The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 51

III.

From July 11th it was clear that France had decided to do nothing.

England's course of action was still undecided.

'Although reparation at Alexandria was being virtually exacted by the bombardment, in spite of this having been put only on the safety of the fleet and the defiance of Beauchamp Seymour's orders, yet it had not, on account of Mr. Gladstone's opposition, up to this time been settled that we should land troops. There was now no hope that the threat which the French had proposed to us, and which we had accepted in January, declaring that "the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed ... would certainly find England and France united to oppose them," would be acted upon; but there was still some idea that Turkish troops might be landed under strict safeguards for supervision. On July 11th Chamberlain suggested to Lord Granville that Lord Ampthill should be sent to Varzin to see Bismarck, and ask him what intervention would be best if Turkish failed. This suggestion was not accepted, but Lord Granville wrote to the German Amba.s.sador to the same effect.

'Mr. Gladstone was in a fighting humour on the next day, July 12th. I have the notes on which he made his speech, which give all the heads, and are interesting to compare with the speech as it stands in Hansard. He put our defence upon "the safety of the fleet" and "safety of Europeans throughout the East." He was indignant, in reply to Gourley, about the bondholders, and, in reply to Lawson, about our "drifting into war," and he certainly believed, as I believed at that moment, that the Alexandria ma.s.sacres had been the work of Arabi, for one of his notes is: "International atrocity. Wholesale ma.s.sacre of the people, to overrule the people of that country." [Footnote: Sir Charles, as has been said, did not adhere to his view concerning Arabi's responsibility.]

'On July 13th the Foreign Office prepared a most elaborate despatch from Lord Granville to Lord Dufferin, explaining the whole position of affairs in Egypt. The despatch was much knocked about by Chamberlain and myself. It had recited how an officer and two men of our fleet had been killed, another officer wounded, the British Consul dragged out of his carriage and severely injured; six British-born subjects killed, and the Greek Consul-General beaten; but it had omitted the important fact that a French Consular-Dragoman, and one, if not two men of the French fleet, and several other French subjects had been killed. The chief alterations, however, which we made, or tried to make, in the despatch were in the direction of omitting all reference to the financial engagements of Egypt, which we were most unwilling to take upon ourselves in any manner. I actively pursued the question of the outrages upon British subjects at Alexandria and of compensation.

We went into the case of Marshal Haynau, that of Don Pacifico, [Footnote: Both cases furnished precedents for dealing with an instance in which foreigners had been maltreated when visiting or residing in another country. Marshal Haynau, the Austrian General infamous for his brutalities in Italy (especially at Brescia) and in Hungary in 1848, came to England on a private visit in 1850, went to see Barclay and Perkins' brewery in Southwark, and was mobbed by the employees. The Queen, in response to indignant remonstrance by the Austrian Government, pressed the sending of a note of apology and regret for this maltreatment of "a distinguished foreigner." Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Minister in Lord John Russell's Ministry, sent the Note, but added a paragraph which indicated that, in his personal opinion, the brewery men were justified in their action, and that Haynau had acted improperly in coming to this country at all, knowing the feeling against him here.

Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew who had settled in Athens, was, as a native of Gibraltar, a British subject. Having had his house pillaged by a Greek mob, he appealed to the Home Government, and Lord Palmerston sent the Fleet to the Piraeus to enforce his demand for settlement of the claim put in. Greece appealed to Russia and France, and part of Don Pacifico's claim was referred to arbitration by a Convention of the Powers signed in London. Our Minister at Athens continued to take measures which resulted in the Greek Government giving way, and, in consequence, the French Amba.s.sador was recalled, while Russia threatened to recall Baron Brunnow. It was in the Don Pacifico debate that Lord Palmerston made his great speech of five hours, containing the famous _Civis Roma.n.u.s sum_, which turned the House of Commons in his favour, and saved him from defeat by a majority of forty-six.] and others mentioned in a memorandum printed for the use of the Foreign Office in August, 1877; but the inquiry afterwards held broke down our case.

