The Empire Project_ The Rise And Fall Of The British World-System, 1830-1970 Part 4

In Britain, then, the political climate was sympathetic to empire but unpropitious for schemes of imperial 'reform'. Public alarm over defence shone a fitful spotlight on the white dominions as sources of loyal manpower. Their commercial prospects and migrant appeal were touted more aggressively in the British press.104 Imperial news was more widely and professionally reported. An influential section of the political elite (on both sides of the party line) was attracted to the idea of 'closer union' with the sister nations of 'Greater Britain'. But wide differences existed on timing and method even among the enthusiasts. A broader consensus prevailed that, while imperial unity was desirable, perhaps even inevitable, imperial federation was at best premature, at worst unworkable. Imperial news was more widely and professionally reported. An influential section of the political elite (on both sides of the party line) was attracted to the idea of 'closer union' with the sister nations of 'Greater Britain'. But wide differences existed on timing and method even among the enthusiasts. A broader consensus prevailed that, while imperial unity was desirable, perhaps even inevitable, imperial federation was at best premature, at worst unworkable.105 Towards India and the tropical dependencies, British opinion was complacent. The MorleyMinto reforms had taken India off the political agenda. The commercial promise of tropical territories bought off half the critics of imperial aggrandis.e.m.e.nt. The new gospel of imperial duty, artfully diffused (not least in Towards India and the tropical dependencies, British opinion was complacent. The MorleyMinto reforms had taken India off the political agenda. The commercial promise of tropical territories bought off half the critics of imperial aggrandis.e.m.e.nt. The new gospel of imperial duty, artfully diffused (not least in The Times The Times), disarmed most of the rest. The radical critique of empire, fanned into flame by the South African War, burned low by the decade's end. In the age of diplomatic detente, const.i.tutional devolution (in South Africa and India) and social reform, 'imperialism' was less easily d.a.m.ned as the road to national ruin.106 The dominions The dominions' counterpart to this imperial att.i.tude in Britain was the 'Britannic nationalism' of their English-speaking populations. Britannic nationalism was both more and less than an affirmation of empire loyalism. It a.s.serted that Canada (or Australia or New Zealand) was (or must soon become) 'nations' the highest stage of political and cultural development. Only as nations could the white dominions escape the dependent, parochial quarrelsomeness of their colonial origins. Only as nations could they offer their citizens security, opportunity and the promise of progress, cultural as well as material. But they must be 'British nations', because it was British (or British-derived) inst.i.tutions, culture, ethnic origins and allegiance (to the British Crown) that held them together. It was being 'British' that endowed them with their 'progressive' qualities and their sense of a manifest, expansionist destiny. This was a far cry from colonial cringe. Nor was it always a recipe for imperial harmony. Britannic nationalism demanded partnership between Britain and the settler countries not central direction. It meant a dominion commitment to imperial defence but a dominion voice in imperial policy. It viewed empire as a cooperative and 'Britishness' as a common inheritance not the private property of the 'old country'.

There were good reasons why Britannic nationalism and its message of political community among the British nations should have been influential (though not uncontested) in the pre-war years. The upsurge in trade, migration and investment showed that British expansion, far from being over, was more vigorous than ever. Whatever metropolitan doubters might say, there was little dispute on the imperial frontier that the future belonged to 'white men's countries'. So long, that was, as they took pains to defend their 'inheritance'. It was significant that alarm in Britain over Germany's threat to the naval shield coincided with dominion fears of the 'Yellow Peril' and of j.a.panese hegemony in the Pacific. These common sources of fear and hope took on added colour in each dominion. In Canada, it was resentment at the French Canadians' 'disloyalty' and their obstruction of the nation-making programme of the English Canadians. In Australia, the defence of 'White Australia' against an imaginary Asian invasion became the central purpose of the federation achieved in 1900 and the guarantee of its social cohesion. In New Zealand, racial purity as a 'British' country was part of the message of social reform in the Liberal era after 1890. Here, too, external defence and internal peace made a double case for Britannic sentiment. Relations between the dominions and Downing Street may have been tetchy. The scale of contribution to imperial defence was bound to be controversial bitterly so in Canada. The cause was not so much doubt about the imperial a.s.sociation as division over how its burdens should be shared.

