The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume II Part 48

218). It was finally settled in the Lansdowne-Delca.s.se agreement of 1904, with other then pending questions. Sir Charles Dilke gave a useful summary of the history of the question and its numerous developments after 1783, in a small volume ent.i.tled _The British Empire_, published in 1899.] Great Britain appeared to him to "have gone infinitely beyond the strict terms of the treaty in the concessions to France made for the sake of peace," and to have made proposals which "would not be tolerated for an instant if any of the other ten self-governing colonies were in question," and were only considered because of the "poverty and feebleness of Newfoundland." Lord Salisbury was, in his eyes, no worse a sinner in this respect than the Liberal Government of 1893, except that Lord Salisbury had also made concessions in giving up the existing situation secured by treaty in Madagascar, in Tunis, and in Siam, against which there might have been set off a settlement of this "really dangerous question." He said that in Newfoundland the British navy was being used to coerce British colonists into submission to the French demands; and he foresaw peril to the colonial relation, as well as peril in the international field.

Whether it was possible during the period now under consideration to make an alliance, or even to establish friendly relations with Germany on a solid and permanent basis, is a question which will never fail to be the subject of discussion and controversy: for on it hinged the future of Europe. With an unfriendly France and a German Chancellor-- Prince Hohenlohe--aiming, and for a time with some partial success, at re-establishing friendly relations with Russia, the advantages of a good understanding between Great Britain and Germany were obvious; for hardly had the difficulties on the North-West frontiers of India been for the time quieted by the "Pamir" Treaty of 1895, [Footnote: This Treaty was made while Lord Kimberley was Foreign Secretary.] when the war between j.a.pan and China opened up the long series of events in the Far East which culminated later on in the Russo-j.a.panese War. In those events all or nearly all the European Great Powers were taking a hand; Germany was aspiring to take a leading part, and had to a certain extent obtained it by the command-in-chief of the Allied Forces being given to Count Waldersee, and by the expedition to relieve the Legations in Pekin. But the Jameson Raid and the congratulatory telegram of the Emperor to President Kruger in January, 1896, showed that Germany might intend also to have a South African policy, which in the hands of a less skilful or a less friendly Foreign Secretary than Baron Marschall might open, notwithstanding all the previous treaties, a new chapter of diplomacy.

Meanwhile Baron Marschall, with the hand of a skilful jurist, softened down the meaning of the famous telegram, by a close and minimizing interpretation of the words, and, as a practised diplomatist, went out of his way to meet the wishes of Lord Salisbury, who had proposed that the cost of the recent British Expedition to Dongola should be a charge on the funds of the Egyptian Caisse.

But Baron Marschall's tenure of his post was becoming precarious, and Sir Charles did not believe in the possibility of any alliance or permanent understanding with Germany. He feared, on the contrary, that one result of the policy of concession might be ultimately to tempt France, Germany, and Russia, to form a practical and informal union against Great Britain, similar to that which had proved so great a cause of anxiety in 1884-85. This, though not a formal alliance, had been almost as dangerous as one more specific and avowed, and it was now, he thought, likely to be found to exist with reference to events in China.

After the defeat of China by j.a.pan in 1895, every year brought some new and dangerous development, and the break-up of the Chinese Empire seemed near. Any understanding on the part of Great Britain with Russia, in regard to China, Sir Charles believed to be unreliable, and probably impossible, and Lord Salisbury's policy, which seemed to have gone out of its way to let Russia into Port Arthur, showed in his opinion deplorable weakness.

Mr. Chamberlain in a speech in the winter of 1898--which was followed by others in the same strain--had seemed almost to propose an alliance with Germany. Following him at Birmingham, Sir Charles pointed out that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had said: "If the policy of isolation which has. .h.i.therto been the policy of this country is to be maintained in the future, then the fate of the Chinese Empire may be--probably will be--hereafter decided without reference to our wishes and in defiance of our interests;" and went on to say: "If, on the other hand, we are determined to enforce the policy of the open door, to preserve an equal opportunity for trade with all our rivals, then we must not allow jingoes to drive us into a quarrel with all the world at the same time, and we must not reject the idea of an alliance with those Powers whose interests most closely approximate to our own." No doubt, Sir Charles replied, the Government were pledged to pursue the policy of "equal opportunity for trade," but they had not successfully maintained that policy in action. What were the Powers, he asked, which Mr.

