The Franco-German War of 1870-71 Part 17

OPERATIONS OF THE XIVTH CORPS IN THE SOUTH-EAST.

(October.)

Since the fall of Strasburg the newly-formed XIVth Corps had been employed in safe-guarding the communications between the German armies standing fast respectively before Metz and before Paris. General von Werder had no great battle to look forward to, but a succession of small engagements. To prepare his four infantry brigades for independent action under such circ.u.mstances, he detailed artillery and cavalry to each. In this formation the Corps crossed the Vosges by the two roads through Schirmeck and Barr, driving swarms of hostile Franctireurs out of the narrow pa.s.ses without material delay. But on emerging from the mountains it at once met with serious opposition.

The French General Cambriels had been at Epinal with about 30,000 men ever since the beginning of October, and under cover of this force numerous battalions of National Guards and Gardes-Mobiles had been formed in the south of France.

On the 6th, General von Degenfeld[38] with the advanced guard of the Baden force approached St. Die, marching on both banks of the Meurthe.

The weak column was beset on all sides by far superior forces, yet after repeated attacks it succeeded in taking the villages which the enemy had been holding.

The struggle, which lasted seven hours, ended with the eccentric retreat of the enemy to Rambervillers and Bruyeres. It had cost the Germans 400 and the French 1400 men. The Baden force bivouacked on the field, and presently found that the French had evacuated St. Die. General Cambriels had, in fact, collected all his available forces in intrenched positions about Bruyeres. The Baden Brigade advanced on these on the 11th, drove the Gardes-Mobiles and volunteers from the outlying villages, climbed the heights on both sides of the town, and forced its way into it with inconsiderable loss. The enemy retired to the southward on Remiremont.

From the small resistance hitherto made by the French, though so far superior in numbers, General von Werder a.s.sumed that they would hardly make a stand before reaching Besancon, so he immediately countermanded further pursuit, though somewhat early in the day, and concentrated his forces on Epinal, which place was taken possession of by the Germans after insignificant fighting. From thence an etappen-route and telegraph-line were opened to Luneville and Nancy, magazines were formed, and the trains, which were following the Corps from Saverne by Blamont to Baccarat, were brought up. The railway along the Moselle remained, however, useless for a long time, in consequence of injury done to it by the enemy.

General von Werder was now anxious, in accordance with his instructions of September 30th, to march on the Upper Seine by Neufchateau, but a telegram from the supreme Headquarter directed him in the first instance to complete the rout of the enemy in his vicinity under General Cambriels.

The Corps accordingly put itself in motion forthwith through Conflans and Luxeuil on Vesoul, and information was received that the enemy had in fact halted at the Ognon, taken up quarters there, and received reinforcements. General von Werder determined to attack at once. He ordered that the pa.s.sages over the river should be secured on the 22nd; further decisions were postponed till reports should be brought in. The 1st Baden Brigade came up on the right by nine o'clock, reaching Marnay and Pin without having encountered the French; it secured the bridges there, and then halted to await further orders. On the left flank the franctireurs were driven out of the woods by the 3rd Brigade, which also stormed Perrouse, and at about half-past two seized the bridge over the Ognon at Voray. In the centre the head of the advanced guard of the 2nd Brigade entered Etuz after a slight skirmish, but had to withdraw at eleven o'clock to the northern bank, before the enemy's flank attack from out the woods. Afterwards, when the main force came up and the artillery opened fire, the place was taken for the second time at one o'clock. But a prolonged fire-fight ensued, the French making an obstinate stand in front of the pa.s.sage over the river at Cussey. Orders had already been sent to the 1st Brigade to move up on the southern bank from Pin on the enemy's flank and rear. But it could not reach the ground until six o'clock, when the battle was over. When two batteries had made good the possession of the bridge over the Ognon under a heavy fire, the enemy hastily retired, pursued by the Badeners; he was again driven out of his rearward positions, but when night fell he still remained in possession of several points in front of Besancon.

The Germans had lost 120 men, the French 150 and 200 prisoners. In opposition to Gambetta, who was himself in Besancon, General Cambriels obstinately resisted every order to renew the advance, and would only consent to maintain his strong position under the walls of the fortress.

Parties sent out to reconnoitre on the right reported the presence of French forces at Dole and Auxonne, the advance-guard probably of an "Army of the Vosges" under Garibaldi, which was a.s.sembling on the Doubs.

General von Werder disregarded it, and on the 26th moved his Corps to Dampierre and Gray. Beyond the Saone all the roads were broken up, the woods choked with abatis, and the whole population in arms. But the franctireurs and Gardes-Mobiles were dispersed without difficulty, and a column marching without any precautions was driven back on the Vingeanne brook, where 15 officers and 430 men laid down their arms.