'On July 14th the Admiralty and War Office fell out; the Admiralty maintaining that they could put down all the trouble in Egypt by the employment of a few marines commanded by an Admiral, whereas the War Office had set their hearts upon a great expedition under Wolseley.

'On July 16th the German Amba.s.sador complained of my having stated in the House of Commons that Germany approved our action, not denying the fact that she did, but saying that such "announcements made confidential communications impossible," and I had to reply that, while Austria had approved and Germany not disapproved, I was not justified in stating that Germany had approved, although there had been "circ.u.mstances calculated to make me believe that such had been the case." On July 16th Wolff wrote to me from the country: "I suppose Bright has resigned. _Si sic omnes_ except yourself." Bright had resigned, and there were some who were anxious that I should be put into the Cabinet in his place, but I was not one of them. On July 17th Wilfrid Blunt was at the window of the St. James's Club in Piccadilly, and, seeing me pa.s.s, cried out to Lord Blandford and others who were with him: "There's Dilke that has done it all." That seemed to me to be an answer to those who wanted me put in in the place of Bright.

"The great peace man goes out, and they want-Mr. Gladstone to put in a man who is looked upon as a war man, although he thinks he is not and thinks he is right." ...

'On July 18th I received a letter from Labouchere which was characteristic: "Dear Dilke,--I am one of those who regretted that the late Government did not seize Egypt.... Many on our side--being fools --regret that we ever interfered in Egypt.... Personally I think ...

unless you seize upon the opportunity ... to establish yourselves permanently in Egypt, you all deserve to be turned out of office.

Success is everything. This is the 'moral law' as understood by the English nation. Bombard any place, but show a _quid pro quo_." There was, however, no member of the Government, unless it was Lord Hartington, who held these views, and not one who at this moment even contemplated a permanent occupation, though I was fearful that unless the matter was fairly faced, in advance, upon the lines which I had suggested, a permanent occupation would be set on foot.

'Late on July 18th there was a Cabinet to discuss a proposal from me to tell Dufferin in a "personal" telegram that we should not object to Italy being third with England and France; which was afterwards expanded into a direct invitation, upon my suggestion, for Italy to go with us without France, which Italy declined. [Footnote: The reason for Italy's refusal will be found explained in the Appendix to this chapter (p. 477) in a letter from Baron Blanc, who was Italian Amba.s.sador at Constantinople.]

'After the sitting Lord Granville told me that Mr. Gladstone's letter to Bright about his resignation was far from pleasant in tone, and had put an end to a very long friendship. Morley, in his _Life of Gladstone_, states the contrary, but he is wrong. [Footnote: _Life of Gladstone_, iii. 83-90.]

'On July 19th I suggested that Arabi had probably told the people in Cairo that he had defeated us at Alexandria, and that it would be well to inform the Khedive, and through him the Governor of Cairo, that intervention was about to take place on a scale which would make resistance ridiculous, and Lord Granville asked Sinadino to do this.

'On July 20th the German first secretary came to me about Bismarck's complaint of my speech, and Lord Granville wrote back in reply to my report of the conversation: "I do not think much of Stumm's observations.... There is something in Bob Lowe's maxim, never to admit anything; but if you do, I have always found it better to shut the admission against any rejoinder." After all, Count Munster admitted that we had the "moral support" of Germany, and I could not myself see much difference between "moral support" and "approval."

Lord Granville even reported in writing that we had Bismarck's "good wishes, good will, and moral support," and I certainly could not see that I was wrong. The last position of all of Bismarck was that we were not justified in saying even "moral support," but that we had his "best wishes," I think he must have had a touch of gout at the moment when he read my speech.

'A Cabinet was to have been held early on July 20th to decide to send out an army corps; Mr. Gladstone forgot to call it, and it had to be brought together suddenly (some members being absent), and agreed to the proposal for a vote of credit. Mr. Gladstone informed his colleagues that he should not meet Parliament again in February, but should leave the House of Commons after the Autumn Session, if not before it. Late at night there came the news that Arabi had turned the salt water from the Lake into the great fresh--water ca.n.a.l, and I had to go to inform Mr. Gladstone and Childers in their rooms. Their replies were full of character. Mr. Gladstone dramatically shivered, and said with a grimace: "What a wicked wretch!" Childers said: "How clever!"

