The Freedom of Science Part 27

"Nevertheless," we are told, "the representatives of science have the duty of freely communicating their opinions; they are called by people and state to find the truth for the great mult.i.tude, that is not itself in the position to pursue laborious research. Where else could it get the truth but from science?" "The mult.i.tude partic.i.p.ates in truth generally in a receptive, pa.s.sive manner; only a few pre-eminent minds are destined by nature to be the dispensers and promoters of knowledge" (_Paulsen_), and with this vocation of science a restriction of its freedom of speech would be incompatible.

The idea has something enticing about it. It also has its justification, if the matter at issue concerns things outside of the common scope of human knowledge, such as the more precise research of nature, of history, and so on. But the idea is not warranted when applied to the higher questions of human life. Here it is based on the false premise that man cannot arrive at the certain possession of truth without scientific research. We have demonstrated previously how this notion involves a total misconception of the nature of human thought.

There is, beside the scientific certainty, another true certainty, a natural certainty, the only one we have in most matters, and a safe guide to mankind especially in higher questions, nay, in general much safer than science, which, as proved by history, goes easily astray in such matters. Long before there was a science, mankind possessed the truth about the principles of life; and it possesses this truth still, through common sense and, even more, through divine revelation, which offers enlightenment to every one regardless of science. Here apply the words of the poet:

"Das Wahre ist schon laengst gefunden Hat edle Geisterschaar verbunden Das alte Wahre, fa.s.st es an!"

Nevertheless, it is claimed, science remains the sole guide to truth and progress. Must not truth be searched for and struggled for always anew?

There are no patented truths for all times-each age must sketch its own image of the world, must form new values. And it is for science to point out these new roads. Therefore, full swing for its doctrines. "Science knows not of statutes of limitations or prescription, hence of no absolutely established possession. Consequently real, scientific, instruction can only mean absolutely free instruction" (_Paulsen_). We may be brief. Every line bears the imprint of that sceptical subjectivism which we have met so often as the philosophical presumption of modern freedom of science. It is the wisdom of ancient sophistry, which even Aristotle stigmatized as a "sham-science," "a running after something that invariably slips away." A freedom in teaching with such a theory of cognition can never be a factor of mental progress, least of all when it seeks to rise above a G.o.d-given, Christian truth to "higher" forms of religion. This, however, is often the very progress for which freedom in teaching is intended-the unhindered propagation of an anti-Christian view of the world.

3. No Innate Right.

Very well, we are told, leave aside the appeal to the province of science; but it cannot be denied that man has at least an innate right of communicating his thoughts in the freest manner. The first right of the human individual, a right which must not be curtailed in any way, is his right to free development according to his inner laws, provided the freedom of the fellow-man is not thereby injured. Hence every man has the right of freely uttering his opinion, in science especially, because the free right of others is thereby not infringed upon in any matter whatsoever.

This is the claim. It is again rooted in the autonomy of the human subject, the main idea of the liberal view of life, and, at the same time, the princ.i.p.al presumption of its freedom of science. It leads to the _individualistic theory of rights_, which declares freedom to be man's self-sufficient object, viz., freedom in all things regardless of the weal and woe of others, no matter if the sequel be error, scandal, or seduction, if only the strict right to freedom be not violated.

"Act outwardly so," says the philosophic preceptor of autonomism, "that the free use of thy free will may be consistent with the liberty of others according to a general law." "This liberty,"

continues _Kant_, "is the sole, original right of every man by virtue of his humanity." And _Spencer_ concurrently teaches: "Every one is free to do what he wants, as long as he does not infringe upon the liberty of others."