In South Africa, Britannic nationalism played a different part. The white 'nation' was predominantly Afrikaner not British. The grant of self-government to the former Boer republics had brought Afrikaner not British politicians to power. Union in 1910 gave them control over a unitary (not federal) dominion. To the ex-proconsul Lord Milner, conceding self-government before the British could form a majority among whites had been disastrous. 'I absolutely decline', he wrote in 1908, 'to take any further account of South Africa in drawing up the balance sheet of empire.'107 But, he conceded, there was a saving grace. Because South Africa was 'technically a British country', British emigrants could exert their improving influence without losing their nationality. 'It may be', he concluded, 'that it is the destiny of the Englishman in South Africa to turn the scale in South Africa to save the better native [i.e. Afrikaner] element from being submerged by the worse.' But, he conceded, there was a saving grace. Because South Africa was 'technically a British country', British emigrants could exert their improving influence without losing their nationality. 'It may be', he concluded, 'that it is the destiny of the Englishman in South Africa to turn the scale in South Africa to save the better native [i.e. Afrikaner] element from being submerged by the worse.'108 The leading 'English' politicians in South Africa adopted this view. Their Progressive (Unionist after 1910) party embraced the cla.s.sic programme of Britannic nationalism: support for immigration, the 'Imperial Navy' and imperial preference in a 'united...nation, forming an integral part of the Empire and cooperating harmoniously with Imperial authority'. The leading 'English' politicians in South Africa adopted this view. Their Progressive (Unionist after 1910) party embraced the cla.s.sic programme of Britannic nationalism: support for immigration, the 'Imperial Navy' and imperial preference in a 'united...nation, forming an integral part of the Empire and cooperating harmoniously with Imperial authority'.109 But the party's leaders saw that, with an 'English' minority, opposition to the Afrikaners on purely racial lines was futile. Instead, their object must be to divide the 'extreme racial backveld' section from the 'progressive' elements under Botha and s.m.u.ts. But the party's leaders saw that, with an 'English' minority, opposition to the Afrikaners on purely racial lines was futile. Instead, their object must be to divide the 'extreme racial backveld' section from the 'progressive' elements under Botha and s.m.u.ts.110 It was vital to prevent the Free State politicians, Hertzog and Steyn, and their 'cultural nationalist' allies in the Cape's Afrikaner Bond, from dominating the government. It was vital to prevent the Free State politicians, Hertzog and Steyn, and their 'cultural nationalist' allies in the Cape's Afrikaner Bond, from dominating the government.

Botha was too shrewd to wear his heart on his sleeve. He was an adept of the ambiguous phrase. His regime, grumbled Milner's South African confidant Percy Fitzpatrick, was 'dishonest and unclean'.111 But he made a rea.s.suring figure. 'Ties with the Mother Country must be strengthened', he declared in 1910. He wanted a 'South African nationality...able to take an honourable place in the ranks of sister states'. But he made a rea.s.suring figure. 'Ties with the Mother Country must be strengthened', he declared in 1910. He wanted a 'South African nationality...able to take an honourable place in the ranks of sister states'.112 'Botha really wants to do what is best for the British Empire', wrote Walter Long, a senior British Conservative who met him at the Imperial Conference in 1911. It would be disastrous to alienate him. 'Botha really wants to do what is best for the British Empire', wrote Walter Long, a senior British Conservative who met him at the Imperial Conference in 1911. It would be disastrous to alienate him.113 Even Milner agreed he was better than any alternative. Even Milner agreed he was better than any alternative.114 Both urged in favour of Jameson's policy of conditional cooperation. Botha's own motives are hard to reconstruct. Fitzpatrick believed that both he and s.m.u.ts had realised that they could not rule through the 'Dutch' (i.e. Afrikaner) party alone. Both urged in favour of Jameson's policy of conditional cooperation. Botha's own motives are hard to reconstruct. Fitzpatrick believed that both he and s.m.u.ts had realised that they could not rule through the 'Dutch' (i.e. Afrikaner) party alone.115 This a.n.a.lysis seems plausible. Certainly, they showed little inclination towards the cultural nationalism of their Cape and Free State allies, though they were wary of its ethnic appeal. They preferred to feel their way towards a more inclusive 'South Africanism' acceptable to 'moderate' Afrikaners and English the old programme of Rhodes before 1895. So in the fluid aftermath of Union the local Britannic nationalism operated in low key. But its role was crucial nonetheless. For it served as a warning to Botha and s.m.u.ts that repudiation of the spirit of empire membership (never mind the letter of British sovereignty) would drive the English into all-out opposition and force them into the arms of those who wished to reverse the verdict of 1902. This a.n.a.lysis seems plausible. Certainly, they showed little inclination towards the cultural nationalism of their Cape and Free State allies, though they were wary of its ethnic appeal. They preferred to feel their way towards a more inclusive 'South Africanism' acceptable to 'moderate' Afrikaners and English the old programme of Rhodes before 1895. So in the fluid aftermath of Union the local Britannic nationalism operated in low key. But its role was crucial nonetheless. For it served as a warning to Botha and s.m.u.ts that repudiation of the spirit of empire membership (never mind the letter of British sovereignty) would drive the English into all-out opposition and force them into the arms of those who wished to reverse the verdict of 1902.

