The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume II Part 5

'"My Dear Northbrook,

'"I have received and read this morning Sir Cooper Key's very interesting paper on an expedition to Khartoum. I write, however, to suggest that it would be a great advantage if two suggestions it contains were to be fully examined and developed. (1) The _small_ river expedition which he thinks practicable. (2) The small desert expedition from Korosko to which he also adverts as an auxiliary method.... Clear as is the case for the railway from Suakim, as against the large expedition by the Nile, in every other view it is attended with the most formidable difficulties of a moral and political kind ... whether the 'turning of the first sod' of a Soudan railway will not be the subst.i.tution for an Egyptian domination there, of an English domination ... more unnatural, more costly, more destructive, and altogether without foundation in public right. It would be an immense advantage that the expedition (should one be needed) should be one occupying little time, and _leaving no trace behind it_.

'"Yours sincerely, '"W. E. Gladstone."

'Of this letter a copy was made by Edward Hamilton, and enclosed to me with an autograph letter from Mr. Gladstone.

'On May 31st I had received a further letter from Mr. Gladstone about the Soudan expedition, in which he said: "Suakim and Berber route has utterly beaten Nile route for a large expedition.... But the question of a small expedition has hardly yet been touched, while some believe Gordon is or will be free, and there need be no expedition at all." I sent this letter to Lord Northbrook, and to Lord Hartington, pointing out that Colonel Sartorius had written a letter to the papers in favour of an expedition of a thousand picked men armed with repeating rifles; and after receiving replies, I wrote to Mr. Gladstone on June 4th that I had not had much encouragement from Hartington and Northbrook, the fact being that Hartington was determined on giving Wolseley his big job. [Footnote: See _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 395.]

'On June 6th Lord Granville called a meeting to ask us whether, Waddington having now agreed to all our demands, we could devise some plan of getting out of them. He said that for his own part he should not have asked the question, but that Hartington had suggested it.... He said: "I must rather complain of Hartington's conduct--from so intimate a friend. If it had been Dodson I should have been very angry." After such an introduction, the meeting could hardly come to a conclusion favourable to Hartington's views.

'On June 9th Sir Henry Ponsonby came to see me before the Cabinet, wishing to talk to me before he spoke to any other member, as the Queen thought that I was the most in agreement with her views, which was not the case, as regarded evacuation. He discussed with me two points: First the term of years, as to which I explained that, under the agreement, if at the end of three and a half years any one Power thought we had better stay, and we ourselves wished to stay, then we could stay. It was not my wish that we should. Secondly, as to the union of Bulgaria and East Roumelia, about which I did not care, and as to which I suggested that the Queen should propose to Lord Granville to take counsel with Austria. [Footnote: The union took place in 1885.] At the Cabinet which followed we discussed the words of our promise to lay our French agreements before Parliament, and also our answer as to the Turks and Suakim. The French having written us a disagreeable despatch, we agreed that they must be made to take it back.

'On the next day, June 10th, there was a Cabinet to begin the railway from Suakim. and to consider the draft despatch to Waddington, and as the Government at this time was not very strong, it was decided to leave for our successors a Cabinet minute upon the subject of our relations at this time with France. After the Cabinet I had to see Mr. Gladstone from Lord Granville upon the question whether we should insist on a casting vote on the Caisse. Mr.

Gladstone, against the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet, replied: "No, not to the point of breaking off."'

On June 12th Sir Charles made two notes in his Diary of that date:

'I think that if Mr. Gladstone was to stay in, and live on, we should come as regards Egypt to evacuation and neutralization. Under the Tories, or under Hartington, the _status quo_ may be tried for a long time.'

'When Bismarck offered Egypt to Dizzy, it was in order to embroil England with France.'

III.

From this point onwards in the Memoir the focus of the Egyptian question changes; attention is centred on the diplomatic questions arising out of the financial problem.

As between England and France the issue concerned itself with the proposal to pay less than the promised interest on previously existing loans. The French view, expressed through M. Barrere, the French agent in Egypt, was that interest need not be reduced; the alternative view was that the bondholders must make a sacrifice of part of their interest, at any rate for some period of years, in return for the better security they were obtaining.

'On July 3rd Barrere called and explained to me a scheme of his on Egyptian finance, in which he was now highly skilled, having been French Agent in Egypt for some time. I put the matter before Lord Granville, who sent it to Mr. Gladstone and Childers. Barrere argued that it was not necessary to reduce interest, or, to use the slang of the moment, to "cut the coupon." We called a meeting of the Commons Ministers, and Chamberlain announced that he should resign if the coupon were not cut.

'July 18th, 1884.--We had virtually decided on declaring Egypt bankrupt in order to force the hands of the French, but Waddington, at a meeting with Childers, had broached a plan, which had originally been suggested by the Germans, for a temporary reduction of interest, to be reconsidered at the end of a certain number of years.' (These proposals were discussed at the Conference, which met in the latter half of July, held seven sittings, and then broke down without arriving at a conclusion on August 1st.) 'The question now raised was--at the end of what number of years? The French said three, and we decided to propose ten; but with a willingness to take six or even five; we advancing 4 1/2 millions instead of 8, or, in other words, leaving out the indemnities due by Egypt. If this arrangement failed, then we were to fall back on bankruptcy.