From further reports and the information of the prisoners it was known that Dijon was strongly garrisoned. In expectation, therefore, of an attack from that side, the XIVth Corps was a.s.sembled behind the Vingeanne, whence early on October 30th General von Beyer[39] marched on Dijon with the 1st and 3rd Brigades. Filled with apprehension by recent events, the National Guards in Dijon had already laid down their arms, the Gardes-Mobiles and the line troops of the garrison had retreated southwards; but the inhabitants were a.s.sured that the forces would be brought back to defend them. About 8000 men were available, but they insisted on their commander pledging himself to fight only outside the city.

The advanced posts on the Tille were driven in by the Baden advanced guard; the village of St. Apollinaire and the neighbouring heights were taken with a rush at noon, in spite of a hot fire. Meanwhile the main body had come up, and at three o'clock six German batteries opened fire.

The vineyards and numerous farmsteads in the neighbourhood of Dijon, and especially the strongly barricaded park south of the city, gave the defence a great advantage. Nevertheless, the Baden infantry continued its steady advance and closed in on the northern and eastern suburbs by a wide encircling movement.

Here a fierce combat ensued, in which the inhabitants took part. House after house had to be stormed, but the attack came to a stand at the deep-cut bed of the Suzon brook, which borders the city on the east. It was four o'clock, and the impending struggle could not be ended before dark. General von Beyer therefore broke off the fight; the battalions were withdrawn and retired to quarters in the adjacent villages; only the artillery still kept up its fire.

The Germans had lost about 150 and the French 100 men; but of the latter 200 were taken prisoners.

In the course of the night a deputation came out to beg that the town might be spared; its members undertook to furnish supplies for 20,000 men, and to guarantee the good behaviour of the inhabitants. The Baden troops took possession of Dijon on the 31st.

Meanwhile fresh instructions had reached General von Werder. They prescribed that he was to protect the left flank of the IInd Army advancing to the Loire and at the same time to cover Alsace and the troops besieging Belfort, where two reserve Divisions had now arrived.

It was intended that the XIVth Corps, while retaining its hold on Dijon, should also move to Vesoul and hold in check from there the gathering of hostile troops round Besancon and at Langres. Some offensive movement on Chalons[40] and Dole was also insisted on.

General von Werder's position was more difficult than was recognized at Versailles. At Besancon alone there were 45,000 French troops, under the command of a new leader, General Crouzat. Garibaldi had collected 12,000 between Dole and Auxonne; lower down the Saone valley a new Corps was being formed of 18,000 men, and 12,000 National Guards and Gardes-Mobiles threatened from Langres the flank of the isolated German Corps. But the French, instead of attacking this slender force with overwhelming numbers--spread out as it was over a distance of fifty-six miles from Lure to Dijon and Gray--were haunted by the apprehension that the Germans, reinforced from Metz, might be intending an attack on Lyons. General Crouzat, leaving a strong garrison in Besancon, consequently marched to Chagny, where up to November 12th he was reinforced from the south to a strength of 50,000 men. The Garibaldian volunteers moved up to Autun to protect Bourges.

General von Werder meanwhile had occupied Vesoul, and had the south face of the city put in a state of defence.

The only event of importance during the course of October which remains to be mentioned was the action taken against the French forts lying rearward of the German armies.

At the beginning of the month the newly const.i.tuted 4th Reserve Division, of fifteen battalions, eight squadrons, thirty-six guns, and a company of fortress-pioneers, had a.s.sembled in Baden, and crossed the Rhine at Neuenburg. The vicinity was first cleared of franctireurs, Mulhausen was occupied, and, by the express desire of its munic.i.p.al authorities, the excited artisan inhabitants were disarmed. General von Schmeling (commanding the Division) was instructed to besiege Neu-Breisach and Schlettstadt, and at once set about the investment of each of these places with a brigade. On October 7th the East Prussian Landwehr invested Breisach, and the field-batteries sh.e.l.led the place, but without effect. The other brigade, having been forced to detach considerably, reached Schlettstadt very weak, but was reinforced by Etappen troops to such extent that the place was invested with 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries. At the same time 12 companies of fortress-artillery and 4 companies of pioneers arrived from Strasburg with the necessary siege material, and an artillery park of fifty-six heavy guns was established at St. Pilt; the engineer park was located at Kinzheim.

FOOTNOTES:

[38] Commanding 2nd Baden Brigade.

[39] Commanding Baden Division.

[40] Chalons-sur-Saone.

REDUCTION OF SCHLETTSTADT.

(October 24th.)

