The Empire Project_ The Rise And Fall Of The British World-System, 1830-1970 Part 7

In all three dominions where there was a Britannic majority, the sense of being 'British' countries remained strong and there was a continued and intense commitment to the survival of Britain as an independent great power. The armies despatched by dominion governments told only half the story. Among RAF aircrews, where losses were highest and life expectancy shortest, dominion volunteers were out of all proportion to their population size.68 'England is the home of our race', said an Australian Labor MP in June 1940. 'We love England, and if England should go down, it would seem to me as if the sun went down.' 'England is the home of our race', said an Australian Labor MP in June 1940. 'We love England, and if England should go down, it would seem to me as if the sun went down.'69 But all three had been forced to find ways of compensating for the British weaknesses so starkly revealed between 1940 and 1942. All three had been forced to recognise that the old reciprocity of the British system could no longer be counted on. The unstinting commitment of the dominions' manpower to an imperial war had been based on the a.s.sumption that British sea-power would keep their homelands safe. After 19402, that a.s.sumption could no longer be made: another great-power protector was needed whose claims might be greater. For the British system, the implications were profound. Since the late nineteenth century, the mutual and unconditional loyalty of the 'British' countries had lain at the core of British world power. Their relatively high levels of economic development (Canada's national income, calculated But all three had been forced to find ways of compensating for the British weaknesses so starkly revealed between 1940 and 1942. All three had been forced to recognise that the old reciprocity of the British system could no longer be counted on. The unstinting commitment of the dominions' manpower to an imperial war had been based on the a.s.sumption that British sea-power would keep their homelands safe. After 19402, that a.s.sumption could no longer be made: another great-power protector was needed whose claims might be greater. For the British system, the implications were profound. Since the late nineteenth century, the mutual and unconditional loyalty of the 'British' countries had lain at the core of British world power. Their relatively high levels of economic development (Canada's national income, calculated The Economist The Economist in 1941, was as large as Italy's in 1941, was as large as Italy's70), their shared political values, and their astonishing capacity to mobilise their manpower for faraway wars, made them valued allies out of all proportion to their population size. Their oft-declared loyalty to King and Empire was an important source of psychological rea.s.surance to the British at home that their global burdens would be shared in a crisis. Though it took some time before the pattern was clear, 1942 saw the end of this old imperial nexus. As they took stock of their interests in the worldwide war, it was to a new international order that they began to look to supplement, replace or incorporate the British connection.

It was ironic that this trend was weakest in the least Britannic of the overseas dominions. In South Africa, s.m.u.ts had won the support of enough Afrikaners to back South African entry. The volunteer army despatched to fight in East and North Africa was composed of Afrikaners as much as English South Africans.71 s.m.u.ts waged a vigorous propaganda campaign to win over South African opinion and counter the calls for peace made by opposition politicians after the fall of France. But in South Africa's case there was no Singapore, although, with the crisis of the North African war in July 1942, s.m.u.ts was anxious enough to start thinking of how South African forces might be withdrawn to stage a fighting retreat up the Nile valley. s.m.u.ts waged a vigorous propaganda campaign to win over South African opinion and counter the calls for peace made by opposition politicians after the fall of France. But in South Africa's case there was no Singapore, although, with the crisis of the North African war in July 1942, s.m.u.ts was anxious enough to start thinking of how South African forces might be withdrawn to stage a fighting retreat up the Nile valley.72 In 1943, after Alamein, s.m.u.ts was strong enough to win a decisive victory in a general election (another 'khaki electie' as his opponents complained). The pragmatic basis of Anglo-South African relations, helped by the specially favourable treatment in imports and shipping by which Churchill aimed to bolster s.m.u.ts' popularity, In 1943, after Alamein, s.m.u.ts was strong enough to win a decisive victory in a general election (another 'khaki electie' as his opponents complained). The pragmatic basis of Anglo-South African relations, helped by the specially favourable treatment in imports and shipping by which Churchill aimed to bolster s.m.u.ts' popularity,73 was undisturbed by the presence of an alternative great-power patron in the Southern African sub-continent. But there were warning signs that the greater warmth that s.m.u.ts had brought to the imperial link would only be temporary. Afrikaner nationalism, frustrated in parliament, mobilised furiously among teachers and journalists and denounced s.m.u.ts' government as a British lackey. The 1943 election was a formal triumph, but a closer a.n.a.lysis was less rea.s.suring. The percentage of Afrikaners who voted for the United party fell from 40 per cent in 1938 to 32 per cent, was undisturbed by the presence of an alternative great-power patron in the Southern African sub-continent. But there were warning signs that the greater warmth that s.m.u.ts had brought to the imperial link would only be temporary. Afrikaner nationalism, frustrated in parliament, mobilised furiously among teachers and journalists and denounced s.m.u.ts' government as a British lackey. The 1943 election was a formal triumph, but a closer a.n.a.lysis was less rea.s.suring. The percentage of Afrikaners who voted for the United party fell from 40 per cent in 1938 to 32 per cent,74 while the nationalist opposition was united firmly behind D. F. Malan and an independent republic outside the Empire. while the nationalist opposition was united firmly behind D. F. Malan and an independent republic outside the Empire.75 The dream of fusion and Afrikaner reconciliation to the British system was fading away. The dream of fusion and Afrikaner reconciliation to the British system was fading away.

The second pillar of British world power was the Indian Raj. India had been the captive market for Britain's largest export, an important field for British investment and a vital contributor to Britain's balance of payments though all three had suffered badly in the 1930s. But its greatest value after 1900 had been as the indispensable auxiliary to Britain's military power. The Indian budget had paid for two-thirds of the Empire's standing army. Its vast rural manpower formed an inexhaustible reserve against an imperial emergency. At the outbreak of war, however, India's military strength was in decline. The Indian army was unmechanised. Funds were short. The modernisation programme, for which London was paying, had hardly begun. Nor was it expected that Indian troops would play an important part in the European war. The main objective of the Army in India (a term used for the combined British garrison and the Indian army proper) was to defend the Northwest Frontier against Afghanistan. The n.a.z.iSoviet pact of August 1939 made it seem all the more important to keep watch on the Central Asian front against the 'old enemy'.

