The History of Currency, 1252 to 1896 Part 24

Allard, one of the Belgian delegates, declared that it was insufficient, and Sir Rivers Wilson declared, on behalf of himself and Sir Charles Fremantle, that recognising that this want of support would prevent them from recommending the plan to their Government, they would refrain from taking part in a detailed discussion of it, although they did not consider it inconsistent with the monometallist opinions which they held. Mr. M'Creary (delegate for the United States), then stated that he did not consider M. de Rothschild's proposal, as it stood, equitable to the United States, and therefore that he would be unable to support it.

[Sidenote: CLOSE OF THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE]

In view of the various declarations, M. de Rothschild withdrew his plan, and there was left before the conference only the Levy plan. This latter was favourably regarded, but was radically insufficient for the situation, and not considered important enough to receive really vigorous support.

The course of the conference thereupon returned to the general discussion of the bimetallic proposal of the United States. In this discussion the att.i.tude of reserve which the French delegates had maintained was abandoned, and M. Tirard declared with the greatest clearness that he could not advise his Government to open the French Mints to the free coinage of silver, unless there was a general agreement on the part of other nations to open their Mints also. Until, therefore, there should be a decided change of opinion on the part of Great Britain, Germany, Austria, the Scandinavian States, and other monometallic states, the question of returning to the free coinage of silver must be looked upon as settled.

In view of such declarations the delegates of the United States declared that they would not press for a vote upon the question of bimetallism.

And the conference closed with a formal adjournment, should the Governments approve, to the 30th May 1893.

The close of the conference was a heavy blow to the bimetallic cause, as ill.u.s.trating so fully the impossibility of any arrangement. Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, declared clearly that no change would be made on the gold basis of their currency. The delegate of Austria Hungary was equally explicit in his statement that his Government had every intention of abiding by the gold standard they were in the course of adopting.

The decided lead of France was followed punctually by Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, and Greece. The Netherlands were prepared to join a bimetallic union, provided that Great Britain formed a part of it; and Spain and Mexico were willing to adopt bimetallism, or other measures which would have the effect of raising the price of silver. No declaration was made on the behalf of Russia, though one of the delegates, speaking personally, was an active supporter of the gold standard. The Roumanian Government did not consider bimetallism a practical possibility, and Turkey and Portugal expressed no opinion.

Practically, the United States stood alone in advocacy of bimetallism.

In addition to this fact, the situation was rendered much more trying for her delegates by the fact that since their appointment the presidential election had placed the Democratic party in power, and great uncertainty prevailed as to the att.i.tude and intentions of a new President and Congress. "In these circ.u.mstances it soon became evident that the delegates were anxious for an adjournment of the question to give the new Government the opportunity of expressing their views, and that the conference would adjourn without any practical result. But, nevertheless, some very important statements and declarations were elicited in the course of the debates. In the first place, in addition to the distinct declarations on the part of some of the most important European powers that they would not entertain bimetallism, the representatives of the United States announced in very clear language that at any moment their Government might be disinclined to continue their purchases of silver, and that they were determined to protect their stock of gold. The Indian delegates alluded to the possibility of their Government finding itself under the necessity of closing its Mint to the free coinage of silver."

[Sidenote: GOLD STANDARD FOR INDIA]

Already, before the calling of the Brussels Conference, it had been recognised that, in case of failure to arrive at a bimetallic agreement, it would be essential thus far to close the Indian Mint, and to attempt the establishment of a gold standard in India. This impression, together with a draft scheme for a gold currency, was conveyed in a minute of Sir David Barbour's, addressed to the Secretary of State, 21st June 1892. As the result of correspondence between the Secretary of State for India in Council and the Government of India the British Government, on the 21st October 1892, i.e. a month before the meeting of the Brussels Conference, nominated a committee to consider the proposals submitted by the Indian Government for stopping the free coinage of silver in India, with a view to the introduction of a gold standard.

The committee consisted of--The Lord High Chancellor; The Right Hon.

Leonard H. Courtney, M.P.; Sir Thomas Henry Farrer, Bart.; Sir Reginald Earle Welby, G.C.B.; Arthur G.o.dley, Esq., C.B.; Lieutenant-General Richard Strachey, C.S.I.; Bertram Wodehouse Currie, Esq.

A hope was at first expressed that the committee would be able to make its report before the meeting of the conference at Brussels. But it was not actually made until the 31st May 1893.

India.

