The Evidence in the Case Part 10

it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved.

He added that the Servian reply

should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause,

and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna but, as we have already seen, the German Secretary of State had already replied that such a conference "was not practicable," and that it "would practically amount to a court of arbitration," and could not, in his opinion, be called together "except at the request of Austria and Russia."[31]

[Footnote 31: English _White Paper_, No. 16.]

That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had actually commenced its military operations.

Germany's att.i.tude is again clearly indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27th he called at the German Foreign Office and asked it,

to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up this line of conciliation. Von Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.[32]

[Footnote 32: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 38.]

Why not? Russia and its allies had advised Servia to yield and Servia had conceded nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace were sincere?

Before this interview took place, the French Amba.s.sador had called at the German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany, Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that Austria and Servia

should abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour.

By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._

On the same day the Russian Amba.s.sador at Vienna had "a long and earnest conversation" with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that

something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.

Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors.

The Russian Amba.s.sador then said that his country would do all it could to keep the Servians quiet, "and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to gain time."

He urged that the Austrian Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power.

The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.[33]

[Footnote 33: English _White Paper_, No. 56.]

On the same day the German Amba.s.sador at Paris called upon the French Foreign Office and "_strongly insisted on the exclusion of all possibility of mediation or a conference_"[34]; and yet contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had

started the efforts towards mediation in Vienna, immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna.

[Footnote 34: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 34.]

What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the German Foreign Office, after stating its conviction

that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair,

claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further suggestion to Vienna, in which Austro-Hungary was urged

either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations;

but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the role of the wicked partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory activity" (so says the German _White Paper_ with sardonic humor), replied to this proposition that, coming after the opening of hostilities, "_it was too late_."

Can it be fairly questioned that if Germany had done something more than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?

On the following day, July 28th, the door was further closed on any possibility of compromise, when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs

said, quietly, but firmly, _that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would be declared to-day, and that the well-known pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned.

To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of Austria's quarrel, the British Amba.s.sador suggested "the larger aspect of the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger aspect," which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he

had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be postponed.[35]

[Footnote 35: English _White Paper_, No. 62.]

The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve its peace. Its Amba.s.sador in Vienna on July 28th had a further conference with Berchtold and again earnestly pleaded for peace on the basis of friendly relations not only between Austria and Servia but between Austria and Russia. The conversation in the light of present developments is so significant that it bears quotation _in extenso_:

I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, should give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy serious guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

_I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the dangers to the peace of Europe_ which would be brought about by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. _He told me that on the other hand the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note._

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree that the Government, even if it desired, could no longer consent to it, all the less, he said to me, because the very reply of Servia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in its promises for the future.

On the same day, July 28th, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the English Amba.s.sador and excused his failure to accept the proposed conference of the neutral Powers, on the ground that he did not think it would be effective,

because such a conference would, in his opinion, have the appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers.

After engaging in this narrow and insincere quibble, and, being reminded of Servia's conciliatory reply,

his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_.[36]

[Footnote 36: English _White Paper_, No. 71.]

At this stage of the controversy it will be noted that every proposal to preserve peace had come from the Triple Entente and that every such proposal had met with an uncompromising negative from Austria, and either that or obstructive quibbles from Germany.

CHAPTER VII

THE ATt.i.tUDE OF FRANCE

Before proceeding to record the second and final stage in the peace parleys, in which the German Kaiser became the protagonist, it is desirable to interpolate the additional data, which the French _Yellow Book_ has given to the world since the preceding chapter was written and the first editions of this book were printed. This can be done with little sacrifice to the chronological sequence of this narrative.