The Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald Volume I Part 15

The animosity of this political partisanship towards one who had effected so much for his country is an anomaly even in political history. That amended representation of the people in Parliament, for which he strove up to 1818, had only fourteen years afterwards become the law of the land, and the boast of some who had persecuted Lord Cochrane for no offence beyond having been amongst the first to give expression to the popular will subsequently adopted by themselves.

The efforts of Lord Cochrane in favour of reforming the abuses of the Navy and of Greenwich Hospital, which at that time brought upon him the wrath of the Administration, are at this moment seriously engaging the attention of parliament, as being of paramount national necessity.

The doctrine then openly laid down, that no naval officer in parliament had a right to interfere with naval administration, has long been abrogated, and many of the brightest ornaments of the navy are now amongst the foremost to denounce naval abuses in the House of Commons. It is, in fact, to them that the country now looks for that vigilance which shall preserve the navy in a proper state of efficiency. Yet for these very things was Lord Cochrane persecuted, though modern Governments, which have been liberal enough to acquiesce in popular reforms, of which he was the early advocate, have not been liberal enough to make him amends for the wrongs he suffered as one of the indefatigable originators of their now-cherished measures. Still less have they deemed it inconsistent with the honour of this great country to refrain from rewarding him in the ordinary manner for his most important services, rendered when others shrank from them, as was the case at Basque Roads, where his plans, declined by his seniors in the service, were successfully executed by himself under the greatest possible discouragement and disadvantage.

But the injustice manifested towards the late Earl of Dundonald did not end here. Driven from the service of his own country, and without fortune, he was compelled by his necessities to embark in the service of foreign states. With his own hand, directed by his own genius, which had to supply the place of adequate naval force, he liberated Chili, Peru, and Brazil from thraldom, consolidating the rebellious provinces of the latter empire on so permanent a basis, that its internal peace has never again been disturbed. Yet not one of these states has to this day satisfied the stipulated and indisputable arrangements by which he was induced to espouse their cause; the reason of their breach of contract being distinctly traceable to the course pursued towards Lord Dundonald in England. Seeing that the British Government paid no attention to the yet more important claims he had upon its grat.i.tude, the South American States believed that they might with impunity disregard their own stipulations, and the dictates of national honour; the chief of one of them having had the audacity to tell Lord Cochrane that he would find no sympathy in the British Government.

Three of the most distinguished officers in the British service, Sir Thomas Hastings, Sir John Burgoyne, and Colonel Colquhoun, have felt it their duty, when officially reporting on the efficacy of Lord Dundonald's war plans, to give him the highest credit for having kept his secret "_under peculiarly trying circ.u.mstances_," and from pure love of his native country. The "trying circ.u.mstances" were these,--that he had been driven from the service of that country by the machinations of a political faction, which, in the conscientious performance of his parliamentary duties, he had offended. Even this injury, which blasted his whole life and prospects, did not detract one _iota_ from the love of country, which to the day of his death was with him a pa.s.sion; his acute mind well knowing how to draw the distinction between his country and those who were sacrificing its best interests to their love of power, if not to less worthy purposes.

Never was praise more honourably given, than in the Ordnance Report of the above-named distinguished officers, and never was it more n.o.bly deserved.

Another "peculiarly trying circ.u.mstance" alluded to by those officers, was that, when compelled by actual pecuniary necessity, in consequence of the deprivation of his rank and pay, and the demands of increasing family, to accept service under a foreign state as his only means of subsistence, he lay before the castles of Callao, into which had been removed for security the whole wealth of the rich capital of Peru, including bullion and plate, estimated at upwards of a million sterling, he preserved his war secret, though strongly urged to put it in execution. Had he listened to the temptation, in six hours the whole of that wealth must have been in his possession. For not listening to it, he incurred the enmity of his employers, who urged that they were ent.i.tled to all his professional skill and knowledge, as a part of his bargain with them; and his non-compliance with their wishes is doubtless amongst the chief reasons why they have not, to this day, satisfied their own offered stipulations for his services.

