The Marne, 1914 Part 4

THE FRENCH.

Raymond Poincare, president of France

General Ferdinand Foch, French 9th Army

General edouard de Castelnau, French 2nd Army

THE FRENCH.

General Joseph Joffre, French chief of general staff

General Fernand de Langle de Cary, French 4th Army (center). Joffre is at left.

General Charles Lanrezac, commander French 5th Army

THE FRENCH.

General Auguste Yvon Edmond Dubail, French 1st Army

Joseph Gallieni, governor of Fortress Paris

General Michel-Joseph Maunoury

General Maurice Sarrail, French 3rd Army

THE BRITISH.

H. H. Asquith, prime minister of the United Kingdom

Horatio Herbert Lord Kitchener, secretary of state for war, Great Britain (center)

A recruiting poster featuring Lord Kitchener's image

THE BRITISH.

Field Marshal John French, commander-in-chief, British Expeditionary Force

Field Marshal Douglas Haig

Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, British deputy chief of staff

THE BRITISH.

General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, British II Corps

Fort Loncin, Liege, Belgium, November 1918

The library at Louvain

At noon on 1 September, Crown Prince Rupprecht called a meeting of his chief of staff and corps commanders. Krafft von Dellmensingen, as usual, favored offensive operations. La position de Nancy La position de Nancy needed to be taken immediately so that Sixth Army could then break through the Charmes Gap and roll up the flank of the French forces facing Fifth and Fourth armies. To recall the heavy artillery being hauled up to the front would const.i.tute "a definitive admission of defeat." needed to be taken immediately so that Sixth Army could then break through the Charmes Gap and roll up the flank of the French forces facing Fifth and Fourth armies. To recall the heavy artillery being hauled up to the front would const.i.tute "a definitive admission of defeat."48 Oskar von Xylander spoke against Krafft. His I Corps had been badly battered in the advance on Nancy, and he feared that a "drawn-out, costly" siege could lead to the "disintegration" of his corps. The "only viable course was to withdraw." Oskar von Xylander spoke against Krafft. His I Corps had been badly battered in the advance on Nancy, and he feared that a "drawn-out, costly" siege could lead to the "disintegration" of his corps. The "only viable course was to withdraw."49 Karl von Martini of II Corps was at the front and sent his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Franz Stangl, in his stead. Stangl led off with a litany of problems: The corps had sustained heavy losses, especially among the infantry; it lacked heavy artillery; its front was spread too thin and in danger of cracking under a sustained counterattack. Krafft craftily agreed. But the attack had been ordered by the OHL, he noted, and there was nothing he could do about that. Karl von Martini of II Corps was at the front and sent his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Franz Stangl, in his stead. Stangl led off with a litany of problems: The corps had sustained heavy losses, especially among the infantry; it lacked heavy artillery; its front was spread too thin and in danger of cracking under a sustained counterattack. Krafft craftily agreed. But the attack had been ordered by the OHL, he noted, and there was nothing he could do about that.50 The II Corps would just have to mount one final Herculean effort. Ludwig von Gebsattel of III Corps had "vainly" spoken the past week of "making Nancy a present" for King Ludwig III, but he now favored delaying the a.s.sault until his corps could be properly concentrated and the heavy artillery promised by Major Bauer was in place. The II Corps would just have to mount one final Herculean effort. Ludwig von Gebsattel of III Corps had "vainly" spoken the past week of "making Nancy a present" for King Ludwig III, but he now favored delaying the a.s.sault until his corps could be properly concentrated and the heavy artillery promised by Major Bauer was in place.51 Rupprecht, who considered the a.s.sault-especially on the Grand Couronne guarding Nancy-to const.i.tute "an irresponsible, difficult undertaking," readily took up Gebsattel's notion of a delay. The crown prince confided to his war diary that he and Krafft had undergone a "test of nerves" and had both "lost their patience" at the meeting. Rupprecht, who considered the a.s.sault-especially on the Grand Couronne guarding Nancy-to const.i.tute "an irresponsible, difficult undertaking," readily took up Gebsattel's notion of a delay. The crown prince confided to his war diary that he and Krafft had undergone a "test of nerves" and had both "lost their patience" at the meeting.52 The attacks on Bayon and the charge through the Trouee de Charmes were canceled. The great host of 272 guns was to be a.s.sembled before the Grand Couronne. The attack was set for the night of 45 September. Gebsattel's Bavarian III Corps, which had largely been spared the fighting around Nancy and thus denied battle honors,53 would spearhead the a.s.sault. would spearhead the a.s.sault.

"NEVER DO WHAT THE enemy wants for the very reason that he wants it," the great Napoleon had counseled a century before. "Avoid a battleground that he has reconnoitered and studied, and with even more reason ground that he has fortified and where he is entrenched." enemy wants for the very reason that he wants it," the great Napoleon had counseled a century before. "Avoid a battleground that he has reconnoitered and studied, and with even more reason ground that he has fortified and where he is entrenched."54 As is often the case, sound advice grounded in solid history was ignored. The Grand Couronne northeast of Nancy const.i.tutes a plateau scarp that in the north is a mere ridge broken by b.u.t.tes and mesas, but that near Nancy becomes wider and forms "an eastward projecting bastion measuring half a dozen miles from the [Moselle] to its apex." The entire plateau of the Grand Couronne is "breached by transverse stream valleys" As is often the case, sound advice grounded in solid history was ignored. The Grand Couronne northeast of Nancy const.i.tutes a plateau scarp that in the north is a mere ridge broken by b.u.t.tes and mesas, but that near Nancy becomes wider and forms "an eastward projecting bastion measuring half a dozen miles from the [Moselle] to its apex." The entire plateau of the Grand Couronne is "breached by transverse stream valleys"55 and erosion gaps. Attacking infantry from the north and northeast would have to batter their way across the plateau to a.s.sault Nancy. Key to the French defenders was the so-called Pont-a-Mousson Gateway, a broad opening in the Grand Couronne that cut the plateau east to the Moselle. It was protected by two pillars: the Mousson b.u.t.te, to the north, and the Sainte-Genevieve Plateau, to the south. and erosion gaps. Attacking infantry from the north and northeast would have to batter their way across the plateau to a.s.sault Nancy. Key to the French defenders was the so-called Pont-a-Mousson Gateway, a broad opening in the Grand Couronne that cut the plateau east to the Moselle. It was protected by two pillars: the Mousson b.u.t.te, to the north, and the Sainte-Genevieve Plateau, to the south.

As well, the French had carefully prepared the defenses around Nancy-and especially on the ridges of the Grand Couronne. It was one of the many ironies of the war that this work had been ordered by Foch, the apostle of the all-out offensive, after he a.s.sumed command of XX Corps at Nancy in August 1913. The French had left Nancy unfortified because it projected dangerously in front of the line of forts they had constructed in the 1880s through Toul, epinal, and Belfort. Foch obviously thought Nancy worth saving from attack.

