The Mind of the Child Part 24

Among the subjective changes is, without doubt, the smiling at the image in the tenth week, which was probably occasioned merely by the brightness (Sigismund). Another boy in the twenty-seventh week looked at himself in the gla.s.s with a smile (Sigismund).

Darwin recorded of one of his sons, that in the fifth month he repeatedly smiled at his father's image and his own in a mirror and took them for real objects; but he was surprised that his father's voice sounded from behind him (the child). "Like all infants, he much enjoyed thus looking at himself, and in less than two months perfectly understood that it was an image, for if I made quite silently any odd grimace, he would suddenly turn round to look at me. He was, however, puzzled at the age of seven months, when, being out of doors, he saw me on the inside of a large plate-gla.s.s window, and seemed in doubt whether or not it was an image. Another of my infants, a little girl, was not nearly so acute, and seemed quite perplexed at the image of a person in a mirror approaching her from behind. The higher apes which I tried with a small looking-gla.s.s behaved differently. They placed their hands behind the gla.s.s, and in doing so showed their sense; but, far from taking pleasure in looking at themselves, they got angry and would look no more." The first-mentioned child, at the age of not quite nine months, a.s.sociated his own name with his image in the looking-gla.s.s, and when called by name would turn toward the gla.s.s even when at some distance from it. He gave to "Ah!" which he used at first when recognizing any person or his own image in a mirror, an exclamatory sound such as adults employ when surprised. Thus Darwin reports.

My boy gave me occasion for the following observations:

In the eleventh week he does not see himself in the gla.s.s. If I knock on the gla.s.s, he turns his head in the direction of the sound. His image does not, however, make the slightest impression upon him.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth weeks he looks at his image with utter indifference. His gaze is directed to the eyes in the image without any expression of pleasure or displeasure.

In the sixteenth week the reflected image is still either ignored or looked at without interest.

Near the beginning of the seventeenth week (on the one hundred and thirteenth day) the child for the first time regards his image in the gla.s.s with unmistakable attention, and indeed with the same expression with which he is accustomed to fix his gaze on a strange face seen for the first time. The impression appears to awaken neither displeasure nor pleasure; the perception seems now for the first time to be distinct.

Three days later the child for the first time undoubtedly laughed at his image.

When, in the twenty-fourth week, I held the child again before the gla.s.s, he saw my image, became very attentive, and suddenly turned round toward me, manifestly convincing himself that I stood near him.

In the twenty-fifth week he for the first time stretched out his hand toward his own image. He therefore regarded it as capable of being seized.

In the twenty-sixth week the child is delighted at seeing me in the gla.s.s. He turns round toward me, and evidently _compares_ the original with the image.

In the thirty-fifth week the child gayly and with interest grasps at his image in the gla.s.s, and is surprised when his hand comes against the smooth surface.

In the forty-first to the forty-fourth week, the same. The reflected image is regularly greeted with a laugh, and is then grasped at.

All these observations were made before a very large stationary mirror.

In the fifty-seventh week, however, I held a small hand-mirror close to the face of the child. He looked at his image and then pa.s.sed his hand behind the gla.s.s and moved the hand hither and thither as if searching.

Then he took the mirror himself and looked at it and felt of it on both sides. When after several minutes I held the mirror before him again, precisely the same performance was repeated. It accords with what was observed by Darwin in the case of anthropoid apes mentioned above (p.

197).

In the fifty-eighth week I showed to the child his photograph, cabinet-size, in a frame under gla.s.s. He first turned the picture round as he had turned the hand-mirror. Although the photographic image was much smaller than the reflected one, it seemed to be equally esteemed.

On the same day (four hundred and second) I held the hand-mirror before the boy again, pointing out to him his image in it; but he at once turned away obstinately (again like the intelligent animal).

Here the incomprehensible--in the literal sense--was disturbing. But very soon came the insight which is wanting to the quadrumana, for in the sixtieth week the child saw his mother in the mirror, and to the question, "Where is mamma?" he pointed to the image in the mirror and then turned round, laughing, to his mother. Now, as he had before this time behaved roguishly, there is no doubt that at this time, after fourteen months, original and image were distinguished with certainty as such, especially as his own photograph no longer excited wonder.

Nevertheless, the child, in the sixty-first week, is still trying to feel of his own image in the gla.s.s, and he licks the gla.s.s in which he sees it, and, in the sixty-sixth week, also strikes against it with his hand.

In the following week for the first time I saw the child make grimaces before the gla.s.s. He laughed as he did it. I stood behind him and called him by name. He turned around directly, although he saw me plainly in the gla.s.s. He evidently knew that the voice did not come from the image.

In the sixty-ninth week signs of vanity are perceived. The child looks at himself in the gla.s.s with pleasure and often. If we put anything on his head and say, "Pretty," his expression changes. He is gratified in a strange and peculiar fashion; his eyebrows are raised, and the eyes are opened wide.

In the twenty-first month the child puts some lace or embroidered stuff about him, lets it hang down from his shoulders, looks round behind at the train, advancing, stopping, eagerly throwing it into fresh folds.