Chamberlain had in view when he went on to say: "Unless we are allied to some great military Power, as we were in the Crimean War, when we had France and Turkey as our allies, we cannot seriously injure Russia"? Mr.

Chamberlain must have referred to an alliance with Germany. Personally, Dilke said that he "was entirely opposed to a policy of standing and permanent alliances; but was there any prospect that Germany would ever agree to bear in Europe the brunt of defending for us--for that was what it would come to--the most dangerous of our responsibilities? Prince Bismarck's policy on the subject had been avowed over and over again; he had foreseen these suggestions, and had rejected them in advance.

Speaking in 1887, Prince Bismarck said: 'Our friendship for Russia suffered no interruption during the time of our wars, and stands to-day beyond all doubt.... We shall not ... let anyone throw his la.s.so round our neck in order to embroil us with Russia.' And again in 1888: 'No Great Power can, in the long-run, cling to the wording of any treaty in contradiction to the interests of its own people. It is sooner or later compelled to say, "We cannot keep to that," and must justify this announcement as well as it can.' [Footnote: See, too, _Bismarck Memoirs_, ii., pp. 258, 259.] In 1890 the present German Emperor renewed the Triple Alliance, and the relations also of Germany and Russia had never, he believed, been closer than they were at the present time. Any notion of a permanent or standing alliance with Germany against Russia was, in short, a Will-o'-the-wisp. Opposed as he was to the whole policy of alliances as contrary to the true interests of this country, he was specially opposed to this particular proposal, because it was calculated to lead our people to think that they could rely on the strong arm of another Power instead of only on their own strong arm." [Footnote: The speech of Mr. Chamberlain referred to above was made at Birmingham. It was followed by speeches at Wakefield on December 8th, 1898, and at Leicester on November 20th, 1899.]

Yet a strong action in the Near East, Sir Charles thought, might have compensated for a feebler policy on the Pacific Coast. In Armenia, Christians for whom Great Britain was answerable under the Treaty of Berlin were being ma.s.sacred, but Lord Salisbury did nothing to help them. In November, 1896, there was a faint stir of public opinion, but many of the suggestions made in regard to what ought to be done were unwise. [Footnote: _November 4th_, 1896.--'Morley told me that in order to force the hand of the Turks, before July, 1895, Kimberley had proposed to force the Dardanelles, and that Harcourt had stopped it. Mr.

Gladstone had written to Morley to insist on his speaking about Armenia and to complain of his lukewarmness. I said: "But Mr. G. in 1880, when something could have been done, confined himself to what he called 'friendly' words to the Sultan.'" See on the whole subject _Crispi Memoirs_, vol. ii., chap. ix.]

"No one," Sir Charles had said in 1896, "would protest more emphatically than he did against some of the advice which had been given. One of the ablest journalists and highest of financial authorities, Mr. Wilson, had suggested the landing of a few troops and the deportation of the Sultan to Cyprus. The defences of the Dardanelles were not such as could be very easily forced even by the British fleet.... No British Admiral, even if he succeeded in forcing the Dardanelles, would have troops to land who could overcome the Turkish guard, an army corps, and the excited Turkish population." Elsewhere, with prophetic foresight, he showed that the forcing of the Dardanelles could not be carried out without "heavy loss, possibly tremendous loss, and that the loss of a first-cla.s.s British ironclad is equivalent to the loss of an army corps with all its guns." [Footnote: Letter to the _Macclesfield Chronicle_, September 19th, 1896.]

Crete was now again in a state of chronic rebellion against Turkish rule; and Turkish methods of repression only stimulated the popular demand to be joined to Greece. Sir Charles Dilke thought that, if the Powers really wished to coerce Turkey to bring about better government within its dominions, coercion could most safely begin in the Greek islands, where European fleets could absolutely control the issue and no question of Continental part.i.tion need arise. In Crete the Sultan could, Sir Charles believed, have been compelled to accept a nominal sovereignty, such as he retained over Cyprus; and the aspiration towards h.e.l.lenic unity, the need for h.e.l.lenic expansion, might thus have been satisfied.

If England had taken "instant and even isolated action," France would, he thought, not have thwarted British policy. "The effect would ultimately have been the addition of Crete to the Greek kingdom under the auspices, perhaps, of all the Powers, perhaps of the Powers less Germany, perhaps of only three or four of them." [Footnote: Ibid.]

