The Life of Napoleon I Part 75

[Footnote 336: Letter of July 29th.]

[Footnote 337: Gentz to Sir G. Jackson, August 4th ("Bath Archives,"

vol. ii., p. 199). For a version flattering to Napoleon, see Ernouf's "Maret" (pp. 579-587), which certainly exculpates the Minister.]

[Footnote 338: Metternich, "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 546 (Eng. ed.).]

[Footnote 339: "F.O.," Russia, No. 86. A letter of General Nugent (July 27th), from Prague, is inclosed. When he (N.) expressed to Metternich the fear that Caulaincourt's arrival there portended peace, M. replied that this would make no alteration, "as the proposals were such that they certainly would not be accepted, and they would even be augmented."]

[Footnote 340: "Souvenirs du Duc de Broglie," vol. i., ch. v.]

[Footnote 341: British aims at this time are well set forth in the instructions and the accompanying note to Lord Aberdeen, our amba.s.sador designate at Vienna, dated Foreign Office, August 6th, 1813: " ... Your Lordship will collect from these instructions that a general peace, in order to provide adequately for the tranquillity and independence of Europe, ought, in the judgment of His Majesty's Government, to confine France at least within the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine: and if the other Great Powers of Europe should feel themselves enabled to contend for such a Peace, Great Britain is fully prepared to concur with them in such a line of policy. If, however, the Powers most immediately concerned should determine, rather than encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to trust for their own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it never has been the policy of the British Government to attempt to dictate to other States a perseverance in war, which they did not themselves recognize to be essential to their own as well as to the common safety." As regards details, we desired to see the restoration of Venetia to Austria, of the Papal States to the Pope, of the north-west of Italy to the King of Sardinia, but trusted that "a liberal establishment" might be found for Murat in the centre of Italy. Napoleon knew that we desired to limit France to the "natural frontiers" and that we were resolved to insist on our maritime claims. As our Government took this unpopular line, and went further than Austria in its plans for restricting French influence, he had an excellent opportunity for separating the Continental Powers from us. But he gave out that those Powers were bought by England, and that we were bent on humiliating France.]

[Footnote 342: Boyen, "Erinnerungen," Pt. III., p. 66.]

[Footnote 343: Fain, vol. ii., p. 27. The italicized words are given thus by him; but they read like a later excuse for Napoleon's failures.]

[Footnote 344: "Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany," p.

195.]

[Footnote 345: In his letters of August 16th to Macdonald and Ney he a.s.sumed that the allies might strike at Dresden, or even as far west as Zwickau: but meanwhile he would march "pour enlever Blucher."]

[Footnote 346: "Lettres inedites de Napoleon." The Emperor forwarded this suggestion to Savary (August 11th): it doubtless meant an issue of false paper notes, such as had been circulated in Russia the year before.]

[Footnote 347: Cathcart, "Commentaries," p. 206.]

[Footnote 348: "Extrait d'un Memoire sur la Campagne de 1813." With characteristic inaccuracy Marbot remarks that the defection of Jomini, _with Napoleon's plans_, was "a disastrous blow." The same is said by Dedem de Gelder, p. 328.]

[Footnote 349: The Emperor's eagerness is seen by the fact that on August 21st he began dictating despatches, at Lauban, at 3 a.m. On the previous day he had dictated seventeen despatches; twelve at Zittau, four after his ride to Gorlitz, and one more on his arrival at Lauban at midnight.]

[Footnote 350: Letters of August 23rd to Berthier.]

[Footnote 351: Boyen, vol. iii., p. 85. But see Wiehr, "Nap. und Bernadotte in 1813," who proves how risky was B.'s position, with the Oder fortresses, held by the French, on one flank, and Davoust and the Danes on the other. He disposes of many of the German slanders against Bernadotte.]

[Footnote 352: Hausser, pp. 260-267. Oudinot's "Memoirs" throw the blame on the slowness of Bertrand in effecting the concentration on Grossbeeren and on the heedless impetuosity of Reynier. Wiehr (pp.

74-116) proves from despatches that Bernadotte meant to attack the French _south of Berlin_: he discredits the "bones" anecdote.]

[Footnote 353: Letters of August 23rd.]

[Footnote 354: So called to distinguish it from the two other Neisses in Silesia.]

[Footnote 355: Blasendorfs "Blucher"; m.u.f.fling's "Aus meinem Leben"

and "Campaigns of the Silesian Army in 1813 and 1814"; Bertin's "La Campagne de 1813." Hausser a.s.signs to the French close on 60,000 at the battle; to the allies about 70,000.]

[Footnote 356: Jomini, "Vie de Napoleon," vol. iv., p. 380; "Toll,"

vol. iii., p. 124.]

[Footnote 357: "Toll," vol. iii., p. 144. Cathcart reports (p. 216) that Moreau remarked to him: "We are already on Napoleon's communications; the possession of the town [Dresden] is no object; it will fall of itself at a future time." If Moreau said this seriously it can only be called a piece of imbecility. The allies were far from safe until they had wrested from Napoleon one of his strong places on the Elbe; it was certainly not enough to have seized Pirna.]

[Footnote 358: "Corresp." No. 20461.]