Here there is a mixture of apish imitation with vanity.

As the child had, moreover, even in the seventeenth month, been fond of placing himself before the gla.s.s and making all sorts of faces, the experiments with the mirror were no longer continued.

They show the transition from the infant's condition previous to the development of the _ego_, when he can not yet see distinctly, to the condition of the developed _ego_, who consciously distinguishes himself from his image in the gla.s.s and from other persons and their images. Yet for a long time after this step there exists a certain lack of clearness in regard to names. In the twenty-first month the child laughs at his image in the gla.s.s and points to it when I ask, "Where is Axel?" and at my image when asked, "Where is papa?" But, being asked with emphasis, the child turns round to me with a look of doubt. I once brought a large mirror near the child's bed in the evening after he had gone to sleep, so that he might perceive himself directly upon waking. He saw his image immediately after waking, seemed very much surprised at it, gazed fixedly at it, and when at last I asked, "Where is Axel?" he pointed not to himself but to the image (six hundred and twentieth day). In the thirty-first month it still afforded him great pleasure to gaze at his image in the gla.s.s. The child would laugh at it persistently and heartily.

Animals show great variety of behavior in this respect, as is well known. A pair of Turkish ducks, that I used to see every day for weeks, always kept themselves apart from other ducks. When the female died, the drake, to my surprise, betook himself by preference to a cellar-window that was covered on the inside and gave strong reflections, and he would stand with his head before this for hours every day. He saw his image there, and thought perhaps that it was his lost companion.

A kitten before which I held a small mirror must surely have taken the image for a second living cat, for she went behind the gla.s.s and around it when it was conveniently placed.

Many animals, on the contrary, are afraid of their reflected image, and run away from it.

In like manner little children are sometimes frightened by the discovery of their own shadows. My child exhibited signs of fear at his shadow the first time he saw it; but in his fourth year he was pleased with it, and to the question, "Where does the shadow come from?" he answered, to our surprise, "From the sun" (fortieth month).

More important for the development of the child's _ego_ than are the observation of the shadow and of the image in the gla.s.s is the learning of speech, for it is not until words are used that the higher concepts are first marked off from one another, and this is the case with the concept of the _ego_. Yet the wide-spread view, that the "I"-_feeling_ first appears with the beginning of the use of the word "I," is wholly incorrect. Many headstrong children have a strongly marked "I"-feeling without calling themselves by anything but their names, because their relatives in speaking with them do not call themselves "I," but "papa, mamma, uncle, O mamma," etc., so that the opportunity early to hear and to appropriate the words "I" and "mine" is rare. Others hear these words often, to be sure, especially from children somewhat older, and use them, yet do not understand them, but add to them their own names. Thus, a girl of two and a half years, named Ilse, used to say, _Ilse mein Tuhl_ (Ilse, my chair), instead of "mein Stuhl" (Bardeleben). My boy of two and three fourths years repeated the "I" he heard, meaning by it "you." In the twenty-ninth month _mir_ (me) was indeed said by him, but not "ich" (I), (p. 171). Soon, however, he named himself no more, as he had done in the twenty-third and even in the twenty-eighth month (pp.

147-167), by his first name. In the thirty-third month especially came _das will ich! das mocht ich!_ (I wish that, I should like that) (p.

183). The fourfold designation of his own person in the thirty-second month (p. 180)--by his name, by "I," by "he," and by the omission of all p.r.o.nouns--was only a brief transition-stage, as was also the misunderstanding of the "dein" (your) which for a time (p. 156) meant "gross" (large).

These observations plainly show that the "I"-feeling is not first awakened by the learning of words, for this feeling, according to the facts given above, is present much earlier; but by means of speech the _conceptual_ distinction of the "I," the self, the mine, is first made exact; the development, not the origin, of the "I"-feeling is simply favored.

How obscure the "I"-concept is even after learning the use of the personal p.r.o.nouns is shown by the utterance of the four-year-old daughter of Lindner, named Olga, _die hat mich na.s.s gemacht_ (she has made me wet), when she meant that she herself had done it; and _du sollst mir doch folgen, Olga_ (but you must follow me, Olga), the latter expression, indeed, being merely said after some one else. In her is noteworthy, too, the confounding of the possessives "his" and "her,"

e. g., _dem Papa ihr Buch auf der Mama seinen Platz gelegt_ (her book, papa's, laid in his place, mamma's) (Lindner); and yet in these forms of speech there is an advance in the differentiation of the concepts.

All children are known to be late in beginning to speak about themselves, of what they wish to become, or of that which they can do better than others can, and the like. The _ego_ has become an experience of consciousness long before this.

All these progressive steps, which in the individual can be traced only with great pains, form, as it were, converging lines that culminate in the fully developed feeling of the personality as exclusive, as distinct from the outer world.

Thus much the purely physiological view can admit without hesitation; but a further unification or indivisibility or unbroken permanence of the child's _ego_, it can not reconcile with the facts, perfectly well established by me, that are presented in this chapter.