Specifically, Foch's engineers had extended the defensive works three kilometers out to the heights of Malzeville. They had studded every approach to the escarpment with forts, artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. They had dug deep trenches across roads and rail beds to slow the enemy advance. They had calibrated every piece of ground for the heavy Rimailho artillery as well as the soixante-quinzes soixante-quinzes. They had concealed much of this firepower in the ravines that dissected the Grand Couronne. Even geography had played into their hands. To the north of Nancy, 150-to 200-meter-high ridges shot straight up from the western banks of both the Meurthe and Moselle rivers, offering defenders a natural bulwark. The fallback position west of Nancy across the Moselle trench was even more formidable: The high plateau of the Forest of Haye in the angle formed by the Meurthe and the Moselle bristled with artillery emplacements and concrete forts. In between lay three water obstacles: the Mortagne River, 8 to 15 meters wide and 1.2 meters deep; the Moselle, 70 to 100 meters wide and between 0.60 and 1.50 meters deep; and the Ca.n.a.l de l'Est, 18 to 22 meters wide and 2.2 meters deep. All three would have to be crossed by the Bavarians after they had seized Nancy.56 French units, refreshed after the Battle of the Trouee de Charmes, were a.s.signed positions around Nancy for the expected German a.s.sault.57 Castelnau deployed four corps of Second Army on the heights north and northeast of the city, with Jean Kopp's 59th Reserve Infantry Division (RID) at Sainte-Genevieve and emile Fayolle's 70th RID at Amance. He then sited half of Pierre Dubois's IX Corps southeast of Nancy behind the Meurthe: emile Brun d'Aubignosc's 68th RID at Saffais, Louis Espina.s.se's XV Corps at Haussonville behind the Mortagne, and Louis Taverna's XVI Corps as well as Louis Bigot's 74th RID near Belchamp. Dubail placed Joseph de Castelli's VIII Corps east of the Forest of Charmes and Cesar Alix's XIII Corps around Rambervillers. Leon Durand's Second Reserves Group (three divisions) was divided among the active units. emile-Edmond Legrand-Girarde's XXI Corps was the last to arrive. Castelnau deployed four corps of Second Army on the heights north and northeast of the city, with Jean Kopp's 59th Reserve Infantry Division (RID) at Sainte-Genevieve and emile Fayolle's 70th RID at Amance. He then sited half of Pierre Dubois's IX Corps southeast of Nancy behind the Meurthe: emile Brun d'Aubignosc's 68th RID at Saffais, Louis Espina.s.se's XV Corps at Haussonville behind the Mortagne, and Louis Taverna's XVI Corps as well as Louis Bigot's 74th RID near Belchamp. Dubail placed Joseph de Castelli's VIII Corps east of the Forest of Charmes and Cesar Alix's XIII Corps around Rambervillers. Leon Durand's Second Reserves Group (three divisions) was divided among the active units. emile-Edmond Legrand-Girarde's XXI Corps was the last to arrive.58 But this formidable concentration was short-lived. Joffre was so confident of Nancy's defenses that between 31 August and 2 September, he continued to strip his forces there to bolster the front around Paris. Unit by unit, Second Army had to surrender Espina.s.se's XV Corps, three brigades of Dubois's IX Corps, Justinien Lefevre's 18th ID, Camille Grellet de la Deyte's 10th CD, and a cha.s.seur brigade. First Army entrained Legrand-Girarde's XXI Corps, bound for Paris.59 It now consisted mainly of Castelli's VIII Corps and Pierre Roques's XII Corps, 167,300 effectives and 5,400 sabers in all. It now consisted mainly of Castelli's VIII Corps and Pierre Roques's XII Corps, 167,300 effectives and 5,400 sabers in all.60 Joffre was no longer interested in tying down Joffre was no longer interested in tying down (fixer) (fixer) German forces in Lorraine, but merely in making a stand German forces in Lorraine, but merely in making a stand (durer) (durer) east of Nancy. east of Nancy.61 By 4 August, Castelnau's Second Army consisted of Taverna's XVI Corps and Maurice Balfourier's XX Corps (nine infantry divisions), Foch's former unit, as well as the reserves (ten infantry divisions), roughly 120,500 soldiers as well as 3,800 cavalrymen and 536 pieces of artillery. By 4 August, Castelnau's Second Army consisted of Taverna's XVI Corps and Maurice Balfourier's XX Corps (nine infantry divisions), Foch's former unit, as well as the reserves (ten infantry divisions), roughly 120,500 soldiers as well as 3,800 cavalrymen and 536 pieces of artillery.62 Still, Second Army alone was superior to the attacking Bavarian Sixth Army. Still, Second Army alone was superior to the attacking Bavarian Sixth Army.

NANCY AND THE GRAND COURONNe.

THE a.s.sAULT ON THE Grand Couronne began a day ahead of schedule, in the heavy, humid night of 34 September. The air pressure caused by the ma.s.sive artillery barrage was so powerful that it blew out the doors at Bavarian I, II, I Reserve, XIV, and XXI corps headquarters. Grand Couronne began a day ahead of schedule, in the heavy, humid night of 34 September. The air pressure caused by the ma.s.sive artillery barrage was so powerful that it blew out the doors at Bavarian I, II, I Reserve, XIV, and XXI corps headquarters.63 In the morning, Crown Prince Rupprecht pushed his right wing north of Nancy along the Saffais Plateau and sent his left against epinal. As well, he ordered Seventh Army to advance on Rambervillers, northeast of epinal. Comprising mostly Landwehr formations, it quickly became bogged down in vicious hand-to-hand combat. Heavy fighting also ensued along the Meurthe River. But the main a.s.sault consisted of a frontal infantry attack on the Grand and Pet.i.t Mont d'Amance, northeast of Nancy, as well as Forts Saint-Nicolas-de-Port and Pont-Saint-Vincent, southeast of Nancy, and Frouard, northwest of Nancy. It was now or never on the In the morning, Crown Prince Rupprecht pushed his right wing north of Nancy along the Saffais Plateau and sent his left against epinal. As well, he ordered Seventh Army to advance on Rambervillers, northeast of epinal. Comprising mostly Landwehr formations, it quickly became bogged down in vicious hand-to-hand combat. Heavy fighting also ensued along the Meurthe River. But the main a.s.sault consisted of a frontal infantry attack on the Grand and Pet.i.t Mont d'Amance, northeast of Nancy, as well as Forts Saint-Nicolas-de-Port and Pont-Saint-Vincent, southeast of Nancy, and Frouard, northwest of Nancy. It was now or never on the Sudflugel Sudflugel.

The desperate nature of the fighting immediately became apparent. At Mandray, a village ten kilometers southeast of Saint-Die, the battle raged from house to house.64 French artillery on the Grand Couronne poured fire on the tight German waves as they attempted to cross the plains below. Cha.s.seurs ferociously defended Mandray at every corner, finally retiring on the church. The soldiers of Eugen von Benzino's Ersatz division blew open its barricaded door. With trumpets sounding the charge, the Bavarians stormed the sanctuary. They set the wooden stairs leading to the steeple on fire. The cha.s.seurs there never had a chance. French artillery on the Grand Couronne poured fire on the tight German waves as they attempted to cross the plains below. Cha.s.seurs ferociously defended Mandray at every corner, finally retiring on the church. The soldiers of Eugen von Benzino's Ersatz division blew open its barricaded door. With trumpets sounding the charge, the Bavarians stormed the sanctuary. They set the wooden stairs leading to the steeple on fire. The cha.s.seurs there never had a chance.