This is termed the "Maxim of Co-existence." Accordingly any one may say and write anything at will, no matter if people are led astray by his errors. Even the government must in no way limit this freedom, except where rights are violated; to defend religion and morals against attacks, to guard innocence and inexperience against seduction, is, according to this theory, not allowed to the state. _W. von Humboldt_ writes: "He who utters things or commits actions, offending the conscience or the morals of other people, may act immorally: but unless he is guilty of obtrusiveness, he does not injure any right." Hence the state must not interfere. "Even the a.s.suredly graver case, when the witnessing of an action, the listening to certain reasoning, would mislead the virtue or the thought of others, even this case would not permit restraint of freedom."

We are dealing here with that misconception of the social nature of man which has always characterized liberalism. It knows only of the right and liberty of the individual; of his duties to society it knows nothing, not even that men should not injure the possessions of others, but rather promote them; nor does it know that men are placed in a society that requires the free will of the individual to yield to the common weal of the many. To liberal thought human society is only an accidental aggregation of individuals, not connected by social unity. The autonomous spheres of the single individuals are rolling side by side, each one for itself: wherever it pleases them to roll, there they are carried by the autonomous centre of gravity, whatever they upset in their career has no right to complain. This principle of freedom was given free rein in the economical legislation of the nineteenth century. Free enterprise, free development of energy, was the rallying cry; the result was devastation and wreckage.

Unrestricted Freedom of Teaching Inadmissible.

Hence the claim for absolute freedom in teaching is not warranted; on the contrary, its chief arguments are borrowed from a philosophy that is unacceptable to the Christian mind. Is it even admissible? Though not warranted, is it permissible at least from the viewpoint of ethics? It is not even this. The claim is ethically inadmissible, because the _religious, moral, and social_ inst.i.tutions, especially the _Christian faith_ and the Christian morals of mankind, would be seriously injured. In other words: The claim that it is permissible to proclaim scientific theories which are apt to do great _damage_ to the foundations of religious, moral, and social life, especially to Christian conviction and morals, is ethically reprehensible.

A few remarks in explanation. We merely speak here of the freedom in teaching relating to the philosophical-religious foundations of life; that it cannot be the subject of serious objection in other matters we have previously mentioned. Nor do we yet inquire what social powers should fix the needed limitations, whether state or Church should regulate them; we are merely investigating, from the viewpoint of ethics, what barriers are set by the law of reason, and would have to be set even in the absence of state laws, because of the important influence exercised by scientific doctrine upon the social life-the social welfare of mankind is the consideration beside the truth that is decisive in considering freedom in teaching.

The teacher or writer may himself be of the opinion that his pernicious errors are not dangerous; he may fancy them even of utmost importance to the world; hence he thinks he has the right, even the duty, to communicate them to the world. And do we not hear them all a.s.sure us that they desire only the truth? We do not wish to sit in judgment on the good faith of them individually; we make no comment when a man like _D. F. Strauss_, looking back upon the forty years of his career as a writer, vouches for his unwavering and pure aim for truth; and when even _Haeckel_ a.s.serts this of himself. Every fallacy has made its appearance with this avowal.

But, by way of parenthesis, there is no reason to boast in a general way of the sincere aim at truth and the pure mind for the ideal, alleged to prevail in the modern literature of our times, especially in philosophical literature. He who stands upon Christian ground knows that the denial of a personal G.o.d, of immortality and other matters, are errors of gravest consequence.

Furthermore, if one is convinced of the capability of man to recognize the truth, at least in the most important matters, and if one knows that G.o.d has made His Revelation the greatest manifestation in history, and proved it sufficiently by doc.u.ments-indeed, had to prove it; that He will let all who are of good will come to the knowledge of the truth; then it remains incomprehensible how modern philosophy considered as a whole is said on the one hand to be guided by a sincere desire for truth, while on the other hand it clings with hopeless obstinacy to the most radical errors.

Such talk of general sincere searching for truth is apt to deceive the inexperienced. He who has obtained a deeper insight into modern philosophy, he who steadily watches it at work, will recall to mind only too often the word of the Holy Ghost: "For there shall be a time when they will not endure sound doctrine, but according to their own desires shall they heap to themselves teachers ... and will indeed turn away their hearing from the truth and shall be turned unto fables" (2 Tim. iv. 3).