Harcourt was much against declaring bankruptcy, and in favour of the policy of "scuttle." Hartington was against bankruptcy, and for paying the differences ourselves; so as to force us into annexation.

Spencer, Childers, Chamberlain, and I, were for bankruptcy or for a strong threat of bankruptcy.

'On July 21st there was a meeting of members of the Cabinet after questions, at which Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Hartington, Harcourt, Childers, and I, were present. The French had backed out of their proposals, and we considered a new scheme of Childers's to put all administrative charges in Egypt before interest of debt, a scheme which it was certain that the French would refuse. Harcourt was again violent against bankruptcy, which he announced he thought grossly "illegal," as if there were such a thing as illegality in such affairs.

'On August 2nd there was a full Cabinet, every member being present, and we had to consider whether, the Conference having broken down, Baring should go back to Egypt or remain at the Foreign Office and continue to advise us. Lord Granville proposed that he should remain, and that Malet should go to Egypt. Chamberlain proposed that Goschen should go. Childers proposed J. K. Cross. [Footnote: Under-Secretary for India.] Dufferin was mentioned; then Lord Granville proposed Northbrook. All other names were immediately withdrawn, and Northbrook took time to consider, but evidently meant to go, and decided, I think, in the course of the same evening.

Baring was then called in, and we once more began to chop straw by considering the "ulterior consequences" of the collapse of the Conference--i.e., bankruptcy. Lastly, Gordon was dealt with, and it was decided that a supplementary estimate should be proposed, with the understanding that we should spend more if it was wanted. I wrote to Chamberlain: "We always have two subjects--(a) Conference, (b) Gordon." And he wrote back: "The first always taking up two or three hours; and the second five minutes at the f.a.g end of business."

'On August 3rd I noted "we are going to send Northbrook to Egypt to put down Barrere."

'On August 5th we considered the instructions to Northbrook, or rather whether he should have any at all, and if so, what they should be. Northbrook read us a scheme which he had written, which attempted to conciliate Turkey and Italy, so as to have great naval strength in the Mediterranean and to prevent all chance of a sudden occupation of Egypt by France. We were to express our continued determination not to annex. We were to stay five years at the request of the Sultan. We were again to propose to the Powers those arrangements with regard to the Ca.n.a.l which we had proposed already.

We were to pay the indemnities in stock; and the next coupon in full; and we were to promise for the future not less than 4 per cent, on privileged stocks, and not less than 3 per cent, on the Unified debt, while we were in Egypt. Indian troops were to hold Ma.s.sowah. Harcourt, in reply, read a written counter-statement, again proposing to "scuttle," and again threatening us that we should have war with France. Hartington again spoke for a guarantee by us of the whole Egyptian debt. After Hartington's observations the discussion was, as usual, adjourned. Chamberlain and I decided that we would ask for our old term of three and a half years'

occupation, as against Northbrook's five. Next came Gordon, and Hartington proposed that we should embody some militia.

'On August 6th there was another Cabinet, and the first question was that of Northbrook's scheme. Lord Granville agreed to a temporary use of Turkish troops provided that they were to leave Egypt when we left. Chamberlain would not agree, and wished to stick to Northbrook's phrase only inviting "co-operation." This view prevailed, and it was decided that if the Turks proposed to send a commissioner, we were to refuse. But the question of troops was really left open for more discussion. Next came the question of an advance of nearly a million which had been made by Rothschild to Egypt, and we asked him, as a favour to ourselves, to let it run, which was all he wanted us to do. Northbrook, who is not strong, had been a good deal fatigued with the discussion on his scheme, and instead of sleeping (his usual practice at a Cabinet) on this occasion fainted, and we had to get up and look after him at this point.

'On August 26th I received a letter from Hartington, saying that Northbrook was going to Osborne at the end of the week, and starting for Egypt from there. Hartington told me he was coming up to meet him, and he afterwards wrote to me to fix an appointment at the War Office on the 29th. This I kept. Northbrook was deplorably weak. He had returned from Rosebery's completely under the influence of Mr.

Gladstone's pro-French views. [Footnote: At Dalmeny Lord Northbrook "met Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone." See Life of Lord Northbrook, p. 190.]

He had settled to spend a day at Walmer, and had telegraphed to Lord Lyons to meet him there. His plan now was to ask the French Government to send a man to Egypt in order that he and the Frenchman might settle matters together. Hartington and I pointed out to him that the Frenchman's instructions from his Government must either be to refuse all reduction of interest, or to consent to it upon obtaining from us a better political position than that given to France by the Anglo-French agreement. We explained to him that it would be impossible for us to tolerate such proposals. I wrote to Chamberlain a full account of the interview.