'Early in the afternoon of Sat.u.r.day, July 22nd, when the House of Commons sat, I was two hours in Mr. Gladstone's room with Lord Granville, Northbrook, and Childers. There had been a mistake in the vote of credit, really a blunder of 1,300,000; not of 1,000,000 only, as was afterwards pretended, for the estimate had been cut down in the meantime. It was entirely Northbrook's fault, ... but Childers, like a good-natured fellow, in spite of their many quarrels, let it rest upon his shoulders, where the public put it. In the course of our conversation it came out that Childers was in hot water with the Queen, and had sent her a letter of apology on the Friday night, Mr.

Gladstone writing at the same time that he himself had nothing to add to what Childers said. Childers broke out against the Duke of Cambridge, who "went chattering about the place, refused to behave as a subordinate, and wrote direct to the Queen." I guessed that the trouble had been either about the employment of the Duke of Connaught or about the sending of the Household Cavalry; both of which had been decided. The Queen likes the Duke of Connaught to be employed, but never to run the slightest risk; and in dealing with soldiers this is a little awkward. The Duke of Cambridge was always a great source of trouble to Governments, Liberal or Conservative, for even Conservative Governments have, from the necessity of the case, to desire military reform. He is essentially not a grandson, as history tells us, but a son of King George III., just such a man as the royal Dukes whose oaths and jollity fill the memoirs of the time of the great war. But the Duke of Cambridge ... knows how to stop all army reform without incurring personal responsibility or personal unpopularity with the public. A distinguished General once said to me: "When we are invaded and the mob storm the War Office, the Duke of Cambridge will address them from the balcony, and, amid tumultuous cheering, shout, 'This is what those clever chaps who have always been talking about army reform and brains have brought us to,' and lead them on to hang the Secretary of State for War."

'On Monday, July 24th, there was a Cabinet to consider the obstruction of the French, who were trying to prevent our intervention. I was not called in, but I believe that my suggestion as to Italy was again mentioned, for on Tuesday, the 25th, Lord Granville told me that he had been intending to ask the Italians to go with us, but that the Queen had objected and caused the loss of a day, and that he thought he should be able to ask them on the morrow.

'On July 25th I made a speech which was much liked by the House, and Northcote congratulated me quite as warmly as did our own people. When Mr. Gladstone was finishing his letter to the Queen late at night, Chamberlain asked him to let him look at it, which I never had the "cheek" to do. The phrase about me was "answered the hostile criticisms with marked ability and with the general a.s.sent of the House," and there was no praise of Chamberlain's own speech, which had been spoilt by mine. On this occasion, as in the great Zulu debate in the previous Parliament, when he had been my seconder, it so happened that I took all Chamberlain's points beforehand, and in almost the very words in which he had meant to take them. On the other hand, on occasions when he spoke before me and I had to follow, as, for example, in the famous debate with Randolph Churchill about the Aston riots, [Footnote: At the height of Mr. Chamberlain's influence in Birmingham Lord Randolph Churchill proposed to stand against him, and held a meeting at Aston. Lord Randolph accused Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons of having hired roughs to break up this meeting.] the converse occurred. This was, of course, the inevitable result of our habit of very free and continual conversation.

'When we sounded Paget in advance as to our invitation to the Italians on this evening, he replied that "if we pressed her, swearing she would ne'er consent, she _would_ consent." But, although I afterwards thought and said that I had been amazed at her refusal, my notes of the moment show that I had antic.i.p.ated it.

'On July 27th a new element of disturbance was introduced by the Prince of Wales applying to the Government for leave to take a military command in Egypt. The Queen at once interfered to stop it; some members of the Cabinet consulted together at a sudden meeting in the Cabinet room at Downing Street, to which I was called in, Childers, Northbrook, and Mr. Gladstone being present, and it was decided to back the Queen's refusal. It was agreed between Lord Northbrook, Childers, and myself that for the future I should see all the Admiralty and War Office telegrams.

