The Life of Napoleon I Part 76

[Footnote 381: That the British Ministers did not intend anything of the kind, even in the hour of triumph, is seen by Castlereagh's despatch of November 13th, 1813, to Lord Aberdeen, our envoy at the Austrian Court: "We don't wish to impose any dishonourable condition upon France, which limiting the number of her ships would be: but she must not be left in possession of this point [Antwerp]" ("Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 76).]

[Footnote 382: Boyen describes the surprising effects of the fire of the British rocket battery that served in Bernadotte's army. Captain Bogue brought it forward to check the charge of a French column against the Swedes. He was shot down, but Lieutenant Strangways poured in so hot a fire that the column was "blown asunder like an ant-heap,"

the men rushing back to cover amidst the loud laughter of the allies.]

[Footnote 383: The premature explosion was of course due, not to Napoleon, but to the flurry of a serjeant and the skilful flanking move of Sacken's light troops, for which see Cathcart and Marmont. The losses at Leipzig were rendered heavier by Napoleon's humane refusal to set fire to the suburbs so as to keep off the allies. He rightly said he could have saved many thousand French had he done so. This is true. But it is strange that he had given no order for the construction of other bridges. Pelet and Fain affirm that he gave a verbal order; but, as Marbot explains, Berthier, the Chief of the Staff, had adopted the pedantic custom of never acting on anything less than _a written order_, which was not given. The neglect to secure means for retreat is all the stranger as the final miseries at the Beresina were largely due to official blundering of the same kind.

Wellington's criticism on Napoleon's tactics at Leipzig is severe (despatch of January 10th, 1814): "If Bonaparte had not placed himself in a position that every other officer would have avoided, and remained in it longer than was consistent with any ideas of prudence, he would have retired in such a state that the allies could not have ventured to approach the Rhine."]

[Footnote 384: Sir Charles Stewart wrote (March 22nd, 1814): "On the Elbe Napoleon was quite insane, and his lengthened stay there was the cause of the Battle of Leipzig and all his subsequent misfortunes"

("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 373).]

[Footnote 385: Napier, vol. v., pp. 368-378.]

[Footnote 386: On November 10th Lord Aberdeen, our amba.s.sador at the Austrian Court, wrote to Castlereagh: " ... As soon as he [Murat]

received the last communication addressed to him by Prince Metternich and myself at Prague, he wrote to Napoleon and stated that the affairs of his kingdom absolutely demanded his presence. Without waiting for any answer, he immediately began his journey, and did not halt a moment till he arrived at Basle. While on the road he sent a cyphered dispatch to Prince Cariati, his Minister at Vienna, in which he informs him that he hopes to be at Naples on the 4th of this month: that he burns with desire to revenge himself of [_sic_] all the injuries he has received from Bonaparte, and to connect himself with the cause of the allies in contending for a just and stable peace. He proposes to declare war on the instant of his arrival." Again, on December 19th, Aberdeen writes: "You may consider the affair of Murat as settled.... It will probably end in Austria agreeing to his having a change of frontier on the Papal territory, just enough to satisfy his vanity and enable him to show something to his people. I doubt much if it will be possible, with the claims of Sicily, Sardinia, and Austria herself in the north of Italy, to restore to him the three Legations: but something adequate must be done" ("Austria," No. 102).

The disputes between Murat and Napoleon will be cleared up in Baron Lumbroso's forthcoming work, "Murat." Meanwhile see Bignon, vol.

xiii., pp. 181 _et seq._; Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. xx.; and Chaptal (p. 305), for Fouche's treacherous advice to Murat.]

[Footnote 387: Lady Burghersh's "Journal," p. 182.]

[Footnote 388: Fain, "Ma.n.u.scrit de 1814," pp. 48-63. Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," p. 606, states that Napoleon touched up Maret's note; the sentence quoted above is doubtless the Emperor's. The same author proves that Maret's advice had always been more pacific than was supposed, and that now, in his old position of Secretary of State, he gave Caulaincourt valuable help during the negotiations at Chatillon.]

[Footnote 389: "Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 74. This was written, of course, before he heard of the Frankfurt proposals; but it antic.i.p.ates them in a remarkable way. Thiers states that Castlereagh, after hearing of them, sent Aberdeen new instructions. I cannot find any in our archives. This letter warned Aberdeen against any compromise on the subject of Antwerp; but it is clear that Castlereagh, when he came to the allied headquarters, was a partisan of peace, as compared with the Czar and the Prussian patriots.

Schwarzenberg wrote (January 26th) at Langres: "We ought to make peace here: our Kaiser, also Stadion, Metternich, even Castlereagh, are fully of this opinion--but Kaiser Alexander!"]

[Footnote 390: Fournier, "Der Congress von Chatillon," p. 242.]

