The Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald Volume I Part 14

During the one-and-twenty weary months that elapsed between Lord Cochrane's acceptance of service in the Greek War of Independence and his actual partic.i.p.ation in the work, the Revolution pa.s.sed through a new and disastrous stage. In the summer of 1825, when the invitation was sent to him, the disorganisation of the Greeks and the superior strength of the Turks, and yet more of their Egyptian and Arabian allies under Ibrahim Pasha, were threatening to undo all that had been achieved in the previous years. One bold stand had begun to be made, in which, throughout nearly a whole year, the Greeks fought with unsurpa.s.sed heroism, and then the whole struggle for liberty fell into the lawless and disordered condition which already had prevailed in many districts, and which was then to become universal and to offer obstacles too great even for Lord Cochrane's genius to overcome in his efforts to revive genuine patriotism and to render thoroughly successful the cause that he had espoused.

The last great stand was at Missolonghi. Built on the edge of a marshy plain, bounded on the north by the high hills of Zygos and protected on the south by shallow lagoons at the mouth of the Gulf of Lepanto, and chiefly tenanted by hardy fishermen, this town had been the first in Western Greece to take part in the Revolution. Here in June, 1821, nearly all the Moslem residents had been slaughtered, the wealthiest and most serviceable only being spared to become the slaves of their Christian masters. In the last two months of 1822 the Ottomans had made a desperate attempt to win back the stronghold; but its inhabitants, led by Mavrocordatos, who had lately come to join in the work of regeneration, had resolutely beaten off the invaders and taken revenge upon the few Turks still resident among them. "The wife of one of the Turkish inhabitants of Missolonghi," said an English visitor in 1824, "imploring my pity, begged me to allow her to remain under my roof, in order to shelter her from the brutality and cruelty of the Greeks. They had murdered all her relations. A little girl, nine years old, remained to be the only companion of her misery."[A] Missolonghi continued to be one of the chief strongholds of independence in continental Greece; and, the revolutionists being forced into it by the Turks, who scoured the districts north and east of it in 1824 and 1825, it became in the latter year the main object of attack and the scene of most desperate resistance. Here were concentrated the chief energies of the Greek warriors and of their Moslem antagonists, and here was exhibited the last and most heroic effort of the patriots, unaided by foreign champions of note, in their long and hard-fought battle for freedom.

[Footnote A: Millingen, "Memoirs on the Affairs of Greece," p. 99.]

Reshid Pasha, the ablest of the Turkish generals, having advanced into the neighbourhood of Missolonghi towards the end of April, began to besiege it in good earnest, at the head of an army of some seven or eight thousand picked followers, on the 7th of May. While he was forming his entrenchments and erecting his batteries, the townsmen, augmented by a number of fierce Suliots and others, were strengthening their defences. They increased their ramparts, and organised a garrison of four thousand soldiers and armed peasants, with a thousand citizens and boatmen as auxiliaries. At first the tide of fortune was with them. The Turks had to defend themselves as best they could from numerous sorties, well-planned and well-executed, in May and June; and fresh courage came to the Greeks with the intelligence that Admiral Miaoulis was on his way to the port, with as powerful a fleet as he could muster. While he was being expected, however, on the 10th of July, the Turkish Capitan Pasha of Greece arrived with fifty-five vessels. Miaoulis, with forty Greek sail, made his appearance on the 2nd of August. Thus the naval and military forces of both sides were brought into formidable opposition.

At first the Greeks triumphed on the sea. In the night of the 3rd of August, Miaoulis, finding that Missolonghi was being greatly troubled by the blockade established by the Turks, cleverly placed himself to windward of the enemy's line, and at daybreak on the 4th he dispersed the squadron nearest the sh.o.r.e. At noon the whole Turkish force came against him. He met them bravely, but being able to do no more than hold his own by the ordinary method of warfare, he sent three fireships against them in the afternoon. The Turks did not wait to be injured by them. They fled at once, going all the way to Alexandria in search of safety. Miaoulis then lost no time in seconding his first exploit by another. A detachment of the army of Eastern Greece, under the brave generals Karaskakes and Zavellas, having been sent to hara.s.s Reshid Pasha's operations, the admiral a.s.sisted them in a successful piece of strategy. The Turks were, on the 6th of August, attacked simultaneously by the ships and by the outlying battalion of Greeks, while fifteen hundred of the garrison rushed out upon the invaders. Four Turkish batteries were seized, and a great number of their defenders were killed and captured; the remainder, after tough fighting during three hours and a half, being driven so far back that much of the besieging work had to be done over again.