At the beginning of the blockade, inundations and marsh-land rendered Schlettstadt, a fortified town of 10,000 inhabitants, unapproachable on the east and south, and partly on the north. The place itself, perfectly safe from storm, with high walls and a wet ditch, was armed with 120 guns, but garrisoned with only 2000 men, for the most part Gardes-Mobiles. There was a deficiency of safe casemates, and on the west front vineyards and hedgerows favoured the near approach of a.s.saults, while the railway embankment was a ready-made protecting wall for the construction of the first parallel. To divert the attention of the besieged from this front of attack, a battery was constructed on the 20th at the Kappel Mill on the south-east, from which fire was opened on the barracks and magazine in the town, and on the sluice which maintained the inundation. By the evening of the 21st, the infantry posts had advanced to within 400 paces of the glacis, and the construction of the first parallel was proceeded with that night, immediately behind the railway, as well as of emplacements for six batteries within 1230 feet from the ramparts. The garrison fired in the dark on the entire field of attack, but almost without effect. By the morning the trenches were two feet wide and three and a half feet deep, and 20 heavy guns and 8 mortars were ready to open fire. A hot artillery duel now began with the fortress, which replied very steadily. The battery at the mill subjected the west front to a telling reverse fire, and several guns and embrasures were severely damaged. The town was fired at several points, and the defenders' fire gradually ceased.

During the night, which was very stormy, the batteries of the attack kept up their fire, the parallel was widened and two new batteries were begun.

At daybreak of the 24th the white flag was seen flying, and a capitulation was forthwith signed, by which Schlettstadt surrendered with its garrison and war-material. The commandant begged the Germans to take possession at once, as the greatest disorder reigned within the town. The public buildings were being plundered by the mob and the drunken soldiery, and a powder-magazine was actually on fire. The German battalions promptly restored order, extinguished the flames, and took away the prisoners. Seven thousand stand of arms fell into German hands, besides the fortress artillery and a large quant.i.ty of stores.

The siege had cost the victors only twenty men. Schlettstadt was occupied by Etappen troops, and the battalions released from duty there marched into southern Alsace, three of them going to strengthen the siege of Breisach, which was now being proceeded with.

REDUCTION OF BREISACH.

(November 10th.)

This fortress, lying in the plain and of very symmetrical shape, was proof against a coup-de-main because of its ditches, which were dry indeed, but faced with solid masonry. The garrison of over 5000 men had well-protected quarters in the bomb-proof casemates of the ravelins.

Fort Mortier, standing near the Rhine, and constructed for independent defence, effectually commanded the ground over which the intended attack must be made on the north-west front of the fortress. Therefore 12 heavy guns were brought up from Rastatt to Alt Breisach, where the right bank of the Rhine commands the fort at effective range.

It was not till near the end of October that the siege-guns arrived before New Breisach from Schlettstadt, and when the infantry had closed up and all preparations were complete, fire from 24 heavy guns was opened on the fortress on November 2nd from Wolfgantzen, Biesheim and Alt Breisach.

By three o'clock a large part of the town was on fire, and detachments of infantry were skirmishing with the French posts at the foot of the glacis. Fort Mortier had suffered exceptionally severely. Nevertheless, an attempt to storm it was repulsed, but at six o'clock it capitulated, an utter ruin. Only one gun remained in serviceable condition. Two new mortar batteries were erected to sh.e.l.l the main fortress, the defence became perceptibly more feeble, and on November 10th Breisach surrendered on the same terms as Schlettstadt, but the garrison was allowed to march out with the honours of war. The fortifications were almost uninjured, but the town was for the most part burnt down or severely damaged. The success had cost the Germans only 70 men; 108 guns, 6000 small arms and large quant.i.ties of stores fell into their hands.

While these strongholds in Alsace-Lorraine were thus being reduced, Verdun still intercepted the line of railway which formed the shortest line of communication with Germany.

TAKING OF VERDUN.

(November 9th.)

This place, too, was made quite storm-free by high walls and deep wet ditches; but, on the other hand, it was surrounded by a ring of heights whence it could be seen into, and at the foot of these heights villages and vineyards favoured an approach to within a short distance of the outworks.

The fortress was armed with 140 guns and abundantly victualled, and the garrison, which had been supplemented by escaped prisoners, was 6000 strong. A bombardment by field-artillery had already proved perfectly ineffectual. For a long time Verdun was only under observation, at first by cavalry, and afterwards by a small mixed force. At the end of September the 65th Regiment and twelve companies of Landwehr a.s.sembled under General von Gayl before the east face of the place. It was not till October 9th that two companies of fortress-artillery brought up some French heavy guns from Toul and Sedan. The infantry now advanced to within a few hundred paces of the west and north fronts and there established itself. Under this cover the construction of the batteries was begun on the evening of October 12th.

The heavy ground after the rain, and the rocky subsoil very thinly covered, made the work uncommonly difficult, yet by next morning fifty-two guns were able to open fire. But the fortress replied with such effect that before noon two batteries on the Cote de Hayvaux on the westward were reduced to inaction.