The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge Volume Iv Part 26

Ib. p. 149.

For it is demonstrable that if there be three Persons and one G.o.d, each Person must be G.o.d, and yet there cannot be three distinct G.o.ds, but one. For if each Person be not G.o.d, all three cannot be G.o.d, unless the G.o.dhead have Persons in it which are not G.o.d.

Three persons having the same nature are three persons;--and if to possess without limitation the divine nature, as opposed to the human, is what we mean by G.o.d, why then three such persons are three G.o.ds, and will bethought so, till Gregory Nyssen can persuade us that John, James, and Peter, each possessing the human nature, are not three men. John is a man, James is a man, and Peter is a man: but they are not three men, but one man!

Ib. p. 150.

I affirm, that natural reason is not the rule and measure of expounding Scripture, no more than it is of expounding any other writing. The true and only way to interpret any writing, even the Scriptures themselves, is to examine the use and propriety of words and phrases, the connexion, scope, and design of the text, its allusion to ancient customs and usages, or disputes. For there is no other good reason to be given for any exposition, but that the words signify so, and the circ.u.mstances of the place, and the apparent scope of the writer require it.

This and the following paragraph are excellent. 'O si sic omnia'!

Ib. p. 153.

Reconcile men to the doctrine (of the Trinity), and the Scripture is plain without any farther comment. This I have now endeavoured; and I believe our adversaries will talk more sparingly of absurdities and contradictions for the future, and they will lose the best argument they have against the orthodox expositions of Scripture.

Good doctor! you sadly over-rated both your own powers, and the docility of your adversaries. If so clear a head and so zealous a Trinitarian as Dr. Waterland could not digest your exposition, or acquit it of Tritheism, little hope is there of finding the Unitarians more persuadable.

Ib. p. 154.

Though Christ be G.o.d himself, yet if there be three Persons in the G.o.dhead, the equality and sameness of nature does not destroy the subordination of Persons: a Son is equal to his Father by nature, but inferior to him as his Son: if the Father, as I have explained it, be original mind and wisdom, the Son a personal, subsisting, but reflex image of his Father's wisdom, though their eternal wisdom be equal and the same, yet the original is superior to the image, the Father to the Son.

But why? We men deem it so, because the image is but a shadow, and not equal to the original; but if it were the same in all perfections, how could that, which is exactly the same, be less? Again, G.o.d is all Being:--consequently there can nothing be added to the idea, except what implies a negation or diminution of it. If one and the same Being is equal to the Father, as touching his G.o.dhead, but inferior as man; then it is + 'm-x', which is not = + 'm'. But of two men I may say, that they are equal to each other. A. = + courage-wisdom. B. = + wisdom-courage.

Both wise and courageous; but A. inferior in wisdom, B. in courage. But G.o.d is all-perfect.

Ib. p. 156.

So born before all creatures, as [Greek: prototokos] also signifies, 'that by him were all things created'.

'All things were created by him, and for him, and he is before all things', (which is the explication of [Greek: portotokos pasaes ktiseos], begotten before the whole creation', and therefore no part of the creation himself.)

This is quite right. Our version should here be corrected. [Greek: Proto] or [Greek: protaton] is here an intense comparative,--'infinitely before'.

Ib. p. 159.

That he 'being in the form of G.o.d, thought it not robbery to be equal with G.o.d', &c.--Phil. ii. 8, 9.

I should be inclined to adopt an interpretation of the unusual phrase [Greek: harpagmon] somewhat different both from the Socinian and the Church version:--"who being in the form of G.o.d did not 'think equality with G.o.d a thing to be seized with violence', but made, &c."

Ib. p. 160.

Is a mere creature a fit lieutenant or representative of G.o.d in personal or prerogative acts of government and power? Must not every being be represented by one of his own kind, a man by a man, an angel by an angel, in such acts as are proper to their natures? and must not G.o.d then be represented by one who is G.o.d? Is any creature capable of the government of the world? Does not this require infinite wisdom and infinite power? And can G.o.d communicate infinite wisdom and infinite power to a creature or a finite nature? That is, can a creature be made a true and essential G.o.d?

This is sound reasoning. It is to be regretted that Sherlock had not confined himself to logical comments on the Scripture, instead of attempting metaphysical solutions.

Ib. pp. 161-3.

I find little or nothing to 'object to' in this exposition, from pp.