Yet, at the very moment when he was displaying this self-sacrificing patriotism, lest his country might suffer from his secret being divulged, the Government of Great Britain had, at the suggestion of the Spanish Government, pa.s.sed a "Foreign Enlistment Act," with the express intention of enveloping him in its meshes.[A]

[Footnote A: On Lord Cochrane's return from Brazil, having occasion to go before the Attorney-General, on the subject of a patent, that learned functionary rudely asked him, "_Whether he was not afraid to appear in his presence?_" Lord Cochrane's reply was, "_No, nor in the presence of any man living_." Evidence exists that the Attorney-General asked the Ministry if he should prosecute Lord Cochrane under the Foreign Enlistment Act, the reply being in the negative.]

II.

(Page 23.)

As a striking instance of Lord Cochrane's method of exposing naval abuses, part of a speech delivered by him in the House of Commons, on the 11th of May, 1809, is here copied from his "Autobiography," vol.

ii. pp. 142-144.

An admiral, worn out in the service, is superannuated at 410_l._. a year, a captain at 210_l._., a clerk of the ticket office retires on 700_l._. a year! The widow of Admiral Sir Andrew Mitch.e.l.l has one third of the allowance given to the widow of a Commissioner of the Navy.

I will give the House another instance. Four daughters of the gallant Captain Courtenay have 12l. 10s. each, the daughter of Admiral Sir Andrew Mitch.e.l.l has 25l., two daughters of Admiral Epworth have 25l. each, the daughter of Admiral Keppel 24l., the daughter of Captain Mann, who was killed in action, 25l., four children of Admiral Moriarty 25l. each. That is--thirteen daughters of admirals and captains, several of whose fathers fell in the service of their country, receive from the grat.i.tude of the nation a sum less than Dame Mary Saxton, the widow of a commissioner.

The pension list is not formed on any comparative rank or merit, length of service, or other rational principle, but appears to me to be dependent on parliamentary influence alone. Lieutenant Ellison, who lost his arm, is allowed 91l.

5s., Captain Johnstone, who lost his arm, has only 45l.

12s. 6d., Lieutenant Arden, who lost his arm, has 9l.

5s., Lieutenant Campbell, who lost his leg, 40_l._., and poor Lieutenant Chambers, who lost both his legs, has only 80_l._., whilst Sir A.S. Hamond retires on 1500_l._. per annum. The brave Sir Samuel Hood, who lost his arm, has only 500_l._., whilst the late Secretary of the Admiralty retires, in full health, on a pension of 1500_l._. per annum.

To speak less in detail, 32 flag officers, 22 captains, 50 lieutenants, 180 masters, 36 surgeons, 23 pursers, 91 boatswains, 97 gunners, 202 carpenters, and 41 cooks, in all 774 persons, cost the country 4028l. less than the nett proceeds of the sinecures of Lords Arden (20,358_l._), Camden (20,536_l._), and Buckingham (20,693_l._).

All the superannuated admirals, captains, and lieutenants put together, have but 1012l. more than Earl Camden's sinecure alone! All that is paid to the wounded officers of the whole British navy, and to the wives and children of those dead or killed in action, do not amount by 214l. to as much as Lord Arden's sinecure alone, viz.

20,358_l._. What is paid to the mutilated officers themselves is but half as much.

Is this justice? Is this the treatment which the officers of the navy deserve at the hands of those who call themselves his Majesty's Government? Does the country know of this injustice? Will this too be defended? If I express myself with warmth I trust in the indulgence of the House. I cannot suppress my feelings. Should 31 commissioners, commissioners' wives, and clerks have 3899l. more amongst them than all the wounded officers of the navy of England?