As a result, although the Viceroy would have liked to enlist Congress support and keep their ministries in office, there was no sense of urgency on the British side. After May 1940, the picture changed dramatically. Over the next six months, the Indian army was almost doubled in size. In the following two years, the total strength of its combat arms rose to over two million.76 Recruitment, supply and the promotion of war industries became the central preoccupation of the Indian government. The cooperation of Indians (especially the educated) became more and more vital, and the wooing of opinion all the more necessary. Not surprisingly, then, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, made another attempt to draw representatives of the Congress into the government. The 'August Offer' promised dominion status at the end of the war (no deadline had been offered previously), Congress seats in the Viceroy's 'cabinet', and an advisory council to bring a larger Indian voice into the war effort. Recruitment, supply and the promotion of war industries became the central preoccupation of the Indian government. The cooperation of Indians (especially the educated) became more and more vital, and the wooing of opinion all the more necessary. Not surprisingly, then, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, made another attempt to draw representatives of the Congress into the government. The 'August Offer' promised dominion status at the end of the war (no deadline had been offered previously), Congress seats in the Viceroy's 'cabinet', and an advisory council to bring a larger Indian voice into the war effort.77 The Congress refused. Dominion status, said Jawaharlal Nehru, was 'as dead as a doornail'. India must be free to leave the EmpireCommonwealth. The Congress refused. Dominion status, said Jawaharlal Nehru, was 'as dead as a doornail'. India must be free to leave the EmpireCommonwealth.

The widening rift between the British and Congress was not just the result of nationalist mistrust of British intentions, or the pacifist inclinations of the large Gandhian wing. The real reason was the tacit but deepening commitment of the British to the claims advanced by the Muslim League. Since the Lah.o.r.e resolution of March 1940, its leader Jinnah had insisted on a Muslim veto in effect a League veto on any const.i.tutional settlement hammered out for India. An independent India must acknowledge 'Pakistan' the whole community of Indian Muslims as an equal partner in a confederal India.78 The League would negotiate an equal footing with the Congress. Of course, successive Viceroys had long recognised the Muslim claim to separate representation, to protection against a 'Hindu Raj', and to the right to govern the Muslim majority provinces. The grand federal scheme of 1935 had been designed to prevent the concentration of power in Congress hands by devolving heavily to semi-autonomous provinces. But, from 1940 onwards, the politics of war gave a fierce twist to this established policy. The most vital zones of the Indian war effort were Muslim majority provinces: Bengal, which contained more than half of India's industrial capacity; and the Punjab, the main recruiting ground of the Indian army. In both, Muslim-dominated governments had co-operated willingly. The League would negotiate an equal footing with the Congress. Of course, successive Viceroys had long recognised the Muslim claim to separate representation, to protection against a 'Hindu Raj', and to the right to govern the Muslim majority provinces. The grand federal scheme of 1935 had been designed to prevent the concentration of power in Congress hands by devolving heavily to semi-autonomous provinces. But, from 1940 onwards, the politics of war gave a fierce twist to this established policy. The most vital zones of the Indian war effort were Muslim majority provinces: Bengal, which contained more than half of India's industrial capacity; and the Punjab, the main recruiting ground of the Indian army. In both, Muslim-dominated governments had co-operated willingly.79 But their goodwill and stability could not be taken for granted especially if talk of const.i.tutional change raised the temperature of HinduMuslim rivalry. Nor would recruitment continue if communal tensions discouraged would-be sepoys from leaving their homes. But their goodwill and stability could not be taken for granted especially if talk of const.i.tutional change raised the temperature of HinduMuslim rivalry. Nor would recruitment continue if communal tensions discouraged would-be sepoys from leaving their homes.80 The result politically was that, at the very moment when it was more important than ever to gain the cooperation of Congress, the British had less than ever (of what really mattered) to give away in return. The stalemate persisted until the end of 1941 and the early phase of the Pacific War. Then the rapid advance of the j.a.panese armies showed that India would soon be in the war's front-line and that its war effort would need to be cranked up to even higher levels. This was not the only worry. The dismal failure of Malaya's defence raised a disturbing question. What would happen if India were attacked or invaded? Would the internal administration fall apart as Indians refused to take orders or abandoned their posts? Would the Indian ma.s.ses simply disown a colonial regime in which the largest party had no share of power? The prospect unnerved the government in London. The case for a new approach was strengthened by signs that the Congress 'moderates' might be more amenable, and even more perhaps by Churchill's grudging acceptance that some new initiative was needed to disarm American complaints against colonial rule.81 Congress endors.e.m.e.nt of the British war effort (then at its nadir) would be helpful evidence of the continued vitality of the British system. What was needed, urged Clement Attlee, in a burst of hyperbole, was someone who would save the British Empire in the East as Lord Durham had once saved Canada. Congress endors.e.m.e.nt of the British war effort (then at its nadir) would be helpful evidence of the continued vitality of the British system. What was needed, urged Clement Attlee, in a burst of hyperbole, was someone who would save the British Empire in the East as Lord Durham had once saved Canada.82 Singapore fell thirteen days later. Singapore fell thirteen days later.

The fruit of this rethink at the war's worst moment was to be a new const.i.tutional offer. As soon as the war ended, India's political future would be handed over to a 'const.i.tution-making body', free to withdraw India from Empire membership and the British system. Meanwhile, Indian partic.i.p.ation in the Viceroy's government would be increased significantly. It would even include a defence minister with control over almost everything except operational matters. At the Viceroy's insistence (he threatened to resign), the offer was not published. Instead, it was taken to India (and published there) by Sir Stafford Cripps, widely considered Churchill's likeliest successor. Cripps began with high hopes that his old friendships in Congress would win him a deal. But two insoluble differences wrecked his prospects. The first (and less serious) was the Congress insistence on a direct say in defence operations a demand to which London, the Viceroy and Cripps himself were unanimously opposed. The second (and more fundamental) was the British insistence that, whatever the model of independence proposed after the war, the Muslim provinces and the princely states would be free to opt out and make their own arrangements in negotiation with Britain. It would be up to the Congress to find an acceptable formula. This was the recipe for 'Pakistan' or worse still 'balkanisation' that the Congress feared most and rejected completely. With an imperial war effort ever more deeply dependent upon Muslim goodwill, it was also the recipe that London could not surrender. By early April, all negotiation was over (Congress gave its final rejection on 10 April), and Cripps was on his way home.83 Two months later, as the j.a.panese armies drove closer towards the Indian frontier, the Congress pa.s.sed its 'Quit India' resolution, and set in motion a ma.s.s campaign to bring British rule to an immediate end. Two months later, as the j.a.panese armies drove closer towards the Indian frontier, the Congress pa.s.sed its 'Quit India' resolution, and set in motion a ma.s.s campaign to bring British rule to an immediate end.