The occasion was missed, and war, declared by Turkey against Greece, followed, and years of anarchy in Crete. The Ministers of the Powers "even in the free Parliaments of the United Kingdom and France" "used pro-Turkish language," and attacked those who, because they upheld the traditional Liberal policy of both countries, were accused of abetting the Greeks.

"The blockade by the fleets of the Powers became pro-Turkish, and Europe took sides against Greece in the war. If Greece had been allowed to hold Crete, she could have exchanged it against Thessaly, if the worst had come to the worst, without those financial sacrifices which are now necessary. [Footnote: Such a proposal had actually been made in 1881 by Prince Bismarck. _Life of Goschen_, i.

214; _Life of Granville_, ii. 226.] The very claim of the Powers to have localized the war by stopping the Slav States from attacking Turkey is in itself a claim to have interfered on one side."

When Greece was defeated, "the majority in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, if not of the British people," Sir Charles wrote, "professed that their burning sympathies for Greece had been destroyed by Greek cowardice, although the stand, at Domoko, of ill-supplied young troops against an overwhelmingly superior force of Turkish veterans deserved fairer criticism." He interpreted his own duty differently, and when the h.e.l.lenic cause was most unpopular he continued to express his faith in the "rising nationalities of the Eastern Mediterranean," and looked forward with confidence to a future in which Palmerston's generous surrender of the Ionian Islands should be emulated by a new act of Liberal statesmanship. "There can be little doubt that Cyprus, as a part of a great scheme for strengthening the elements of the Eastern Mediterranean that are hopeful for the future, will not be kept out of the arrangement by any reluctance on the part of the United Kingdom to let its inhabitants follow the tendencies of their race!" [Footnote: The above Notes on Crete relate to the period when war broke out, in 1897, between Greece and Turkey, and the Turks invaded Thessaly.]

"Oh for an hour of Canning or of Palmerston!" he said, at a great public meeting in the North in October, 1898. "Canning was a Tory, a Tory Foreign Secretary of State, a Tory Prime Minister, although at odds with the Duke of Wellington upon some subjects. Lord Palmerston was looked upon by many Radicals as a Whig, but in foreign affairs he had never exhibited that carelessness and that absence of a willingness to run risks for the sake of freedom which no doubt marred his conduct of home affairs. Canning had seen the interest of Great Britain in maintaining the Greek cause, as Palmerston had seen her interest in strengthening Greece by allowing the Republic of the Ionian Isles, of which we had the protectorate, to join her after the downfall of the Prince called by Palmerston 'the spoilt child of autocracy, King Otho.' Canning had consistently refused in circ.u.mstances of far greater difficulty and danger than those which attended the Greek or Cretan questions in our times, to be dragged at the heels of the great despotic Powers. Canning resolved not only to a.s.sist the Greek cause, but in doing so to maintain the superiority of British influence in the Eastern Mediterranean; and, seeing the course which was clear in the interest of Europe and in our own interest, he determined to settle the question in his own way, as he at the same time settled that of South America to the immense advantage of this country, which now had found in South America one of the best of all markets for her trade. There never was a greater loss to England than when Canning died as Prime Minister and was succeeded in office by one of those fleeting figures who, in the language of Disraeli, were but transient and embarra.s.sed phantoms. [Footnote: Lord G.o.derich, Prime Minister from August 8th, 1827, to January 8th, 1828.] The deeds of Canning in the questions of Greece and South America, his regard at once for liberty and for Britain, might be read in all the lives of that great Minister, and what Palmerston did of the same kind in the case of Italy was perfectly known."

In consequence of observations of this kind, he had to defend himself more than once against the charge of "Jingoism," as the cant term of the day had it; and more particularly in the debate on foreign policy on June 10th, 1898, when it was made by an old political friend, Mr.

Leonard Courtney.

"I am one of those," Dilke replied, "who are in favour of large armaments for this country, and believe in increasing the strength of our defences for the sake of peace; and one of the very reasons why I desire that is because I repudiate the idea of making our policy depend upon the policy of others. I have always repudiated, and never ceased to repudiate, the policy of grab which is commonly a.s.sociated with the name of Jingo.... I submit that the worst policy in these matters is to have regard to our own rights only, and not to the rights of others. We want our country to be viewed with that respect which men will ever cherish for unbending integrity of purpose. We should be more scrupulous with regard to a.s.serting nominal rights which we do not intend to maintain.