I find upon examination that the Wellesleys receive from the public 34,729_l._, a sum equal to 426 pairs of lieutenants' legs, calculated at the rate of allowance of Lieutenant Chambers's legs. Calculating for the pension of Captain Johnstone's arm, viz. 45l., Lord Arden's sinecure is equal to the value of 1022 captains' arms. The Marquis of Buckingham's sinecure alone will maintain the whole ordinary establishment of the victualling department at Chatham, Dover, Gibraltar, Sheerness, Downs, Heligoland, Cork, Malta, Mediterranean, Cape of Good Hope, Rio de Janeiro, and leave 5460_l._ in the Treasury.

Two of these comfortable sinecures would victual the officers and men serving in all the ships in ordinary in Great Britain, viz. 117 sail of the line, 105 frigates, 27 sloops, and 50 hulks. Three of them would maintain the dockyard establishments at Portsmouth and Plymouth.

The addition of a few more would amount to as much as the whole ordinary establishments of the royal dockyards at Chatham, Woolwich, Deptford, and Sheerness; whilst the sinecures and offices executed wholly by deputy would more than maintain the ordinary establishment of all the royal dockyards in the kingdom.

Even Mr. Ponsonby, who lately made so pathetic an appeal to the good sense of the people of England against those whom he was pleased to term demagogues, actually receives, for having been thirteen months in office, a sum equal to nine admirals who have spent their lives in the service of their country; three times as much as all the pensions given to all the daughters and children of all the admirals, captains, lieutenants, and other officers who have died in indigent circ.u.mstances, or who have been killed in the service.

III.

(Page 258.)

The following letter, too long to be quoted in the body of the work, but too important to be omitted, was addressed by Lord Cochrane to the Brazilian Secretary of State. It gives memorable evidence of the treatment to which he was subjected by the Portuguese faction in Brazil.

Rio de Janeiro, May 3rd, 1824.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

I have received the honour of your excellency's reply to my letter of the 30th of March, and as I am thereby taught that the subjects on which I wrote are not now considered so intimately connected with your excellency's department as they were by your immediate predecessor, nor even so far relevant as to justify a direct communication to your excellency, I should feel it my duty to avoid troubling you farther on those subjects, were it not that you at the same time have freely expressed such opinions with respect to my conduct and motives as justice to myself requires me to controvert and refute.

With regard to your excellency's a.s.surance that it has ever been the intention of his Imperial Majesty and Council to act favourably towards me, I can in return a.s.sure your excellency that I have never doubted the just and benign intention of his Imperial Majesty himself, neither have I doubted that a part of his Privy Council has thought well of my services; and if I have imagined that a majority has been prejudiced against me, I have formed that conclusion merely from the effects which I have seen and experienced, and not from any undue prepossession against particular individuals, whether Brazilian or Portuguese. But when your excellency adds that those transactions between the late minister and myself, which, owing to their having been conducted verbally, have been ill-understood, have invariably been decided in a manner favourable to me, I confess myself at a loss to understand your excellency's meaning, not having any recollection of such favourable decisions, and therefore not feeling myself competent either to admit or deny unless in the first place your excellency shall be pleased to descend to particulars. I do indeed recollect that the late ministers, professing to have the authority of his Imperial Majesty, and which, from the personal countenance I have experienced from that august personage, I am sure they did not clandestinely a.s.sume, proffered to me the command of the imperial squadron, with every privilege, emolument, and advantage which I possessed in the command of the navy of Chili; and this, your excellency is desired to observe, was not a verbal transaction, but a written one, and therefore not liable to any of those misunderstandings to which verbal transactions, as your excellency observes, are naturally subject. Now, in Chili my commission was that of commander-in-chief of the squadron, without limitation as to time or any other restriction. My command, of course, was only to cease by my own voluntary resignation, or by sentence of court-martial, or by death, or other uncontrollable event. And accordingly the appointment which I accepted in the service of his Imperial Majesty, and in virtue of which I sailed in command of the expedition to Bahia, was that of commander-in-chief of the whole squadron, without limitation as to time or otherwise; and this, too, your excellency will be pleased to observe, was not a verbal transaction, but a solemn engagement in writing, bearing date the 26th day of March, 1823, and now in my possession. I had also the a.s.surance in writing of the Minister of Marine, that the formalities of engrossment and registration of such appointment were only deferred from want of time, and should be executed immediately after my return.