[Footnote 359: Cathcart's "Commentaries," p. 230: Bertin, "La Campagne de 1813," p. 109; Marmont, "Mems.," bk. xvii.; Sir Evelyn Wood's "Achievements of Cavalry."]

[Footnote 360: It is clear from Napoleon's letters of the evening of the 27th that he was not quite pleased with the day's work, and thought the enemy would hold firm, or even renew the attack on the morrow. They disprove Thiers' wild statements about a general pursuit on that evening, thousands of prisoners swept up, etc.]

[Footnote 361: Vandamme on the 28th received a reinforcement of eighteen battalions, and thenceforth had in all sixty-four; yet Marbot credits him with only 20,000 men.]

[Footnote 362: Thiers gives Berthier's despatch in full. See also map, p. 336.]

[Footnote 363: Marmont, bk. xvii., p. 158. He and St. Cyr ("Mems.,"

vol. iv., pp. 120-123) agree as to the confusion of their corps when crowded together on this road. Napoleon's aim was to insure the capture of all the enemy's cannon and stores; but his hasty orders had the effect of blocking the pursuit on the middle road. St. Cyr sent to headquarters for instruction; but these were now removed to Dresden; hence the fatal delay.]

[Footnote 364: Thiers has shown that Mortier did not get the order from Berthier to support Vandamme _until August 30th_. The same is true of St. Cyr, who did not get it till 11.30 a.m. on that day. St.

Cyr's best defence is Napoleon's letter of September 1st to him ("Lettres inedites de Napoleon"): "That unhappy Vandamme, who seems to have killed himself, had not a sentinel on the mountains, nor a reserve anywhere.... I had given him positive orders to intrench himself on the heights, to encamp his troops on them, and only to send isolated parties of men into Bohemia to worry the enemy and collect news." With this compare Napoleon's approving statement of August 29th to Murat ("Corresp.," No. 20486): "Vandamme was marching on Teplitz _with all his corps_."]

[Footnote 365: "Lettres inedites de Napoleon," September 3rd.]

[Footnote 366: Hausser, vol. iv., p. 343, and Boyen, "Erinnerungen,"

vol. ii., pp. 345-357, for Bernadotte's suspicious delays on this day; also Marmont, bk. xviii., for a critique on Ney. Napoleon sent for Lejeune, then leading a division of Ney's army, to explain the disaster; but when Lejeune reached the headquarters at Dohna, south of Dresden, the Emperor bade him instantly return--a proof of his impatience and anger at these reverses.]

[Footnote 367: Thornton, our envoy at Bernadotte's headquarters, wrote to Castlereagh that that leader's desire was to spare the Swedish corps; he expected that Bernadotte would aim at the French crown ("Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., pp. 48-59). See too Boyen, vol. ii., p. 378.]

[Footnote 368: Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol.

iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The Emperor's plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.]

[Footnote 369: Thiers a.s.serts that he had. But if so, how could the Emperor have written to Macdonald (October 2nd) that the Silesian army had made a move on Grossenhain: "It appears that this is so as to attack the intrenched camp [at Dresden] by the side of the plain, by the roads of Berlin and Meissen."? On the same day he scoffs at Lefebre-Desnoettes for writing that Bernadotte had crossed the Elbe, and retorts that if he had, it would be so much the worse for him: the war would soon be over.}

[Footnote 370: Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol.

iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The Emperor's plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.]

[Footnote 371: Martens, "Traites," vol. ix., p. 610. This secret bargain cut the ground from under the German unionists, like Stein, who desired to make away with the secondary princes, or strictly to limit their powers.]

[Footnote 372: Thiers and Bernhardi ("Toll," vol. iii., p. 388) have disposed of this fiction.]

[Footnote 373: Sir E. Wood, "Achievements of Cavalry."]

[Footnote 374: "Corresp.," No. 20814. Marmont, vol. v., p. 281, acutely remarks that Napoleon now regarded as true only that which entered into his combinations and his thoughts.]

[Footnote 375: Bernadotte was only hindered from retreat across the Elbe by the remonstrances of his officers, by the forward move of Blucher, and by the fact that the Elbe bridges were now held by the French. For the council of war at Kothen on October 14th, see Boyen, vol. ii., p. 377.]

[Footnote 376: m.u.f.fling, "Campaign of 1813."]

[Footnote 377: Colonel Lowe, who was present, says it was won and lost five times (unpublished "Memoirs").]

[Footnote 378: Napoleon's bulletin of October 16th, 1813, blames Ney for this waste of a great corps; but it is clear, from the official orders published by Marmont (vol. v., pp. 373-378), that Napoleon did not expect any pitched battle on the north side on the 16th. He thought Bertrand's corps would suffice to defend the north and west, and left the defence on that side in a singularly vague state.]

[Footnote 379: Dedem de Gelder, "Mems.," p. 345, severely blames Napoleon's inaction on the 17th; either he should have attacked the allies before Bennigsen and Bernadotte came up, or have retreated while there was time.]

[Footnote 380: Lord Burghersh, Sir George Jackson, Odeleben, and Fain all a.s.sign this conversation to the night of the 16th; but Merveldt's official account of it (inclosed with Lord Cathcart's despatches), gives it as on October 17th, at 2 p.m. ("F.O.," Russia, No. 86). I follow this version rather than that given by Fain.]