The part which India has played in the currency history of the world has been characteristic and uniform from the first. India is, and has been, from the birth of international commerce, the receptacle or sink for the precious metals of the civilised Western world. The fact that in so being she has const.i.tuted herself the safety-valve of the world's currencies is not confined to the present day merely. It is peculiarly applicable to the present day, with our organisation of banking and credit, which has concentrated the metallic reserves in certain burning central spots, and built thereon a superstructure of credit transactions so vast and in so delicately poised a manner that any undue addition to the metallic reserve sends a shudder of excitement and speculation through the whole, inducing over-trading and over-funding, and in the end a crisis. Such is the structure of the world's commerce that India provides an outlet or drain for any sudden crisis-bringing inflow of precious metal, and preserves the equilibrium of our system. The fact is patent to-day, because the nature of our credit and banking system is understood. But in reality this function India has performed through ages.

The influence she now exerts through impact with a highly delicate credit system, she formerly exerted on a less uniform and delicate system by the rougher influence of prices generally. The gain attending the Eastern trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not measured by modern conceptions of dividends or trading margins. To the European trader the intercourse was attended with a double gain, commercial and financial--the latter really bimetallic in nature from the higher ratio then prevailing between silver and gold in India.

To India it meant a perpetual balance of trade in her favour, if such a phrase can be used of such a situation,--a continual inflow of precious metal. Her capacity of absorption of metal seems as large and unsatisfied as ever, and, on the a.s.sumption of an unaltered situation in Europe and America, her function in the world's currency system still remains--feasible and beneficent. It is the most difficult question attending the modern currency crisis, whether such a.s.sumption of an unaltered situation is permissible.

Further than this, as a simple matter of fact, the currency difficulty with India at the present moment is purely governmental and commercial.

The Indian Government has yearly to remit a very large sum to this country in discharge of its gold obligations. In 1873-74, before the great fall in silver commenced, the amount remitted was 13,285,678, which, at the rate of exchange of 1 rupee = 1s. 10.35d., meant 142,657,000 rupees. During the year 1892-3 the amount remitted was 16,532,215, which, at the average rate of exchange in that year, 1s.

2.985d., required a payment of 264,784,150 rupees. If this could have been remitted at the exchange of 1873-74, it would only have needed 177,519,200 rupees, making a difference of 87,274,950 rupees. The result of this is to turn what would be a surplus of revenue into a large deficit. At an estimated exchange of 1s. 4d. per rupee for the past year, a surplus of revenue over expenditure was shown of 1,466,000 rupees. The exchange having fallen to an average of rather less than 1s.

3d., this surplus has been converted into an estimated deficit of 10,819,000 rupees. Notwithstanding the improvement of the revenue by 16,533,000 rupees over the budget estimate, the situation at the close of 1892 was fraught with a double danger to the Indian Government. The fall of silver--which had been such that during the year exchange could scarcely be maintained at 1s. 2-5/8d. for the rupee by the refusal to sell bills in India below that rate--might still proceed. And, secondly, in case of failure attending the Brussels Conference, the United States would be inevitably driven to abandon her single-handed attempt to keep up the price of silver by her silver purchases. In that case an unexampled fall of silver might be expected. The only practical solution of the difficulty was the adoption of a gold standard for India, and in order to do so at a workable rate for the rupee it would be necessary to antic.i.p.ate such further fall.

So much, in very brief, for the Government situation. For the commercial,--the hara.s.sment of trade by fluctuations of exchange, the check to investments, the handicapping of the Lancashire manufactures, and so on,--all this ground is still strewn with the debris of debate and difference. As far as the currency question, pure and simple, is concerned--such, that is, as is conceived of throughout this book, viz.

metallic--it is almost incapable of presentation or realisation. Through the extraordinary preference of the Indian for the precious metals as metals or as a commodity, quite apart from currency use, the ordinary action of such monetary laws as have been at work in Europe for centuries is nullified--to how great an extent it is quite impossible to estimate. The minting of silver has been such as might be expected under the conditions of free minting of a cheapening metal--i.e. it has risen on an average to the full amount of the net imports of silver. But, conversely, there has been no such reactionary influence of such mintings on the gold store of the country as would have taken place in Europe. The importations of silver have gone hand in hand with a net importation, not exportation, of gold, with no traceable evidence of bimetallic action.

The establishment of the gold standard for India is, therefore, primarily and in greatest part a governmental measure. As far as relates to such purely scientific phenomena and considerations, as have governed the European currencies for centuries, India still presents field for little or for very questionable observation.[22]