'At 5.30 there was a regular Cabinet to consider the tardy consent of the Turks to send troops at once. They were informed that circ.u.mstances had changed, and that we must go on with our intervention; but that they would be allowed to occupy forts not at Alexandria.

'One of the first Admiralty telegrams that were brought to me was one which directed the Admiral to inform the Khedive that we were going to restore his authority, which was the most emphatic thing which I had seen.'

On July 29th M. de Freycinet's Government was defeated on a vote of credit for money to send ships to protect the Suez Ca.n.a.l, [Footnote: A new Ministry was formed under M. Duclerc.] and so terminated all possibility of France's partnership in the enterprise. On the same day General Menabrea politely refused an invitation that Italy should co-operate.

But the Turks were still disposed to a.s.sist, on their own terms, and these did not yet make it clear what, if they landed, would be their att.i.tude towards Arabi and his partisans. Accordingly,

'On Monday, July 31st, we had to tell the Turks that if they insisted on going to Alexandria we should sink them, and matters began to look like a second Navarino.

'On Thursday, August 3rd, the Cabinet approved our previous proposals to send instructions to the Admiral not to allow the Turks to land in Egypt until they agreed to all our terms.

'On Tuesday, August 8th, Childers insisted that if Turks landed in Egypt they should not be treated as allied forces, but as a portion of our forces under our General. Lord Granville, Hartington, and Northbrook thought this too strong, and it was left to the Cabinet to decide, and on the next day, Wednesday, the 9th, Harcourt expressed his concurrence with the majority.'

'About this time I had a letter from Dufferin, describing how he had tried to frighten the Sultan by the bogey of an Arab caliph. But Dufferin was at this moment in despair; the face of politics changed too rapidly for Turkish diplomacy, and just as he had succeeded in getting the Turks to send troops to Egypt, as he had been told to do, it was so much too late that we had to tell them that we should sink them if they went--so doubtless the Turks were a little confused in their minds as to what we really wanted.'

The Memoir now carries the story down to the close of the expedition by which Sir Garnet Wolseley destroyed Arabi's power in the Battle of Tel-el- Kebir.

'_August 10th_.--At this moment the Prince of Wales being most anxious as to what was going on in Egypt, and having again failed to obtain the telegrams, I promised that I would write to him daily, or whenever there was anything of importance, and keep him informed, and this I did.

'On August 16th there was a debate in which we defended the general policy of the expedition, and I again have Mr. Gladstone's notes for his reply to Sir Wilfrid Lawson, in which he again a.s.serted that the supporters of Arabi Pasha were not only rebels, but criminals as well, accusing them of misuse of a flag of truce, and of deliberately setting fire to the town of Alexandria.

'On August 17th I had a visit from a brother of the Khedive, Ibrahim Pasha, who said: "I want to go to Egypt. I should be very glad to go as a Sub-Lieutenant, although there may be a little difficulty, for I am a Field-Marshal in the Turkish Army." This modest youth, who looked like the full moon, had been trained at Woolwich, spoke English well, and was a devout Mohammedan, thought that he would be of use to us, but his brother would no more let him land in Egypt than he would any of the other and abler brothers.'

Parliament was prorogued on August 27th.

'On August 28th Mr. Gladstone thought that we should refuse to make a Convention with the Turks, which they had now agreed to. But Lord Granville and I thought that we had better make it for the sake of the effect in Egypt, and Mr. Gladstone half yielding, our willingness was telegraphed. On September 5th, however, Lord Granville told me at Walmer that the Queen was strongly opposed to the Convention, and I noted that this was the first time when I had ever known the Queen and Mr. Gladstone to be agreed upon any subject.

'We took time by the forelock as a Government with regard to the preparation in advance, and, even before our landing in Egypt, for that which was to happen after the revolutionary movement was put down. Sir A. Colvin thought that 4,000 men in addition to the military police would be ample for the security of the country, and Sir E.

Malet appeared to agree. Mr. Gladstone wrote a minute himself upon the future of the country, in which he proposed to act upon all my ideas.

