The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 22

He set forth his position in a speech to his const.i.tuents at Kensington on January 9th, 1877. He condemned Lord Derby, who had neither "the energy nor the force of character to fit him for the post of Foreign Secretary,"

and whose policy had left them at the close of 1876 in "absolute isolation." Yet, "on the other hand, he marvelled to see Radicals, for years the enemies of Russian autocracy, propose the immediate adoption of the policy of Canon Liddon and of the Emperor Alexander." [Footnote: Dr.

H. P. Liddon and Dr. Malcolm MacColl were conspicuous as enthusiastic supporters of Mr. Gladstone's campaign.] And he went on to depict what that policy might mean:

"The world could not afford to see 120,000,000 of Slavs united under the sceptre of an absolute despot, holding at Constantinople the strongest position in all Europe, stretching from the Adriatic to Kamskatka and the Behring Straits, and holding in Corea the strongest position in the Pacific." Then he recalled the record of "that Power with which the Liberals of England were to strike alliance--an absolute autocracy of the purest type, the Power which crushed Poland, the Power which crushed Hungary for Austria." And by what methods! The long story of violation "both of the public and the moral law" was repeated, with citation of British Ministers who had spoken in fierce condemnation of, Russian methods; the decoration of Mouravief, the "woman-flogging General," was set off against the promotion of Chefket Pasha. He himself had seen in 1869 "long processions of Polish exiles, who were still being sent by hundreds into the solitudes of Siberia." In Turkestan General Kaufmann had ordered a ma.s.sacre of women and children, and Kaufmann, "loaded with favours by the Emperor Alexander, still ruled in Turkestan." It was a vehement denunciation of the autocracy of Russia, and he notes that he had never before so moved his hearers. To his attack on the Russian Government were added some severe strictures on the barbarities perpetrated by Servians, and by Mr. Gladstone's special favourites, the Montenegrins, inhabitants of "countries whose civilization had not sufficiently progressed to allow of the belief that they were the unselfish champions of an outraged Christianity."

Holding these views, and holding them the more strongly because they were the outcome of personal experience and knowledge laboriously acquired, he was in a considerable degree isolated, not only from the Liberal party as a whole, but even from that more intimate organization whose existence was already recognized in the autumn of 1876, when Mr. Knowles asked him to write in the _Nineteenth Century_ on the "New Party."

His closest a.s.sociate, now and henceforward, was Mr. Chamberlain, who in 1877 stayed a great deal in Sloane Street, and Dilke notes that in February of that year he was giving dinners almost every night to introduce the member for Birmingham to London. But the "New Party," when Mr. Knowles made his unsuccessful request, consisted

'of Chamberlain and myself and Cowen in the House of Commons, and Morley outside of it.... As Chamberlain and Cowen failed to agree upon any subject whatever, the House of Commons portion of the party soon dwindled to two leaders, in the persons of Chamberlain and myself, who, however, picked up one faithful follower in Dillwyn. From September, 1876, to April, 1880, there did exist a very real and very influential, but little numerous, party, consisting of Chamberlain and myself, followed blindly by dear old Dillwyn, and supported in the Press by Morley. As Randolph Churchill afterwards said to me, shaking his head over Balfour's desertion: "When you and Chamberlain were together, your party was not too large." He had begun with four (three regular and one half-attached), and found it certainly one, perhaps two, and I sometimes think three, too many, though Wolff indeed followed him almost as steadily as Dillwyn followed us.'

For a time the "New Party" consisted of six. Mr. Edmund Dwyer Gray, an Irish Nationalist, owner of the _Freeman's Journal_, was of it, but soon dropped out, and for a time Mr. Burt--Father of the House in 1910--was also included.

At the beginning of 1877 summons was sent to a meeting before the opening of Parliament, to which Mr. Chamberlain replied solemnly: "The party will be complete." Further solemnity was added by the holding, at 76, Sloane Street, of a Queen's Speech dinner in due form on the eve of the Session, but--

'the dinner of six members, which a.s.sembled democratically without dressing in order to suit Burt's habits, was not graced by that copy of the Queen's Speech which is sent by Government to the leaders of the regular Opposition.'

The "New Party" of 1876-77 differed notably in one respect from the other small and influential group of which it was the forerunner. It had no leader.

'On Sat.u.r.day, February 17th, Chamberlain dined with the Prince of Wales. In noting the invitation in my diary I put down: "The Prince of Wales has asked Chamberlain to dinner for Sat.u.r.day. I call this 'n.o.bbling my party.'" But the possessive p.r.o.noun with regard to the party was not according to my custom. We always said that the party consisted of three in all--two leaders and a follower--and Dillwyn acknowledged Chamberlain and myself as equal leaders.'