At Maixe, a hamlet of five hundred people on the Marne-Rhine Ca.n.a.l, German reserves took a terrible pounding for fifteen hours from well-hidden French artillery, accurately directed by fliers.65 The Bavarian history of the war recorded, "Soon h.e.l.l broke loose. French heavy and light artillery sh.e.l.ls whistled over our heads with their ear-shattering screams and their shrapnel, and the entire region was soon enveloped in a thick haze of smoke and dust." Even well-dug-in infantry companies were hit hard. "Human torsos and individual [body] parts flew through the air" from wagons that had been abandoned in the village square. "Everywhere there was horror and despair, death and perdition; everywhere, there were wild screams of pain and fear." Horses, as if whipped, ran about in panic, taking with them wagons and artillery caissons. The wounded screamed horribly-and had to be abandoned. The Bavarian history of the war recorded, "Soon h.e.l.l broke loose. French heavy and light artillery sh.e.l.ls whistled over our heads with their ear-shattering screams and their shrapnel, and the entire region was soon enveloped in a thick haze of smoke and dust." Even well-dug-in infantry companies were hit hard. "Human torsos and individual [body] parts flew through the air" from wagons that had been abandoned in the village square. "Everywhere there was horror and despair, death and perdition; everywhere, there were wild screams of pain and fear." Horses, as if whipped, ran about in panic, taking with them wagons and artillery caissons. The wounded screamed horribly-and had to be abandoned.

On 4 September, Sixth Army concentrated its artillery fire on the front along the Meurthe between the Forest of Vitrimont and Courbesseaux, but could not drive the French out. The next day, Rupprecht's gunners shifted their fire to the area northeast of Nancy; roughly three thousand sh.e.l.ls rained down on the Amance heights. Xylander's I Corps fired off a thousand howitzer rounds on 5 September. Day and night the deafening artillery duel continued. Wave after wave of gray-clad Bavarian infantry debouched from the Champenoux Forest under cover of darkness to storm the front of the Grand Couronne-only to be cut down by murderous cross fire from the French 75s concealed on reverse slopes of the Mont d'Amance mesa and the Pain de Sucre b.u.t.te guarding the eastern and southern approaches to the Grand Couronne. Still, the future of la position de Nancy la position de Nancy hung by a thread on the second day of Rupprecht's offensive. hung by a thread on the second day of Rupprecht's offensive.

Castelnau's earlier optimism evaporated. He feared a repet.i.tion of the Battle of the Saar-decimation of Second Army if it stubbornly clung to defending the Grand Couronne. Reports from Durand's reserve divisions and Balfourier's XX Corps revealed that Second Army, recently depleted by Joffre, could not long withstand the Bavarian a.s.sault. At 2:30 PM on 5 September, Castelnau telegraphed the Grand quartier general (GQG): "I cannot depend upon a prolonged resistance." He suggested a "timely withdrawal" behind the Meurthe and Moselle rivers, to the Forest of Haye or to the heights of Saffais and Belchamp-and perhaps even beyond.66 Joffre was not amused. Unlike his German counterpart, he never lost sight of the overall campaign and never gave in to momentary situations, no matter how dire they appeared. Thus, he began his "tres urgent" "tres urgent" epistle to Castelnau at 1:10 epistle to Castelnau at 1:10 PM PM on 6 September with a lecture on strategy. "The princ.i.p.al ma.s.s of our forces is engaged in a general battle [along the Marne] in which the Second Army, too remote from the scene of operations, cannot take part." If Second Army suddenly retreated to the line Belfort-epinal, the two French armies in Lorraine would be separated from each other and defeated piecemeal. If First Army joined Castelnau's retreat, all of Franche Comte, along with its capital, Besancon, and the major fortress Belfort, would be lost and the right wing threatened with envelopment and annihilation. Joffre deemed it "preferable" that Castelnau maintained his "present position" at Nancy "pending the outcome of this battle." on 6 September with a lecture on strategy. "The princ.i.p.al ma.s.s of our forces is engaged in a general battle [along the Marne] in which the Second Army, too remote from the scene of operations, cannot take part." If Second Army suddenly retreated to the line Belfort-epinal, the two French armies in Lorraine would be separated from each other and defeated piecemeal. If First Army joined Castelnau's retreat, all of Franche Comte, along with its capital, Besancon, and the major fortress Belfort, would be lost and the right wing threatened with envelopment and annihilation. Joffre deemed it "preferable" that Castelnau maintained his "present position" at Nancy "pending the outcome of this battle."67 The "little monk in boots" well understood the understated meaning of the term The "little monk in boots" well understood the understated meaning of the term preferable preferable. Incredibly, after the war he would claim that he had heroically resisted Joffre's "order" to abandon Nancy. It became another legend of the Battle of the Marne.

Castelnau dug in. The French right in the area of Rehainviller-Gerbeviller held firm, staunchly defended by Taverna's XVI Corps and Espina.s.se's XV Corps, shattered earlier at Sarrebourg, as well as by Bigot's 74th RID and Charles Holender's 64th RID. The center and the left of the line from the Sanon River to the Forest of Champenoux saw the fiercest fighting, with outposts and villages frequently pa.s.sing from one hand into the other.

The battle for Nancy reached its climax on 7 September. The Bavarians advanced out of the north from the Pont-a-Mousson Gateway and three times furiously stormed the north front of the Grand Couronne with flags unfurled and bands playing. The village of Sainte-Genevieve and the Mont Toulon ridge commanding the southern side of the gateway witnessed brutal bayonet charges throughout the night. If they could be taken, the way would be opened for the Bavarians to march up the Moselle to Nancy, storm the vital Mont d'Amance defensive works from the rear, and shatter the entire French defensive network on the Moselle Plateau.68 The German a.s.sault almost worked. Several units from 314th IR of General Kopp's French 59th RID accidentally abandoned Sainte-Genevieve, nicknamed the "Hole of Death" by its defenders.69 But by 8 September, the French had retaken the village, thanks in large measure to the gallant counterattacks of Balfourier's XX Corps and the fact that the Bavarians had not detected the French withdrawal. More than eighty-two hundred German dead littered the battlefield; Baden XIV Corps suffered ten thousand casualties. The forests around Nancy had seen desperate bayonet charges. At one place, in the dark of night two Bavarian soldiers of Gebsattel's III Corps had bayoneted each other; next morning a patrol found their bodies thus "nailed" to two trees. But by 8 September, the French had retaken the village, thanks in large measure to the gallant counterattacks of Balfourier's XX Corps and the fact that the Bavarians had not detected the French withdrawal. More than eighty-two hundred German dead littered the battlefield; Baden XIV Corps suffered ten thousand casualties. The forests around Nancy had seen desperate bayonet charges. At one place, in the dark of night two Bavarian soldiers of Gebsattel's III Corps had bayoneted each other; next morning a patrol found their bodies thus "nailed" to two trees.70 General von Gebsattel had finally experienced the battle he'd yearned for so desperately. It was not at all the glorious venture that he had imagined. His corps had advanced into an "undoubtedly cleverly prepared battlefield" studded with "far-ranging French guns." Bavarian artillery had been unable to gain any "significant advantage" because its spotters could not detect the sources of hostile fire. Each night, the enemy had moved its units from one "well prepared position into another." His own infantry had been unable to close with the French. "Everywhere trenches and advance guards and rear-echelon reinforcements."71 It was siege-style warfare at its worst. It was siege-style warfare at its worst.

