The Inhabitants of the Philippines Part 16

Manila Bay.

The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from sh.o.r.e to sh.o.r.e. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern sh.o.r.e, farther reduces that channel.

The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.

The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.

In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.

With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.

And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.

On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisers Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon were fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.

There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.

But Admiral Dewey's exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.

To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful. As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. The Castilla and Reina Cristina were wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the a.r.s.enal.

But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possible that the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.

It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.

The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country's need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite a.r.s.enal to its fate.

We must infer that Admiral Dewey's victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had a.s.sembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city, three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.

General Aguinaldo.

On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces, a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.

He soon rea.s.serted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.

I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who had partic.i.p.ated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his a.s.sistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.

The Tagal Republic.

The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896-7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.

They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Const.i.tution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly a.s.serted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.

Paymaster Wilc.o.x, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported [9] to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.

Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the army co-operating with the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs pa.s.sed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.

I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. The cui bono test cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that "fighting must go on."

Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory att.i.tude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.

I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.

The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.

Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:--

First.--A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America, fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.

Second.--A strict discipline amongst the American forces.

Third.--The princ.i.p.al aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be secured.

General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all, and only dealt in vague generalities which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.

As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate.

Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, "to enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II.," not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free "for their welfare, not our gain," nor that this army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry, [10] would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely a parallel.

Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over by such as these.

More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?

This seems to have been General Otis' intention. I think he might have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.

The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess., Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: "We have no law which will allow us to arbitrarily do so."

As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda, who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis, and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.

Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars'

vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would in due time take possession and exploit them.

One can understand the Tagals' grief and desperation; all their blood and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!

I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.

In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness and adaptability one would have expected from them. For my part, I expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors, acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmission of accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of victories gained by the American troops.

It would not be right, however, to pa.s.s over the fighting without rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and soldiers.

Who can forget Colonel Funston's gallant exploit in crossing the Rio Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry and enfilading the Tagals' position? Or his leading part of same regiment in a charge upon an enemy's earthwork near Santo Tomas, where he was wounded?

What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg's leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quingua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabebe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac. [11] This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight a.s.sistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.