'September 22nd_.--We decided with reference to Egyptian finance that Chamberlain should write a strong letter to Lord Granville protesting against any British advance to Egypt, unless accompanied by a cutting of the coupon. He did so, and on September 25th sent me a copy, and I sent the copy to Childers, and wrote myself to Lord Granville. On the 27th I received a memorandum from Chamberlain as to Lord Granville, Lord Derby, and Bismarck.

'Chamberlain's memorandum was a fierce denunciation of the principles laid down in Northbrook's despatch No. 4, dated September 13th, and received September 22nd.' [Footnote: Lord Northbrook had arrived in Egypt.]

Controversy now raged over Lord Northbrook's scheme, and added to the difficulties of the Cabinet, which was divided on the question of lowering or not lowering the rate of interest.

'On 19th November the second matter mentioned was Northbrook's scheme, against which I fought hard.... I pointed out that early in April, when Mr. Gladstone had wished to borrow on the future value of the Ca.n.a.l shares, that proposal had not been accepted, and we laid down the principle that it was for the bondholders to make sacrifices. On July 3rd we had decided that the coupon must be "cut." On July 18th the whole Cabinet had taken the same view except Harcourt and the Chancellor, and four members--Childers, Spencer, Chamberlain, and I--had advocated distinct bankruptcy. On August 2nd we had seen Baring to lay our plans for bankruptcy. On August 5th Northbrook himself had proposed a reduction of the interest. On August 29th there had been a general agreement to the same effect.

Northbrook's policy had enormously sent up Egyptian stocks. After my strong observations the opinions stood: Mr. Gladstone, Childers, Chamberlain, Harcourt, Trevelyan, and Dilke against Northbrook's scheme; for it, Lord Granville, the Chancellor, Hartington, Spencer, Kimberley, Derby, Carlingford, and Northbrook himself. All the Lords on one side, curiously enough, and all the Sirs and Mr.'s on the other; eight to six against us. But I noted: "Mr. Gladstone is so strong that we shall win." "As we did."' [Footnote: Letter from Sir Charles to Mr. Brett (afterwards Lord Esher):

Local Government Board, Whitehall, _November_ 19_th_, 1884.

'_My_ policy has always been bankruptcy and stand the shot, and if we had stuck to that we should have had no trouble with the Powers; but indiscretions have made that difficult. It is not pleasant to be called in too late. I quite agree in your general view, but how can the bondholder be got to make sacrifices without his consent?']

'At the meeting of the Cabinet of December 2nd, Egyptian finance again came up. We were informed that Prince Bismarck suggested oral communications among amba.s.sadors. For this Malet proposed Paris, and we replied Berlin.'

IV.

During this time the Government continued to waver as to the Soudan expedition.

On June 21st

'with regard to Gordon it was decided to wait ten days before settling anything, and to see whether we heard from him in reply to the silly questions which had been asked.'

On June 27th came the definitive news that Berber had fallen on May 26th. On July 5th

'We discussed the Egyptian army of the future, and then the question of whether we should send an expedition to Khartoum, as to which we again could come to no decision; Mr. Gladstone still opposing.'

Dilke, backed by Chamberlain, was still pressing the military solution which he favoured. On July 16th

'Hartington on this occasion gave up the Berber-Suakim route, and pressed for a decision as to an immediate expedition by the Nile. He was supported by the Chancellor, Northbrook, Carlingford, and Dodson. Mr. Gladstone, Harcourt, and Childers opposed.

'Chamberlain and I opposed a large expedition by the Nile, and supported a small expedition, under the control of the navy, with a body of picked men. Baring was called in about the police in Egypt, and his views in support of Nubar were approved. Nubar was to have his own way in the appointment of Inspectors of Police in Egypt.'

'On July 22nd we found that Mr. Gladstone had again taken up Zebehr, and was anxious to send him to Khartoum in order to avoid a British expedition.

'On July 25th there was a full Cabinet, Spencer being present, which first discussed the Conference and then the Gordon expedition, for which for the first time a large majority of the Cabinet p.r.o.nounced.

The issue was narrowed down to that of sending some sort of British force to or towards Dongola; and this was supported by Hartington, the Chancellor, Derby, Northbrook, Spencer, Carlingford, Dodson, Chamberlain, and me, while on the other side were only Mr.

Gladstone, Harcourt, and Kimberley. Lord Granville said nothing. By the stoutness of their resistance the three for the moment prevailed over the nine.

'On July 31st a storm was brewing about Gordon, and Harcourt went about declaring that the Government would break up upon the question. On the next day, August 1st, a way out of the difficulty was found in an agreement that we should ask for a small vote of credit, which we were to use or not as should be thought right later.'

It must be remembered that communications with Gordon were now interrupted, though occasionally renewed, and this added to the confusion.

'On September 17th we received a telegram from Gordon which looked as though he were perfectly mad, although some of the other telegrams from him sent at the same time were sane enough.'

Since Parliament had risen and the Cabinet scattered, preparations had been going on apace.