Violent fighting also occurred in the Forest of Champenoux. Kopp's 59th RID and d'Aubignosc's 68th RID were hard-pressed between its ridges. Rupprecht drove his troops on to encircle them. Castelnau wavered again-in part no doubt enervated by the news that his son had died in battle several days earlier at Morhange. Joffre called to rally Second Army. "I will try to hold out where I am," Castelnau responded. But the prospect was not bright. "I feel that my army will be lost." He again suggested "retreating immediately behind the Moselle." And again, Joffre demurred. "Do nothing of the kind. Wait twenty-four hours. You do not know how things are going with the enemy. He is probably no better off than you are." Joffre's Order of the Day was blunt: "You must not abandon the Grand Couronne, and I formally order you to hold your present positions."72 Again, Castelnau dug in. More, on 10 September, amid thunder and rain, he ordered an "energetic" attack by 59th RID and 68th RID in the Forest of Champenoux and on La Bouzule, northeast of Nancy, by Taverna's XVI Corps eastward out of Belchamp against Luneville, and by Balfourier's XX Corps against Remereville.73 Ever so slowly, French pressure began to take its toll. German artillery, bound to rail beds due to the lack of draft animals, was too inflexible to support infantry charges. The French 75s, on the other hand, were highly mobile and able to move up with the infantry. By the next day, French fliers reported the Germans abandoning Luneville, leaving behind huge stores of arms and ammunition as well as countless wounded in field hospitals. Second Army pushed forward-into Fraimbois, Remereville, Nomeny, and Pont-a-Mousson. French cavalry rode virtually uncontested into Einville-au-Jard, Serres, and Morville-sur-Seille. Dubail's First Army advanced northward into abandoned ground. The line of the Meurthe had been secured and Nancy spared occupation. Ever so slowly, French pressure began to take its toll. German artillery, bound to rail beds due to the lack of draft animals, was too inflexible to support infantry charges. The French 75s, on the other hand, were highly mobile and able to move up with the infantry. By the next day, French fliers reported the Germans abandoning Luneville, leaving behind huge stores of arms and ammunition as well as countless wounded in field hospitals. Second Army pushed forward-into Fraimbois, Remereville, Nomeny, and Pont-a-Mousson. French cavalry rode virtually uncontested into Einville-au-Jard, Serres, and Morville-sur-Seille. Dubail's First Army advanced northward into abandoned ground. The line of the Meurthe had been secured and Nancy spared occupation.74 Castelnau was promoted Castelnau was promoted grand-officier de la Legion d'honneur grand-officier de la Legion d'honneur on 18 September 1914. on 18 September 1914.

The Battle of the Grand Couronne was as great a defeat for the Germans as Morhange had been for the French. There would be no triumphant entry into Nancy. There would be no breakthrough across the Moselle. There would be no small Cannae between Toul and Belfort. Instead, the Germans had suffered their first true setback in 1914. And the butcher's bill was savage. While neither side cared (or dared) to publish official figures, several unit diaries allow at least a glimpse into the frightful slaughter. On 11 September, Bavarian 14th IR lost a thousand men while retreating. Over the past week, 10th IR had suffered 70 percent casualties and 13th IR, around 50 percent. The Forest of Fraimbois was littered with the corpses of half-starved men and horses.

On the German southern left flank, Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, commanding 30th Division, XV Army Corps, wrote his wife that his troops were also withdrawing. He was delighted at finally being able to leave what he called "the pigsty epinal." The battlefield was littered with the dead, stripped of valuables and some even of clothing. "The woods are full of corpses," he wrote. "The French dead lie in their trenches [packed] like sardines. The smell is so putrid that at [Saint-] Benoit the French built a bonfire to burn their dead."75 WHAT HAD HAPPENED to the German a.s.sault? It had hardly been a "complete vindication of German tactical doctrine and training," as a recent book on the Battle of the Frontiers claims. to the German a.s.sault? It had hardly been a "complete vindication of German tactical doctrine and training," as a recent book on the Battle of the Frontiers claims.76 Apart from the fact that Rupprecht and Krafft von Dellmensingen had ordered a frontal infantry attack against a heavily fortified city without days of preliminary artillery bombardment, other areas of the front had demanded the OHL's immediate attention. Already by the second day of the offensive against the Grand Couronne, rumors of British landings on the Continent caused panic in Luxembourg. Moltke decided at once to create a new northern army, to remove General von Heeringen from the south to command it, and to a.s.sign one corps each from Sixth Army (Xylander's I Corps) and Seventh Army (Bertold von Deimling's XV Corps) to the new formation. He ordered Rupprecht to dispatch Ernst von Heydebreck's 7th CD as well. To the horror of his royal superior, Heeringen released XV Corps without asking or even informing Rupprecht. Apart from the fact that Rupprecht and Krafft von Dellmensingen had ordered a frontal infantry attack against a heavily fortified city without days of preliminary artillery bombardment, other areas of the front had demanded the OHL's immediate attention. Already by the second day of the offensive against the Grand Couronne, rumors of British landings on the Continent caused panic in Luxembourg. Moltke decided at once to create a new northern army, to remove General von Heeringen from the south to command it, and to a.s.sign one corps each from Sixth Army (Xylander's I Corps) and Seventh Army (Bertold von Deimling's XV Corps) to the new formation. He ordered Rupprecht to dispatch Ernst von Heydebreck's 7th CD as well. To the horror of his royal superior, Heeringen released XV Corps without asking or even informing Rupprecht.77 And when Lieutenant Colonel Tappen demanded the immediate transfer of two corps from Lorraine to east of Paris on 5 September, Krafft von Dellmensingen became despondent. "For us, the entire matter is most unfortunate. If that occurs [removal of the two corps], we will never overcome this pa.s.sivity." And when Lieutenant Colonel Tappen demanded the immediate transfer of two corps from Lorraine to east of Paris on 5 September, Krafft von Dellmensingen became despondent. "For us, the entire matter is most unfortunate. If that occurs [removal of the two corps], we will never overcome this pa.s.sivity."78 Crown Prince Rupprecht once more lectured the OHL that any withdrawal from Nancy now would be "highly detrimental to the morale of the troops." Crown Prince Rupprecht once more lectured the OHL that any withdrawal from Nancy now would be "highly detrimental to the morale of the troops."79 Wilhelm II arrived at Bavarian headquarters at this critical moment. He a.s.sured Rupprecht that he would personally "inhibit" any withdrawal of forces from Sixth Army. More, the pressure on the French from German Fourth and Fifth armies to the north would make itself felt within two to three days, with the result that "the enemy will be forced to give up [the battle] along the line of the Mosel."80 But Rupprecht had lost all confidence in the kaiser's role as Supreme War Lord. He was shocked by what he termed Wilhelm II's "cra.s.s dilettantism" and "deficient knowledge" of the situation at the front. But Rupprecht had lost all confidence in the kaiser's role as Supreme War Lord. He was shocked by what he termed Wilhelm II's "cra.s.s dilettantism" and "deficient knowledge" of the situation at the front.81 Rupprecht received more bad news from an irate General Ludwig von Sieger, chief of field munitions, who had arrived at Dieuze on 6 September to put an end to what he considered to be Sixth Army's "wasteful" expenditure of sh.e.l.ls. Sieger now threatened to remove some of Rupprecht's heavy artillery if the attack on Nancy continued to stall. Before leaving Luxembourg, Sieger had mean-spiritedly barked at the Bavarian military plenipotentiary: "If they refuse to attack they hardly need that many artillery pieces."82 And when Sieger on 8 September diverted six munitions trains bound for Sixth Army to Fifth Army-that is, from the Bavarian to the Prussian crown prince-royal relations reached their nadir. Rupprecht, "extremely angry," threatened to resign. Krafft agreed that this was yet another example of "haughty, brutal and encroaching Prussianism," And when Sieger on 8 September diverted six munitions trains bound for Sixth Army to Fifth Army-that is, from the Bavarian to the Prussian crown prince-royal relations reached their nadir. Rupprecht, "extremely angry," threatened to resign. Krafft agreed that this was yet another example of "haughty, brutal and encroaching Prussianism,"83 but pleaded for his chief to remain at his post, citing the devastating impact that such a step would have both at home and abroad. Rupprecht agreed-on condition that he get an accounting from the OHL. but pleaded for his chief to remain at his post, citing the devastating impact that such a step would have both at home and abroad. Rupprecht agreed-on condition that he get an accounting from the OHL.

