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"Perhaps so," he replied; "it wants thinking over. But in any case I agree with you so far, that I should never place the Good in Art."
"In what then?"
"I should be much more inclined to place it in Knowledge."
"In Knowledge!" I repeated. "That seems to me very strange!"
"But why strange?" he said. "Surely there is good authority for the view. It was Aristotle's for example, and Spinoza's."
"I know," I replied, "and I used to think it was also mine. But of late I have come to realize more clearly what Knowledge is; and now I see, or seem to see, that whatever its value may be, it is something that falls very far short of Good."
"Why," he said, "what is your idea of Knowledge?"
"You had better ask Wilson," I replied, "it is he who has instructed me."
"Very well," he said, "I appeal to Wilson."
And Wilson, nothing loth, enunciated his definition of Knowledge.
"Knowledge," he said, "is the description and summing up in brief formulae of the routine of our perceptions."
"There!" I exclaimed. "No one, I suppose, would identify that with Good?"
"But"--objected Dennis--"in the first place, I don't understand the definition; and, in the second place, I don't agree with it."
"As to understanding it," replied Wilson, "there need be no difficulty there. You have only to seize clearly one or two main positions.
First, that Knowledge is of perceptions only, not of things in themselves; secondly, that these perceptions occur in fixed routines; thirdly ..."
"But," interrupted Dennis, "what is a perception? I suppose it's a perception of something?"
"No," he said, "I don't know that it is."
"What then? Simply a state in me?"
"Very likely."
"Then does nothing exist except my states?"
"Nothing else exists primarily for you."
"Then what about the world before I existed, and after I cease to exist?"
"You infer such a world from your states."
"Then there is something besides my states--this world which I infer; and that, I suppose, and not merely my perceptions, is the reality of which I have knowledge?"
"Not exactly," he replied, "the fact is ..."
"I don't think," I interrupted, "that we ought to plunge into a discussion of the nature of Reality. It is Good with which we are at present concerned."
"But," said Dennis, "we wanted to find out the connection of Knowledge with Good; and to do so we must first discover what Knowledge is."
"Well then," I said, "let us first take Wilson's account of Knowledge, and see what he makes of that with regard to Good; and then we will take yours, and see what we make of that. And if we don't find that either satisfies the requirements of Good we will leave Knowledge and go on to something else."
"Very well," he replied, "I am content, so long as I get my chance."
"You shall have your chance. But first we will take Wilson. And I dare say he will not keep us long. For you will hardly maintain, I suppose," I continued, turning to him, "that Knowledge, as you define it, could be identified with Good?"
"I don't know," he said; "to tell the truth, I don't much believe in Good, in any absolute sense. But that Knowledge, as I define it, is a good thing, I have no doubt whatever."
"Neither have I," I replied; "but good, as it seems to me, mainly as a means, in so far as it enables us to master Nature."
"Well," he said, "and what greater Good could there be?"
"I don't dispute the greatness of such a Good. I merely wish to point out that if we look at it so, it is in the mastery of Nature that the Good in question consists, and not in the Knowledge itself. Or should you say that there is Good in the scientific activity itself, quite apart from any practical results to which it may lead?"
"Certainly," he replied, "and the former, in my opinion, is the higher and more ideal Good."
"This activity itself of inventing brief formulae to resume the routine of our perceptions?"
"Yes."
"Well, but what _is_ the Good of it? That is what it is so hard for a layman to get hold of. Does it consist in the discovery of Reality?
For that, I could understand, would be good."
"No," he said, "for we do not profess to touch Reality. We deal merely with our perceptions."
"So that when, for example, you conceive such and such a perfect fluid, or whatever you call it, and such and such motions in it, you do not suppose this fluid to be real."
"No. It is merely a conception by means of which we are enabled to give an account of the order in which certain of our perceptions occur. But it is very satisfactory to be able to give such an account."
"I suppose it must be," I said, "but once more, could you say more precisely wherein the satisfaction consists? Is it, perhaps, in the discovery of necessary connections?"
"No," he said, "we don't admit necessity. We admit only an order which is, as a matter of fact, regular."
"You say, for example, that it so happens that all bodies do move in relation to one another in the way summed up in the law of gravitation; but that you see no reason why they should?"
"Yes."
"But ..." began Dennis, who had found difficulty all this time in restraining himself.
"One moment!" I pleaded, "let Wilson have his say." And turning to him I continued: "If, then, the satisfaction to be derived from scientific activity does not consist in the discovery of Reality, nor yet in that of necessary connection, wherein should you say, does it consist?
Perhaps in the regulating of expectation?"
"What do you mean by that?"
"I mean, that it is painful for us to live in a world in which we don't know what to expect; it excites not only our fears and apprehensions, but also a kind of intellectual disgust. And, conversely, it is a relief and a pleasure to discover an order among our experiences, not only because it enables us the better to utilize them for our ends (for that belongs to the practical results of science), but because in itself we prefer order to disorder, even if no other advantage were to be got out of it."
"I don't know that we do!" objected Ellis, "it depends on the kind of order. An order of dull routine is far more intolerable than a disorder of splendid possibilities! Ask the Oriental why he objects to British rule! Simply because it is regular! He prefers the chances of rapine, violent and picturesque, to the dreary machine-like depredations of the tax-collector."