The Franco-German War of 1870-71 Part 36

(January 19th.)

The sortie was planned to take place on January 19th. On that day, as we have seen, General Faidherbe advanced as far as St. Quentin on the way to Paris, and the army which was to make the sortie stood on the eastern and northern fronts of the capital. The attempt to break through was, however, made in the opposite direction. But in fact, the peninsula of Gennevilliers was now the only ground on which large ma.s.ses of troops could still be deployed without being exposed for hours while they were being a.s.sembled, to the fire of the German artillery.

Two days previously the mobilized National Guards had already relieved the three Divisions of the sortie-Army from the positions they had held; and those Divisions, collectively 90,000 strong, were to move to the attack in three columns simultaneously. General Vinoy on the left, supported by the fire from the enceinte, was to carry the height of Montretout; General Bellemare in the centre was to push forward through Garches; General Ducrot on the right by way of the Chateau of Buzanval.

The attack was set to begin at six in the morning, but blocks occurred at the bridges of Asnieres and Neuilly, as no specific orders had been issued for regulating the crossing. When at seven o'clock the signal to advance was made from Mont Valerien, only the advance of General Vinoy's force was ready, the other columns had not yet deployed, and the last detachments tailed back as far as Courbevoix. Before they had reached their rendezvous-points the left wing was already marching on St. Cloud with fifteen battalions.

These at first met only isolated posts and patrols, eighty-nine men in all, who rushed into the open gorge of the redoubt of Montretout, and there made a stand for some time; they then fought their way out with great bravery, but some of them were taken prisoners. There, and in the northern part of St. Cloud, the French promptly prepared for defence.

The centre column under General Bellemare also took possession without difficulty of the height of Maison du Cure.

Not till now, at nearly nine o'clock, did the first supports of the German forepost line appear on the scene. Till within a short time the observatories had been able to report nothing but "thick fog;" but reports from the right and left wings announced that a serious attack was threatened on the whole front from St. Cloud to Bougival. The Vth Corps was now alarmed, and General von Kirchbach betook himself to the 9th Division. On the German right, in the park of St. Cloud, stood the 17th Brigade; on the left, behind the Porte de Longboyau, the 20th; the other troops of the Corps marched from their quarters in Versailles and the villages to its north, to Jardy and Beauregard. The Crown Prince ordered six battalions of the Guard Landwehr and a Bavarian Brigade to Versailles, and himself rode to the Hospice of Brezin; the King went to Marly.

The French meanwhile had seized the foremost houses of Garches, and made their eastward way here and there through the breaches in the wall into the park of the Chateau of Buzanval. The 5th Jager Battalion, supported by single companies of the 58th and 59th Regiments, hurried forward and drove the enemy back out of Garches, occupied the cemetery on its north, and still reached the advanced post of La Bergerie just at the right time. The other bodies under General von Bothmer (commanding 17th Brigade, 9th Division, Vth Corps), by order from the commanding General, maintained a stationary fight on the skirts of the park of St. Cloud, to gain time. About half-past nine they repulsed an attack by Bellemare's column, arrested the advance of the enemy along the Rue Imperiale of St.

Cloud, and themselves took the offensive from the Grille d'Orleans and the Porte Jaune. Five French battalions unsuccessfully a.s.saulted La Bergerie. A section of Engineers tried with great devotion to demolish the wall surrounding the court, but the frozen dynamite did not explode, and the Jagers held the position steadfastly throughout the day.

The attacks of the French had hitherto been undertaken without a.s.sistance from their artillery. The batteries of General Vinoy's advance had been seriously delayed by crossing with the centre column, and were now detained at Briqueterie to meet the contingency of a repulse. General Bellemare's batteries tried to get up the slope of the height of Garches, but the exhaustion of the teams made it necessary to take up a position at Fouilleuse. Meanwhile the batteries of the German 9th Division came up by degrees, and by noon thirty-six guns had opened fire. In St. Cloud a hot street-fight was going on.

Only General Ducrot on the French right wing had opened the battle with his strong force of artillery, which came into position on both sides of Rueil. The tirailleurs then advanced and made their way through the park of Buzanval to its western boundary-wall, but were driven back by the 50th Fusilier Regiment which had hastened forward.