Even if the teacher is himself convinced of the truth and inoffensiveness of his theory, it does not follow by any means that society is obliged to receive it. Indeed not. The state prohibits cults dangerous to the common weal: it does not intend to suffer damage just because the adherents of such cults may be in good faith. And if some one thinks himself called to deliver a people from its legitimate ruler, let it be undecided whether his purpose is good or not, he will nevertheless be restrained by rather drastic means from proceeding according to his idea. This proves that the principle of "no barrier but one's own veracity" is not conceded in practical life. The teacher and author, this is the sense of our thesis, must ever be conscious of the grave responsibility of science, against whose power the unscientific are so often defenceless; his great duty will be to make use of this power with utmost compunction, to teach nothing whereof he is not fully convinced, nor to announce for truth anything he is still investigating.

As we turn to the demonstration of our proposition, a start from the _definition of scientific teaching_ suggests itself; manifestly this must be decisive for the measure of its freedom. No doubt, its purpose obviously is: to promote the weal of mankind by communicating the truth, by guarding men against errors, especially against those which would most harm them, by elevating and increasing the blessings of this life: for knowledge guides man in all his steps, it is the light on his way.

Science is not self-sufficient. It is an equally false and pernicious notion to make science a sovereign authority, throning above man, who must pay homage, and subordinate his interests to it, but which he must not ask to serve him for his own ends in life. There are such notions of science and also of art. Art, too, it is sometimes claimed, should serve its own ends only; the demand, that it should edify, or promote the ideals of society, is deemed a desertion of its purposes, "the furtherance of worldly or heavenly ideals may be eliminated from its task" (_E. von Hartmann_). These are the excrescences of unclarified cultural thoughts.

Since man and his culture is more and more replacing the divine Ideal, this culture itself has grown to be the overshadowing ideal of the Deity, without whom evidently man cannot live. The Egyptians worshipped Sun and Moon; modern man often burns incense before the products of his own mind.

It is a reversal of the right proportion. Science and its doctrine are activities of life, results of the human mind. Activities of life, however, have man for their end, they are to develop and perfect him: man does not exist for the clothes he wears-the clothes exist on account of man; the leaves exist for the sake of the tree that puts them forth, nor can grapes be of more importance than the vine that has produced them.

Hence, where science does not serve this end, where it in consequence becomes not a blessing, but an injury to man, where it tears down, instead of building up, there it forfeits the right to exist; it is no longer a fruitful bough on the tree of humanity, but a harmful outgrowth. Like every organism actively opposes its harmful growths, society, too, must not tolerate within its bosom any scientific tendencies which act as malign germs, perhaps attack its very marrow.

From the true object of science, as above stated, it follows that it is wrong to disseminate doctrines that are apt to injure mankind in the possession of the truth, which may even imperil the authenticated foundations of life. For n.o.body will deny that firm foundations are needed to uphold and support the highest ideals of life; they can no more withstand a constant jarring and shaking than can a house of frame and stone. Such foundations are, first of all, the moral and religious truths and convictions about the Whence and Whither of human life, about G.o.d and the hereafter, the social duties toward the fellow-man, obedience to authority, and so on. If man is to perform burdensome duties as husband and father, if, as a citizen, he is to do justice to others and yield in obedience to authority, he must have powerful motives; else his impulses will take the helm, the sensible, moral being becomes a sensual being who reverses the order and drives the ship of life towards the cataract of ethical and social revolution. And these motives must rest deeply in the mind, like the foundation that supports the house; they must become identified with it, as the vital principle penetrates the tree, as the instinct of the animal is part of its innermost being. If new notions are continually whizzing without resistance through the mind, like the wind over the fields, repose and permanence are impossible in human life. To jolt the foundations invites collapse and ruin.