The failure to agree with Congress did not prevent the British from using Indian resources and manpower to fight the rest of their imperial war. Nor did Quit India prevent the successful defence of the Indian frontier in the desperate battles of Imphal and Kohima. Nevertheless, the Cripps offer and its violent aftermath signalled the definite end of India's special place in the British system: the sentence of death was merely postponed. It was true, of course, that the federal scheme on which the British set such store had stalled politically before the war. It was also true that any further advance towards dominion status would have meant a progressive reduction in India's military contribution to imperial defence. The British garrison, for which India paid, would have had to go home. On the other hand, it was more than likely that, with the power to shape its successor regime (without a deadline, a 'const.i.tution-making body', or a prior commitment that India could secede from the British system), the Viceroy's government would have secured special status for the Indian army, largely officered by British expatriates, and tied India closely (through a treaty or bases) into the global system of imperial defence. But for the Pacific War, India would still have been a financial debtor, a dependent part of London's sterling empire. But, in its desperate scramble for a const.i.tutional settlement amid the political fall-out of the Singapore surrender, Churchill's Cabinet was forced to play almost all its trumps. Abdicating control over the const.i.tutional process, let alone the timing of the const.i.tutional convention, was a last-ditch effort to soothe away Congress outrage at the Muslim veto. Cripps' ultimate failure and the violent unrest of Quit India that followed left the Raj a political bankrupt. It could repress disorder and gaol the Congress leadership (Nehru went to gaol for the rest of the war84). But it had no means of containing the rising tide of communal tension, and nothing left to trade with India's political leaders. The promise to go had been published abroad. In two revolutionary years, the British had 'sold off' what remained of their Indian empire to meet the pressing demands of their last imperial crisis.

The third blow was perhaps the hardest: the collapse of London's commercial empire, the ultimate guarantee, alongside sea-power and the Home Islands' resources, of Britain's global status. By the outbreak of war, that commercial empire was very different from what it had been in 1913. Then London had been the undisputed centre of a global trading system, and sterling the indispensable medium for international transactions. British investment, like British trade, was as much international as imperial: nearly half was placed in Latin America or the United States. The huge stream of income from Britain's 'invisible exports' was reinvested abroad to build up still further the enormous claim on overseas resources. The First World War had cut this empire down to size. Its dollar a.s.sets were sold to buy munitions in the United States (by 1929, claimed The Economist The Economist, only 3 per cent of British investment was in the US85). A huge debt was contracted. And heavy borrowing at home reduced the capital available to lend overseas. After 1931, when Britain went off gold and adopted protection, the commercial empire had become more and more a sterling empire. Following the Ottawa agreements of 1932, the British Empire countries with Argentina (and some other non-empire states) formed a trading bloc. With the exception of Canada, they also acted as a currency bloc, the sterling area. By the late 1930s, a large proportion of British trade was conducted within the sterling area and the post-war tendency to concentrate British investment in empire countries became even more marked reaching 62 per cent of the total at the end of 1936.86 As the effects of depression bit deeper, Britain's portfolio of overseas a.s.sets slowly shrank. The marked shift towards investment at home, and a much less favourable balance of payments after 1930, made it hard to replenish the capital fund at the rate that was needed to maintain its value. Nevertheless, in a world divided into economic zones, London's commercial empire was second to none. London was still the banker to the largest group of trading countries. It had preserved the core of its old financial business, and its overseas clients (including the dominions and India) were among the soundest. Britain's overseas trade was as large as that of the United States despite the huge disparity in national output. The invisible earnings from this great commercial network still paid for a quarter of her merchandise imports and supplied 5 per cent of the national income. As the effects of depression bit deeper, Britain's portfolio of overseas a.s.sets slowly shrank. The marked shift towards investment at home, and a much less favourable balance of payments after 1930, made it hard to replenish the capital fund at the rate that was needed to maintain its value. Nevertheless, in a world divided into economic zones, London's commercial empire was second to none. London was still the banker to the largest group of trading countries. It had preserved the core of its old financial business, and its overseas clients (including the dominions and India) were among the soundest. Britain's overseas trade was as large as that of the United States despite the huge disparity in national output. The invisible earnings from this great commercial network still paid for a quarter of her merchandise imports and supplied 5 per cent of the national income.87 The Achilles' heel of the British system was its need for dollars. Before the war this was a manageable problem: protection and sterling area cooperation had cut the demand for American goods. Predictions of America's commercial primacy had been decidedly premature. In fact, America's record of economic recovery from depression had been much worse than Britain's. Nor was it obvious that there could be any escape to a permanent level of greater prosperity. The American economy had been badly squeezed by the general collapse of agricultural prices, affecting up to one-third of its workforce. To prop them up and defend manufacturing against outside compet.i.tion meant heavy protection and a growing burden of internal debt. As imports shrivelled, American exports also suffered from retaliation abroad and the lack of dollars in foreign hands. There was no 'dollar empire' of complementary producers to soak up the surplus of American industry. American resentment at economic misfortune was partly aimed at London's sterling empire, and at what were seen as Britain's persistent attempts to devalue sterling against the dollar.88 Although the late 1930s had seen somewhat better relations (the Anglo-American trade agreement of 1938 had made limited concessions to American exports), there could be little doubt that breaking up (or into) London's commercial empire was the most obvious way of expanding America's trade in a deeply segmented international economy. Although the late 1930s had seen somewhat better relations (the Anglo-American trade agreement of 1938 had made limited concessions to American exports), there could be little doubt that breaking up (or into) London's commercial empire was the most obvious way of expanding America's trade in a deeply segmented international economy.

Until 1940, there was little chance that they could do so. Chamberlain had been very protective of the sterling empire and part of the rationale of his slow-motion war had been to reduce to the minimum the financial strain of additional dollar purchases. Britain's dollar a.s.sets were carefully husbanded and London built up a large stockpile of gold, buying the entire production of South Africa's mines in return for sterling. But, after June 1940, this cautious strategy was blown to pieces. In the desperate rush to re-equip Britain's armies for a war of survival, every marketable a.s.set was pressed into service. Paying cash on the nail, the British purchasing mission bought all the American supplies they could find. By December 1940, more than half of Britain's pre-war stock of dollars and gold had been spent89 and the haemorrhage was such that the rest would have been spent by March 1941. In the event, the threat of bankruptcy, default and economic defeat was lifted by lendlease. Even so, by September 1941, gold and dollar a.s.sets had shrunk even further to $1,527 million (approximately 340 million), out of which pre-lendlease contracts and non-lendlease items had still to be met, a total of more than $1 billion. and the haemorrhage was such that the rest would have been spent by March 1941. In the event, the threat of bankruptcy, default and economic defeat was lifted by lendlease. Even so, by September 1941, gold and dollar a.s.sets had shrunk even further to $1,527 million (approximately 340 million), out of which pre-lendlease contracts and non-lendlease items had still to be met, a total of more than $1 billion.90 Nor, of course, was lendlease a gift without strings. Nor, of course, was lendlease a gift without strings.