And now I most respectfully put it home to your excellency whether these engagements have or have not been fully confirmed and complied with under the present administration. I ask your excellency whether the patent which I received, bearing date the 25th November, 1823, did not contain a clause of limitation by which I might at any time be dismissed from the service under any pretence or without any pretence whatever--without even the form of a hearing in my own defence. Then again I ask your excellency whether my office as commander-in-chief of the squadron was not reduced for a period of three months--as appears by every official communication of the Minister of Marine to me during that period--to the command only of the vessels of war anch.o.r.ed in this port?[A] and further on this subject I ask your excellency whether after my repeated remonstrances against this injurious limitation of my stipulated authority, it was not pretended by the decree published in the Gazette of the 28th February, that I was then for the first time, as a mark of special favour, elevated to the rank of commander-in-chief of the squadron, and that too during the period only of the existing war: although nothing less than the chief command had been offered to me at the first, without any restriction as to time, and although it was only in that capacity I had consented to enter into the service, and under a written appointment as such I had then been in the service nearly twelve months. And then I ask your excellency whether the limitation introduced into the patent of the 25th of November last, in violation of the original agreement, and confirmed and defined by the decree published on the 28th of February following; to which may be added the communication which I received from your excellency, excluding me from taking the oath, and becoming a party to the const.i.tution, the 149th article of which provides for the protection of officers until lawfully deprived by sentence of court-martial; I say that I respectfully ask your excellency whether these proceedings were not well adapted for the purpose of casting me off with the utmost facility at the earliest moment that convenience might dictate; either with or without the admission of those claims for the future to which past services are usually considered ent.i.tled, as might best suit the inclination of those with whom my dismissal might originate. And is it not most probable that their inclination would run counter to those claims, especially when it is considered that my letter of the 6th of March to the Minister of Marine, in which I made the inquiry whether my right to half-pay would be recognized on the termination of the war, has never been answered, although my application for a reply has been repeated?[B] If then the explicit engagements in writing between the late minister of his Imperial Majesty and myself have, as I have shown, been set aside by the present ministry and council, and other arrangements far less favourable to me, and destructive of the lawful security of my present and future rights, have without my consent been subst.i.tuted in their stead, where, I entreat your excellency, am I to look for those favourable constructions of "ill-understood verbal transactions,"

which your excellency requires me to accept as a proof that the intentions of the present ministry and council, in respect to me, have ever been of the most favourable and obliging nature?

[Footnote A: This was resorted to, in order to prevent Lord Cochrane from stationing the cruisers to annoy the enemy, to deprive him of any interest in future captures, and prevent his opposition to the unlawful restoration of enemy's property.]

[Footnote B: An answer was at last given, a few days before Lord Cochrane's a.s.sistance was called for to put down the revolution at Pernambuco; and _half_ of the originally-granted _half-pay_ was decreed when he should return, after the termination of hostilities, to his native country.]

I would beg permission, too, to inquire how it happened that portarias[A] from the Minister of Marine, charging me unjustly from time to time with neglecting to obey the command of his Imperial Majesty, were constantly made public, while my answers in refutation were always suppressed. And why, when I remonstrated against this injustice, was I answered that the same course should be persisted in, and that I had no alternative but to acquiesce, or to descend to a newspaper controversy by publishing my exculpations myself? Is it possible not to perceive that the _ex parte_ publication of these accusatory portarias was intended to lower me in the public estimation, and to prepare the way for the exercise of that power of summary dismissal which was so unfairly acquired by the means above described?

[Footnote A: Official communications.]