Miaoulis then went in search of the Ottoman fleet, leaving the townsmen, who were enabled, by the raising of the blockade, to receive fresh supplies of food, ammunition, and men, to continue their defence with a good heart. Reshid Pasha vigorously restored his siege operations, but, attempting to force his way into the town on the 21st of September, was again seriously repulsed. The Turks were allowed, and even tempted, to advance to a point which had been skilfully undermined by the besieged. The mine was then fired, and a great number of Moslems were blown into the air, while their comrades, fleeing in disorder, were further injured by a storm of shot from the ramparts. A similar device was resorted to, with like success, on the 13th of October. Reshid had to retire to a safe distance and there build winter quarters for his diminished and starving army.

Karaskakes and Zavellas entered Missolonghi without hindrance, there to concert measures which, had they been promptly adopted, might have utterly destroyed the besieging force.

They delayed their plans too long. The Capitan Pasha having in August fled in a cowardly way to Alexandria, there effected a junction with the Egyptians, and returned to the neighbourhood of Missolonghi in the middle of November with a huge fleet of a hundred and thirty-five vessels, well supplied with troops and provisions. These he landed at Patras on the 18th, just in time to be free from any annoyance that might have been occasioned by Miaoulis, who returned to Missolonghi on the 28th with a fleet of only thirty-three sail. He had vainly attacked a part of the Moslem force on its way, and now, after landing some stores at Missolonghi, made several vain attempts to overcome a force four times as strong as his own. He soon retired, intending to return as promptly as he could collect a large fleet and bring with him further supplies of the provisions of which the Missolonghites were beginning to be in need.

The need was greater even than he imagined. Not only had the Capitan Pasha brought temporary a.s.sistance, in men and food, to the besieging force. Yet greater a.s.sistance soon came in the shape of an Egyptian army, led by Ibrahim Pasha himself. An overwhelming power was thus organized during the last weeks of 1825, and the defenders of Missolonghi were left to succ.u.mb to it, almost unaided. Their previous successes had induced the Greeks of other districts to believe that they could continue their defence alone, and almost the only relief obtained by them was from the Zantiots, who had all along been zealous in the despatch of money and provisions, and from Miaoulis and the small fleet and equipment that he was able to collect from the islands of the Archipelago. Miaoulis returned in January, 1826, and did much injury to the Turkish and Egyptian vessels. But he could offer no hindrance to the action of the Turks and Egyptians upon land. The rainy months of December and January, in which no important attack could be entered upon, were spent by Ibrahim and his companions in preparation for future work. The invaders were now well provided with every requisite. The besieged were in want of nearly everything.

"Invested for ten months," says the contemporary historian, "frequently on the verge of starvation, thinned by fatigue, watching, and wounds, they had already buried fifteen hundred soldiers. The town was in ruins, and they lived amongst the mire and water of their ditches, exposed to the inclemency of a rigorous season, without shoes and in tattered clothing. As far as their vision stretched over the waves they beheld only Turkish flags. The plain was studded with Mussulman tents and standards; and the gradual appearance of new batteries more skilfully disposed, the field days of the Arabs, and the noise of saws and hammers, gave fearful warning. Yet these gallant Acarnanians, Etolians, and Epirots never flinched for an instant."[A]

[Footnote A: Gordon, vol. ii., p. 253.]

On the 13th of January, Ibrahim Pasha sent to say that he was willing to treat with them for an honourable surrender if they would convey their terms by deputies who could speak Albanian, Turkish, and French.