Roosevelt's eagerness to help Britain rearm was entirely genuine, and entirely self-interested. From his economic advisers, and the business interests represented in Congress, British pleas for financial aid drew a calculated response. They were determined not to ease London's shortfall in dollars and gold only to find that, when the war had ended, they were back where they started, facing a sterling empire. They were deeply suspicious that the British were hiding their fabled wealth. They demanded a visible sacrifice of British-owned enterprises in the United States.91 And they made three stipulations in return for lendlease. British reserves were to be run down to the lowest possible level (a demand later eased); British exports, especially to dollar markets, were to be pegged back sharply to less than one-third of pre-war levels; and, at the end of the war, the British would have to agree to abandon any trade discrimination against American exports. The sterling empire would be blasted open. Its industrial engine-room and financial power-house would be drastically weakened. In unspecified ways, it would have to make good the largesse of lendlease. And they made three stipulations in return for lendlease. British reserves were to be run down to the lowest possible level (a demand later eased); British exports, especially to dollar markets, were to be pegged back sharply to less than one-third of pre-war levels; and, at the end of the war, the British would have to agree to abandon any trade discrimination against American exports. The sterling empire would be blasted open. Its industrial engine-room and financial power-house would be drastically weakened. In unspecified ways, it would have to make good the largesse of lendlease.92 Its member states would look elsewhere. To J. M. Keynes, the 'Churchill' of the economic war, the negotiation with America was a gruelling struggle for what was left of Britain's commercial independence. Its member states would look elsewhere. To J. M. Keynes, the 'Churchill' of the economic war, the negotiation with America was a gruelling struggle for what was left of Britain's commercial independence.93 This doomsday scenario was not entirely realised for reasons to be explained in the following chapter. But there was little doubt that between 1940 and 1942 the pre-war balance of commercial power between London and Washington shifted for good and erased in the process Britain's century-old status as a (and, for much of the time, the the) dominant force in the world's trading economy. This was not just a matter of exhausting Britain's a.s.sets in dollars and gold. In the sterling empire, too, the dramatic change in the scope of the war piled up new obligations overseas. 'The growth of balances in favour of other parts of the sterling area is becoming unmanageable', remarked Keynes in June 1942. 'The more the war moves to the East, the more we spend in the Middle East and India.'94 By September 1942, Britain already owed India some 360 million for goods and services supplied to the war effort, wiping out the whole of India's pre-war debt to Britain. A year later, the figure was 655 million. Egypt was owed some 250 million. It would mean, said Keynes, 'great prospective embarra.s.sment'. By September 1942, Britain already owed India some 360 million for goods and services supplied to the war effort, wiping out the whole of India's pre-war debt to Britain. A year later, the figure was 655 million. Egypt was owed some 250 million. It would mean, said Keynes, 'great prospective embarra.s.sment'.95 What Keynes had in mind was obvious enough. The large sterling balances (i.e. the amounts Britain would have to pay sterling area countries at the end of the war) would mean much larger exports than before the war, to meet overseas debts and compensate for the loss of invisible income. Without the cushion of invisibles, it would be a constant struggle to avoid a deficit on the balance of payments. There would be no surplus to rebuild Britain's overseas investment, and the attractions of sterling as an international currency (a highly profitable status) would soon disappear. The vicious circle would close. Across the Atlantic, the new economic order had already been glimpsed. The Pax Britannica was dead, announced What Keynes had in mind was obvious enough. The large sterling balances (i.e. the amounts Britain would have to pay sterling area countries at the end of the war) would mean much larger exports than before the war, to meet overseas debts and compensate for the loss of invisible income. Without the cushion of invisibles, it would be a constant struggle to avoid a deficit on the balance of payments. There would be no surplus to rebuild Britain's overseas investment, and the attractions of sterling as an international currency (a highly profitable status) would soon disappear. The vicious circle would close. Across the Atlantic, the new economic order had already been glimpsed. The Pax Britannica was dead, announced Fortune Fortune magazine in May 1942. Britain was 'broke, her empire shrivelled...her banking and insurance income will never come back and her merchant marine is sinking'. magazine in May 1942. Britain was 'broke, her empire shrivelled...her banking and insurance income will never come back and her merchant marine is sinking'.96 'Since the Pax Britannica can no longer be counted on to defend America, what kind of world-power system does America propose to put in its place?' 'Since the Pax Britannica can no longer be counted on to defend America, what kind of world-power system does America propose to put in its place?'

The fall of Singapore Churchill had convinced himself, and sought to convince others, that j.a.pan would not dare enter the war until Britain was defeated or disabled. Under the terrible strain of the invasion threat, the Atlantic struggle and the see-saw war in the Mediterranean and North Africa, it was hardly surprising that neither he nor his Chiefs of Staff found much time to ponder the risks of defeat if j.a.pan attacked Singapore and Malaya. Even after Pearl Harbor, Churchill fell back on the comforting mantra that Singapore could hold out in a six-month siege.97 Local army opinion took refuge in racial contempt for j.a.panese military prowess: the j.a.panese might beat Chinese armies; Europeans would be different. But, when the j.a.panese army invaded northern Malaya, its battle-hardened veterans were more than a match for its British, Indian and Australian defenders, many of them recently recruited, poorly trained or barely acclimatised. The catastrophic loss of Local army opinion took refuge in racial contempt for j.a.panese military prowess: the j.a.panese might beat Chinese armies; Europeans would be different. But, when the j.a.panese army invaded northern Malaya, its battle-hardened veterans were more than a match for its British, Indian and Australian defenders, many of them recently recruited, poorly trained or barely acclimatised. The catastrophic loss of Prince of Wales Prince of Wales and and Repulse Repulse, poor intelligence and the lack of air power combined with poor generalship to turn Singapore from an 'impregnable fortress' into the 'naked island'. Once the British forces had abandoned the mainland and fled onto Singapore island, their fate was sealed. On 15 February 1942, 130,000 British Empire troops surrendered to a numerically inferior attacking force.