Krafft von Dellmensingen knew that the action against Nancy had unraveled and that the Bavarians would be blamed for the failure. He therefore penned a lengthy memorandum for posterity. Therein, he stressed the issue of troop morale. "Abandonment of the attack is a heavy moral blow for which we we will will not not take responsibility." He crowed that he had not "fallen" into Sieger's "trap" by having the Bavarians concede failure. "The OHL take responsibility." He crowed that he had not "fallen" into Sieger's "trap" by having the Bavarians concede failure. "The OHL all by itself must all by itself must shoulder the responsibility for the entire idiocy of this on-again and off-again with regard to besieging Nancy." shoulder the responsibility for the entire idiocy of this on-again and off-again with regard to besieging Nancy."84 He deplored how much modern warfare had degenerated in just one month. "This trench-and siege war is horrible!" He deplored how much modern warfare had degenerated in just one month. "This trench-and siege war is horrible!"85 It reminded Rupprecht of another conflict-the Russo-j.a.panese War (190405). It reminded Rupprecht of another conflict-the Russo-j.a.panese War (190405).

There remained one final act to be played out in the tragicomic opera that was Lorraine. Crown Prince Rupprecht traveled to Luxembourg to appeal his case to Moltke and Tappen. Neither was willing to order the heir of the Reich's second largest kingdom to break off the a.s.sault on Nancy. Instead, they simply steered him toward that decision by restricting his supply of artillery sh.e.l.ls. Moltke slyly informed Rupprecht to his "great surprise" that he could "proceed with the attack"-just as long as he suspended all other offensives, that he used his ammunition sparingly, and that he agreed to return all heavy artillery within six to nine days.86 That very moment, without informing Rupprecht, the last of the OHL's emissaries was on his way to Sixth Army headquarters. Major Erich von Redern, Tappen's chief of staff, painted a bleak picture of the war for Krafft. Russian units from Archangel had arrived in Britain and were on their way to northern France. "Hindus from India" had landed in southern France and likewise were headed for the front. To combat them, the OHL needed to draw down its forces in Lorraine. "It would be preferable," Redern stated, for Sixth Army "to break off contact with the enemy east of the Mosel" and to "recall" those units. Some could be redeployed to secure the line Metz-Strasbourg; the rest would be sent north. "The operations" at Nancy, Redern allowed, "had reached a dead point."87 Upper Alsace was to be evacuated so that the Rhine Valley could be held. Krafft had no option but to call off the attack on the Grand Couronne. And to send Bavarian I Corps up north as requested. Upper Alsace was to be evacuated so that the Rhine Valley could be held. Krafft had no option but to call off the attack on the Grand Couronne. And to send Bavarian I Corps up north as requested.

One can only imagine Rupprecht's bitterness when, upon his return from Luxembourg, Krafft apprised him of the gist of Redern's instructions. In an angry telephone call from Dieuze to Luxembourg, Rupprecht demanded to know which advice to follow, Redern's or Tappen's? This brought a final piece of obfuscation: Redern's directives were valid, but Rupprecht could continue the a.s.sault on Nancy!88 A disillusioned Rupprecht formally suspended operations against Nancy. "They have totally lost control of their nerves at the OHL," he noted in his war diary. A disillusioned Rupprecht formally suspended operations against Nancy. "They have totally lost control of their nerves at the OHL," he noted in his war diary.89 He then ordered the bridges over the Meurthe River and all rail and communications centers destroyed. He then ordered the bridges over the Meurthe River and all rail and communications centers destroyed.