[Footnote 391: "Castlereagh Papers," _loc. cit._, p. 112.]

[Footnote 392: Metternich. "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 214.]

[Footnote 393: "F.O.," Austria, No. 102.]

[Footnote 394: "Lettres inedites" (November 6th, 1813).]

[Footnote 395: The memorandum is endorsed, "Extract of Instructions delivered to me by Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, 18 Dec, 1813" ("Russia," No.

92).]

[Footnote 396: Metternich's letter to Hudelist, in Fournier, p. 242.]

[Footnote 397: Houssaye's "1814," p. 14; Metternich, "Memoirs," vol.

i., p. 308.]

[Footnote 398: "Our success and everything depend upon our moderation and justice," he wrote to Lord Bathurst (Napier, bk. xxiii., ch.

ii.).]

[Footnote 399: "Lettres inedites" (November 12th). The date is important: it refutes Napier's statement (bk. xxiii., ch. iv.) that the Emperor had planned that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in November when the disputes between Wellington and the Cortes at Madrid were at their height. Bignon (vol. xiii., p. 88 _et seq._) says that Talleyrand's indiscretion revealed the negotiations to the Spanish Cortes and Wellington; but our general's despatches show that he did not hear of them before January 9th or 10th. He then wrote: "I have long suspected that Bonaparte would adopt this expedient; and if he had had less pride and more common sense, it would have succeeded."]

[Footnote 400: On January 14th the Emperor ordered Soult, as soon as the ratification of the treaty*treatry was known, to set out northwards from Bayonne "with all his army, only leaving what is necessary to form a screen." Suchet was likewise to hurry with 10,000 foot, _en poste_, and two-thirds of his horse, to Lyons. On the 22nd the Emperor blames both Marshals for not sending off the infantry, though the Spanish treaty had _not_ been ratified. After long delays Ferdinand set out for Spain on March 13th, when the war was almost over.]

[Footnote 401: Houssaye's "1814," ch. ii.; m.u.f.fling's "Campaign of 1814."]

[Footnote 402: Letter of January 31st to Joseph.]

[Footnote 403: "Mems. de Langeron" in Houssaye, p. 62; but see m.u.f.fling.]

[Footnote 404: Letter of February 2nd to Clarke.]

[Footnote 405: Metternich said of Castlereagh, "I can't praise him enough: his views are most peaceful, in our sense" (Fournier, p.

252).]

[Footnote 406: Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, January 22nd and 30th, 1814.]

[Footnote 407: Letter to Hudelist (February 3rd), in Fournier, p.

255.]

[Footnote 408: Stewart's Mem. of January 27th, 1814, in "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 535. On that day Hardenberg noted in his diary: "Discussion on the plan of operations, and misunderstandings. Intrigue of Stein to get the army straight to Paris, as the Czar wants. The Austrians oppose this: others don't know what they want" (Fournier, p.

361).]

[Footnote 409: Stewart's notes in "Castlereagh Papers," pp. 541-548.

On February 17th Castlereagh promised to give back all our conquests in the West Indies, except Tobago, and to try to regain for France Guadaloupe and Cayenne from Sweden and Portugal; also to restore all the French possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope except the Iles de France (Mauritius) and de Bourbon (Fournier, p. 381).]

[Footnote 410: Letters of January 31st and February 2nd to Joseph.]

[Footnote 411: Printed in Napoleon's "Corresp." of February 17th. I cannot agree with Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," and Fournier, that Caulaincourt could have signed peace merely on Maret's "carte blanche"

despatch. The man who had been cruelly duped by Napoleon in the D'Enghien affair naturally wanted an explicit order now.]

[Footnote 412: Given by Duca.s.se, "Les Rois Freres de Napoleon," p.

64.]

[Footnote 413: Hausser, p. 503. According to Napoleon, 6,000 men and forty cannon were captured!]

[Footnote 414: Letter of February 18th, 1814.]

[Footnote 415: At Elba Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that he would have made peace at Chatillon had not England insisted on his giving up Antwerp, and that England was therefore the cause of the war continuing. This letter, however, proves that he was as set on retaining Mainz as Antwerp. Caulaincourt then wished him to make peace while he could do so with credit ("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p.

287).]

[Footnote 416: Fournier, pp. 132-137, 284-294, 299.]

[Footnote 417: See Metternich's letter to Stadion of February 15th in Fournier, pp. 319, 327.]

[Footnote 418: Houssaye, p. 102.]

[Footnote 419: Instructions of February 24th to Flahaut, "Corresp.,"

No. 21359; Hardenberg's "Diary," in Fournier, pp. 363-364.]

[Footnote 420: Fournier, pp. 170, 385.]

[Footnote 421: _Ibid._, pp. 178-181, 304; Martens, vol. ix., p. 683.