"When such transactions are criticized, the Government always reply by asking: 'Would you have gone to war at this or that particular point, for this or that particular object?' It always appears to me in these cases that there is some confusion in our minds about this risk of war on such occasions. If the intention of the other Power is to avoid war, war will be avoided when you quietly hold your own.

But if the intention of the other Power is war, there will be no lack of pretexts to bring it about."

His policy, therefore, would have been to advance no claims but such as could be made good, if need arose, by England's own carefully measured resources in connection with those of France.

It was, however, impossible at this time to focus public attention upon events in the Mediterranean, or even in the Nile Valley. The eyes of all politicians alike were becoming fixed upon a different part of the African continent.

Mr. Chamberlain had taken the Colonial Office in 1895, and it was in reply to a short speech from Sir Charles Dilke during the brief Autumn Session of that year that he expressed himself glad to outline his general policy, and spoke of finding in the Colonies an undeveloped estate, which he was determined to develop. His phrases caught the popular imagination then as always. Colonial enterprise was the theme of all pens and tongues. Then on New Year's Day of 1896 had come the Jameson Raid. But in the stormy chapters of Parliamentary life which followed Sir Charles took little part, beyond commending Mr.

Chamberlain's prompt.i.tude in condemning the Raid. The speech which he made in the vote of censure on the colonial policy of Mr. Chamberlain, moved on January 30th, 1900, as an amendment to the Address, by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice on behalf of the Opposition, was of an independent character, dealing more with the military and naval aspects of the position than those purely political. But, though standing rather apart from the general line of attack, the speech was recognized as one of the most weighty contributions to the debate, as it brought home to the country on how dangerously narrow a margin of strength the policy of Mr.

Chamberlain rested, and how entirely it owed its success to the maintenance of the navy of this country, which German Navy Bills were about to threaten. Four years later, when the German naval preparations were a.s.suming a definite shape, he repeated these warnings in a still more decisive manner by a speech which attracted great attention in Germany itself, as well as at home. [Footnote: "Der fruhere Unterstaatsecretar des Auswartigen, und sehr angesehene Sir Charles Dilke, wies damals auf Deutschland bin und sagte: man vergrossere dort die Flotte mit einer ausgewohnten Schnelligkeit und richte sich damit offentlich gegen England." (Reventlow, p. 242).]

Sir Charles disapproved of the Boer War, [Footnote: "I am myself opposed to the Milner policy, which led up to the South African War. But in spite of the Natal events I do not share the opinion either that the war itself will be a long one, or that foreign complications will arise."

("Risk of European Coalition," _Review of the Week_, November 4th, 1899).] but he held that when the country was seized by the war-fever interposition was useless: it did more harm than good both at home and abroad. Staying in Paris, in the early days of the contest, when we were suffering and beaten for the moment, he told those who commiserated us and threatened European complications to "wait and see," laughing at the idea that England could be permanently at a disadvantage, but not entering into the abstract merits of the question. If forced to speak, he admitted that the war was "unwise," but his utterances were very few.

It, however, raised a general principle, inducing him to recall facts which had been too frequently forgotten. The party which was now opposing government by Chartered Company was, he said, the party which had revived it in 1881 in the case of North Borneo; while the Tories, who then had condemned that method of colonization, were now enthusiastic for it. Sir Charles, who had opposed the system in regard to Borneo, where it was attended by little danger, now pointed out that not only had it produced the Jameson Raid in South Africa, but that on the West Coast the Niger Company threatened to involve England in differences with France by action which England could not control. These were conclusive proofs that the principle which in 1881 he had resisted to the point of seriously differing from his official chief was fraught with inconvenience and dangers. The Niger Company's position, however, was the affair of political specialists; South African policy was embroiled with the fortunes of a gigantic gambling speculation.

[Footnote: This is recalled by a fact in Sir Charles's personal history.

His son became ent.i.tled on coming of age in September, 1895, to a legacy of 1,000. Sir Charles offered him in lieu of that bequest 2,000 "Chartered South African shares." Had he accepted, he could, when the legacy became due, 'have sold them for 17,000 and cleared 16,000 profit! But he refused them when offered, and,' says Dilke, 'not thinking them things for a politician, I sold them, and (purposely) at a loss.']