THE BATTLE OF THE Frontiers in Lorraine ended in bitter recriminations (that were to last through the postwar period). Moltke's staff convinced themselves that Sixth Army had allowed Joffre to "dupe it" into believing that far greater numbers of French forces opposed them than in actuality; that Sixth Army simply had lacked the will to advance; and that by his "inaction" Rupprecht had brought great stress to the armies north of him. "As punishment for this incompetence," the OHL decreed, "Sixth Army needed to be disbanded." Frontiers in Lorraine ended in bitter recriminations (that were to last through the postwar period). Moltke's staff convinced themselves that Sixth Army had allowed Joffre to "dupe it" into believing that far greater numbers of French forces opposed them than in actuality; that Sixth Army simply had lacked the will to advance; and that by his "inaction" Rupprecht had brought great stress to the armies north of him. "As punishment for this incompetence," the OHL decreed, "Sixth Army needed to be disbanded."90 The Bavarians rose to the occasion in kind. Krafft von Dellmensingen decried the lack of clear direction from the OHL in general, and from Tappen in particular. He repeated his earlier accusation that Tappen had been nothing more than a "cipher" whom Erich Ludendorff had chosen as his successor "to keep the seat warm" at the Second Section for his return.91 General von Wenninger stuck a dagger in the heart of the federal structure of the German army when he spoke of the unfortunate "anti-Bavarian" General von Wenninger stuck a dagger in the heart of the federal structure of the German army when he spoke of the unfortunate "anti-Bavarian" Kollegium Kollegium that dictated operations: Tappen was a Prussian, Hentsch a Saxon, and Groener a Wurttemberger. that dictated operations: Tappen was a Prussian, Hentsch a Saxon, and Groener a Wurttemberger.92 The price for the command chaos in Lorraine was b.l.o.o.d.y stalemate. It was paid by the troops. While there never was a precise calculation of losses for the German armies in Alsace and Lorraine, Bavarian army historian Karl Deuringer "guesstimated" total casualties for the infantry at 60 percent and those killed at 15 percent. Since the Germans deployed fifty infantry brigades (three hundred thousand soldiers) in the area of the most violent battles between Pont-a-Mousson and Markirch, Deuringer calculated sixty-six thousand men killed or wounded, with seventeen thousand paying the ultimate price.93 Given the savage nature of the fighting, one can hardly expect French losses to have been less. Given the savage nature of the fighting, one can hardly expect French losses to have been less.94 The German army's official ten-day medical reports (Sanitatsberichte) (Sanitatsberichte) bear out Deuringer's findings. For Sixth Army, they set the casualty figure for August at 34,598-almost the size of a fully mobilized army corps-and the number of dead at 11,476. For September, half of which Sixth Army spent in transit from Lorraine to Belgium, the casualty total remains high at 28,957 (including 6,687 killed). bear out Deuringer's findings. For Sixth Army, they set the casualty figure for August at 34,598-almost the size of a fully mobilized army corps-and the number of dead at 11,476. For September, half of which Sixth Army spent in transit from Lorraine to Belgium, the casualty total remains high at 28,957 (including 6,687 killed).95 Most of this is due to the intense fighting around the Grand Couronne. Surprisingly, given that it was half the strength of Rupprecht's Sixth Army, Heeringen's Seventh Army suffered equally in terms of raw numbers: 32,054 casualties (10,328 killed) in August and 31,887 (10,384 killed) in September. On a percentage basis, Heeringen's unit of "weekend warriors" lost 70 percent of its original mobilized strength killed or missing in August, compared with 50 percent for Rupprecht's regulars. Most of this is due to the intense fighting around the Grand Couronne. Surprisingly, given that it was half the strength of Rupprecht's Sixth Army, Heeringen's Seventh Army suffered equally in terms of raw numbers: 32,054 casualties (10,328 killed) in August and 31,887 (10,384 killed) in September. On a percentage basis, Heeringen's unit of "weekend warriors" lost 70 percent of its original mobilized strength killed or missing in August, compared with 50 percent for Rupprecht's regulars.96 The Battle of the Frontiers in Lorraine had been central to neither the German nor the French deployment plan. It had simply gathered momentum and taken on a life of its own, at one time absorbing almost one-third of the forces on either side. Joffre had spied a chance for a frontal breakthrough of the Moselstellung Moselstellung between Metz and Thionville, with hopes of thereafter rolling up the German left wing and falling into the flank of Wilhelm's Fifth Army around Verdun. When that offensive failed, Moltke, for his part, had sought a German breakthrough of the Trouee de Charmes between Toul and epinal, with hopes of a follow-up drive north against French Third and Fourth armies east of Vitry-le-Francois. Both designs failed to reach their objectives, and by early September the front in Lorraine had degenerated into trench warfare. Both Rupprecht and Heeringen had been rea.s.signed to command newly const.i.tuted armies in northern France and Belgium. The southern flank was divided into a host of third-rate army detachment commands. The main decision would have to come elsewhere. between Metz and Thionville, with hopes of thereafter rolling up the German left wing and falling into the flank of Wilhelm's Fifth Army around Verdun. When that offensive failed, Moltke, for his part, had sought a German breakthrough of the Trouee de Charmes between Toul and epinal, with hopes of a follow-up drive north against French Third and Fourth armies east of Vitry-le-Francois. Both designs failed to reach their objectives, and by early September the front in Lorraine had degenerated into trench warfare. Both Rupprecht and Heeringen had been rea.s.signed to command newly const.i.tuted armies in northern France and Belgium. The southern flank was divided into a host of third-rate army detachment commands. The main decision would have to come elsewhere.

THE INABILITIES OF C CROWN Prince Rupprecht, Crown Prince Wilhelm, and Max von Hausen to achieve their small Cannaes, combined with Bulow's inexplicable failure to pursue Lanrezac's badly knocked Fifth Army after Saint-Quentin, shifted the German center of gravity back to its original axis: First Army driving on Paris. Neither Alexander von Kluck nor his chief of staff, Hermann von Kuhl, was in high spirits at the end of August. Although as a reward for Le Cateau, Moltke on 27 August had restored First Army's independence, Kluck and Kuhl resented Bulow's constant demands for accountability, his ceaseless cries for a.s.sistance, and his petty reminders to maintain contact on the flanks. Twice-at Mons and at Le Cateau-they had allowed the British to elude them. In disgust, Kuhl, fearing that First Army might be pulled apart in an endless pursuit, decided to let the BEF go wherever it wanted on its southwesterly trajectory. Prince Rupprecht, Crown Prince Wilhelm, and Max von Hausen to achieve their small Cannaes, combined with Bulow's inexplicable failure to pursue Lanrezac's badly knocked Fifth Army after Saint-Quentin, shifted the German center of gravity back to its original axis: First Army driving on Paris. Neither Alexander von Kluck nor his chief of staff, Hermann von Kuhl, was in high spirits at the end of August. Although as a reward for Le Cateau, Moltke on 27 August had restored First Army's independence, Kluck and Kuhl resented Bulow's constant demands for accountability, his ceaseless cries for a.s.sistance, and his petty reminders to maintain contact on the flanks. Twice-at Mons and at Le Cateau-they had allowed the British to elude them. In disgust, Kuhl, fearing that First Army might be pulled apart in an endless pursuit, decided to let the BEF go wherever it wanted on its southwesterly trajectory.

But could the German right wing in general and First Army in particular still achieve the primary mission? Alfred von Schlieffen had demanded a ratio of 7:1 between the German right and left wings, and Moltke still one of 3:1. The reality at the end of August 1914 was that while the left flank in Alsace-Lorraine (Sixth and Seventh armies) had a strength of 331,597 men, the right flank in northern France (First and Second armies) had just 372,240, or about one corps more. What was now the German center in the Ardennes and the Argonne (Third, Fourth, and Fifth armies) was greatest at 474,050 soldiers.97 With specific reference to the critical pivot wing, during the initial battles of the war the With specific reference to the critical pivot wing, during the initial battles of the war the Schwenkungsflugel Schwenkungsflugel (First, Second, and Third armies) had enjoyed an advantage of 100 infantry battalions and 175 artillery batteries over French Fifth Army and the BEF; by the time it reached the Marne, that ratio had been reversed, with the French left wing (Ninth, Fifth, and Sixth armies) superior to the German right wing (First and Second armies, and half of Third Army) by 200 battalions of infantry and 190 batteries of artillery. (First, Second, and Third armies) had enjoyed an advantage of 100 infantry battalions and 175 artillery batteries over French Fifth Army and the BEF; by the time it reached the Marne, that ratio had been reversed, with the French left wing (Ninth, Fifth, and Sixth armies) superior to the German right wing (First and Second armies, and half of Third Army) by 200 battalions of infantry and 190 batteries of artillery.98 More, First Army was no longer the "strike" force that it had been at the start of the campaign, when it had put 217,384 men and 748 guns in the field. By the end of the month, it had lost 2,863 killed or missing, 7,869 wounded, and 9,248 ill.99 The large number in the latter category was due to heat exhaustion, sunstroke, foot sores, and hunger. Most corps were down to half of their full strength by early September. And the farther First Army advanced, the more its supplies lagged behind. By 4 September, its railhead at Chauny was 140 kilometers behind the fighting front. Its motor transport companies had been driven so hard that 60 percent of their wood-rimmed trucks had broken down by the time First Army reached the Marne. There were on hand far fewer than the 924 fodder wagons required to haul two million pounds of hay and oats daily to its eighty-four thousand horses. The large number in the latter category was due to heat exhaustion, sunstroke, foot sores, and hunger. Most corps were down to half of their full strength by early September. And the farther First Army advanced, the more its supplies lagged behind. By 4 September, its railhead at Chauny was 140 kilometers behind the fighting front. Its motor transport companies had been driven so hard that 60 percent of their wood-rimmed trucks had broken down by the time First Army reached the Marne. There were on hand far fewer than the 924 fodder wagons required to haul two million pounds of hay and oats daily to its eighty-four thousand horses.100 And given that the German army had gone to war with its reserves (Landwehr and Ersatz) in the line, it would be weeks if not months before suitable replacements were ready to fill the manpower holes. Leaving II Corps to besiege Antwerp and VII Reserve Corps to invest Maubeuge had further reduced First Army's combat strength to just 174,000 "rifles." And given that the German army had gone to war with its reserves (Landwehr and Ersatz) in the line, it would be weeks if not months before suitable replacements were ready to fill the manpower holes. Leaving II Corps to besiege Antwerp and VII Reserve Corps to invest Maubeuge had further reduced First Army's combat strength to just 174,000 "rifles."