161-163 inclusively, of 'Phil'. ii. 8, 9. And yet I seem to feel, as if a something that should have been prefixed, and to which all these considerations would have been excellent seconds, were missing. To explain the Cross by the necessity of sacrificial blood, and the sacrificial blood as a type and 'ante'-delegate or pre-subst.i.tute of the Cross, is too like an 'argumentum in circulo'.

Ib. p. 164.

And though Christ be the eternal Son of G.o.d, and the natural Lord and heir of all things, yet 'G.o.d hath' in this 'highly exalted him' and given 'him a name which is above every name, that at' (or in [Greek: en]) 'the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven', &c.--Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11.

Never was a sublime pa.s.sage more debased than by this rendering of [Greek: en] by 'at', instead of 'in';--'at' the 'phenomenon', instead of 'in' the 'noumenon'. For such is the force of 'nomen', name, in this and similar pa.s.sages, namely, 'in vera et substantiali potestate Jesu': that is, [Greek: en logo ka dia logou], the true 'noumenon' or 'ens intelligibile' of Christ. To bow at hearing the 'cognomen' may become a universal, but it is still only a non-essential, consequence of the former. But the debas.e.m.e.nt of the idea is not the worst evil of this false rendering;--it has afforded the pretext and authority for un-Christian intolerance.

Ib. p. 168.

'The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son'.--John v. 22. Should the Father judge the world he 'must' judge as the maker and sovereign of the world, by the strict rules of righteousness and justice, and then how could any sinner be saved?

(Why? Is mercy incompatible with righteousness? How then can the Son be righteous?)

But he has committed judgment to the Son, as a mediatory king, who judges by the equity and chancery of the Gospel.

This article required exposition incomparably more than the simple doctrine of the Trinity, plain and evident 'simplici intuitu', and rendered obscure only by diverting the mental vision by terms drawn from matter and mult.i.tude. In the Trinity all the 'Hows'? may and should be answered by 'Look'! just as a wise tutor would do in stating the fact of a double or treble motion, as of a ball rolling north ward on the deck of a ship sailing south, while the earth is turning from west to east.

And in like manner, that is, 'per intuitum intellectualem', must all the mysteries of faith be contemplated;--they are intelligible 'per se', not discursively and 'per a.n.a.logiam'. For the truths are unique, and may have shadows and types, but no a.n.a.logies. At this moment I have no intuition, no intellectual diagram, of this article of the commission of all judgment to the Son, and therefore a mult.i.tude of plausible objections present themselves, which I cannot solve--nor do I expect to solve them till by faith I see the thing itself.--Is not mercy an attribute of the Deity, as Deity, and not exclusively of the Person of the Son? And is not the authorizing another to judge by equity and mercy the same as judging so ourselves? If the Father can do the former, why not the latter?

Ib. p. 171.

And therefore now it is given him to have life in himself, as the Father hath life in himself, as the original fountain of all life, by whom the Son himself lives: all life is derived from G.o.d, either by eternal generation, or procession, or creation; and thus Christ hath life in himself also; to the new creation he is the fountain of life: 'he quickeneth whom he will'.

The truths which hitherto had been metaphysical, then began to be historical. The Eternal was to be manifested in time. Hence Christ came with signs and wonders; that is, the absolute, or the anterior to cause and effect, manifested itself as a 'phenomenon' in time, but with the predicates of eternity;--and this is the only possible definition of a miracle 'in re ipsa', and not merely 'ad hominem', or 'ad ignorantiam'.

Ib. p. 177.

His next argument consists in applying such things to the divinity of our Saviour as belong to his humanity; 'that he increased in wisdom, &c.:--that he knows not the day of judgment';--which he evidently speaks of himself as man: as all the ancient Fathers confess. In St.

Mark it is said, 'But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels that are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father'.

St. Matthew does not mention the Son: 'Of that day and hour knoweth no man, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only'.

How much more politic, as well as ingenuous, it had been to have acknowledged the difficulty of this text. So far from its being evident, the evidence would be on the Arian side, were it not that so many express texts determine us to the contrary.

Ib.

Which shows that the Son in St. Matthew is included in the [Greek: oudes] none, or no man, and therefore concerns him only as a man: for the Father 'includes the whole Trinity', and therefore includes the Son, who seeth whatever his Father doth.

This is an 'argumentum in circulo', and 'pet.i.tio rei sub lite'. Why is he called the Son in 'ant.i.thesis' to the Father, if it meant, "no not the Christ, except in his character of the co-eternal Son, included in the Father?" If it "concerned him only as a man," why is he placed after the angels? Why called the 'Son' simply, instead of the Son of Man, or the Messiah?