"We are illiterate, and do not understand so many languages," was their blunt reply; "pashas we do not recognize; but we know how to handle the sword and gun."[A]

[Footnote A: Ibid.]

Sword and gun were handled with desperate prowess during February and March and the early part of April. In April, offers of capitulation were renewed by Ibrahim, and more disinterested attempts to avert the worst calamity were made by Sir Frederick Adam, the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. Both proposals were stoutly rejected. The Missolonghiotes declared that they would defend their town to the last, and trust only in G.o.d and in their own strong arms.

But on the 1st of April the last scanty distribution of public rations was exhausted. For three weeks the inhabitants subsisted upon nothing but cats, rats, hides, seaweed, and whatever other refuse and vermin they could collect. At length, on the 22nd of April, finding it impossible to hold out for a day longer, they resolved to evacuate the town in a body, and, cutting their way through the enemy, to try to join Karaskakes and his small force, who, hiding among the mountain fastnesses, were vainly seeking for some way of a.s.sisting them, and to whom they now despatched a message, asking them to advance and help to clear a pa.s.sage for their flight.

After sunset four bridges of planks were secretly laid over the outer ditch of Missolonghi, and the inhabitants were ordered to prepare to leave in two hours. Many--about two thousand--lost heart at last; some betaking themselves to the powder stores, there, when all hope was over, to end their lives by easier death than the enemy might allow them; others, crouching in corners of their homesteads, deeming it better to be murdered there than in the open country. The rest obeyed the orders of the generals. All the women dressed themselves as men, with swords or daggers at their waists. Every child who could hold a weapon had one placed in his hand. There was bitter leave-taking, and desperate words of encouragement pa.s.sed from one to another, as the patriots were marshalled in the order of their departure;--three thousand fighting men to open a pa.s.sage and four thousand women and children to follow;--the whole being divided into three separate parties. At length all was ready, and the first party silently pa.s.sed out of the town and advanced to the bridges. To their amazement, they no sooner appeared than they were met by volley after volley of Turkish fire. A traitor had revealed their plan, and every measure had been taken for their destruction. Some rushed on in despite; others hurried back, to fall into confusion, which it was hard indeed to overcome. They felt, however, that this deadly chance was their only chance of life, and they pressed on through the fire, and the swords of their foes, and by the sheer heroism of despair forced a pa.s.sage to the mountains. Karaiskakes's aid--apparently through no fault of his--was only obtained when the worst dangers had been surmounted or succ.u.mbed to. Of the nine thousand persons who were in Missolonghi on the day of the evacuation, four thousand were killed in the town or on the way out of it. Only thirteen hundred men and two hundred women and children lived to reach Salona after more than a week of wandering and hiding among the mountains.

The long siege of Missolonghi ill.u.s.trates all the best and some of the worst features of the Greek Revolution. In it there was patriotism worthy, in its bursts of splendour, of the nation that claimed descent from the heroes of Plataea and Thermopylae. But the patriotism was often fitful in its working, and oftener wholly wanting. The Greeks could not shake off the pernicious influences that sprang, almost necessarily, from their long centuries of thraldom. Heroism was closely linked with treachery and meanness. The worthiest and most disinterested energy was intimately a.s.sociated with ignorance as to the right methods of action, and with wilful action in wrong ways. The elements of weakness that had been apparent from the first were more and more developed as the painful struggle reached its termination.

It seems as if, in spite of Reshid Pasha and Ibrahim and their fierce armies, it would have been easy for Missolonghi and its brave defenders to have been saved. But rival ambitions and paltry jealousies divided the leaders of the Revolution. They were quarrelling while the power that each one coveted for himself was, step by step, being wrested from them all; and when they tried to do well their want of discipline often rendered their efforts of small avail. No adequate attempt was made to relieve Missolonghi by land, and the brave conduct of Miaoulis on the sea was almost neutralized by the disorganization of his crews and the selfish policy of the islanders who sent him out.