On the subject of the prizes your excellency is pleased to state: "Les difficultes survenues dans le jugement des prizes ont eu des motifs si connus et positifs qu'il est a.s.sez doloureux de les voir attribuir a la mauvaise volonte du Conseil de S.M.I." To this I reply that I know of no just cause for the delay which has arisen in the decision of the prizes, and consequently I have a right to impute blame for that delay to those who have the power to cause it or remove it. If the majority of the voices in council had been for a prompt condemnation to the captors of the prizes taken from the Portuguese nation, is it possible that individuals of that nation would be suffered to continue to be the judges of those prizes after an experience of many months has demonstrated either their determination to do nothing, or nothing favourable to the captors? The repugnance of Portuguese judges to condemn property captured from their fellow-countrymen, as a reward to those who have engaged in hostilities against Portugal, is natural enough, and is the only well-known and positive cause of the delay with which I am acquainted; but it is not such a cause for delay as ought to have been permitted to operate by the ministers and council of his Imperial Majesty, who are bound in honour and duty to act with fidelity towards those who have been engaged as auxiliaries in the attainment and maintenance of the independence of the empire. I did, however, inform your excellency that I had heard it stated that another difficulty had arisen in the apprehension that this Government might be under the necessity of eventually restoring the prizes to the original Portuguese owners as a condition of peace. But this, your excellency a.s.sures me, proves nothing but that I am a listener to "rapporteurs," whom I ought to drive from my presence. Unfortunately, however, for this bold explanation of your excellency, the individual whom I heard make the observation was no other than his excellency the present Minister of Marine, Francisco Villala Barboza. If your excellency considers that gentleman in the light of a "rapporteur," or talebearer, it is not for me to object; but the imputation of being a listener to or encourager of talebearers, so rashly advanced by your excellency against me, is without foundation in truth. It may be necessary for ministers of state to have their eavesdroppers and informers, but mine is a straightforward course, which needs no such precautions. And if there be any who volunteer information or advice, I can appreciate the value of it, and the motives of those who offer it. Those who know me much better than your excellency does, will admit that I am in the habit of thinking for myself, and not apt to act on the suggestions of others, especially if officiously tendered.

As to the successive appointment and removal of incompetent auditors of marine, for which your excellency gives credit to the council, I can only say that the benefit of such repeated changes is by no means apparent. And to revert again to the difficulty of decision, for which your excellency intimates there is sufficient cause, I beg leave to ask your excellency what just reason can exist for not condemning these prizes to the captors. Can it be denied that the orders under which I sailed for the blockade of Bahia authorized me to act hostilely against the ships and property of the crown and subjects of Portugal? Can it be denied that war was regularly declared between the two nations? Was it not even promulgated under the sanction of his Imperial Majesty in a doc.u.ment giving to privateers certain privileges which it is admitted were possessed by the ships of war in the making and sale of captures? And yet did not the Prize Tribunal (consisting chiefly, as I before observed, of Portuguese), on the return of the squadron, eight months afterwards, pretend to be ignorant whether his Imperial Majesty was at war or at peace with the kingdom of Portugal?

And did they not under that pretence avoid proceeding to adjudication?

Was not this pretence a false one, or is it one of those well-founded causes of difficulty to which your excellency alludes? Can it be denied that the squadron sailed and acted in the full expectation, grounded on the a.s.surance and engagements of the Government, that all captures made under the flag of the enemy, whether ships of war or merchant vessels, were to be prize to the captors? and yet when the prize judges were at length under the necessity of commencing proceedings, did they not endeavour to set aside the claims of the captors by the monstrous pretence that they had no interest in their captures when made within the distance of two leagues from the sh.o.r.e?