The soldiers of First Army were spent: tired, hungry, thirsty, and wounded. They had marched five hundred kilometers, often as much as thirty or forty per day, in searing heat. They had fought major battles with the British as well as with French rear guards. "Our men are done up," one of Kluck's infantry commanders noted. "They stagger forward, their faces coated with dust, their uniforms in rags. They look like living scarecrows." They sang as they marched, mainly to keep from falling asleep. "They drink to excess but this drunkenness keeps them going."101 Walter Bloem, a company commander with 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers, wrote likewise of his men. Walter Bloem, a company commander with 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers, wrote likewise of his men.

Unshaved, and scarcely washed at all for days ... faces covered with a scrubbly beard, they look like prehistoric savages. Their coats were covered with dust and spattered with blood from bandaging the wounded, blackened with powder-smoke, and torn threadbare by thorns and barbed wire.102 All Kluck could offer them were more forced marches. Paris was but sixty kilometers away.

The closer the German "strike" armies approached Fortress Paris, the more critical it became to coordinate their advance. Nothing of the sort happened. In fact, silence descended over the German front. The OHL at Luxembourg did not receive a single communication from either First or Second army on 1 September. Nor did it receive any news from either unit on 2 September. All it knew was that the two armies had generally changed from a southwesterly to a southerly direction of pursuit.

Around suppertime on 1 September, Moltke had dashed off a terse note to Kluck: "What is your situation? Request immediate reply."103 No reply. During the afternoon of 2 September, the OHL intercepted a message from Second Army to First Army, informing the latter that the enemy was "in full retreat behind the Marne and to the south," and that Bulow intended to push his advance guards to the Marne the next day. Planning at Luxembourg thus remained based on "suspicions" rather than facts. On the basis of these "suspicions," Moltke and Tappen on the evening of 2 September reached a basic decision: The war would have to be decided by concentrating the German armies for an envelopment of the "main French forces" No reply. During the afternoon of 2 September, the OHL intercepted a message from Second Army to First Army, informing the latter that the enemy was "in full retreat behind the Marne and to the south," and that Bulow intended to push his advance guards to the Marne the next day. Planning at Luxembourg thus remained based on "suspicions" rather than facts. On the basis of these "suspicions," Moltke and Tappen on the evening of 2 September reached a basic decision: The war would have to be decided by concentrating the German armies for an envelopment of the "main French forces"104 somewhere in the area between Paris and Verdun-the region of the Marne. At 8:30 somewhere in the area between Paris and Verdun-the region of the Marne. At 8:30 PM PM on 2 September, Moltke sent out his General Directive: "Intention Army Supreme Command to drive the French away from the capital in southeasterly direction. 1 Army is to follow 2 Army in echelon and to continue to protect the army's flank." on 2 September, Moltke sent out his General Directive: "Intention Army Supreme Command to drive the French away from the capital in southeasterly direction. 1 Army is to follow 2 Army in echelon and to continue to protect the army's flank."105 Paris was to be bypa.s.sed to the east. Paris was to be bypa.s.sed to the east.

Specifically, Sixth and Seventh armies would continue to tie down French First and Second armies in Alsace-Lorraine; Fifth and Fourth armies were to keep the pressure up on French Third and Fourth armies in the middle of Joffre's line; and Third Army was to advance in concert with Second Army's left wing against Foch's Special Army Detachment. The knockout blow now was to be delivered by Bulow's Second Army, which would race south of Paris, cut off French Fifth Army's line of retreat, and roll up the enemy armies west of the Argonne. First Army's new role was to follow Second Army in echelon and guard its right flank against a possible attack out of the west. Satisfied with his labors, Moltke a.s.sured members of the kaiser's entourage that "the steamroller in France is moving ahead unstoppable."106 Unsurprisingly, Kluck and Kuhl, headquartered at Louis XV's chateau at Compiegne, were not thrilled with this turn of events. Quite on their own, the two had crafted a new role for First Army. Fully appreciating that it was no longer sufficiently powerful to attempt the march around Paris, and seeing in Lanrezac's retreat from Guise/Saint-Quentin a splendid chance at last to strike an enemy army in the flank, they turned First Army toward the Oise River along the line Compiegne-Noyon. Once more, their corps commanders were well ahead of Kuhl's staff work. By the morning of 3 September, both Ewald von Lochow's III Corps and Ferdinand von Quast's IX Corps had reached the Marne; advance guards crossed the river at Nanteuille-Haudouin, Charly, and Chateau-Thierry. Friedrich Sixt von Arnim's IV Corps stood on the Aisne at Crouy. Alexander von Linsingen's II Corps and Hans von Gronau's IV Reserve Corps had advanced across the Oise between Chantilly and Compiegne.107 Later that afternoon Kuhl, perhaps antic.i.p.ating Moltke's directive for First Army to follow Bulow's Second Army "in echelon," issued orders formalizing the new advance due southeast. In fact, Bulow after his victory at Saint-Quentin on 30 August had suggested that very move. Later that afternoon Kuhl, perhaps antic.i.p.ating Moltke's directive for First Army to follow Bulow's Second Army "in echelon," issued orders formalizing the new advance due southeast. In fact, Bulow after his victory at Saint-Quentin on 30 August had suggested that very move.

While this "deviation" is generally depicted as a spur-of-the-moment "bolt out of the blue," new doc.u.ments discovered after the fall of the German Democratic Republic in 1990 prove this not to have been the case. For Kuhl, then in the grade of major, had gamed just such a scenario in Case "Freytag II" as part of Schlieffen's "General Staff Ride West 1905."108 In short, the march-by east of Paris had been a major component in the master's great design. In short, the march-by east of Paris had been a major component in the master's great design.

Kuhl was not worried about a possible French sortie out of the capital as long as the "phantom Paris" did not become "flesh and blood."109 But just to be on the safe side, he dispatched Gronau's IV Reserve Corps to Nanteuil-le-Haudouin to guard First Army's right flank-where, according to the latest intelligence, the only enemy formation was the BEF beating a hasty retreat. Indeed, he was sufficiently unconcerned about the area north and northeast of Paris not to send aerial reconnaissance there. But just to be on the safe side, he dispatched Gronau's IV Reserve Corps to Nanteuil-le-Haudouin to guard First Army's right flank-where, according to the latest intelligence, the only enemy formation was the BEF beating a hasty retreat. Indeed, he was sufficiently unconcerned about the area north and northeast of Paris not to send aerial reconnaissance there.