It is the duty of self-preservation, for which every being strives, that society guard these foundations of order against subversion and capricious experimentation. Of the Locrians it is told that any one desiring to offer a resolution for changing existing laws, was required to appear at the public meeting with a rope around his neck. He was hanged with it if he failed to win his fellow-citizens over to his view. This custom pictures the necessity of erecting a powerful dam against the inundation by illicit mental tidal waves, that endanger the stability of the order of life.

This, of course, does not oppose every new progress. In building a house, firm foundations do not prevent the house from growing in size; but the foundations are a necessary preliminary to a suitable construction. Under no circ.u.mstances must a man be permitted, in his individualistic mania for reform, to lay an impious hand at the fundamental principles of life; and the scientist must bear in mind the fact that it is not the task and privilege of his individualistic reason to put the seal of approval on these principles as if the truth had never before been discovered.

To _Christian_ nations the immutable truths of Christianity are these safe foundations. They are vouched for by divine authority, they have stood all historical tests of fitness; they sustain the inst.i.tutions of family and of government, they determine thought, education, the ideas of right and wrong-a venerable patrimony of the nations. Shall every _Nietzsche_, big or little, be free to attack them? Experiments may be made with rabbits, flowers, or drugs; but it would violate the first principle of prudence and justice to allow every Tom, d.i.c.k, and Harry, who may have the neological itch, to experiment on the highest inst.i.tutions of mankind.

_Primum non nocere_ is an old caution to the physician; for many medical pract.i.tioners and surgeons not an untimely admonition. It is a.s.serted, and vouched for by proof, that patients are made the subjects of experiment for purposes of science; not, indeed, rich people, but the poor in hospitals and clinics (comp. _A. Moll_, Arztliche Ethik, 1902). Every conscientious physician will turn with moral abhorrence from such action.

Indeed, man and his greatest possession, life, is not to be made the victim of scientific experiment. If this holds good as to the physical things of life, then how much more of the ideal things of mankind!

"Every One to Form His Own Judgment"?

But, then, cannot every one decide for himself as to the teachings of science, and reject whatever he thinks to be false? Then would be avoided all damage that might result from a freedom in teaching. Science does not force its opinion upon any one. With due respect for the discernment of its disciples, science lays its results before them, leaving it to them to judge and choose, whatever they think is good.

Such words voice the optimism of an inexperienced idealism. To be sure, were the devotee to science, be he a student at a university or a reader of scientific works, a clear-sighted diagnostician, who could at once perceive error, and, moreover, if he were a mathematical ent.i.ty, without personal interest in the matter, the argument might be listened to. But any one past the immaturity of youth, he, especially, who has earnestly commenced to know himself, is aware that unfortunately the opposite is the case.

First the lack of ability to _distinguish error from truth_. Even when recognized, error is not without danger; it shares with truth the property to act suggestively, especially when it repeatedly and with a.s.surance approaches the mind. And often error does pose with great a.s.surance, as the result of science, as the conclusion of the superior mind of the teacher, perhaps of a famous teacher! It is taken for granted that whatever serious men a.s.sert in the name of science must be right; or, if not that, there is the overawing feeling that there must be some justification for the confidence of the a.s.sertion. Authority impresses even without argument, and impresses the more strongly, the less there is of intellectual independence. The latter is at lowest ebb at the youthful age. That which in hypnotic suggestion is intensified into the morbid: the effective psychical transfer of one's own thought into some one else, occurs in a lesser form through the influence of the morbid scepsis of our times; it is a poisonous atmosphere, affecting imperceptively the susceptible mind which remains long in it.

For this reason the religious savant, who has to do a great deal with infidel books, must be on his watch incessantly, even though he has the knowledge and the intellect to detect wrong conclusions. Thus we find that great scholars often display a striking fear of irreligious books. Of Cardinal _Mai_ it is told: "He said-and this we can vouch for-'I have the permission to read forbidden books; but I never make use of it nor do I intend to do so' " (_Hilger_, Der Index, 1905, 41).