At half-past ten the chief attack ensued at this point, supported by part of the central column. It found only an under-officer's post at Malmaison, but at the eastern exit from Bougival near La Jouchere and Porte de Longboyau, it encountered the already reinforced line of posts of the 20th Infantry Brigade. General von Schmidt (commanding 10th Infantry Division) still held back at Beauregard the reserve of the 10th Division. A murderous fire from the well-covered German infantry broke the onset of the French, and converted it by mid-day into a stationary fire fight, in which the German artillery also took part with great effect. Two batteries of the 10th Division at St. Michel were reinforced by two Guard batteries brought up from St. Germain to Louvenciennes; a third came into action near Chatou and forced an armour-plated train halted at the railway station north of Rueil to retire rapidly to Nanterre. Four batteries of the IVth Corps finally opened fire from Carrieres, heedless of the fire of Valerien, and sh.e.l.led the dense ma.s.ses of hostile infantry halted in rear of Rueil.

At two o'clock the French decided on renewing the attack. When two of their batteries had sh.e.l.led Porte de Longboyau a brigade marched on that point, and a second on the western wall of the park of the Chateau Buzanval; a third followed in support. Not less bold than unsuccessful was the attempt of a section of Engineers, one officer and ten men, to blow up part of the wall; they all fell together. The attacking columns had advanced to within 200 paces, when thirteen German companies at the moment met them, broke and stopped their rush by pouring fire into them at short range, and presently routed the hostile columns in disorder, in spite of the devoted exertions of the officers.

The French, however, still found a strong protection in the park-wall, which had been prepared for defence with great skill and with the utmost rapidity; and the advance of several companies from Brezin and La Bergerie on this wall was repulsed with heavy loss.

But the strength of the French attack was already broken. So early as three o'clock a movement of retreat was observable in their left wing, and as dusk fell the French centre began to withdraw from the heights of Maison du Cure. When Colonel von Kothen pursued, with a small force, several battalions indeed fronted, and even threatened a sharp counter-attack; but timely support arrived from La Bergerie, Garches, and Porte Jaune, and, backed by the fire of the batteries, the pursuit was followed up. The King's Grenadiers drove back the enemy to the vicinity of Fouilleuse.

The Germans, however, had not yet succeeded in repossessing themselves of the Montretout redoubt. The chief hindrance arose from their having been unable to advance through the town of St. Cloud. As, however, the possession of this position was indispensable for the protection of the right wing, General von Kirchbach gave orders that it was to be retaken either that evening or early next morning.

General von Sandrart (commanding 9th Infantry Division) decided on immediate action, and at eight that evening five battalions went forward on this duty. Only a few French were found in the redoubt and were taken prisoners; but in the town the struggle was severe. Finally the Germans had to restrict themselves to blockading the houses held temporarily by the enemy. The French also clung to the outer park-wall of Buzanval throughout the night. The Guard Landwehr and the Bavarian Brigade were therefore a.s.signed quarters in Versailles, to form a strong reserve at hand in case of need on the following day. The remainder of the troops withdrew into their former quarters.

At half-past five General Trochu had issued the order for a retreat. He perceived that the prolongation of the struggle could afford no success, especially as the National Guards were becoming insubordinate. The brave defenders of St. Cloud were forgotten in these directions. They did not surrender till the day after, when artillery was brought against the houses they occupied. And the park-wall was not relinquished till the following morning.

The French attack of January 19th was wrecked even before it had reached the main position of the defenders. The reserves in readiness on the German side had not needed to be brought into action. The Vth Corps alone had driven back an enemy of four times its own strength. It lost 40 officers and 570 men; the loss of the French in killed and wounded was 145 officers and 3423 men, besides 44 officers and 458 men taken prisoners.

When the fog lifted at about eleven o'clock on the morning of the 20th, their long columns were seen retreating on Paris across the peninsula of Gennevilliers.

PROSECUTION OF THE ARTILLERY ATTACK ON PARIS UP TO THE ARMISTICE.