At this critical point of the campaign, with million-man armies either in panicked retreat or in hot pursuit, intelligence was at a premium. Where was the enemy? In what strength? And, especially, on what route of march? The French, like Bulow during the night of the first day of the Battle of Guise/Saint-Quentin, now received a "dramatic windfall." An officer with German Guard Cavalry Division, apparently fresh from Kluck's headquarters, had been ambushed and killed in his car by soldiers of French 310th Infantry Regiment. His haversack contained a blood-smeared map bearing numbers and pencil lines. Commandant Girard, head of the Deuxieme Bureau, was ecstatic. He at once deduced that the numbers referred to German First Army's corps and the pencil lines, their lines of advance. It was the intelligence breakthrough that Joffre needed. For it was now clear to him that Kluck had changed his course toward the southeast.110 Kluck and Kuhl, having made their momentous decision to turn southeast without any input from the OHL, Bulow, or Hausen, in the morning of 4 September finally conveyed their new course of action to Moltke. The rambling message was a strange mix of information, accusation, and self-justification. It began, "First Army requests information about the situation at other armies." The duumvirate then testily reminded Moltke that they had heard only "news of decisive victories followed on many occasions with pleas for a.s.sistance." That was aimed directly at Bulow. First Army had at all times provided the requested a.s.sistance, which had entailed "sustained heavy fighting and [long] marches," and in the process had "reached the limits of its capabilities." Quast's IX Corps alone had allowed Bulow to cross the Marne and to force the enemy to retreat. "Hope now to exploit that success." Kluck and Kuhl bluntly informed Moltke that they could not heed his General Directive of 2 September to follow Second Army "in echelon" if they were to stove in the left flank of French Fifth Army. They requested immediate reinforcement in the form of Hans von Beseler's III Reserve Corps (guarding Antwerp) and Hans von Zwehl's VII Reserve Corps (besieging Maubeuge). And they demanded at all times to be kept abreast of the action of the other German armies. It took an incredible sixteen hours for the six-part message to be drafted, typed in clear text, enciphered, and transmitted.111 Was it purposeful obfuscation? Moltke chose not to reply to this stinging epistle. Was it purposeful obfuscation? Moltke chose not to reply to this stinging epistle.

Lost in all the excitement of the "march to the Marne" were several German reconnaissance reports of French troop movements. On 31 August, a flier from First Army reported "strong ma.s.ses," which he estimated at one army corps, marching in a southerly direction toward Villers-Cotterets; "various columns" heading south out of the Forest of Compiegne; and "about a division" leaving the Oise Valley for Senlis.112 Three days later, just after Moltke and Tappen had sent out their General Directive for First Army to march by Paris on its eastern side, fliers from Maximilian von Laffert's XIX Corps of Saxon Third Army sent in detailed reports of French troop movements. One spied "marching columns of all weapons formations" heading south on the roads near Sainte-Menehould. "Suippes full of troops." French infantry was being entrained at railroad stations at Suippes, Somme-Suippe, Cuperly, and Saint-Hilaire-au-Temple. "One army corps" and eight troop trains ready to roll were spotted at Chalons-sur-Marne; another four troop trains at Mairy. A second flier reported seeing forty-two and a half kilometers of roads bursting with French troops en route to Chalons, epernay, and Montmirail. Three days later, just after Moltke and Tappen had sent out their General Directive for First Army to march by Paris on its eastern side, fliers from Maximilian von Laffert's XIX Corps of Saxon Third Army sent in detailed reports of French troop movements. One spied "marching columns of all weapons formations" heading south on the roads near Sainte-Menehould. "Suippes full of troops." French infantry was being entrained at railroad stations at Suippes, Somme-Suippe, Cuperly, and Saint-Hilaire-au-Temple. "One army corps" and eight troop trains ready to roll were spotted at Chalons-sur-Marne; another four troop trains at Mairy. A second flier reported seeing forty-two and a half kilometers of roads bursting with French troops en route to Chalons, epernay, and Montmirail.113 The next day, twenty-three kilometers of roads still bristled with The next day, twenty-three kilometers of roads still bristled with poilus poilus heading south toward epernay. Obviously, these French movements would impact the coming battle in the Reims-Verdun sector of the front. heading south toward epernay. Obviously, these French movements would impact the coming battle in the Reims-Verdun sector of the front.

The reports by Saxon fliers were b.u.t.tressed by other reports. At 11 AM AM and again at 8:45 and again at 8:45 PM PM on 3 September, Prussian fliers noted enemy movements at Dammartin-en-Goele and Villeron, northeast of Paris-heading in the general direction of Gronau's IV Reserve Corps of First Army. Kluck and Kuhl ignored them and ordered reconnaissance for 4 September only toward the south. One of the aircraft strayed off course, and at 5:30 on 3 September, Prussian fliers noted enemy movements at Dammartin-en-Goele and Villeron, northeast of Paris-heading in the general direction of Gronau's IV Reserve Corps of First Army. Kluck and Kuhl ignored them and ordered reconnaissance for 4 September only toward the south. One of the aircraft strayed off course, and at 5:30 PM PM on 4 September reported hostile formations marching northward from epiais-les-Louvres, just north of Paris. There was no way to warn Gronau as IV Reserve Corps was without radio communications. on 4 September reported hostile formations marching northward from epiais-les-Louvres, just north of Paris. There was no way to warn Gronau as IV Reserve Corps was without radio communications.114 At Luxembourg, the OHL dismissed these reports as merely pertaining to French rear guards At Luxembourg, the OHL dismissed these reports as merely pertaining to French rear guards (Nachhut) (Nachhut).

During that same period, Linsingen's II Corps skirmished with troops of Frederic Vautier's VII Corps-previously known to have been in Alsace-and Georg von der Marwitz's II Cavalry Corps with fresh forces from Celeste Deprez's 61st RID, Francois Ganeval's 62d RID, and d'Amade's Territorials. Kluck and Kuhl refused to acknowledge that the French were undertaking major troop transfers. Like Moltke, they argued that Linsingen and Marwitz had simply stumbled upon isolated French rear guards.

"The left wing of the main French forces"-read, Fifth Army-remained of "decisive importance" to Kluck and Kuhl. It was to be "pushed away from Paris" and "outflanked."115 If all went according to plan, First Army would at the eleventh hour again become the hammer that would strike the left flank of the French armies as they were driven south by the other German armies. This grand vision of a right hook against French Third, Fourth, and Fifth armies blinded Kluck and Kuhl to the formation of Maunoury's Sixth Army on their right flank. Day after day, they drove II, IV, and III corps forward in frontal charges against Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army, withdrawing behind the Marne, as well as against the three British army corps retreating from Creil and La Ferte-Milon. Day after day, the French and the British refused to accept a decisive battle. On 3 September, an advance guard of Pomeranian Grenadiers of Linsingen's II Corps had reported-rather optimistically-that they were just eighteen kilometers east of Paris. At dusk the next day, Kluck's flanking cover, IV Reserve Corps, made contact with French units at the Ourcq River. If all went according to plan, First Army would at the eleventh hour again become the hammer that would strike the left flank of the French armies as they were driven south by the other German armies. This grand vision of a right hook against French Third, Fourth, and Fifth armies blinded Kluck and Kuhl to the formation of Maunoury's Sixth Army on their right flank. Day after day, they drove II, IV, and III corps forward in frontal charges against Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army, withdrawing behind the Marne, as well as against the three British army corps retreating from Creil and La Ferte-Milon. Day after day, the French and the British refused to accept a decisive battle. On 3 Sept