TABLE OF THE SURPLUS OR NET IMPORTS OF THE PRECIOUS METALS INTO INDIA

+---------+-----------+---------------+----------------+ | Year. | Gold. | Silver. | Council Bills. | +---------+-----------+---------------+----------------+ | 1835-6 | 329,918 | 1,611,896 | 2,045,254 | | 1836-7 | 419,724 | 1,338,882 | 2,042,232 | | 1837-8 | 430,870 | 1,966,944 | 1,706,184 | | 1838-9 | 258,925 | 2,645,130 | 2,346,592 | | 1839-40 | 226,643 | 1,650,471 | 1,439,525 | | 1840-1 | 137,312 | 1,401,670 | 1,174,450 | | 1841-2 | 165,623 | 1,283,228 | 2,589,283 | | 1842-3 | 211,161 | 2,952,445 | 1,197,438 | | 1843-4 | 406,523 | 3,695,442 | 2,801,731 | | 1844-5 | 710,100 | 1,988,561 | 2,516,951 | | 1845-6 | 544,476 | 932,490 | 3,065,709 | | 1846-7 | 846,949 | 1,378,249 | 3,097,042 | | 1847-8 | 1,039,116 | (_-491,191_) | 1,541,804 | | 1848-9 | 1,348,918 | 313,904 | 1,889,195 | | 1849-50 | 1,116,993 | 1,273,607 | 2,935,118 | | 1850-1 | 1,153,294 | 2,117,225 | 3,236,458 | | 1851-2 | 1,267,613 | 2,865,357 | 2,777,523 | | 1852-3 | 1,172,301 | 4,605,024 | 3,317,122 | | 1853-4 | 1,061,443 | 2,305,744 | 3,850,565 | | 1854-5 | 731,290 | 29,600 | 3,669,678 | | 1855-6 | 2,506,245 | 8,194,375 | 1,484,040 | | 1856-7 | 2,091,214 | 11,073,247 | 2,819,711 | | 1857-8 | 2,783,073 | 12,218,948 | 628,499 | | 1858-9 | 4,426,453 | 7,728,342 | 25,901 | | 1859-60 | 4,284,234 | 11,147,563 | 4,694 | | 1860-1 | 4,232,569 | 5,328,009 | 797 | | 1861-2 | 5,184,425 | 9,086,456 | 1,193,729 | | 1862-3 | 6,848,159 | 12,550,155 | 6,641,576 | | 1863-4 | 8,898,306 | 12,796,719 | 8,979,521 | | 1864-5 | 9,839,964 | 10,078,798 | 6,789,473 | | 1865-6 | 5,724,476 | 18,668,673 | 6,998,899 | | 1866-7 | 3,842,328 | 6,963,074 | 5,613,746 | | 1867-8 | 4,609,467 | 5,593,961 | 4,137,285 | | 1868-9 | 5,159,352 | 8,601,022 | 3,705,741 | | 1869-70 | 5,592,117 | 7,320,337 | 6,980,122 | | 1870-1 | 2,282,121 | 941,937 | 8,443,509 | | 1871-2 | 3,565,344 | 6,512,827 | 10,310,339 | | 1872-3 | 2,543,362 | 704,644 | 13,939,095 | | 1873-4 | 1,382,638 | 2,451,383 | 13,285,678 | | 1874-5 | 1,873,535 | 4,642,202 | 10,841,615 | +---------+-----------+---------------+----------------+

_NET_ IMPORT OF SILVER AND MINTING OF _NEW_ SILVER, 1870-92

+-----------+---------------+---------------+ | | Net | New | | Year. | Imports | Coinage | | | (Rupees). | (Rupees). | +-----------+---------------+---------------+ | 1870-1 | 9,419,240 | 17,181,970 | | 1871-2 | 65,203,160 | 16,903,940 | | 1872-3 | 7,151,440 | 39,809,270 | | 1873-4 | 24,958,240 | 23,700,070 | | 1874-5 | 46,422,020 | 48,968,840 | | 1875-6 | 15,553,550 | 25,502,180 | | 1876-7 | 71,988,720 | 62,711,220 | | 1877-8 | 146,763,350 | 161,803,260 | | 1878-9 | 39,706,940 | 72,107,700 | | 1879-80 | 78,697,420 | 102,569,680 | | 1880-1 | 38,925,740 | 42,496,750 | | 1881-2 | 53,790,500 | 21,862,740 | | 1882-3 | 74,802,270 | 65,084,570 | | 1883-4 | 64,051,510 | 36,634,000 | | 1884-5 | 72,456,310 | 57,942,320 | | 1885-6 | 116,066,290 | 102,855,660 | | 1886-7 | 71,557,380 | 46,165,370 | | 1887-8 | 92,287,500 | 107,884,250 | | 1888-9 | 92,466,790 | 73,122,550 | | 1889-90 | 109,378,760 | 85,511,580 | | 1890-1 | 141,751,360 | 131,634,740 | | 1891-2 | 90,221,840 | 55,539,700 | | 1892-3 | 128,635,690 | 127,052,100 | | +---------------+---------------+ | Total of} | | | | 23 years} | 1,652,256,020 | 1,525,044,460 | +-----------+---------------+---------------+

