The First Seven Divisions Part 12

Of that force the 1st A.C. alone (with the 7th Division, which it had absorbed) still remained unrelieved east and south-east of Ypres. The force, however, which now stood between the enemy and the possession of Ypres, had by this time lost many of its distinctive characteristics.

The actual battalion units had become in most cases reduced to a mere shadow of their original strength. The 7th Division had become part of the 1st A.C., and several battalions of the 2nd A.C. were acting in concert with this already mixed corps. Many of the brigades had been broken up from their original const.i.tuents, and the fragments consolidated into new and temporary brigades. Sir Horace was for the moment an A.C. commander without an A.C., the remnants of his six heroic brigades being scattered here and there along the whole front.

The first, and perhaps the most interesting, because the most strenuous, epoch in the war--as far as it concerned the British Force--was nearly closed; but not quite. Before that can be written of it, some great deeds had yet to be done, and were done. The Germans were still making continuous and determined efforts to break through to Ypres by way of Klein Zillebeke, and to that particular zone of the fighting our attention can henceforth be confined.

KLEIN ZILLEBEKE

When we last took leave of the Klein Zillebeke section of the fighting line, on the night of October 30th, the cavalry position from Klein Zillebeke to the ca.n.a.l had just been taken over by Lord Cavan with the 2nd Grenadiers and Irish Guards, the former being on the ca.n.a.l. On the left of the Irish Guards were the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, with the Oxford Light Infantry in reserve, and beyond them the Suss.e.x and Northamptons, with their left joining up with the 22nd Brigade. On the left of the 22nd Brigade was the 21st Brigade, with the 2nd R.

Scots Fusiliers on its extreme flank just south of the Menin road at Gheluvelt. The 20th Brigade was in reserve.

During the morning the 3rd Cavalry Division was kept at Verbranden Molen ready for emergencies, but about 1 p.m. orders were received for it to go to the support of the 3rd C.B. at St. Eloi. Contradictory orders were, however, afterwards received, and in the end the brigade joined up with the 4th Hussars, and together they held the two bridges over the ca.n.a.l at the bend just north of Hollebeke till nightfall. In this action Sergt. Seddons, of the 4th Hussars, showed great gallantry during the defence of the eastern bridge and was deservedly awarded the D.C.M. In the meanwhile the 6th C.B. was sent along the Menin road so as to be ready to co-operate with the 7th Division or the 1st A.C. in case of need. That need--as will presently be seen--very quickly arose.

The original plan for this day had been to attack and retake the Zandvoorde ridge, together with the trenches which had been lost the day before, but the enemy's extreme activity rendered this impracticable, and we were in the end forced to act purely on the defensive.

We are now, be it remembered, dealing with the morning of October 31st, the day on which the cavalry were driven out of Wytschate and Messines and the 1st and 7th Divisions out of Gheluvelt. The terrific bombardment of that morning has already been described. It was chiefly concentrated on the Menin road, but the whole line from Gheluvelt to the ca.n.a.l was involved.

The 2nd Brigade, which was between the two Guards' battalions and the 7th Division, had a curious experience during the morning. It survived the bombardment, and when this slackened to allow the German infantry to advance, it was still in its trenches and prepared to remain there.

About eight o'clock, however, General Bulfin summoned the four C.O.'s of the brigade, and ordered a general retirement of the brigade to the cross-roads at Zillebeke, about a mile in rear. This was duly carried out, and without much loss on the part of the Suss.e.x and Northamptons, who were able to retire through the Zwartelen woods without coming under observation. The 2nd Gordon Highlanders, however (attached temporarily to the 2nd Brigade), were less fortunate. Their trenches were in the open, running north-eastward from Klein Zillebeke farm along the edge of the country lane known as the Brown Road, and, in retiring, they had to cross a considerable tract of exposed ground, during which they suffered very severely from machine-gun fire, Captain McLean's company being practically wiped out.

It was afterwards freely rumoured that this order to retire had been delivered to General Bulfin, as a Divisional Order, by a German dressed in the uniform of a British Staff officer. Some colour is given to this rumour by the extreme improbability of such an order having been officially given after Sir Douglas Haig's ultimatum of the day before, that the line which this apocryphal order caused to be abandoned was to be held at all costs. In any event, it is a matter of history that those concerned did not accept the retired position as a permanency, and a counter-attack was quickly organized. The 6th C.B., which had been waiting in reserve on the Menin road, was brought up as far as the Ba.s.seville brook, where they deployed to the south, and, partly mounted and partly dismounted, charged through the Zwartelen woods.

Simultaneously the Gordon Highlanders, now reduced to 300, and under the command of Major Craufurd (Col. Uniacke having been knocked out by a sh.e.l.l earlier in the day), charged on the right of the cavalry, with the Oxford Light Infantry extending the line again on their right.

Before this united movement the Bavarian troops in the woods turned and ran, but, true to their principles, continued to cover their retreat with a heavy machine-gun fire. Two of these machine-guns were successfully located, and the 6th C.B. menhandled a gun into the firing line and knocked them both out in fine style. This broke the back of the resistance. The Bavarians started surrendering, and the Gordon Highlanders took a number of prisoners up to the time when Lieut.

Grahame was shot dead by an officer who had surrendered to him; after that they took fewer.

The enemy losses were very heavy. Eight hundred and seventy prisoners were taken during the day, and the number of killed and wounded in the woods ran into several hundreds.

This charge--successful though it had been in clearing the Zwartelen woods of the enemy--had not yet reinstated the 2nd Brigade in the line which they had occupied in the morning, before the much-discussed order to retire had arisen. General Bulfin therefore decided to try during the night to regain the morning position. Accordingly at midnight, under the full moon, and at the same time that the desperate battle was raging round Messines and Wytschate eight miles to the south-west, the 2nd Brigade made their second counter-attack. This, as far as it went, was a complete success. The trenches were carried and occupied, and the Germans driven out. Unfortunately, however, the 22nd Brigade, on the left, found themselves unable to get up into line, and, owing to their left being unprotected, the 2nd Brigade battalions had one after the other--in succession from the left--to fall back again.

These two attacks, _i.e._, the afternoon charge through the woods and the midnight a.s.sault on the trenches, had now reduced the Gordons to 3 officers and 110 men, and these were for the time being amalgamated with the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, who were on their right. The Irish Guards remained in their original position, on the right of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, but the 2nd Grenadiers were relieved by French Territorials and went back into reserve.

The nett result of this terrible day's fighting was that our line was pushed back everywhere, except at Klein Zillebeke and Zonnebeke, the two points which marked the northern and southern limits of the Ypres salient. The effect of the recapture of the Gheluvelt position by the 2nd Worcesters and 1st Scots Guards was neutralized by the cave in the line south of that place, which rendered Gheluvelt untenable. It had therefore to be abandoned. The loss of that place, however, was of no material importance, as its abandonment had long been recognized as a necessary step in the gradual straightening out of the Ypres salient.

The only serious effect of the new line was that Klein Zillebeke, which for long had been the re-entering angle, so to speak, of the position, now, by the retirements to right and left of it, was pushed forward into a species of salient, and its vulnerability was thereby appreciably increased. This increased vulnerability at once transformed Klein Zillebeke into the centre of interest as far as this zone was concerned, this little village being--for reasons already given--a spot which at any and all costs had to be kept from the enemy. To Klein Zillebeke and neighbourhood, then, we may not unreasonably look for early developments.

One of the many unhappy incidents of this day's costly fighting was the landing of a sh.e.l.l in the Divisional Head Quarters at Hooge, by which General Lomax received wounds from which he subsequently died, General Munro was rendered unconscious, and Col. Kerr and five staff officers were killed.

THE RELIEF OF THE SEVENTH DIVISION

All through the 31st and morning following, the Irish Guards on the right of the Gordon Highlanders were subjected to a relentless sh.e.l.ling, and their casualties were considerable. On the morning of November 1st both their machine-guns were knocked out, and at 3 p.m.

news came that they were retiring. Lord Cavan sent word for them to hold on some 200 yards to the rear, and also for the French Territorials between them and the ca.n.a.l at Hollebeke to hold on to their position at all costs. This the French managed to do, with very great credit to themselves, at the same time throwing back their left so as to keep in touch with the new position.

The Germans at once occupied the Irish Guards' trenches, but luckily did not realize the position sufficiently to pursue their advantage further, otherwise the consequences might have been serious. As it was, sufficient time was given for the 2nd Grenadiers and 7th C.B. to come up in support, and with this stiffening the new line was held for the rest of the day. But there was a cave at Klein Zillebeke.

The Irish Guards had 400 casualties during this and the previous day's fighting, including 11 officers: Major Stepney, the Hon. A. Mulholland and Lieuts. c.o.ke and Mathieson being killed, and Col. Lord Ardee (attached from the Grenadiers), the Hon. T. Vesey, the Hon. A.

Alexander, Lieuts. Fergusson, Gore-Langton, Lord Kingston, and Lord Francis Scott (attached from Grenadiers), wounded. The last named officer and Captain Orr-Ewing (attached from Scots Guards) were each awarded the D.S.O. "for gallant and persistent attempts to rally the battalion."

On the morning of November 2nd there was a renewal of the regulation attack along the Menin road. This time the attack took the form of a high-explosive bombardment of the barricade across the road at Veldhoek. This was soon demolished and an infantry attack on the 1st Brigade ensued, as a result of which that skeleton brigade yielded 300 yards of ground, but held on to the trenches in rear till nightfall.

Further south, about 11.30 on the same morning, a tremendous attack was delivered against the 2nd Brigade, in the course of which Gen. Bulfin was wounded and part of the line driven in. An urgent appeal for support was sent to Lord Cavan, upon whom it now devolved to take over command of Gen. Bulfin's four battalions, in addition to his own two.

He made his way with all speed to the scene of action, with a view to discovering the extent of the mischief. This proved to be (so far) that the Northamptons had been driven in, and that the enemy--following up--had broken through in numbers into the Hooge woods. Beyond the Northamptons, that is to say, on the left of his new command, the R.

Suss.e.x were still standing firm. This regiment, however, was greatly reduced in numbers, its casualties during the last four days having averaged over a hundred per day. On the 30th Col. Crispin had been killed; on the following day his successor, Major Green, had been killed, and the regiment was at the moment under the command of Captain Villiers. Lord Cavan found it in an extremely precarious situation, owing to its weak numerical condition, and the envelopment of its right flank, consequent upon the Northamptons' retirement. He thereupon hurried up the 2nd Grenadiers from reserve as far as the Brown Road, where he ordered them to leave their packs and go straight through the wood towards the south-east with the bayonet.

These Ypres woods have all the appearance of an English copse wood, that is to say, they are formed of some six years' growth of hazel and ash, with standard oaks dotted about here and there. Incidentally they were at this time full of pheasants, destined to be shot in normal times by the Lords of the Chateaux of Hooge, Gheluvelt and Heronhage.

Precisely in the manner of a line of beaters driving game, the Grenadiers now pushed through the thick undergrowth, and while the pheasants rose before the advancing line, so did the Germans run. By 4.30 the wood was cleared and the morning line restored. The Northamptons thereupon re-occupied their trenches, but they were not destined to be left there in peace. About six in the evening the Germans again attacked the same part of the line, this time advancing with discordant yells, thinking, no doubt, to repeat their performance of the morning. If so, the event must have come to them as something of a surprise, for the Northamptons--profiting possibly by their previous experience--coolly waited till the attacking party was within fifty yards of the trenches, and then mowed them down. Not a German reached the trenches, and over 200 dead were left on the ground.

At night the R. Suss.e.x were brought back into reserve and the remnant of the Gordons went back to the 20th Brigade, which brigade was at the time in the grounds of the Hooge Chateau. In addition to their previous losses, the Gordons had during the day lost their C.O., Major Craufurd, who was wounded in the early morning. The position of Lord Cavan's command was then, as follows: the Northamptons on the left, in touch with the R. Welsh Fusiliers in the 7th Division; then the Oxfordshire Light Infantry and the 2nd Grenadiers, who had become very much mixed up, and on the right the Irish Guards. Beyond were the French Territorials.

With the fall of night on the 2nd of November the acuteness of the five days' crisis may be said to have pa.s.sed. The all-highest War Lord had come and gone; the supreme effort of the enemy to break through to Ypres had been made, and had failed; the British force had come out of the ordeal reduced to a shadow, and battered out of recognition, but unconquered. The Kaiser's forces had fallen back sullen and--for the time being--disheartened, realizing at last the hopelessness of the task they had been set to accomplish. Their losses had been prodigious, and though their repeated attacks had--at great sacrifice--forced back the face of the Ypres salient some two miles, the only military effect resulting therefrom was that the British force was at last in occupation of the true line of defence dictated by military prudence and the natural features of the country. From this line, that is to say, the ridge some 150 feet in height which runs from the corner of the ca.n.a.l at Hollebeke to Zonnebeke, they were never afterwards dislodged.

The 3rd, 4th and 5th were in the main uneventful. November 5th was chiefly memorable in this year, not for anti-Popish demonstrations, but as the day on which the 7th Division--after three weeks' incessant fighting--was temporarily relieved. During the three weeks in question it had lost 356 officers out of a full complement of 400, and 9,664 rank and file out of a total of 12,000. Battalions had been reduced to the dimensions of platoons, and had, in some cases, lost every combatant officer.

The 7th Division's performance, during its three weeks east of Ypres, will go down to history as one of the most remarkable achievements in the records of war. Many other units had, by the second half of November, lost as heavily in officers and men as had the twelve battalions of the 7th Division--in one or two cases even more heavily; but the losses of these had been distributed over three months; those of the 7th Division were concentrated into three weeks. They had been suddenly pitchforked into a position of the most supreme responsibility. They found themselves more by chance than by design standing in the road along which the War Lord had elected to make his most determined efforts to reach Calais. These efforts came as a succession of hammer-blows, which gave the defending force neither rest nor respite, and to cope with which their numbers were ludicrously insufficient. Their failure, however, would have spelt disaster to the cause of the Allies, and--realizing this--they actually achieved the impossible. There is something particularly stirring in the thought of this small force beaten back step by step, as fresh and fresh troops were hurled upon it day after day, and yet never turning its back to the foe, never beaten, never despondent, and never for a moment failing in the trust which had been imposed upon it. The most remarkable feature about the 7th Division was that it had no weak spot in its composition. Each one of its twelve battalions lived up in every particular to the high standard of duty and efficiency which the Division set itself from the beginning. The troops were mostly veterans from abroad, who had been summoned back from foreign service too late to take part in the earlier stages of the war, and they may therefore in a sense be considered as picked troops.[12]

[12]

The 7th Division (Gen. Capper).

20th Brigade (Gen. Ruggles-Brise), 1st Grenadiers.

2nd Scots Guards, 2nd Battalion the Border Regiment.

2nd Gordon Highlanders (old 92nd).

21st Brigade (Gen. Watt), 2nd Yorkshire Regiment.

2nd Bedfordshire Regiment, 2nd R. Scots Fusiliers.

2nd Wiltshire Regiment.

22nd Brigade (Gen. Lawford), 2nd R. Warwickshire Regiment.

2nd Queen's (R. West Surrey Regiment), 1st R. Welsh Fusiliers.

1st S. Staffordshire Regiment.

The 7th and 15th Brigades from the 2nd A.C., who relieved the 7th Division, were themselves sadly thinned in numbers. The 7th Brigade, which took the place of the 20th Brigade, had, in fact, lost seventy-four per cent. of its numbers during the fighting round La Ba.s.see, and was in almost as bad a plight as the 20th Brigade, which it relieved. The 15th Brigade, which replaced the 22nd, was rather stronger, having received drafts from home.

The 20th Brigade went back to Locre, and the 22nd to Bailleul. The 21st--which perhaps had suffered rather the least of the three--remained for the time being in the trenches.

At night the 6th C.B. took over the trenches at Heronhage Chateau from the 3rd Brigade, who had been having a rough time during the preceding days, and these went back into reserve.

ZWARTELEN

November 6th saw a certain renewal of the enemy's activity. The day opened very foggy, but by eleven o'clock there was a bright sun. In the morning the French once more re-took Wytschate and Messines, but again found them untenable, and in fact this was the last attempt on the part of the Allies to occupy either of these two places.

The respite of the poor 22nd Brigade from the trenches was short-lived, and the evening of the 6th saw them once more hurried up into the firing line. This came about in the following way. The French had now taken over all our trenches as far north as the Brown Road, our own troops being pushed up to the left. North of the French were the Irish Guards, and, beyond them, the 2nd Grenadiers. The French troops, who had so far held their ground with splendid tenacity, now found the position more than they could support. The German bombardment, with which they as usual opened the day, was more than usually severe, and lasted the whole morning, and about 2 p.m. it was followed by an infantry attack before which the left of the French and the right of the Irish Guards was driven in. As a result of this cave in the line, the left of the Irish Guards, which remained in the trenches, suffered considerably, Lord John Hamilton, Captain King-Harman and Lieut.

Woodroffe being killed. An urgent message was sent to Gen. Kavanagh to bring up the 7th C.B., who were in readiness near Lord Cavan's Head Quarters behind Zillebeke, and the 22nd Brigade was also wired for to come up from Bailleul. The cavalry came galloping up to Zillebeke, where they dismounted and advanced on foot along and astride of the road from Zillebeke to Zwartelen, which runs along the foot of the ridge ending in Hill 60. Just short of Zwartelen they deployed, the 1st Life Guards on the left being told off to restore the Irish Guards'