"With respect to the Greek army," wrote General Ponsonby to the Duke of Wellington, from Corfu, on the 15th of June, "it is, generally speaking, a mob; and a chief can only calculate upon keeping it together as long as he has provisions to give it or the prospect of plunder without danger. There is nothing to oppose the Egyptian army but a mob kept together by the small sums sent by the different committees in foreign countries. The Greeks have a great horror of the bayonet, which, however, they have never seen near, except at Missolonghi. The Suliots, who chiefly formed the garrison of that place, are fine men, and certainly fought with great courage. Much has been said of naval actions, but there is no truth in any of the accounts. The Greeks are better sailors than the Turks, but no action has been fought since the beginning of the war, if it is understood by action that there is risk and loss on both sides. The Greeks, however, have done wonders with their fleet. They have destroyed many large ships, and, in the month of February last, with twenty-three brigs, they out-manoeuvred the Turkish fleet of sixty sail, and threw provisions into Missolonghi. This, though done by seamanship, and not fighting, was called a great battle and a great victory. I was within two miles of the fleets, and the cannonade for six hours was tremendous; but when I spoke to Miaoulis the following morning he told me he had not lost a man in his fleet."[A]

[Footnote A: "Despatches of the Duke of Wellington," vol. iii., p.

338.]

During the summer and winter following the fall of Missolonghi a series of small disasters, the aggregate of which was by no means small, befel the Greeks. It was the opinion of all parties, and admitted even by jealous rivals, that the tottering cause of independence was only sustained by the constant and eager expectation of the arrival of the powerful fleet which was supposed to be on its way to the Archipelago, under the able leadership of Lord Cochrane, the world-famous champion of Chilian and Brazilian freedom.

His approach was hardly more a cause of hope to the Greeks than a subject of fear to the Turks. No sooner was it publicly known that he had espoused the cause of the insurgents than angry complaints were made by the Turkish Government to the British ministry, and Mr.

Canning, then Foreign Secretary, had more than once to avow that the authorities in England knew nothing of his movements, and had done all that the law rendered possible to restrain him. He had also to promise that everything legal should be done to keep him in check on his arrival in Greek waters. "We have heard," he wrote in August to his cousin, Mr. Stratford Canning, afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the amba.s.sador at Constantinople, "that Lord Cochrane is gone to the Mediterranean; whether it be really so, we know not." He then proceeded to define the bearing of English and international law in the existing circ.u.mstances. "Lord Cochrane may enter the Greek service, and continue therein. He may even, as a Greek commander, inst.i.tute (as he did in Brazil) blockades which British officers will respect, and exercise the belligerent rights of search on British merchant-ships, without exposing himself to any other penalty than that which the law will inflict upon him if ever hereafter he shall again bring himself within its reach, and be duly convicted of the offence for the punishment of which that law was enacted. If, indeed, he should do any of such things without a commission he would become a pirate, and liable to the summary justice to which, without reference to the munic.i.p.al laws of his country, he would, as an enemy of the human race, be liable; and liable just as much from the officers of any other country as of his own."[A]

[Footnote A: "Despatches of the Duke of Wellington," vol. iii., pp.

357, 358.]