Will your excellency contend that this was a good and sufficient reason? Was it founded in common sense, or on any rational precedent, or indeed any precedent whatever? Was it either honest to the squadron or faithful to the country? Was it not calculated to prevent the squadron from ever again a.s.sailing an invading enemy, or again expelling him from the sh.o.r.es of the empire? Then, in the next place, did not these most extraordinary judges pretend that at least all vessels taken in ports and harbours should be condemned as droits to the crown, and not as prize to the captors? Was not this another most pernicious attempt to deprive the imperial squadron not only of its reward for the past but of any adequate motive for the risk of future enterprise? And in effect, were not these successive pretences calculated to operate as invitations to invasions? Did they not tend to encourage the enemy to resume his occupation of the port of Bahia, and generally to renew his aggressions against the independence of the empire on her sh.o.r.es and in her ports without the probability of resistance by the squadrons of his Imperial Majesty? And have not these same judges actually condemned almost every prize as a droit to the crown, thereby doing as much as in them lay to defraud the squadron and to damp its zeal and destroy its energies? Nay, have not the auditors of marine actually issued decrees p.r.o.nouncing the captures made at Maranho to have been illegal, alleging that they were seized under the Brazilian flag, although in truth the flag of the enemy was flying at the time both in the forts and ships; declaring me a violator of the law of nations and law of the land; accusing me of having been guilty of an insult to the Emperor and the empire, and decreeing costs and damages against me under these infamous pretences? Can your excellency perceive either justice or decency in these decrees? Do they in any degree breathe the spirit of grat.i.tude for the union of so important a province to the empire, or are they at all in accordance with the distinguished approbation which his Imperial Majesty himself has evinced of my services at Maranho?

Can it be unknown to your excellency that the late ministers, acting doubtless under the sanction of his Imperial Majesty, and a.s.suredly under the guidance of common sense, held out that the value of ships of war taken from the enemy was to be the reward of the enterprise of the captors? And yet are we not now told that a law exists decreeing all captured men-of-war to the crown, and so rendering the engagements of the late ministers illegal and nugatory? Can anything be more contrary to justice, to good faith, to common sense, or to sound policy? Was it ever expected by any government employing foreign seamen in a war in which they can have no personal rights at stake, that those seamen will incur the risk of attacking a superior, or even an equal, force, without prospect of other reward than their ordinary pay? Is it not notorious that even in England it is found essential, or at least highly advantageous, to reward the officers and seamen, though fighting their own battles, not only with the full value of captured vessels of war, but even with additional premiums; and was it ever doubted that such liberal policy has mainly contributed to the surpa.s.sing magnitude of the naval power of that little island, and her consequent greatness as a nation?

Can your excellency deny that the delay, the neglect, and the conduct generally of the prize judges, have been the cause of an immense diminution in the value of the captures? Have not the consequences been a wanton and shameful waste of property by decay and plunder?

Can your excellency really believe in the existence of a good and sufficient motive for consigning such property to destruction, rather than at once awarding it to the captors in recompense for their services to the empire? Is it not true that all control over the sales and cargoes of the vessels, most of which are without invoices, have been taken from the captors and their agents and placed in the hands of individuals over whom they have no authority or influence, and from whom they can have no security of receiving a just account? And can it be doubted that the gracious intentions of his Imperial Majesty, as announced by himself, of rewarding the captors with the value of the prizes, are in the utmost danger of being defeated by such proceedings?

Since the 12th day of February, when his Imperial Majesty was graciously pleased to signify his pleasure in his own handwriting that the prizes, though condemned to the crown, should be paid for to the captors, and that valuators should be appointed to estimate the amount, is it not true that nothing whatever, up to the date of my former letter to your excellency, had been done by his ministers and council in furtherance of such his gracious intentions? On the contrary, is it not notorious that, since the announcement of the imperial intention, numerous vessels and cargoes have been arbitrarily disposed of by authority of the auditors of marine, by being delivered to pretended owners and others without legal adjudication, and even without the decency of acquainting the captors or their agents that the property had been so transferred? And has not the whole cost of litigation, watching and guarding the vessels and cargoes, been entirely at the expense of the captors, notwithstanding the disposal of the property and the receipt of the proceeds by the agents of Government and others?

