniently named the battle of Loos. The task of the 4th Corps (Rawlinson), with the 47th (London Territorial) Division on the right, the 15th (New Army) Division in the centre, and the 1st Division on the left, was to carry, as its first objective, Loos and the heights between Lens and Hulluch. The 1st Corps (Hubert Gough), with the 7th Division on its right, the 9th (New Army) Division in the centre, and the 2nd Division (Horne) on the left extended to the ca.n.a.l, was to link up with the Fourth Army at Hulluch, taking in its stride the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the formidable German fortresses in the Quarries and Fosse 8. Had this general plan succeeded, and the Tenth French Army on the British right advanced in line with it, a great gap would have been made in the German positions in Artois, which, with a similar success from the mightier French blow in Champagne, would at least have brought relief to the hard-pressed Russians in the East, if it did not achieve all that Joffre had hoped for it. As it was, the Allied victory, both in Artois and Champagne, fell far short of its aims, and, save for insubstantial advances, was fruitful chiefly in b.l.o.o.d.y experience.

An intense bombardment for four days preceded the main British advance, and was followed by a gas-attack--used by the British on this occasion for the first time.[2] Many parts of the German defences along the 7-mile front, however, were far from obliterated when the infantry advanced to the attack, especially on the left, where the 2nd Division was held up by impa.s.sable wire defences. The 9th Division had a similar experience on its left wing, where the undemolished defences of the Hohenzollern Redoubt became a veritable shambles. On its right, however, the leading Scottish battalions scored a fine success in reaching Fosse 8. On their right the 7th Division did equally well, capturing the Quarries and reaching Cite St.

Elie, north of Hulluch, though subsequently forced to rest on the Quarries.

In the meantime the 4th Corps, like the 1st, had been repulsed on the left and victorious on the right. Held up on the left by unbroken wire and undamaged German defences, the 1st Division could make no appreciable advance on the Lens-Hulluch road, thus exposing the left flank of the next division in line--the 15th (Scottish). The Scotsmen on their part had made a magnificent advance, first sharing with the Londoners of the 47th Division the honour of capturing Loos, and then rushing on impetuously to Hill 70, and beyond as far as Cite St. Auguste, on the outskirts of Lens.