While that correspondence was going on, Lord Cochrane, as we have seen, was battling with a long series of delays, as irksome to himself as they were unfortunate to the Greeks. It was not till the 14th of September, about eight months after the time fixed for the arrival of his whole fleet, that the first instalment of it, the _Perseverance_, which he had sent on as soon as it was completed, with Captain Abney Hastings as its commander, entered the harbour of Nauplia. On the 26th of October, Captain Hastings wrote a letter, giving curious evidence of the estimate formed by him of the Greek character. It was left at Nauplia and addressed to "the commander of the first American or English vessel that arrives in Greece to join the Greeks." "An apprenticeship in Greece tolerably long," he wrote, "has taught me the risks to which anybody newly arrived, and possessed of some place and power, is exposed. They know me, and they also know that I know them; yet they have not ceased, and never will cease, intriguing to get this vessel out of my hands and into their own, which would be tantamount to ruining her. Knowing all this, I take the liberty of leaving this letter, to be delivered to the first officer that arrives in Greece in the command of a vessel, to caution him not to receive on board his vessel any Greek captain. They will endeavour, under various pretences, to introduce themselves on board, and when once they have got a footing, they will gradually encroach until they feel themselves strong enough to turn out the original commander. The presence of such men can only be attended with inconvenience, for, if you are obliged to take a certain number of Greek sailors, these captains will render subordination among them impossible by their own irregularity and bad example. If you want seamen, take some from Hydra, Spetzas, Kranidi, or Poros. The Psarians may be trusted in very small numbers. Take a few men from one, a few from another island, and thus you will be best enabled to establish some kind of discipline. Take a good number of marines. Choose them from the peasantry and foreign Greeks, and you may make something of them. You must see, sir, that, in this my advice to the first officer arriving in command of a vessel, I can have no interest any further than inasmuch as I wish well to the Greek cause, and therefore do not wish to see a force that can be of great service rendered ineffective by falling into the hands of people totally incapable and unwilling to adopt a single right measure. In Greece there cannot be any military operations except such as are carried on by foreigners in their service."

That letter was written after Captain Hastings had endured a month's annoyance from the trouble brought upon him by the Hydriot officers and seamen who tried to oust him from the command of his fine vessel, whose name was now changed from the _Perseverance_ to the _Karteria_.

Unfortunately, his letter, left at Nauplia, did not reach the captain of the next reinforcement, the American frigate, which arrived at Egina on the 8th of December. "She was one of the finest ships in the world," we are told, "carrying sixty-four guns--long 32-pounders on the main, and 42-pound carronades on the upper deck--and was filled with flour, ammunition, medicines, and marine stores for eighteen months' consumption. The Greeks contemplated her with delight, but, upon the departure of the American officers and seamen who navigated her out, they discovered that she would be more embarra.s.sing than useful to them. To manage vessels of such a size was beyond their capacity, and the mutual jealousy of the islanders suggested to the Government the absurd notion of putting the frigate into commission, Hydra, Spetzas, and the Psarian community being desired to send quotas of men. This plan was now found to be impracticable. Repeated fights occurred on board. The ship was twice in danger of being wrecked at Egina, and at Poros she actually drifted ash.o.r.e, luckily on soft mud.

She was finally given up to Miaoulis, with a Hydriot crew of his own selection."[A]

[Footnote A: Gordon, vol. ii., p. 326.]

This frigate, christened the _h.e.l.las_, came too late to be of much service to Admiral Miaoulis, before the arrival of Lord Cochrane. In the previous summer and autumn, however, he had been hara.s.sing and keeping at bay the Turkish and Egyptian fleets--work in which Hastings was in time to a.s.sist him.

Andreas Miaoulis, one of the least obtrusive, was almost the worthiest of all the Greek patriots. During five years he had never ceased to do the best that it was possible for him to do with the bad materials at his disposal. When the Greek Revolution was at its height, he had contributed largely to its success; and in the ensuing years of disaster upon land, he had maintained its dignity on the sea by offering bold resistance to the great naval power of the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleets. No better proof of his patriotism could be given than in the zeal with which he surrendered to Lord Cochrane the leadership of the fleet which had devolved upon him for so long and been so ably conducted by him. "I received four days ago," he wrote from Poros on the 23rd of February, 1827, "your amiable letter of the 19th of last month, and my great satisfaction at the announcement of your approaching arrival in Greece is joined with a special pleasure at the honour you do me in a.s.sociating me with your important operations. I shall be happy, my admiral, if, in serving you, I can do my duty. I await you with impatience."