NET IMPORT AND MINTING OF GOLD

+---------+--------------------------+---------+ | Year. | Rupees. | Rupees. | +---------+--------------------------+---------+ | 1875-6 | 15,451,310 | 171,500 | | 1876-7 | 2,073,490 | Nil | | 1877-8 | 4,681,290 | 156,360 | | 1878-9 | (_Export of 8,961,730_) | 850 | | 1879-80 | 17,505,040 | 147,300 | | 1880-1 | 36,551,990 | 133,550 | | 1881-2 | 48,439,840 | 339,700 | | 1882-3 | 49,308,710 | 174,950 | | 1883-4 | 54,625,050 | Nil | | 1884-5 | 46,719,360 | 129,650 | | 1885-6 | 27,629,350 | 225,850 | | 1886-7 | 21,770,650 | Nil | | 1887-8 | 29,924,810 | Nil | | 1888-9 | 28,139,340 | 226,090 | | 1889-90 | 46,153,030 | 230,500 | | 1890-1 | 56,361,720 | Nil | | 1891-2 | 24,137,920 | 248,010 | | 1892-3 | (_Export of 28,126,830_) | ... | +---------+--------------------------+---------+

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 15: The returns for the years 1825-29 give no separate figures for gold and for silver, but give only the total of the two together.]

[Footnote 16: From 1865-1878--

France minted 625,466,380 francs.

Belgium " 350,497,720 "

Italy " 359,059,820 "

Switzerland " 7,978,250 "

------------- 1,343,000,000 "

[Footnote 17: As far, that is, as relates to gold. So far as silver is concerned, it was practically abrogated by the clauses for the prohibition of silver coinage in 38 Geo. III. c. 59 (1798), and finally repealed by the Act of 56 Geo. III. c. 68 (1816). See _postea_.]

[Footnote 18: Professor Laughlin brings out very strongly that even in such action Hamilton shows no trace of the modern conception of bimetallism, that his report expresses an emphatic preference for gold over silver, and that his object in adopting bimetallism was, while retaining silver, to leave a door open, if possible, for the introduction of gold.--_History of Bimetallism in the United States_, pp. 13, 14.]

[Footnote 19: By the law of 1837 the alloy for both gold and silver coins was fixed at 1/10. The pure gold in the eagle, which by the Act of 1834 was fixed at 232 grs. (258 grs. gross for the piece), was thereby changed to 232.2 grs. At the same time the pure metal content of the silver dollar was maintained at 371-1/4 grs., the (gross) weight per piece being changed to 412-1/2 grs.]

[Footnote 20: See the case more fully established in Laughlin's _Bimetallism in the United States_, pp. 29, 57.]

[Footnote 21: Viz. of Philadelphia, New Orleans, Dahlonega, Charlotte, San Francisco, and Carson City.]

[Footnote 22: On the subject of the history of the Indian Currency System under the East India Co., in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see a very interesting communication made in the pages of the _Nineteenth Century_ by Mr. H.D. Macleod (_Nineteenth Century_, November 1894, p. 777). The question of the system established by the Order in Council of January 1841 (authorising officers in charge of public treasuries to freely receive gold coins struck in conformity with the provisions of Act xvii. of 1835, establishing the 15-rupee pieces), which continued till its rescinding in December 1852, is discussed in the evidence of Mr. T. Comber before the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver (_Second Report of the Commission on Changes in the Relative Values of the Precious Metals_, 1888, p. 27). For an excellent and succinct history of the Indian currency system from the end of the 18th century, see Robert Chalmers' _History of Currency and the British Colonies_, p. 336.]

APPENDIX I

THE MONETARY SYSTEM OF FLORENCE DURING THE DAYS OF HER COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY AND INDEPENDENCE

Throughout the history of independent Florence her gold coin type is always the florin. In its first beginning her monetary system had relation to that of the restored Empire. The _silver fiorino_ of which the first mention occurs was equivalent to 12 denari, as in the Charlemagne system. Presumably this would be equal to some hypothecated _soldo_, and the multiple of it a hypothecated fiorino d'oro, gold florin (= 20 soldi), would be equal to the lira or libra, or unit of weight. This will explain how it is possible to have mention of gold florins almost a century before the actual issuing of a real coin so named. Such mention occurs in the monetary ordinances and schedules of France as early as 1180. (See Preface, _supra_, p. xiii, also De Saulcy, _Doc.u.ments_, i. 115. Le Blanc was unable to explain this apparent contradiction of history.)

What the particular Florentine weight unit or lira (libbra) was, however, is uncertain. According to the researches of Neri (in _Argelatus_, i. 157) the scheme of weights was--

Denari. Grani.

Silver florin = ... 38 23 26 Lira (or 20 popolini) = 32 11 15 21