After the repulse of this last struggle for release on the part of the garrison, the extension of the artillery attack to the north front of the defensive position was now determined on. The siege guns no longer needed against the minor French fortresses and on the Marne had been parked for this object at Villiers le Bel. The Army of the Meuse had prepared abundant material for the construction of batteries, and had collected a waggon park of above 600 vehicles. Twelve batteries had already been built in the lines between Le Bourget and the Lake of Enghien, the arming of which followed, for the most part, under cover of night. On January 21st eighty-one heavy guns were ready for action, and Colonel Bartsch opened fire at nine that morning on Forts La Briche, Double Couronne, and de l'Est.

The forts, which opposed the attack with 143 heavy guns, replied vigorously, and on the following day the thick weather prevented the German batteries from resuming their fire till the afternoon. But the ground in front was abandoned by the French, and the outposts of the Guards and IVth Corps took possession of Villetaneuse and Temps Perdu.

During the nights the fire was directed on St. Denis, with every endeavour to spare the Cathedral, and many conflagrations occurred. By the 23rd the vigorous prosecution of the cannonade had materially subdued the fire of the defence. La Briche was wholly silenced, and the other forts only fired occasional salvos. During the night of the 25th four batteries were advanced to within 1300 and 950 yards respectively of the enemy's main works. The engineer attack also could now be undertaken, and a series of new batteries was constructed, which, however, were never used.

The effect of this bombardment of only six days' duration was decisive.

The forts had suffered extraordinarily. In contrast to those of the south front they were dest.i.tute of the powerful backing of the enceinte, and they lacked, too, bomb-proof shelter. The provisional bomb-proofs were pierced by sh.e.l.ls, the powder-magazines were in the greatest danger, and the garrisons had nowhere any more cover. The inhabitants of St. Denis fled to Paris in crowds, and the impaired immunity from storm of the sorely battered works was an insuperable obstacle to a longer maintenance of the defence. This northern attack cost the Germans one officer and 25 men; the French stated their loss at 180.

The fire of the forts on the east front was kept under, and the Wurtemberg Field Artillery sufficed to prevent the enemy from renewing his foothold on the peninsula of St. Maur.

The south front meanwhile suffered more and more from the steady bombardment. The enceinte and the sunken mortar batteries behind the ceinture railway were still active, but in the forts the barracks were reduced to ruins, partly battered in and partly burnt down, and the garrisons had to take shelter in the emptied powder-magazines. The covered ways could no longer be traversed safely, the parapets afforded no protection. In Vanves the embrasures were filled up with sandbags; in the southern curtain of Issy five blocks of casemates had been pierced by sh.e.l.ls penetrating the shielding walls. Even the detached gorge-walls of Vanves and Montrouge were destroyed, forty guns were dismounted, and seventy gun carriages wrecked.

The whole condition of France, political and military, and above all the situation in Paris, was such as to cause the Government the gravest anxiety.

Since the return of Monsieur Thiers from his diplomatic tour, it was certain that no mediatory interposition by any foreign power could be expected. The distress of the capital had become more and more severe.

Scarcity and high prices had long borne heavily on its population; provisions were exhausted, and even the stores of the garrison had been seriously encroached on. Fuel was lacking in the lasting cold, and petroleum was an inefficient subst.i.tute for gas. When the long-deferred bombardment of the south side of Paris was had recourse to, the people took refuge in the cellars or fled to the remoter quarters of the city; and when it was also begun on the northern side the inhabitants of St.

Denis crowded into the capital.

The great sortie of the 19th had proved a total failure, and no relief was to be hoped for from outside since Gambetta had sent news of the disaster at Le Mans. The Paris Army, of whose inactivity he complained, was reduced to a third of its original strength by cold, sickness, and desertion, and the heart taken out of it by repeated miscarriages. Its horses had to be slaughtered to provide meat for the inhabitants, and General Trochu declared any further offensive movements to be quite hopeless; the means even of pa.s.sive resistance were exhausted.

Hitherto the Government had been able to keep the populace in good humour by highly-coloured reports, but now the disastrous state of affairs could no longer be concealed. All its projects were now denounced.