Just a month before that, on the 23rd of January, a like letter of congratulation was addressed to Lord Cochrane from Egina by the Governing Commission of Greece. "The intelligence of your speedy coming to Greece," they said, "has awakened the liveliest joy and satisfaction, and has already begun to rekindle in the hearts of the Greeks that enthusiasm which is the most powerful weapon and the surest support of a nation that has devoted itself to the recovery of its most sacred rights. The Government of Greece is waiting with the utmost impatience for the most zealous defender of the nation's liberty. It hopes to see you in its midst as soon as possible after your arrival at Hydra, and then to make you acquainted with the actual state of Greece, and to furnish you with all the means in its power for the achievement of the grand results proposed by your lordship."

The letter was signed by Andreas Zaimes, as President of the Commission, and by seven of its members, among whom were Mavromichales, or Petro-Bey, who, with Zaimes and two others, represented the Morea, Spiridion Trikoupes, the deputy for Roumelia, Zamados from Hydra, Monarchides from Psara, and Demetrakopoulos from the islands of the Egean Sea.

By the same body was issued, on the 21st of February, a preliminary commission, intended to protect him in case of any opposition being raised to his progress by the authorities of other nations. "The Governing Commission of Greece," it was written, "makes known that Admiral Lord Cochrane is recognised as being in the service of Greece, and accordingly has the permission of the Government to hoist the Greek flag on all the vessels that are under his command. He has power, also, to fight the enemies of Greece to the utmost of his power. Therefore the officers of neutral powers, being informed of this, are implored, not only to offer no opposition to his movements, but also, if necessary, to supply him with any a.s.sistance he may require, seeing that it is our custom to do the same to all friendly nations." Armed with this doc.u.ment, and provided with the necessary means by the Philh.e.l.lenes of England, France, and Switzerland, Lord Cochrane proceeded from Ma.r.s.eilles to Greece.

APPENDIX.

I.

(Page 22.)

The following "Resume of the Services of the late Earl of Dundonald, none of which have been Requited or Officially Recognized," was written by his son, one of the authors of the present work, and printed for private circulation in 1861.

1. The destruction of three heavily-armed French corvettes, near the mouth of the Garonne, the crew of Lord Cochrane's frigate, _Pallas_, being at the time, with the exception of forty men, engaged in cutting out the _Tapageuse_, lying under the protection of two batteries thirty miles up the river, in which operation they were also successful, four ships of war being thus captured or destroyed in a single day. For these services Lord Cochrane obtained nothing but his share of the _Tapageuse_, sold by auction for a trifling sum, the Government refusing to purchase her as a ship of war, though of admirable build and construction. Contrary to the usual rule, no ship ever taken by Lord Cochrane, throughout his whole career, was ever allowed to be bought into the navy. For the corvettes, which Lord Cochrane destroyed with so small a crew, he never received reward or thanks, the alleged reason being, that, having become wrecks, they were not in existence, and therefore could not have value attached to them. This decision of the Admiralty was contrary to custom, as admitted to the present day. In the late Russian war a gunboat of the enemy having been driven on sh.o.r.e and wrecked, compensation is said to have been awarded to the officers and crew of the British vessel which drove her on sh.o.r.e. The importance of wrecking a gunboat, in comparison with the destruction of three fast-sailing ships, which were picking up our merchantmen, in all directions, needs no comment.

2. Lord Cochrane's services on the coast of Catalonia, of which Lord Collingwood, then commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, testified of his lordship to the Admiralty that by his energy and foresight he had, with a single frigate, stopped a French army from occupying Eastern Spain. The services by which this was effected were as follows:--Preventing the reinforcement of the French garrison in Barcelona, by hara.s.sing the newly-arrived troops in their march along the coast, and organising and a.s.sisting the Spanish militia to oppose their progress, Lord Cochrane himself capturing one of their forts on sh.o.r.e, and taking the garrison prisoners.