The Transvaal War destroyed whatever prospects there might have been of a permanent understanding with Germany, and Mr. Chamberlain before the war was over had to make at least one speech which brought on himself the fiercest denunciations of the German Press, when he replied in vigorous language to the charge of cruelty brought against the British military authorities in Africa. The absolute mastery of the sea possessed by Great Britain probably alone prevented the Emperor forcing his Ministers into some imprudent act; and it was clearly seen that Count von Bulow, who had succeeded Baron Marschall as Foreign Secretary in June, 1897, and afterwards succeeded Prince Hohenlohe as Chancellor in 1900, though not desiring a conflict, and convinced, as he has since told the world, that none need come, was nevertheless less friendly than his predecessors, and intended to pursue rigidly the policy of a free hand with a strong navy behind it. [Footnote: Bulow, _Imperial Germany_ (English translation), p. 47. A later edition, with considerable alterations and additions, was published in 1916.] Events were visibly fighting on the side of those who saw that France was the only possible ally of Great Britain, and that the only other alternative was, not an alliance with Germany, but a return to the policy of "splendid isolation." The apologist of Prince von Bulow has himself told the world that the policy of an absolutely "free hand" now inaugurated by the new Chancellor was evidently one, in itself, of great difficulty, because Germany might frequently be compelled to change front; and, to use an expression attributed to Bismarck, might have to "face about" until friendship with this country became impossible. The prognostication was soon to be justified. [Footnote: Reventlow, p. 159.]

It was perhaps the decisive moment in the relations of Great Britain and Germany, when Count von Bulow, with the ink hardly dry on the Anglo- German treaty of October, 1900, which was supposed to be intended to protect China against further Russian advances on the north, cynically went out of his way to make a statement in the German Parliament that the treaty did not apply to Manchuria. The reply of the British Government was the Anglo-j.a.panese treaty of February 11th, 1902.

[Footnote: Reventlow (_German Foreign Policy_, 1888-1914) speaks of this incident as the "Wendepunkt der Britischen Politik und der Deutsch- Englischen Beziehungen." (p. 168). See, too, Berard, _La Revolte de l'Asie_, pp. 192-194, 208, 209, 293.]

In February, 1901, a typical article from Sir Charles's pen appeared in the _Figaro_, strongly urging the absolute necessity for the creation of really cordial relations between Great Britain and France, which he considered were the sure and sufficient guarantee of European peace. It was true, no doubt, that the increasing strength and efficiency of the French army were a guarantee, up to a certain point, of peace with Germany, just as the weakness of the French army had been an active temptation to Germany in 1870 to attack France. The joint action of the Powers in China at the moment was also itself a sign of improved relations. Nevertheless, as Moltke had said, Germany would remain armed for half a century after 1870, if she intended, as she did intend, to keep Alsace-Lorraine; and as Europe had for the present to remain an armed camp, more could hardly be hoped than to maintain peace, however burdensome the cost. Europe, Sir Charles urged, should try to realize that a great war would probably be fatal, whoever might be the victor, to her commercial world-supremacy--as the great and ruinous burdens, which would everywhere result, would surely cause that supremacy to pa.s.s to America. There the development of the resources, not of the United States only, but also of the Argentine Confederation, ought to give pause to those who did not look beyond the immediate future and seemed unable to realize that a Europe laden with all the effects of some gigantic struggle would prove a weak compet.i.tor with the New World on the other side of the Atlantic. To remind Frenchmen that the English have not always been victorious in war was no very difficult task; but he ventured to remind Englishmen also that, as the English army was quite inadequate to take a large part in a Continental war under the changed conditions of modern warfare, Great Britain and France, while united, should more than ever walk warily, and distrust the counsels of those who occasionally in Great Britain spoke lightly of war. It was easy to talk about the victories of Marlborough and Wellington; but the military history of England was really a very chequered one, and of this Englishmen were, unfortunately, mostly unaware. Our military prestige had never been great in the commencement of our wars, and, as he had said in the recent debates on the Boer War, [Footnote: House of Commons, February 1st, 1900] we had too often had to "muddle through." On more than one occasion--in America, for example, during the Seven Years' War, and more recently in New Zealand--we had only been got out of our difficulties by the help of our own colonists. Here at least was a great future source of as yet undeveloped strength. The disastrous Walcheren Expedition was on record; even Wellington had had to retire over and over again in the earlier period of the Peninsular War; in the Crimea we had not shown any great military quality beyond the bravery of our troops. These were truths, unpalatable truths, but they had to be uttered, if on the one hand the cause of army reform in Great Britain was to prosper, and if on the other France was not to reckon too much on the a.s.sistance of a British army on the Continent of Europe, especially in the earlier stages of a war. [Footnote: _Figaro_, February 11th, 1901.]