The symbolic importance of such a shameful failure was bound to be large. In The Times The Times despatch from nearby Batavia (modern Jakarta), the obvious lesson was drawn. '"Soft" troops, unenterprising commanders, an apathetic native population these are not the signs of a gallant army betrayed only by bad luck; they sound uncomfortably like the dissolution of an empire.' despatch from nearby Batavia (modern Jakarta), the obvious lesson was drawn. '"Soft" troops, unenterprising commanders, an apathetic native population these are not the signs of a gallant army betrayed only by bad luck; they sound uncomfortably like the dissolution of an empire.'98 In his private diary, Churchill's most senior military adviser expressed a similar foreboding. 'We are paying very heavily now for failing to face the insurance premiums necessary for security of an Empire! This has usually been the main cause for the loss of Empires in the past.' In his private diary, Churchill's most senior military adviser expressed a similar foreboding. 'We are paying very heavily now for failing to face the insurance premiums necessary for security of an Empire! This has usually been the main cause for the loss of Empires in the past.'99 As defeat sank in at home, there were loud demands for a new approach to colonial rule, and a 'colonial charter' to win the hearts and minds of Britain's subject millions. Fresh impetus was given (as we saw earlier) to the search for an Indian settlement. A propaganda campaign was launched to make the imperial case in the United States, before opinion there hardened into an angry contempt for Britain's dysfunctional empire. But the meaning of Singapore was not just symbolic. As defeat sank in at home, there were loud demands for a new approach to colonial rule, and a 'colonial charter' to win the hearts and minds of Britain's subject millions. Fresh impetus was given (as we saw earlier) to the search for an Indian settlement. A propaganda campaign was launched to make the imperial case in the United States, before opinion there hardened into an angry contempt for Britain's dysfunctional empire. But the meaning of Singapore was not just symbolic.

Singapore's fall was the brutal proof that the Eurasian Revolution of the 1930s and 1940s had reached its climax. The global preconditions in which a British world-system had been continuously viable since the 1830s and 1840s had all but disappeared in the storms of war. The European balance, precariously restored after 1918, had been comprehensively wrecked: indeed, German domination of Russia seemed more than likely in the early summer of 1942. 'Pa.s.sive' East Asia had become an uncontrollable vortex of anti-Western imperialism. In this colossal emergency, the British system lacked the means to defend itself unaided and had not the faintest hope of restoring the status quo ante status quo ante. The internal structure of Britain's pre-war system, as well as its ethos and a.s.sumptions, had been drastically destabilised by a geopolitical earthquake: the relentless consequence of Anglo-French strategic defeat in 193840. How much would survive in a modified form, were the Allies to emerge victorious, was, in 1942, anyone's guess.

12

THE PRICE OF SURVIVAL, 19431951

Amid the calamities that crashed over them in 1942, it was hardly surprising that British leaders, including Churchill, should have thought mainly in terms of survival. In the course of that year, they faced the prospect of defeat in the Middle East and the loss of Egypt and the Ca.n.a.l, a disaster which would have meant far greater losses than those incurred at Singapore. Without their main fighting force, their hope of keeping control over India let alone of exploiting its resources and manpower would have been fatally weakened. The Viceroy's ability to suppress the Quit India movement would not have been helped by the sight of the Germans in Cairo. At much the same time, they could only watch helplessly as the German advance into Russia threatened the collapse of the Soviet regime. A huge reordering of Eurasia seemed on the cards with the 'world-island' divided between the n.a.z.i and j.a.panese empires. Preserving a maritime 'rimland' without the Middle East, India and Southeast Asia, and keeping Britain's connection with Australia and New Zealand, would have been all but impossible. The British world-system would have been a funeral pyre.

Of course, it was true that America's entry in December 1941 had brought ma.s.sive relief and the a.s.surance, perhaps, of survival in some form. In June 1942, the battle of Midway destroyed j.a.pan's hopes of naval control of the Western Pacific. By the end of the year, victory at Alamein and the grim Russian defence of Stalingrad seemed to promise that the relentless expansion of Germany's power had at last been contained. But neither was remotely a guarantee of ultimate victory in Europe, which depended on the Red Army and the Anglo-Americans fighting their way into the European 'fortress' heavily defended by the Germans and their allies. The risk of defeat, or stalemate, was high, especially in the case of an amphibious attack, the Anglo-American route. If either were to happen, then Britain's 'survival' would resemble that of a patient on a life-support machine: dependent indefinitely on American aid to fend off invasion; incapable of defending, supplying, financing or controlling the component parts of the pre-war imperial system. Neither Churchill nor his advisers regarded such a fate as remotely acceptable. 'Our history and geography demand', said Anthony Eden, 'that we should remain a world power with world-wide interests.'1 They imagined survival in imperial terms, as the full recovery of the British world-system. Deprived of its 'system', Britain would be desperately vulnerable to the will of whatever great powers had outlasted the conflict. Real survival meant the freedom to restore London's global network of trade and resuming Britain's function as a banker and investor. It meant regaining the footholds (in the Mediterranean especially) that underpinned Britain's status as a great They imagined survival in imperial terms, as the full recovery of the British world-system. Deprived of its 'system', Britain would be desperately vulnerable to the will of whatever great powers had outlasted the conflict. Real survival meant the freedom to restore London's global network of trade and resuming Britain's function as a banker and investor. It meant regaining the footholds (in the Mediterranean especially) that underpinned Britain's status as a great European European power. It meant reaffirming Britain's leadership over the white dominions on whose loyalty, manpower and resources British influence and interests already depended in part. It meant recovering sufficient power and prestige to negotiate authoritatively over the future of India, and resist the demand (largely from American voices) that Britain's colonial territories should be administered internationally and opened to American business. It meant above all recreating the geopolitical conditions that secured the European mainland from a single power's domination. British leaders suspected that the failure to achieve all or almost all of these war aims (most of them tacit) would unravel the links and connections on which Britain's place in the world was actually (if rather mysteriously) based. In the second half of the war, much of their energy was spent in the struggle to make a military victory that would meet this demanding wish-list. power. It meant reaffirming Britain's leadership over the white dominions on whose loyalty, manpower and resources British influence and interests already depended in part. It meant recovering sufficient power and prestige to negotiate authoritatively over the future of India, and resist the demand (largely from American voices) that Britain's colonial territories should be administered internationally and opened to American business. It meant above all recreating the geopolitical conditions that secured the European mainland from a single power's domination. British leaders suspected that the failure to achieve all or almost all of these war aims (most of them tacit) would unravel the links and connections on which Britain's place in the world was actually (if rather mysteriously) based. In the second half of the war, much of their energy was spent in the struggle to make a military victory that would meet this demanding wish-list.