On the approach of a powerful French _corps d'armee_ towards Barcelona, Lord Cochrane blew up the roads along the coast, and taught the Spanish peasantry how to do so inland. By blowing up the cliff roads, near Mongat, Lord Cochrane interposed an insurmountable obstacle between the army and its artillery, capturing and throwing into the sea a considerable number of field-pieces, so that the operations of the French were rendered nugatory. For these services, Lord Cochrane, notwithstanding the strong representations of Lord Collingwood to the Board of Admiralty, neither received thanks nor reward of any kind; notwithstanding that whilst so engaged, and that voluntarily, in successfully accomplishing the work of an army, he patriotically gave up all chances of prize money, though easily to be obtained by cruising after the enemy's vessels. In place of this, he neither searched for nor captured a single prize, whilst engaged in hara.s.sing the French army on sh.o.r.e, devoting his whole energies towards the enterprise which he considered most conducive to the interests of his country.

3. Having effected his object, Lord Cochrane sailed for the Gulf of Lyons, with the intention of cutting off the enemy's sh.o.r.e communications. This he accomplished by destroying their signal stations, telegraphs, and sh.o.r.e batteries along nearly the whole coast, navigating his frigate with perfect safety throughout this proverbially perilous part of the Mediterranean. In order further to paralyse the enemy's movements, Lord Cochrane made a practice of burning paper near the demolished stations, so as to deceive the French into the belief that he had burned their signal books; he rightly judging that from this circ.u.mstance they might not deem it necessary to alter their code of signals. The ruse succeeded, and, transmitting the signal books to Lord Collingwood, then watching the enemy's preparations in Toulon, the commander-in-chief was thus fully apprised, by the enemy's signals, not only of all their naval movements, but also of the position and movements of all British ships of war on the French coast. Lord Cochrane's single frigate thus performed the work of many vessels of observation, and Lord Collingwood testified of him to the Admiralty that "his resources seemed to have no end." Notwithstanding this testimony from his commander-in-chief, Lord Cochrane neither received reward nor thanks for the service rendered.

4. On his return to the Spanish coast, Lord Cochrane found the French besieging Rosas, the Spaniards maintaining possession of the citadel, whilst Fort Trinidad had just been evacuated by the British officer who had been co-operating with the Spaniards in the larger fortress.

Lord Cochrane, believing that if Fort Trinidad were held till reinforcements arrived, the French must be compelled to raise the siege of Rosas, persuaded the Spanish Governor not to surrender, as he was about to do, on its evacuation by the British officer aforesaid, and threw himself into the fort with a detachment from the seamen and marines of the _Imperieuse_, with which frigate he maintained uninterrupted communication, in spite of the enemy, who, on ascertaining it to be Lord Cochrane who was keeping them at bay, redoubled their efforts to capture the fort, the gallant defence of which is amongst the most remarkable events of naval warfare. Lord Cochrane held Fort Trinidad till, the Spaniards surrendering the citadel, he would not allow his men to run further risk in their behalf, and withdrew the seamen and marines in safety. For this remarkable exploit Lord Cochrane, though himself severely wounded, neither received reward nor thanks, except from Lord Collingwood, who again, without effect, warmly applauded his gallantry to the Admiralty.

5. Immediately on his arrival at Plymouth, on leave of absence in consequence of ill health from his extraordinary exertions, Lord Cochrane was immediately summoned by the Admiralty to Whitehall, and asked for a plan whereby the French fleet in Basque Roads, then threatening our West India possessions, might be destroyed at one blow; this extraordinary request from a junior captain, after the most experienced officers in the navy had p.r.o.nounced its impracticability, forcibly proving the very high opinion entertained by the Admiralty of Lord Cochrane's skill and resources. He gave in a plan, and was ordered to execute it, which order he reluctantly obeyed, having done all in his power to decline an invidious command, for fear of arousing the jealousy of officers to whom he was junior in the service. What followed is matter of history, and needs not to be recapitulated.

Yet for the destruction of that powerful armament he neither received reward nor thanks from the Admiralty, though rewarded by his sovereign with the highest order of the Bath, a distinction which marked his Majesty's sense of the important service rendered.