In a cordial understanding with France, therefore, Sir Charles Dilke considered to lie the sheet-anchor of British foreign policy and the best guarantee of peace. In 1898 the arrival of the French force at Fashoda, on the Nile, had brought things to a crisis, and the firm att.i.tude then adopted by Lord Salisbury at length convinced France, as Sir Charles always believed it would, that she must make her choice between Germany and Great Britain. In the action of Lord Lansdowne, who had succeeded Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office in 1900, and in the policy eventually embodied in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, Sir Charles recognized the views which persistently, but not always successfully, he had urged for many years on his own friends in France and England. But the new departure was only rendered possible by the appearance at the French Foreign Office of a statesman who, after the bitter experience of the final failure of the policy of "pin-p.r.i.c.ks"

before Lord Salisbury's firm stand in the Fashoda affair, boldly threw his predecessors overboard, and managed to make himself the inevitable Foreign Minister of France for a long period of years, successfully maintaining himself in office against every compet.i.tor and every rival, while other Ministers came and went. Late, perhaps too late, the policy of Gambetta was revived by M. Delca.s.se, and it held its own.

By 1903, owing to the complete change in the att.i.tude of France, matters had so much improved as between England and the Republic that Sir Charles could write in the _Empire Review_ of "An Arrangement with France" as possible, basing himself on recent articles in _La Depeche Coloniale_, which had been the extreme anti-British organ. "That the French colonial party should have come frankly to express the desire which they now entertain for an arrangement of all pending questions between the English and the French is indeed a return towards relations better than any which have existed since Gambetta's fall from power."

But this improvement in the relations of the two countries was materially aided by the influence of the personality of King Edward VII., which Sir Charles fully recognized, as he also did one of the consequences, which was perhaps not so fully seen by others. "The wearer of the crown of England plays in foreign affairs," he wrote, "a part more personal than in other matters is that of the const.i.tutional King.

No one can deny that there are advantages, and no one can pretend that there are never drawbacks, attendant on this system. It is not my purpose to discuss it, but it makes the adoption in this country of control by a Parliamentary Committee difficult, if not impossible."

[Footnote: _English Review_, October, 1909. Article by Sir C. Dilke.]

"The great and sudden improvement in the relations between the English-speaking world and France is largely due to the wisdom and courtesy with which the King made clear to France that there was no ground for the suspicions which prevailed."

[Footnote: _Quarterly Review_, July, 1905, p. 313. Article by Sir C.

Dilke. With France Sir Charles had for the moment again a certain official relation, having been placed on the Royal Commission charged with British interests at the Paris Exhibition--an honour due to him not only in his own right, but as his father's son. At this moment also, when relations between the neighbouring countries were severely strained, he gave to the Luxembourg the reversion of Gambetta's portrait, and sent the portrait itself to be placed among the works of Legros on exhibition in June, 1900. M. Leonce Benedez, curator of the Luxembourg, in writing to press for the chance of exhibiting the picture, said:

"Je m'excuse vivement de mon importunite, mais je serais tres desireux que notre public peut etre admis a juger Legros sur cette belle oeuvre. De plus, je serais, en meme temps, tres heureux que les amis de votre grande nation, plus nombreux que la sottise de quelques journalistes ne voudrait le laisser croire, fussent a meme d'apprecier la pensee elevee et delicate de l'ill.u.s.tre homme d'etat anglais qui, au milieu des circonstances presentes, a tenu a donner a notre pays une marque si touchante de sympathie en lui offrant le portrait d'un de ses plus glorieux serviteurs."

The exhibition drew Sir Charles and Lady Dilke for a summer visit to Paris, and it was during this visit that the sculptor Roty executed his medallion of Sir Charles.]