So little hope of justice has been presented by the proceedings of the Prize Tribunal, that it has appeared quite useless to label the stores found in the naval and military a.r.s.enals of Maranho, or the 66,000 dollars in the chests of the Treasury and Custom House, with double that sum in bills, all of which was left for the use of the province, or permitted to be disbursed to satisfy the clamorous troops of Ceara and Pianhy. Has any remuneration been offered to the navy for these sacrifices, of which ministers were duly informed by my official despatches? or has any recompense been awarded for the Portuguese brig and schooner of war, both completely stored and equipped, which were surrendered at Maranho, and which have ever since been employed in the naval service? To a proportion of all this I should have been ent.i.tled in Chili, as well as in the English service; and why, I ask, must I here be contented to be deprived of every hope of these the fruits of my labours? In addition to the prize vessels delivered to claimants without trial, have not the ministers appropriated others _to the uses of the state without valuation or recompense_?[A]

[Footnote A: This conduct was afterwards more flagrantly exemplified on the arrival of the new and n.o.ble prize frigate _Imperatrice_, the equipment whereof had cost the captors 12,000 milreas, which sum has never been returned.]

In short, is it not true that though more than a year has elapsed since the sailing of the imperial squadron under my command, and nearly half a year since its return, after succeeding in expelling the naval and military forces of the enemy from Bahia, and liberating the northern provinces, and uniting them to the empire; I say is it not true that not one shilling of prize money has yet been distributed to the squadron, and that no prospect is even now apparent of any distribution being speedily made? Is it not true that the only substantial reward of the officers and seamen of the squadron for the important services they have rendered has. .h.i.therto been nothing more than their mere pittance of ordinary pay; and even that in many instances vexatiously delayed and miserably curtailed? And with respect to myself individually, is it not notorious that I necessarily consume my whole pay in my current expenses; that my official rank cannot be upheld with less, and that it is wholly inadequate to the due support of the dignity of those high honours which his Imperial Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer?

Under all these circ.u.mstances, it is in vain that I endeavour to make that discovery which your excellency a.s.sures me requires only a moment's reflection: "Au reste" (your excellency says), "que V'e.

Ex'ce. reflechisse un moment, celle trouvera que le Gouvernement de S.M.I. simplement et uniquement pour faire plaisir a V'e. Ex'ce. a s'est attire une enorme responsabilite dans les engagemens pris avec V'e. Ex'ce." It is not one moment only nor one hour that I have reflected on these words, but without making the promised discovery, or any probable guess at your excellency's meaning. I would therefore entreat your excellency to tell me what it is that the Government has engaged to do. All that I know is they have engaged to pay me a certain sum per annum as commander-in-chief of the squadron; and this engagement, I admit, they have so far fulfilled. But the amount is little more than is received by the commander-in-chief of an English squadron; and is it not found in that service, and in every regular or established naval service, that for one officer qualified for any considerable command there are probably ten that are not qualified; though all have necessarily been reared and paid at the national expense? Whereas, in this case, so far from your having been at the expense of money in order to procure a few that are effective, you obtained at once, without any previous cost whatever, the services of myself and the officers that accompanied me, all of whom were experienced and efficient. Now, the united amount of the salaries you are engaged to pay to myself and the officers whom I brought with me does not exceed 25,000 dollars a year. To speak of this as an "enormous responsibility" as an empire, requires more than a "moment's reflection" to be clearly understood. The Government did, however, engage to pay to myself and my brother officers and seamen the value of our captures from the enemy, pursuant to the practice of all maritime belligerents, but this engagement has not hitherto been fulfilled. If, however, your excellency admits the responsibility of the Government to fulfil this engagement also, I am still equally at a loss to conceive in what sense that responsibility can be considered enormous, inasmuch as these prizes were not the property of the state, nor of individuals belonging to this nation, but were the property of Portugal, with whom this nation was and is engaged in lawful war.