Nine years afterwards head money was awarded to the whole fleet, of which only the vessels directed by Lord Cochrane and a few sent afterwards, when too late for effective measures, took part in the action. The alleged reason of this award was that the _Calcutta_, one of the ships driven ash.o.r.e by Lord Cochrane, did not surrender to him, but to ships sent to his a.s.sistance. This was not true, though after protracted deliberation so ruled by the Admiralty Court, and officers now living and present in the action have recently come forward to testify to the ship being in Lord Cochrane's possession before the arrival of the ships which subsequently came to his a.s.sistance. A small sum was therefore only awarded to him as a junior captain, in common with those who had been spectators only, and this he declined to receive. Such was his recompense for a service to the high merit of which Napoleon himself afterwards testified in the warmest manner; and it may be mentioned as a further testimony that a French Court Martial shot Captain Lafont, the commander of the _Calcutta_, because he surrendered to a vessel of inferior power, viz., Lord Cochrane's frigate, the _Imperieuse_ of forty-four guns, the _Calcutta_ carrying sixty guns.[A]

[Footnote A: Captain Lafont was shot on board the _Ocean_, on September 9, 1809, _for surrendering the Calcutta to a ship of inferior force_, thus proving that she surrendered to Lord Cochrane alone, though Sir William Scott ruled in opposition to the facts adopted by the French Court Martial, which condemned Captain Lafont to death for the act. The surrender to Lord Cochrane alone is further proved by the additional fact, that the captains of the _Ville de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, which _did_ surrender to the other ships in conjunction with Lord Cochrane's frigate, were not even accused, much less punished for so doing.]

The exploits of Lord Cochrane in the _Speedy_ and _Pallas_ are too well known in naval history to require recapitulation, and of these it may be said that the numerous prizes captured by these vessels const.i.tuted their own reward. It may here be mentioned in confirmation of what has previously been said, that the _Gamo_, a magnificent xebeque frigate of thirty-two guns, was not allowed to be bought into the navy, but was sold for a small sum to one of the piratical Barbary States, notwithstanding that Lord Cochrane had said that if he were allowed to have her in place of the _Speedy_, then in a very dilapidated condition, he would sweep the Mediterranean of the enemy's cruisers and privateers. His capacity so to do may be judged from what he effected with the _Speedy_, mounting only fourteen 4-pounders.

With regard to the services previously enumerated, the case is different, notwithstanding their national importance in comparison with his minor acts, which may be cla.s.sed as brilliant exploits only.

But that no reward should have been conferred for doing effectively the work of an army, and that without the cost of a shilling to the nation beyond the ordinary expenditure of a small frigate, necessary to be disbursed whether she performed any effective service or not, is a neglect which, unless repaired in the persons of his successors, will for ever remain a blot on the British Government. Still more so will the worse neglect of not having in any way rewarded him for the destruction of the French fleet in Basque Roads, for though only four ships were destroyed at the moment, the whole fleet of the enemy was so damaged by having been driven on sh.o.r.e from terror of the explosive vessel, fired with Lord Cochrane's own hand, that it eventually became a wreck; and thus our West India commerce, then the most important branch of national export and import, was in a month after Lord Cochrane's arrival from the Mediterranean relieved from the panic which paralysed it, and restored to its wonted security;--a service which can only be estimated by the gloom and panic which had previously pervaded the whole country.

Were reference made to the pension list, and note taken of the pensions granted to other officers and their successors for services which in point of national importance do not admit of comparison with those of Lord Cochrane, the present generation would be surprised at the national ingrat.i.tude manifested towards one, who, in his great exploits, had so patriotically sacrificed every consideration of private interest to his country's service. His cruise in the _Imperieuse_, which has no parallel in naval history, procured for Lord Cochrane nothing whatever but shattered health from the incessant anxiety and exertion he had undergone in the profitless but high-minded course he adopted to thwart the French in their attempts to establish a permanent footing in Eastern Spain. His exploits in Basque Roads procured him nothing but absolute ruin; for, from his refusal as a Member of Parliament to acquiesce in a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, even though the same thanks were promised to himself, may be dated that active political persecution which commenced by depriving him of further naval employment and did not cease till it had accomplished his utter ruin, even to striking his name out of the _Navy List_.