Strategy and Empire, 19431945 1943 was the year in which the tide of battle turned. It was also the year in which the shape of a post-war world could begin to be glimpsed, if only in outline. For the British, the signs were not rea.s.suring. Their victories in North Africa and the successful invasion of Italy did not strengthen their hand. At the level of strategy, 1943 was to be dominated by the furious Anglo-American arguments over the priority to be given to the Mediterranean attack on Germany and the planned cross-Channel invasion already named 'Overlord'. The British resented the scale of America's commitment to the war on j.a.pan and suspected the motive behind American support for Kuomintang China in whose military potential they had little confidence. They were also deeply uneasy at what they regarded as the dangerous ignorance of the American planners about the risks and demands of an amphibious invasion against the full weight of German military power in the West. A premature onslaught quickly bogged down in a war of attrition (with a huge cost in life for every advance) or, worse still, a catastrophic defeat and a second Dunkirk, were bound to inflict disproportionate (and perhaps irrecoverable) damage on British resources and British prestige. On the American side, British devotion to a Mediterranean strategy, at the expense of postponing the decisive attack through Northern France to the Rhine, was cynically regarded as a means of shoring up British imperial interests and as evidence that the British lacked the stomach to fight in the theatre that mattered. Too great a delay in the onslaught on Germany would weaken the case of those in the Roosevelt administration who favoured the 'Europe first' strategy, against those who demanded priority for the war on j.a.pan. In Washington's view, it would also worsen the friction with their Soviet ally and increase the danger that Stalin would make a separate peace (of which there were signs). Indeed, the British themselves were all too aware of how much their recovery depended upon Soviet success on the Eastern Front. A Soviet collapse would have released huge German reinforcements to regain the ground lost in the Mediterranean, and open the door into the Caucasus and Iran, hurling the British back into the terrible crisis of July 1942. Yet, by the same token, the Red Army's advance (it had driven the Wehrmacht out of the Caucasus and most of the Ukraine by the end of 1943) reinforced Stalin's claim to a very large voice in any eventual peace, and in the strategic decisions required to achieve it.

By late 1943, as planning began in earnest for the invasion of France the following summer, the growing reliance of the Anglo-American armies upon American manpower as well as materiel,2 and the enormous scale of the Soviet military effort, drove home the lesson that the post-war world-order would be shaped to the wishes of these emerging 'superpowers' more than to Britain's. At the Teheran conference in November 1943, Stalin and Roosevelt, as Churchill later lamented, negotiated over his head. At almost the same time, a speech by Jan s.m.u.ts on 'Thoughts on the New World' (to the Empire Parliamentary a.s.sociation in London) spelt out the dangers of the new balance of power that would follow German defeat. 'We have moved into a strange new world...such as has not been seen for hundreds of years, perhaps not for a thousand years. Europe is completely changing...the map is being rolled up and a new map is unrolling before us.' Three of the continent's five great powers would have vanished. 'Germany will disappear...France has gone...Italy may never be a great power again.' Instead, Russia would be 'the new Colossus of Europe', all the stronger once the threat from j.a.pan in the rear had been vanquished. Britain would have great prestige, but 'she will be a poor country...there is nothing left in the till'. The best hope for peace in the world, s.m.u.ts insisted, lay in a new world organisation, but one in which the 'trinity' of great powers exercised real leadership. But for the British to play their proper part in this required them not only to reorganise their overseas system, but also to strengthen their hand in Europe. That meant closer relations with the small democracies of Western Europe, who knew that 'their future is with Great Britain and the next world-wide British system'. Closer union with Britain would create a 'great European state...an equal partner with the other Colossi in the leadership of nations'. and the enormous scale of the Soviet military effort, drove home the lesson that the post-war world-order would be shaped to the wishes of these emerging 'superpowers' more than to Britain's. At the Teheran conference in November 1943, Stalin and Roosevelt, as Churchill later lamented, negotiated over his head. At almost the same time, a speech by Jan s.m.u.ts on 'Thoughts on the New World' (to the Empire Parliamentary a.s.sociation in London) spelt out the dangers of the new balance of power that would follow German defeat. 'We have moved into a strange new world...such as has not been seen for hundreds of years, perhaps not for a thousand years. Europe is completely changing...the map is being rolled up and a new map is unrolling before us.' Three of the continent's five great powers would have vanished. 'Germany will disappear...France has gone...Italy may never be a great power again.' Instead, Russia would be 'the new Colossus of Europe', all the stronger once the threat from j.a.pan in the rear had been vanquished. Britain would have great prestige, but 'she will be a poor country...there is nothing left in the till'. The best hope for peace in the world, s.m.u.ts insisted, lay in a new world organisation, but one in which the 'trinity' of great powers exercised real leadership. But for the British to play their proper part in this required them not only to reorganise their overseas system, but also to strengthen their hand in Europe. That meant closer relations with the small democracies of Western Europe, who knew that 'their future is with Great Britain and the next world-wide British system'. Closer union with Britain would create a 'great European state...an equal partner with the other Colossi in the leadership of nations'.3 s.m.u.ts called for 'fundamental thinking' and admitted that his ideas were 'explosive stuff'. But his speech was a remarkable summary of the challenges facing the Churchill government in the last two years of the war. Indeed, his speculations about a British 'closer union' with Europe have a more than pa.s.sing resemblance to the 'European union' for which Churchill himself was to call. Amid the press of day-to-day business before and after the landings in Normandy in June 1944, entailing the conduct of campaigns in France, Italy, Greece and Southeast Asia, and in the air over Germany, the looming shape of a Soviet-dominated Europe, from which the American armies would have quickly withdrawn at the end of the war, exerted more and more influence over British military planning. Its conclusions were deeply unwelcome. The defeat of Germany would result in a much heavier strategic burden on Britain than she had had to carry before the descent towards war after 1937. In June 1945, the Post Hostilities Planning Staff told the Chiefs of Staff Committee that even a united British Empire would be no match for Soviet aggression, and would need the help of the United States. To keep the Red Army at bay, Britain would have to be ready to give early help to her European allies, and hold a deep air defence belt in Northern Europe. To keep India safe and guard communications through the Indian Ocean would require new naval and air bases and a main base in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). To deter a Soviet advance in the Middle East, Britain's defence system there would have to be pushed further north, but with no guarantee that either the oilfields or the Suez Ca.n.a.l could be saved in a war. Even in peacetime, maintaining internal security in the Middle East 'will involve a formidable military commitment'.4 It is not hard to see why close cooperation between the Great Power 'trinity', in the new 'world organisation', appeared so urgently necessary to the makers of policy in London. It was the best guarantee that the British could limit the liabilities that otherwise threatened to over-tax their strength. It is not hard to see why close cooperation between the Great Power 'trinity', in the new 'world organisation', appeared so urgently necessary to the makers of policy in London. It was the best guarantee that the British could limit the liabilities that otherwise threatened to over-tax their strength.