'On July 4th I drove Dillwyn down to Chiswick to the Duke of Devonshire's garden party. The Prince of Wales was there, and gave Dillwyn a very friendly bow, whereupon I asked Dillwyn how he came to know him so well, to which "the party" answered that he had shot pigeons with him; and on my reproaching my old friend for indulging in such sport, he said that he not only shot pigeons, but that the Prince had been so struck with his shooting that he had asked who the old gentleman was "who looked like a Methodist parson and shot like an angel."'

At the beginning of 1877, when they were still six, division existed even in that small group on the burning question of the hour. Mr. Cowen was strongly influenced by his intercourse with a settlement of Poles at Newcastle, and--

'although his anti-Russian views were only the same as my own, yet he allowed them, as I think, without reason, to drive him into a position of support of the Government which from this time forward separated him from the Liberal party.'

None of Sir Charles's other colleagues approached the Eastern Question entirely on its own merits as distinct from party. His study of foreign politics had, however, forced him to understand the issues, and thus his position was rendered difficult: 'I was anti-Russian, and in this with Hartington. On the other hand, I was for avowed intervention in the East, and in this more extreme than Mr. Gladstone.' But at the same time his exceptional competence in the discussion brought him steadily to the front. Without any sacrifice of independent judgment he found himself increasingly consulted.

His Memoir gives, therefore, an interesting picture of the movement of opinion in the Liberal party. At the beginning of the Session, when it was known that Lord Salisbury had advocated active interference in the name of Europe, Sir Charles found that 'only Harcourt and the Duke of Argyll were for strong action in the sense of coercion of Turkey.' The Duke, however, soon made two converts, and Dilke wrote to his brother on January 6th, 1877:

"Lord Granville and Lord Hartington will, I am delighted to say, speak for concerted intervention. The only man who strongly opposed their doing so was Mr. Gladstone, who ran away from his own views." Against this Sir Charles notes later: 'Both at the meeting of Parliament in 1877, and also later on in the Session in the case of his own memorable resolutions.'

'Mr. Gladstone had in private conversation told Harcourt that such a course as European intervention to coerce Turkey "should only be resolved upon after much deliberation." To this Harcourt had retorted: "Well, Mr. Gladstone, if people outside knew what you were saying, they might reflect it was you that hung the bag of powder on the door."'

On February 11th Sir Charles noted, 'Harcourt has got frightened and has gone back,' fearing a division in the House of Commons on which Henry Richard and the peace men would either support the Government or abstain from voting, lest intervention should mean war.

Thus party feeling fluctuated. On February 16th, 1877, Sir Charles's diary recorded that 'the popular name for our Front Bench with the London mob is "Bag and baggage Billy and his long-eared crew."' This showed that 'in the popular mind the personality of Mr. Gladstone had finally triumphed over that of Hartington.'

At this moment Sir Charles's views coincided with those of Lord Hartington to the extent of being anti-Russian, and, as already seen, he was more drawn by personal feeling to him than to any of the various leaders. Mr.

Forster and Mr. Goschen seemed to him inclined to what a letter of Harcourt's called "the old facing-both-ways style," and the magic of Mr.

Gladstone's personality never exercised its spell on Dilke. But he liked Lord Hartington personally, and liked also Lord Hartington's ally, the d.u.c.h.ess of Manchester, who, he says--

'used to try very hard to pick up political information for Lord Hartington; but her own strong Conservative prejudices and her want of clearness of head made her by no means a useful guide, and in fact the wonder to me always was to see how Hartington's strong common sense kept him from making the mistakes into which she always tried by her influence to press him.'

That was written after an interview which Sir Charles had with her, at her request, on January 8th, 1877. The d.u.c.h.ess had read a report of a speech of his, in which 'I lectured on the Franco-German War, and condemned the taking of territory as bound to lead to further wars.' On February 10th he met her again to discuss the difficulties which were beginning to spring up, since Mr. Gladstone's sudden access of activity, as to the leadership of the party. In this matter Sir Charles kept himself 'absolutely independent, going now with one and now with the other, with mere regard to the opinions which they put forward.... I had a full knowledge of what was going on behind the scenes,' although, because he was not in complete agreement with either party among the Liberal leaders, he 'had not the complete confidence of either side.'