But wisdom and courtesy were not a little aided by the royal habit of mixing easily with men at home and abroad, just as, on the other hand, the long retirement of Queen Victoria had been injurious in an opposite direction. This feeling finds expression in the fragment of commentary in which Sir Charles dealt with the change of Sovereigns:

'The Accession Council after the Queen's death was a curious comment on history. History will tell that Victoria's death plunged the Empire into mourning, and that favourable opinion is more general of her than of her successor. Yet the Accession Council, attended almost solely by those who had reached power under her reign, was a meeting of men with a load off them. Had the King died in 1902, the Accession Council of his successor would not have been thus gay; there would have been real sorrow.'

Sir Charles thought hopefully of the situation at this moment, and there is a letter dated as far back as 1900 in which Mr. Hyndman noted the "unusual experience" of finding an Englishman who took a more favourable view of France than he himself, and expressed his fear that Sir Charles underrated "the strength of the National party." [Footnote: How well he understood France may perhaps best be judged by an article written, at the desire of M. Labori, for the _Grande Revue_ in December, 1901. It is called "Torpeur Republicaine," and begins with the observation that English Radicals are tempted to think French Republicans more reactionary than any English Tories, for the reason that all English parties had practically, if not in theory, accepted munic.i.p.al Socialism.

"In France," he said, "the electors of certain cities return Socialist munic.i.p.al councils. They are all but absolutely powerless. We, on the other hand, elect Tory or Whig munic.i.p.alities, and they do the best of Socialist work."] But, notwithstanding the alliance of France with Russia, the action of Russia in the Far East in the period covered by the events which ended in the j.a.panese War had not diminished Sir Charles's rooted dislike of any idea of _entente_ or alliance between Russia and Great Britain. He considered that Sir Edward Grey meant to be Foreign Secretary in the next Liberal Government, and was intent on making an arrangement or alliance with Russia to which he would subordinate every other consideration. "Grey," he wrote early in 1905 to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, "has always favoured the deal with Russia. I hope I may be able to stay outside the next Government to kill it, which I would do if outside, not within. This," he said, alluding to the recent death of Lady Dilke, "a.s.sumes that I regain an interest in affairs which I have wholly lost. I am well, but can at present think of nothing but of the great person who is gone from my side." [Footnote: February 2nd, 1905.] At this time the old controversy was again raging, both at home and in India, over the question of the defence of the North-Western Frontier of India; and a recent Governor-General and his Commander-in-Chief in India, it was believed, had not altogether seen eye to eye. The latter was credited with very extensive views as to the necessity of an increase in the number of British troops, with a view to the defence of the frontier against Russian attack. Sir Charles put neither the danger of a Russian invasion nor the general strength of Russia as a military nation so high as did some who claimed to speak with authority; and he did not believe that we had any reason for constant fear in India or elsewhere, or to seek alliances, in order to avoid a Russian attack on India. The vulnerability of Russia on the Pacific, which he had always pointed to, was demonstrated in the j.a.panese War; as well as the miserable military administration of Russia, which he had indicated thirty-eight years before as a permanent source of weakness, certain to be exposed whenever Russia undertook operations on a large scale at any great distance from her base.

[Footnote: In _Greater Britain_, ii. 299-312.] The j.a.panese alliance, he believed, could never be directly utilized for resisting in Afghanistan an attack by Russia on India. Happily, as he considered, the facts had demonstrated that there was no need for such a display of timidity as would be involved in marching foreign troops across India to defend it on the frontier. [Footnote: _Monthly Review_, December, 1905. It is to be observed that this argument does not involve any criticism of the Anglo-j.a.panese Treaty considered as a defensive measure elsewhere.]

But if he thought that an alliance with Russia was not a necessity for a sound British foreign policy, on the other hand he was equally convinced that a good understanding with the United States of America was such a necessity. He believed that if fresh subjects of difference were not created, and any remaining questions of difference--like the Fisheries-- were settled, as the _Alabama_ and Alaska questions had been settled, the old Jeffersonian tradition of suspicion of English policy would die out, even in the Democratic party, and that no obstacle would then remain to prevent the co-operation of all the branches of the race in a common policy.

In a speech made in June, 1898, he had referred to the improved relations with the United States in terms which gave credit for the improvement mainly to Sir Julian Pauncefote, then Amba.s.sador at Washington, for whose services he had the greatest admiration.