There was a large cla.s.s of people in Paris who were but little affected by the general distress. Numbers of civilians had been armed for the defence of their country and were fed and well paid by the authorities, without having too much to do in return. They were joined by all the dubious social elements, which found their reckoning in the disorganized situation. These had been quite satisfied with the condition which the 4th of September had created, and a little later they displayed themselves in the hideous form of the Commune. Already some popular gatherings had been dispersed only by force of arms, and even a part of the National Guard were not free from mutinous tendencies. The revolutionary clubs, too, supported by the press, clamoured for further enterprises, even a sortie _en ma.s.se_ of all the inhabitants of Paris.

Thus the feeble Government, dependent as it was on popular favour alone, was under pressure from the impossible demands of an ignorant mob on the one hand, and, on the other, the inexorable force of actual facts.

There was absolutely no expedient possible but the capitulation of the capital; every delay intensified the necessity, and enforced the acceptance of harder terms. Unless all the railways were at once thrown open for the transport of supplies from a very wide area, the horrors of famine would inevitably fall on a population of more than two million souls; and later it might not be practicable to cope with the emergency.

Yet no one dared utter the fatal word "capitulation," no one would undertake the responsibility for the inevitable.

A great council of war was held on the 21st. In it all the elder Generals p.r.o.nounced any further offensive measures to be quite impossible. It was proposed that a council of the younger officers should also be held, but no decision was arrived at. As, however, some one must be made answerable for every misfortune, General Trochu, originally the most popular member of the Government, was dismissed from his position as Governor, and the chief military command was entrusted to General Vinoy. General Ducrot resigned his command.

All this did nothing to improve the situation, so on the 23rd, Monsieur Jules Favre made his appearance at Versailles to negotiate in the first instance for an armistice.

On the German side there was readiness to meet this request; but of course some guarantee had to be forthcoming that the capital, after having been reprovisioned, would not renew its resistance. The surrender of the forts, inclusive of Mont Valerien and the town of St. Denis, as well as the disarmament of the enceinte was demanded and acceded to.

Hostilities were to be suspended on the evening of the 26th, so far as Paris was concerned, and all supplies to be freely given. A general armistice of twenty-one days was then to come in force on the 31st of January, exclusive, however, of the departments of Doubs, Jura, and Cote d'Or, and the fortress of Belfort, where for the time operations were still being carried on, in which both sides were hopeful of success.

This armistice gave the Government of National Defence the time necessary for a.s.sembling a freely-elected National a.s.sembly at Bordeaux, which should decide whether the war should be continued, or on what conditions peace should be concluded. The election of the deputies was unimpeded and uninfluenced even in the parts of the country occupied by the Germans.

The regular forces of the Paris garrison, troops of the line, marines, and Gardes-Mobiles, had to lay down their arms at once; only 12,000 men and the National Guard were allowed to retain them for the preservation of order inside the city. The troops of the garrison were interned there during the armistice; on its expiry they were to be regarded as prisoners. As to their subsequent transfer to Germany, where every available place was already overflowing with prisoners, the question was postponed in expectation of a probable peace.

The forts were occupied on the 29th without opposition.

There were taken over from the Field Army of Paris 602 guns, 1,770,000 stand of arms, and above 1000 ammunition waggons; from the fortress 1362 heavy guns, 1680 gun-carriages, 860 limbers, 3,500,000 cartridges, 4000 hundred-weight of powder, 200,000 sh.e.l.ls, and 100,000 bombs.

The blockade of Paris, which had lasted 132 days, was over, and the greater part of the German forces which had so long stood fast under its walls, was released to end the war in the open field.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH UNDER GENERAL VON MANTEUFFEL.

The two Army Corps under General von Manteuffel consisted altogether of fifty-six battalions, twenty squadrons, and 168 guns. When it arrived at Chatillon sur Seine on January 12th, the IInd Corps was on the right, and the VIIth on the left on an extension from Noyers Montigny of about forty-five miles. One brigade, under General von Dannenberg, which had already several times been in contact with portions of the French Army of the Vosges, was pushed forward to Vilaines and was charged with the duty of covering the right flank.