This detachment of att.i.tude adds the more weight to the judgment which is pa.s.sed in the following detailed review of the situation as it was in the spring of 1877:

'At this moment' (February 18th, 1877) 'London was a centre of intrigue. But my interest in the Eastern Question had nothing to do with persons, and was an honest one, and I found myself able to act only with those who had no candidate of their own for the leadership of the party, or who, like Lord Granville, were brought to a similar position by the conflict between party loyalty and a personal affection for Mr. Gladstone, and I was able therefore at this moment to act more steadily with Lord Granville than with any other leading member of the Liberal party. He was jealous of Lord Hartington, but he was loyal to him as the party chief. Towards Mr. Gladstone he was affectionate, but not blind.' [Footnote: Sir Charles summarises here a memorandum he drew for Lord Granville for the debate on February 19th, used then and on several other occasions. He pointed out that the Government policy, since the failure of the Conference, of leaving things alone, was safe for the moment, but it did nothing for the Eastern Christians, gave no satisfaction to the demands made in the name of the Queen by Lord Derby on September 21st, 1876, offered no bridge to Russia for the avoidance of war, and therefore left the Turkish Empire and British interests exposed to the gravest danger.

Concerted action was the course Liberals desired.]

'There can be no doubt that many were making use of the Eastern Question for the purpose of advancing their particular views as to the leadership of the party. When men have to use other men as tools for the execution of any plan, it is difficult for them to refrain from that tricky handling of them which is best for the immediate end, but debases both the user and the used. To sway men by knowledge of their weaknesses is the task of a charlatan rather than of a statesman. Mr.

Gladstone, with all his inconsistency upon the Eastern Question, and in spite of the fact that he had only just seen evils which had always been there, had that which the others lacked, moral conviction, and Hartington was infected with moral indifferentism. The Conservatives no doubt thought that Mr. Gladstone's att.i.tude was mere emotional facility, a mere exhibition of spasmodic power of transient enthusiasm, an effect rather of temperament than of conviction, and unlikely therefore to produce a continued consequence of action sustained at a high level. The public, however, saw more clearly.

Power over the moral fibre of other natures is not given to those whose own nature is wanting in this moral force, and Mr. Gladstone's att.i.tude on the Eastern Question, in spite of his contradictions and of his occasional running away from the consequences of his own acts, was appreciated with accuracy by that large section of the public which ultimately followed him.'

To this estimate should be added the record of a talk which pa.s.sed in June of the same year at a dinner party, where Sir Charles, 'along with Matthew Arnold, Bowen, afterwards Lord of Appeal, and Frederick Pollock,'

discussed 'what is known as moral force':

'I upheld the view that to me Gathorne Hardy (although I never agreed in a word which the future Lord Cranbrook said) possessed moral force in the highest degree, but that this moral force was one which I felt had only prejudice behind it. Still to me the intense conviction of the man gave him immense strength, and made him the most really eloquent Englishman to whom I had ever listened. Gladstone, I thought, had moral force, because he believed in the particular thing of which he was speaking at the particular moment at which he spoke. I somewhat differed from the others with regard to Bright, thinking that he was seldom really in earnest, although I admitted that no man gave more strongly the impression of earnestness to his hearers, and therefore no man had "moral force" in a higher degree.... Courtney (who had come in during the autumn of 1876) and Fawcett both have "moral force."'

In March, 1877, the last stage was reached in those long-drawn negotiations by which the statesmen of Europe endeavoured to avoid war, and the declaration which Lord Derby attached in the name of England to the Protocol of London was virtually a refusal to a.s.sent to coercion of Turkey. Acting as leader of the Opposition, Lord Hartington asked Dilke to 'sketch a vote of censure on the declaration.' In the debate which took place on April 13th (the day after Russia declared war against Turkey)--

'I spoke at great length, but too late for good reports, and by my "gospel of selfishness" and other similar phrases raised ringing cheers and counter-cheers, which for some time stopped my going on. I felt after this day no longer afraid to stand up to anyone upon the other side, but I noted that if Mr. Disraeli had been still in the House I should not have hoped to have escaped as I did, after saying all I had said of his colleagues in a full house, and coining such a phrase of their proceedings as "gospel of selfishness"; but that which struck me most in the whole debate was above all the want of statesmanlike suggestion.'

A week after the declaration of war it seemed all but certain that Great Britain must be drawn into the conflict; and Sir Charles--

'prepared (on April 20th, 1877) a resolution, which put on record my opinions, and stated that the House regretted the failure of the policy of the Government either to improve the position of Christian subjects of the Porte or to avert war. It also regretted their unwillingness to co-operate with any other of the European Powers.'

But the Liberal party as a whole was not able to formulate any such clear conclusion. Within a week Mr. Gladstone had determined to break away from the "upper official circles of Liberalism," and to move a series of Resolutions, which were actually drafted on April 26th, but the existence of which did not become generally known till the 29th.