For what is the significance of the fact, that "to the child his feet, hands, teeth, seem a plaything foreign to himself"? and that "the child bit his own arm as he was accustomed to bite objects with which he was not acquainted"? "Seem" to what part of the child? What is that which bites in the child as in the very young chick that seizes its own toe with its bill and bites it as if it were the toe of its neighbor or a grain of millet? Evidently the "subject" in the head is a different one from that in the trunk. The _ego_ of the brain is other than the _ego_ of the spinal marrow (the "spinal-marrow-soul" of Pfluger). The one speaks, sees, hears, tastes, smells, and feels; the other merely feels, and at the beginning, so long as brain and spinal marrow have only a loose organic connection and no functional connection at all with each other, the two _egos_ are absolutely isolated from each other.

Newly-born children with no brain, who lived for hours and days, as I myself saw in a case of rare interest, could suck, cry, move the limbs, and feel (for they stopped crying and took to sucking when something they could suck was put into their mouths when they were hungry). On the other hand, if a human being could be born with a brain but without a spinal marrow and could live, it would not be able to move its limbs.

When a normal babe, therefore, plays with its feet or bites itself in the arm as it would bite a biscuit, we have in this a proof that the brain with its perceptive apparatus is independent of the spinal marrow.

And the fact that acephalic new-born human beings and animal embryos deprived of brain, as Soltmann and I found, move their limbs just as sound ones do, cry just as they do, suck and respond to reflexes, proves that the functions of the spinal marrow (inclusive of the optic thalami, the corpora quadrigemina and the cervical marrow) are independent of the cerebral hemispheres (together with the corpus striatum, according to Soltmann).

Now, however, the brainless living child that sucks, cries, moves arms and legs, and distinguishes pleasure from displeasure, has indisputably an individuality, an _ego_. We must, then, of necessity admit two _egos_ in the child that has both cerebrum and spinal marrow, and that represents to himself his arm as good to taste of, as something to like.

But, if two, why not several? At the beginning, when the centers of sight, hearing, smell, and taste, in the brain are still imperfectly developed, each of these perceives for itself, the perceptions in the different departments of sense having as yet no connection at all with one another. The case is like that of the spinal marrow, which at first does not communicate, or only very imperfectly communicates, to the brain that which it feels, e. g., the effect of the p.r.i.c.k of a needle, for the newly born do not generally react upon that. Only by means of very frequent coincidences of unlike sense-impressions, in tasting-and-touching, seeing-and-feeling, seeing-and-hearing, seeing-and-smelling, tasting-and-smelling, hearing-and-touching, are the intercentral connecting fibers developed, and then first can the various representational centers, these "I"-makers, as it were, contribute, as in the case of the ordinary formation of concepts, to the formation of the corporate "I," which is quite abstract.

This abstract "I"-concept, that belongs only to the adult, thinking human being, comes into existence in exactly the same way that other concepts do, viz., by means of the individual ideas from which it results, as e. g., the forest exists only when the trees exist. The subordinate "I's," that preside over the separate sense-departments, are in the little child not yet blended together, because in him the organic connections are still lacking; which, being translated into the language of psychology, means that he lacks the necessary power of abstraction.

The co-excitations of the sensory centers, that are as yet impressed with too few memory-images, can not yet take place on occasion of a single excitation, the cerebral connecting fibers being as yet too scanty.

These co-excitations of parts of the brain functionally different, on occasion of excitation of a part of the brain that has previously often been excited together with those, form the physiological foundation of the psychical phenomenon of the formation of concepts in general, and so of the formation of the "I"-concept. For the special ideas of all departments of sense have in all beings possessed of all the senses--or of four senses, or of three--the common quality of coming into existence only under conditions of time, s.p.a.ce, and causality. This common property presupposes similar processes in every separate sense-center of the highest rank. Excitations of one of these centers easily effect similar co-excitations of centers that have often been excited together with them through objective impressions, and it is this similar co-excitement extending itself over the cerebral centers of all the nerves of sense that evokes the composite idea of the "I."

According to this view, therefore, the "I" can not exist as a unit, as undivided, as uninterrupted; it exists only when the separate departments of sense are active with their _egos_, out of which the "I"

is abstracted; e. g., it disappears in dreamless sleep. In the waking condition it has continued existence only where the centro-sensory excitations are most strongly in force; i. e., where the attention is on the strain.

Still less, however, is the "I" an aggregate. For this presupposes the exchangeability of the component parts. The seeing _ego_, however, can just as little have its place made good by a subst.i.tute as can the hearing one, the tasting one, etc. The sum-total of the separate leaves, blossoms, stalks, roots, of the plant does not, by a great deal, const.i.tute the plant. The parts must be joined together in a special manner. So, likewise, it is not enough to add together the characteristics common to the separate sense-representations in order to obtain from these the regulating and controlling "I." Rather there results from the increasing number and manifoldness of the sense-impressions a continually increasing growth of the gray substance of the child's cerebrum, a rapid increase of the intercentral connecting fibers, and through this a readier co-excitement--a.s.sociation, so called--which unites feeling with willing and thinking in the child.

This union is the "I," the sentient and emotive, the desiring and willing, the perceiving and thinking "I."

CHAPTER XX.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS.