The Evidence in the Case Part 5

and the German Amba.s.sador a.s.sented to this a.s.sumption.[5]

[Footnote 5: English _White Paper_, No. 1.]

Either the German Amba.s.sador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, or the submarine torpedo was being prepared with such secrecy that even the German Amba.s.sador in England did not know what was then in progress.

The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express a.s.surance that

_the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening att.i.tude._[6]

[Footnote 6: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 18.]

This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the two allies, and it was Germany's saber that it was rattling in the face of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war without first consulting Germany.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English Amba.s.sador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private information that the German Amba.s.sador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor," and that the German Amba.s.sador himself "indorses every line of it."[7] As he does not disclose the source of his "private information," this testimony would not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official defense in the German _White Paper_, we find that the German Foreign Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave that country a carte blanche to proceed_.

[Footnote 7: English _White Paper_, No. 95.]

This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's att.i.tude and pacific protestations that we quote _in extenso_. After referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the German _White Paper_ says:

In view of these circ.u.mstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the Monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of its view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter.

We were able to a.s.sure our Ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to a.s.sure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an Ally.

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact that the British Amba.s.sador at Berlin in his letter of July 22d, to Sir Edward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21st) he had met the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was made to a possible action by Austria.

His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries.

He[8] adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country should approach Austria in the matter, he had

[Footnote 8: von Jagow.]

on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.[9]

[Footnote 9: English _White Paper_, No. 2.]

Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to which it tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European civilization, and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse continuing through many centuries a united European State exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against Servia without interference from any other Power, even though, as was inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the Balkan States and threaten the European balance of power. The inconsistency between Germany's claim that it could give Austria a _carte blanche_ to proceed against Servia and agree to support its action with the sword of Germany, and the other contention that neither Russia nor any European State had any right to interfere on behalf of Servia is obvious. It was the greatest blunder of Germany's many blunders in this Tragedy of Errors.

No s.p.a.ce need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands. It would be difficult to recall a more offensive doc.u.ment, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. The other European nations had little more than a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.[10]

[Footnote 10: English _White Paper_, No. 5; Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 3.]

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the fact that on the day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the German Empire instructed its Amba.s.sadors in Paris, London, and St.

Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian governments that

the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.[11]

[Footnote 11: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]

How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the substance of the ultimatum? Is it probable that Germany would have given in a matter of the gravest importance a blanket endors.e.m.e.nt of Austria's demands, unless the German Government had first been fully advised as to their nature?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M.

Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other Powers on July the 23d unless it had full knowledge not only of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also of the substance thereof.

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from examining _the text_ of the communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of this iniquitous conspiracy against the peace of Europe,--yet the more reasonable a.s.sumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's warning to the Powers was the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this conclusion.

The communication from the German Foreign Office last referred to antic.i.p.ates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such noncompliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left to it."

The German Amba.s.sadors in the three capitals were instructed

to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the Powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,

and the instruction added that Germany strongly desired

that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another Power, on account of the various alliance obligations, _would bring consequences impossible to measure_.

This is one of the most significant doc.u.ments in the whole correspondence. If the German Foreign Office were as ignorant as its Amba.s.sador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany were not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria "_must_" be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?[12]

[Footnote 12: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]

A still more important piece of evidence is the carefully prepared confidential communication, which the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Federated Governments of Germany shortly after the Servian reply was given.

In this confidential communication, which was nothing less than a call to arms to the entire German Empire, and which probably intended to convey the intimation that without formal mobilization the const.i.tuent states of Germany should begin to prepare for eventualities, von Bethmann-Hollweg recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified?

The Imperial Chancellor added that

if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,

but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone

bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European Powers wish to localize.

In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of Servia by Austria. He says, "_our closest interests therefore summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that

if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an Ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire.[13]

[Footnote 13: German _White Paper_, Annex 2.]

It staggers ordinary credulity to believe that this portentous warning to the const.i.tuents of the German Empire to prepare for "the Day"

should not have been written with advance knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum, which had only been issued on July 23d and only reached the other capitals of Europe on July 24th. The subsequent nave disclaimer by the German Foreign Office of any expectation that Austria's attack upon Servia could possibly have any interest to other European Powers is hardly consistent with its a.s.sertion that Germany's "closest interests" were involved in the question, or the portentous warnings to the States of the Empire to prepare for eventualities.

The German Amba.s.sador to the United States who attempted early in the controversy and with disastrous results, to allay the rising storm of indignation in that country, formally admitted in an article in the _Independent_ of September 7, 1914, that Germany "_did approve in advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia_."

Why then was Germany guilty of duplicity in disclaiming, concurrently with its issuance, any such responsibility? The answer is obvious.

This was necessary to support its contention that the quarrel between Austria and Servia was purely "local."

NOTE.--In Chapter VII it will appear from the French _Yellow Book_ that the Prime Minister of Bavaria had knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum before its delivery in Belgrade.