He suggested the banishment of Arabi, a minimum military force '(Egyptian),' a large police force, in which Indian Mohammedans were to be allowed to enlist; but he wished a small British force to remain temporarily in the country--a point to which I was much opposed, inasmuch as I felt certain that if we stayed there at all we should never be able to come away.

'A good deal of Cabinet work fell upon me at this moment because Harcourt buried himself in the New Forest, and Chamberlain went away to Sweden, asking me for a full table of instructions as to what he was to do as to calling upon Kings, inasmuch as, he declared in his letter, I was his _arbiter elegantiarum_. I went down to Birmingham in his absence to see my son' (who was living at Mr. Chamberlain's house). 'Hartington came up to town now and then, but apparently was soon tired of it, as in the middle of September he wrote to me to ask what was the meaning of the Cabinet on the 13th which he meant "to shirk." There were two Governments at this moment--the one consisting of Childers and Northbrook in London, carrying on operations in Egypt; and the other consisting of Lord Granville at Walmer and Mr. Gladstone at Hawarden, connected by the telegraph, explaining them to the Powers.

'During the period of the invasion of Egypt by us I used to meet Childers, Northbrook, and Hartington at the War Office almost every day, when Hartington was in town, and the other two when Hartington was away. Tel-el-Kebir was on September 13th, and we met on that day as well as the days before and immediately after.

'Immediately after Tel-el-Kebir I had from Auberon Herbert a letter, which began: "My dear successful Jingo, whom Heaven confound, though it does not appear to have the least intention of doing so.... How I hate you all! But am bound to admit you have managed your affair up to this point skilfully and well. The G.o.ds, however, do not love, says Horace, people who have three stories to their houses."'

APPENDIX

'The refusal of the Italian Cabinet was afterwards explained to me in a most interesting letter from Baron Blanc, at that time (March, 1888) Italian Amba.s.sador at Constantinople, and afterwards (December, 1893) Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

'"The refusal of the Cabinet of Rome in 1882 to intervene, with England only, as allies in Egypt was a success of French diplomacy, but at the same time a result of the past policy of England.

'"Nothing on the part of England had prepared the Italian Government to believe it possible that England would cease to gravitate towards France in Mediterranean questions, especially when Mr. Gladstone was in power.

The hope that England would join the Italian-German understanding, concluded in principle in 1882, had remained in these early days merely theoretic. The Mancini Cabinet, in doing that which Minghetti, Visconti, Bonghi--the old Right, in short--had not dared to do--that is, in drawing towards the Central Powers--did not go so far as to understand that the rupture of the English-French condominium in Egypt--brought about in 1881- 82 by the appearance on the scene of the Arabi party, secretly pushed from Berlin--offered Italy the chance of leading Gladstone himself to lean on Italy and her allies, and no longer upon Paris and Petersburg; or, if it was understood, faith and courage were wanting.

'"It was an axiom with Menabrea, with Nigra, with Corti, that Italy and England herself could do nothing in the Mediterranean without France, still less do anything against France. The last conversation of Corti with Crispi shows plainly his conviction that a real alliance of Italy and England was a Utopia. How many times after 1870 had not Italy been disappointed in attempts to obtain from England a share of influence in Egypt! How many times had not Italy been sacrificed to the private arrangements of England with France in Egyptian affairs! How could the idea that Germany was to replace France in the Eastern policy of Italy and England have entered into the mind of the Cabinet of Rome when it had not entered into the mind of the Cabinet of St. James's!

'"A thousand financial, journalistic, parliamentary connections attached to France both the Gladstone Cabinet and the Ministry of Mancini--the legal counsel of M. de Lesseps. The dream of treble condominium in Egypt was strong in Mancini and Depretis, as in Minghetti, Visconti, and Cairoli. This dream was encouraged by the Cabinet of Paris, which kept Italy in tow by this vain hope, and also by the fear of fresh French enterprises in Africa, for the French threatened Italy with renewing in Tripoli the precedent of Tunis if Italy broke towards French policy in the East the bonds contracted between them in the Crimean War and the treaties of 1856.