[Footnote: Sir Julian Pauncefote had previously been Permanent Under- Secretary for Foreign Affairs for many years.] When, in 1896, the question of Venezuela had threatened to make trouble between the two English-speaking Powers, he counted the claims of Great Britain in respect of the frontiers of Guiana as "dust in the balance" when weighed against the advantage of not "running across the national line of policy of the United States." He desired to sink all such petty affairs in a policy of Anglo-American co-operation in the Far East. Rivals for trade in China they must be, but the interest of both lay in working for the "open door" which admitted a friendly rivalry. He wrote in the _American Independent_ for May 1st, 1899: "The will of the United States, if it be in accordance with the will of Great Britain and of the Australian Commonwealth--the will, in other words, of the English-speaking peoples--will be paramount in the Pacific if they are united"; and he was never weary of urging the improvement in England's relations with the United States which would follow from a friendly settlement with Ireland. [Footnote: In _Present Position of European Politics_, 1887, he had said: "I, for one, still have hope that the causes of strangement between Great Britain and the chief of her daughter-countries, which are mainly to be found in the friction produced by the Irish Question, may even within our lifetime be removed, and the tie of blood, and tongue, and history and letters, again drawn close." And in a note written later in his own copy are the words: "It is for the Americans of the United States to decide how far towards firm alliance this shall be carried."

Cf. _Life of Beaconsfield_, iv. 231.]

Bearing in mind all these considerations, he believed, notwithstanding all the wars and the rumours of wars, that the Great Armageddon so much dreaded could be avoided by diplomacy combined with proper measures of defence. The long chain of events formed by the Sino-j.a.panese War, the Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Anglo-j.a.panese Treaty, and the Russo- j.a.panese War, were in his opinion "secondary events," however important, appearing to threaten the peace of Europe from time to time--very disquieting, no doubt, and ominous occasionally of yet worse things--but things such as diplomacy had conjured away before, and ought to be able to conjure away again. He did not think that Morocco, long regarded at the Foreign Office as a danger-point, would ever prove a sufficient object to induce Germany to break the general peace. She would threaten, take all she could get, and then withdraw with the spoils, just avoiding the danger-point; and so it no doubt turned out to be in 1905-06 at the time of the troubles which ended in the Algeciras Conference. But he recognized the personal character of the German Emperor as a new factor of danger in the situation.

The essential point since 1871, he wrote in 1905, had been that there never had existed a serious and settled intention of making the much- dreaded "European War" on the part of any of those with whom the great decision rested. There was, he said, to the good this main consideration--that, if any Power had intended war, a sufficient pretext could always have been found, yet the war had not come. The security for the maintenance of the long "armed peace" was, in fact, this: that no Power had really intended war, or intended it now. What the consequences would be was too well known by the responsible leaders.

The sudden heats which most seemed to jeopardize peace had arisen in regard to questions not of European importance, mostly outside Europe, where sometimes on one side or the other, and sometimes upon both, tactful treatment in advance, and what might be styled "a long view,"

would have saved the world from trouble altogether, and ought to do so in future under a.n.a.logous circ.u.mstances, whenever the question of the Bagdad Railway and the remaining questions relating to Africa came up for final settlement. [Footnote: _English Review_, October, 1909.]

The guarantee of peace he believed to lie in the policy of _ententes_, but on condition that the policy begun by Lord Lansdowne and M. Delca.s.se should aim at agreement between two Powers only, and be limited to specific objects. [Footnote: See the same opinion expressed in 1871, Vol. I., p. 133.] Beyond this it was dangerous to go. An _entente_ between more than two Powers, as distinct from one between two only, reminded him of an American game of cards which he had seen played in the Far West. This game when played by two persons was called _euchre_, but when played by three persons was called by another and very disagreeable name, because it so frequently ended in the use of knives.

The Franco-Italian agreements of 1898 and 1900, the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904, the agreements between j.a.pan and Russia which had followed and grown out of the Portsmouth Treaty of September, 1905, the Anglo-j.a.panese Treaty which followed, and the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 as to Persia, were guarantees for peace, because they came within the above definition. It does not appear, however, that he considered the alliance of France and Russia, dating so far as was then known from 1895, as a real guarantee for peace, or that he shared the later views attributed to Gambetta, of the desirability of an _entente_ between Great Britain, France, and Russia.