The learned _L. A. Muratori_ wrote a refutation of a heretic book.

In the preface he thought it necessary to apologize for having read the book. He said: "The book got into my hands very late, and for a long time I could not get myself to read it. For why should one read the writings of innovators except to commit one's self to their folly? I seek and like books which confirm my faith, but not those which would lead me away from my religion. But when I heard that the book was circulated in Italy, I resolved to muster up my strength for the defence of truth and religion, and for the safety of my brethren."

_Saint Francis of Sales_, with touching simplicity, gives in his writings praise to G.o.d for having preserved him from losing his faith through the reading of heretical books. Of the learned Spanish philosopher _Balmes_ is preserved a saying that he once addressed to two of his friends: "You know, the faith is deeply rooted in my heart. Nevertheless, I cannot read a fallacious book without feeling the necessity of regaining the right mood by reading Holy Writ, the Imitation of Christ, and the writings of blessed _Louis of Granada_."

What then must happen when the needed training is lacking? when one easily grasps the objections to the truth, but cannot find the answer? when one is not in a position to ascertain whether the a.s.serted facts are based on truth, whether something important is kept back, whether there are stated positive facts, or mere hypotheses, or perhaps even idle suppositions? If one is not capable to recognize wrong conclusions, to note the ambiguities of words? Our present treatise cites proof of it. How many earnest men, who in good faith are the warm advocates of freedom of science, are aware how ambiguous that term is; how a whole theory of cognition and view of the world is hidden behind it? How many can at once see the ambiguity of phrases like "Difference between knowledge and faith," of "experiencing one's religion," of "evolution and progress," of "humanism," of "unfolding personality"? And of the self-conscious postulate that science cannot reckon with supernatural factors, how many perceive that it is nothing but an undemonstrated supposition? We are told that all great representatives of science reject the Christian view of the world; who knows at once that such a.s.sertion is untrue? We read that the Copernican theory was condemned by Rome, even prohibited up to 1835, and this cannot fail to make an impression; but the part omitted in the story, who will at once supplement or even suspect it?

Then there is the great _want of philosophical training_. Formerly a thorough philosophical education was the indispensable condition for maturity, and considered the indispensable foundation for higher studies.

All this has changed; frequently there is not even the desire for philosophical training. Of course, modern philosophy in its present state does not promise much of benefit. "Students of medicine and law remain for the larger part without any philosophical education, and among those of the other two faculties but few students do better than come into a more or less superficial touch with philosophy" (_Paulsen_). The consequence is, they cannot scientifically get their bearings in respect to ultimate questions, and easily lose their faith, succ.u.mbing to errors and sophisms.

Imagine a young man, untrained; in books, in the lecture room, in his intercourse, everywhere, he is courted by a disbelieving science, with its theories, its objections, its doubts,-tension everywhere that is not relieved, accusations that are not explained; how is he to bring with a steady hand order in all this? To clinch it, he hears the obtrusive exhortation to form forthwith his own conviction by his own reasoning!

He is, moreover, likely to be informed as follows: "The university is a place for mental struggle, for incessant investigation of inherited opinions. For years and years the student was fed with prescribed matter which he had to swallow believingly, ... at last the moment has arrived when he can choose and decide for himself.

True, this freedom of mental choice-and it is the essence of academic freedom-has also its anguish. But how magnificent it is, on the other hand, when the gloomy walls of the cla.s.sroom vanish, and the bright ether of research dawns into view with its wide horizon! He who cannot grasp and enjoy this moment in its grandeur and exquisiteness, he who prefers to the free life of the colt on the vast prairies the dull existence in a narrow fold ... he has taken the wrong road when he came to the gates of the Alma Mater to study worldly science-he should have remained at the restful hearth of the pious, parental home, in the shadow of the old village-church" (_Jodl_).