For, as s.m.u.ts had said candidly, there was nothing left in the till. Strictly speaking, of course, this was an exaggeration. The British had sold off their a.s.sets in dollars and acquired a great burden of overseas debt. They had retained investments in the sterling area countries, but had also a.s.sumed huge sterling obligations by their purchases from them. Egypt and certain Middle East states, the colonial territories that supplied British needs, and above all India with its army of two million men and its industrial base, built up credits in London, the so-called 'sterling balances'. Britain's war effort was sustained in large measure by American aid, especially 'lend-lease'. When peace came, Britain's post-war economy would carry a ma.s.s of overseas debt considerably greater than in 1919 even though the vast bulk of lend-lease (perhaps $20 billions' worth) would be forgiven. This was one side of the ledger. But the sources of overseas income had also been damaged. This was partly a matter of the a.s.sets sold off in the war to the tune of 1.5 billion, more than one-third of the total. It was also a consequence of huge physical losses, including a large share of Britain's mercantile fleet, the largest in the world before 1939, and a valuable earner of invisible income. As part of the terms of lend-lease, the British were required to cut down their exports and withdraw from many overseas markets. By the middle of the war, their exports had fallen to well under one-third of their pre-war level.5 All the main sources of overseas earnings from exports, investments, shipping and services had been drastically shrunk. The destruction of industrial plant at home, the conversion of much of the rest to the production of war goods, and the huge diversion of manpower into military service meant that rebuilding the civilian economy and Britain's export capacity would need a major investment as well as a period of grace. Yet the conditions laid down in return for America's wartime aid demanded the rapid return to peacetime 'normality' making sterling convertible (so that sterling countries could buy dollar goods freely) and ending imperial preference (to remove the tariffs imposed on dollar goods in British Empire countries since the early 1930s). On this scenario, before the British could catch their breath, or begin to scale down the vast military load of the war and its aftermath, their foreign markets would vanish and they would be bankrupt. All the main sources of overseas earnings from exports, investments, shipping and services had been drastically shrunk. The destruction of industrial plant at home, the conversion of much of the rest to the production of war goods, and the huge diversion of manpower into military service meant that rebuilding the civilian economy and Britain's export capacity would need a major investment as well as a period of grace. Yet the conditions laid down in return for America's wartime aid demanded the rapid return to peacetime 'normality' making sterling convertible (so that sterling countries could buy dollar goods freely) and ending imperial preference (to remove the tariffs imposed on dollar goods in British Empire countries since the early 1930s). On this scenario, before the British could catch their breath, or begin to scale down the vast military load of the war and its aftermath, their foreign markets would vanish and they would be bankrupt.

To avert this disaster, the British set out in the autumn of 1944 to persuade their American allies to help them revive much of their pre-war role in the world economy as soon as Germany was defeated. 'Stage II' as the period between the defeat of Germany and the surrender of j.a.pan was termed was expected to last for a year or longer. During Stage II, the British were anxious to begin the process of civilianising their economy. More manpower would be moved into civilian production and much more effort put into the manufacture of exports. Britain would begin to start paying its way. With a nod from Roosevelt, agreements were framed to prolong wartime support and permit its application to the task of post-war recovery.6 Had Stage II taken the time that the planners expected, the economic transition to peace might have been much less painful. In fact, it barely lasted three months. As soon as j.a.pan was defeated, Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, abruptly halted lend-lease. To bail out their economy and keep it afloat, the British were forced to apply for an American loan, but without the leverage that their war effort had given them. In the graphic language of John Maynard Keynes, who had master-minded the management of Britain's external finances, the British were faced at the end of the war with a 'financial Dunkirk'. Had Stage II taken the time that the planners expected, the economic transition to peace might have been much less painful. In fact, it barely lasted three months. As soon as j.a.pan was defeated, Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, abruptly halted lend-lease. To bail out their economy and keep it afloat, the British were forced to apply for an American loan, but without the leverage that their war effort had given them. In the graphic language of John Maynard Keynes, who had master-minded the management of Britain's external finances, the British were faced at the end of the war with a 'financial Dunkirk'.7 Without a drastic reduction of their foreign commitments, and perhaps even with one, they would have to accept years of even greater austerity than they had already endured. The financial and commercial power on which they had always relied as the 'fourth arm' in warfare would have vanished completely. Without a drastic reduction of their foreign commitments, and perhaps even with one, they would have to accept years of even greater austerity than they had already endured. The financial and commercial power on which they had always relied as the 'fourth arm' in warfare would have vanished completely.

The full extent of their economic fragility was thus partially hidden from British leaders until the very end of the conflict. But they were already aware of the enormous importance of close cooperation with the white dominions if they were to make good their claim to be one of the 'Big Three'. In the traumatic twelve months after June 1940, before Hitler's onslaught on Russia gave Britain a reluctant, suspicious and (as it seemed for some time) ill-fated ally, dominion support had been important materially and perhaps vital psychologically. The dominions' contribution to Britain's fighting strength, unlike that of India, cost London nothing. Canadian, South African, Australian and New Zealand troops fought in the Mediterranean and Northern European theatres, as well as closer to home (in the Australian case). Canadian enlistment exceeded the levels of 191418.8 Dominion supplies could be purchased on tick. Canada's dollars and its industrial base (much larger than that of the other dominions) were mobilised for the war effort. The Royal Canadian Navy gradually took over the anti-submarine war in the Northwest Atlantic. Dominion supplies could be purchased on tick. Canada's dollars and its industrial base (much larger than that of the other dominions) were mobilised for the war effort. The Royal Canadian Navy gradually took over the anti-submarine war in the Northwest Atlantic.9 South Africa's value as the great redoubt guarding the only safe route to Egypt and India was greater than ever by 19412. The main base from which the British intended to launch their part in the defeat of j.a.pan after 1944 was expected to be in Australia and to use Australian resources. South Africa's value as the great redoubt guarding the only safe route to Egypt and India was greater than ever by 19412. The main base from which the British intended to launch their part in the defeat of j.a.pan after 1944 was expected to be in Australia and to use Australian resources.