'_29th April_.--Took Chamberlain to a party at Lord Houghton's, where Lord and Lady Salisbury were leading figures, and where was Harcourt, boiling over with rage at Mr. Gladstone, whose Resolutions had just been heard of. Gladstone will very probably split the Liberal party into two factions, but I do not see that he could have avoided doing as he has done. Chamberlain and I and Fawcett must vote with him.

Cowen will vote against him, although if principles and not persons were in question he must vote the other way. Gladstone will move a string of resolutions, of which only one will touch the past--namely, one to condemn the Turks for not carrying out the sentences on their officers employed in the Bulgarian ma.s.sacres. The main one, which touches the future, will, I believe, bind over the Government not to give aid to Turkey. His speech will be very fine.'

The "upper official circles" met, and in full conclave decided to separate themselves publicly from Mr. Gladstone.

More serious still, this decision to oppose their colleague and quondam leader was communicated to the Press. But on May 5th reconciliation was effected. Concerning this Lord Morley says:

"What was asked was that he (Mr. Gladstone) should consent to an amended form of his second resolution, declaring more simply and categorically that the Turk by his misgovernment had lost his claims."

Gladstone himself wrote that the change was "little more than nominal."

But Sir Charles's Memoir of the time shows at once how far the schism had gone, and also how different a view was taken of the alteration by some of Mr. Gladstone's supporters:

'On May 3rd I noted in my diary: "The Liberal party will next week cease to exist. I have already eighty-eight names of men who will vote with Gladstone, and, the Front Bench having foolishly decided to support the previous question, the party will be equally divided, and Hartington will resign. Gladstone will, I think, refuse to lead.

Hartington will be asked to come back, but Goschen's friends may spoil the absolute unanimity of the request, and Hartington then refusing, Goschen would succeed. This seems to be the Goschen intrigue. I am sincerely sorry. The Front Bench people might perfectly well have voted against the 'previous question' on the ground that they support the first resolution, and yet have spoken against Gladstone's later resolutions."' He added later: 'I have still in my possession (1890) the list of the party as made up by me, showing who would have voted with Mr. Gladstone, who would have voted with Lord Hartington, ... and who had stated that they would abstain. The a.n.a.lysis is of interest, as the facts have never been made known.' [Footnote: For a.n.a.lysis see Appendix at end of this chapter, p. 223.]

The outcome was a day in which Mr. Gladstone had to sustain singlehanded from half-past four to seven a Parliamentary wrangle of the most embarra.s.sing kind, concerning the alteration of the form (and possibly the substance) of his original motion, and then to speak for another two hours and a half.[Footnote: See _Life of Gladstone_, vol. ii., chap, iv., p.

565.]

'At the last moment Mr. Gladstone executed a sudden change of front, which prevented a break-up of the party, but made his own position somewhat foolish. I was lunching with old Mrs. Duncan Stewart to meet Mrs. Grote and Lady Aberdare, the wife of Mr. Gladstone's former colleague (Bruce, the Home Secretary), when I heard what was to happen. But publicity was only given to the change at the last moment.

'On May 8th I recorded in my diary that "Gladstone's n.o.ble delivery of his peroration last night saved the evening from being a complete fiasco, but only just saved it. The Duke of Westminster, who was to have presided at the meeting at St. James's Hall, absented himself on account of the change of front; but the meeting was not told that the third and fourth resolutions were to be withdrawn. Both Gladstone and also the rest of the Front Bench people are in the wrong--he for moving at all in a sense hostile to Lord Hartington unless he meant to go through with the thing, and they for not finding a better way out.

Such a way was clear last night. If Hartington had given notice of a direct vote of censure on the new reply to Russia published yesterday, as he might have done consistently with his views, Gladstone could have withdrawn in face of it."'

A general note on his personal difficulties follows later:

'In August (1877) I was again embarra.s.sed by my att.i.tude upon the Eastern Question. The fact that, being responsible, we had neglected to be humane, or to be politic, during the previous one-and-twenty years in which we might have taken the lead--might have insisted upon reform in Turkey and fostered the possibilities of self-government in the dependent States--made it difficult to approve the sudden activity which the conduct of the Turks in their straits called forth on the part of many Liberal politicians. Action might doubtless have been taken by us at any time between the Crimean War and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, but, as the opportunity had been neglected, it was difficult to inaugurate such a policy under pressure of the atrocities agitation....

'The new position of the Eastern Question, although it did not unite me with Mr. Gladstone, made a political breach between myself and Hartington. He fell more and more under the somewhat stupid influence of his surroundings, and I, holding a position between the two wings of the party, found few with whom I myself agreed. Randolph Churchill... made advances towards me which led to joint action, as will be seen, in 1878. But in the autumn of '77 I was isolated, for Chamberlain went, although with moderation, with Mr. Gladstone's agitation.'