Perhaps as a consequence, British leaders began to talk enthusiastically about the need for imperial unity and a common foreign policy to which Britain, the dominions and the rest of the Empire, including India, would be tied. They may have been encouraged by the speech made by John Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister in August 1943. Curtin had enraged Churchill by his notorious statement (at the end of December 1941) that Australia 'looks to America, free of any pangs as to our links or kinship with the United Kingdom'.10 Now, like the prodigal son, he had returned to the fold. His Adelaide speech (amplified some three weeks later) roundly declared that 'some imperial authority had to be evolved', and called for an 'Empire Council' and a permanent secretariat to give it effect. Now, like the prodigal son, he had returned to the fold. His Adelaide speech (amplified some three weeks later) roundly declared that 'some imperial authority had to be evolved', and called for an 'Empire Council' and a permanent secretariat to give it effect.11 His ideas were welcomed in His ideas were welcomed in The Times. The Times. The Empire, it said, could only keep peace in the future as one of the four great powers of the United Nations. But the dominions 'would fail in these duties if they accepted individual membership of the United Nations as a subst.i.tute for the Imperial bond'. The Empire, it said, could only keep peace in the future as one of the four great powers of the United Nations. But the dominions 'would fail in these duties if they accepted individual membership of the United Nations as a subst.i.tute for the Imperial bond'.12 In July 1943, Sir Edward Grigg, a leading Round Tabler and soon to be Resident Minister in the Middle East, had published a manifesto calling for a 'Commonwealth, coherent, united and strong', able to stand beside the United States, Russia and China. Its disintegration, he claimed, 'would expose many parts of Asia, the Pacific, the Atlantic and Africa to open international rivalry'. In July 1943, Sir Edward Grigg, a leading Round Tabler and soon to be Resident Minister in the Middle East, had published a manifesto calling for a 'Commonwealth, coherent, united and strong', able to stand beside the United States, Russia and China. Its disintegration, he claimed, 'would expose many parts of Asia, the Pacific, the Atlantic and Africa to open international rivalry'.13 The book was reissued in December to catch the following wind that now seemed to be blowing. Then, in January 1944, Lord Halifax, the British Amba.s.sador in Washington, and former Foreign Secretary, delivered a widely reported speech in Toronto (where the flame of Empire loyalty usually burned brightest). 'Not Great Britain only', he declared, 'but the British Commonwealth and Empire must be the fourth power in that group on which...the peace of the world will henceforth depend.' The book was reissued in December to catch the following wind that now seemed to be blowing. Then, in January 1944, Lord Halifax, the British Amba.s.sador in Washington, and former Foreign Secretary, delivered a widely reported speech in Toronto (where the flame of Empire loyalty usually burned brightest). 'Not Great Britain only', he declared, 'but the British Commonwealth and Empire must be the fourth power in that group on which...the peace of the world will henceforth depend.'14 When the dominion prime ministers met in London in May 1944, it was left to Mackenzie King, the Canadian premier, to challenge the formula that the British ministers present proposed to insert in the final communique. It would refer, said Eden, to the Empire's foreign When the dominion prime ministers met in London in May 1944, it was left to Mackenzie King, the Canadian premier, to challenge the formula that the British ministers present proposed to insert in the final communique. It would refer, said Eden, to the Empire's foreign policy policy. 'All agreed', said Attlee. There would be an 'Imperial Joint Board for Defence', said Cranborne, the Secretary of State for the Dominions. But King refused to agree. 'The more I think of the high pressure methods that have been used the more indignant I feel', he wrote in his diary that evening.15 The reality was that there was little agreement among the dominions or between them and the London government on what Commonwealth unity should actually mean. Curtin had emphasised Australia's British ident.i.ty. His election campaign in 1943 had wrapped itself in the Union Jack: Australia should be a 'second Britannia in the Antipodes'.16 When he came to London in May 1944, he told his Guildhall audience: 'Australia is a British people, Australia is a British land.' When he came to London in May 1944, he told his Guildhall audience: 'Australia is a British people, Australia is a British land.'17 But Curtin (and Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, who supported Curtin's call for an Empire Council) did not intend the subordination of the Pacific dominions to the wishes of London. Far from it. In the long tradition of Australian statecraft, his aim was to commit more imperial resources to the South Pacific and to a.s.sert Australia's claim to manage all 'British' interests in the region. 'We are in the south what the motherland is in the north', he told a Sydney audience in May 1942. But Curtin (and Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, who supported Curtin's call for an Empire Council) did not intend the subordination of the Pacific dominions to the wishes of London. Far from it. In the long tradition of Australian statecraft, his aim was to commit more imperial resources to the South Pacific and to a.s.sert Australia's claim to manage all 'British' interests in the region. 'We are in the south what the motherland is in the north', he told a Sydney audience in May 1942.18 His 'Empire Council' was meant to rotate between the dominion capitals and London because the Empire could not be run by a government sitting in Britain. In case there should be any doubt in the matter, the AustraliaNew Zealand Agreement in January 1944 had bluntly insisted that any settlement in their region would require the active a.s.sent of Canberra and Wellington an a.s.sertion that was even more badly received in Roosevelt's Washington than in Churchill's London. Curtin and Fraser's 'imperial regionalism' was implicitly shared by s.m.u.ts in South Africa. The northward extension of South African influence and the gradual inclusion of Central and East Africa in the South African sphere were long-cherished ambitions. They duly emerged in s.m.u.ts' 'explosive' speech in November 1943. The British system needed 'tightening up' but also decentralising if it were to match the 'Colossi'. That meant consolidating the colonial territories into larger units and tying them more closely to the neighbouring dominion a delicate euphemism. His 'Empire Council' was meant to rotate between the dominion capitals and London because the Empire could not be run by a government sitting in Britain. In case there should be any doubt in the matter, the AustraliaNew Zealand Agreement in January 1944 had bluntly insisted that any settlement in their region would require the active a.s.sent of Canberra and Wellington an a.s.sertion that was even more badly received in Roosevelt's Wa