India Among the dominions, adhesion to the British system was a matter of sentiment and calculation. It was nourished by the feeling of 'Britishness', the benefits of 'British connection' and the promise of influence over British policy. Neither sentiment nor calculation had so much scope in India. Indians, after all, had almost no share of executive power in British-ruled (not princely) India. Their direct influence on imperial policy was negligible. And, as Indian nationalists regularly complained, India paid a tribute to Britain in money and men burdens that London dared not impose on the dominions.

The British 'Civilians' (the name was gradually slipping out of use) were eager to cultivate Indian loyalty but uncertain how to do it. By 1900, the dominant strain in their policy was an appeal to 'feudal' att.i.tudes they thought typically Indian: a sense of fealty; a respect for authority and the glamour of power. If India's natural leaders were princes and aristocrats, their instincts were conservative and royalist. Hence British rule should clothe itself in imperial purple and a.s.sume the dignity of the Mughal empire. The corollary was indifference approaching hostility towards those Indians who had responded most enthusiastically to the modernising, liberal and 'scientific' face of British rule: the 'microscopic minority' organised in the Congress. Yet, in reality, this group could not be ignored. The Civilians might have liked liked a feudal polity: they certainly a feudal polity: they certainly needed needed a profitable colony. They had to foster the modern India they came to dislike. They had to tolerate the Indians who helped to make it work. And they had to accept that the microscopic minority had the political means to embarra.s.s their rule and upset their faraway masters in London. a profitable colony. They had to foster the modern India they came to dislike. They had to tolerate the Indians who helped to make it work. And they had to accept that the microscopic minority had the political means to embarra.s.s their rule and upset their faraway masters in London.

As we have seen, the Congress did this to some effect in the years after 1905. But, in a larger view, political conditions in the pre-war Raj did not favour a serious a.s.sault on India's subordinate place in the British world-system. The British had been able to stabilise their military spending, a prime grievance of nationalist politics. Good times in trade took the heat out of swadeshi swadeshi agitation in Bengal. The princes were appeased with the promise of non-interference. Muslims were conciliated by separate electorates. The Congress moderates received their schedule of const.i.tutional reform: disappointment was buried in the small print. Unappeased were the followers of Tilak whose 'new party' principles bore the stamp of 'cultural nationalism': the repudiation of British rule, not a plea to share in it. But Tilak was rejected by the moderate majority: without their protection he was crushed by the British. agitation in Bengal. The princes were appeased with the promise of non-interference. Muslims were conciliated by separate electorates. The Congress moderates received their schedule of const.i.tutional reform: disappointment was buried in the small print. Unappeased were the followers of Tilak whose 'new party' principles bore the stamp of 'cultural nationalism': the repudiation of British rule, not a plea to share in it. But Tilak was rejected by the moderate majority: without their protection he was crushed by the British.

For all their impatience with the Civilian Raj and its parsimonious concessions, the Congress leaders were boxed in. In theory, they could have widened their popular appeal. They could have taken the Tilak road. But this was the low road to power through the cultivation of 'sub-national' feeling in India's linguistic provinces: playing on religion, caste or ethnic prejudice. It was a road the Civilians were determined to block. But the Congress leaders rejected it anyway, favouring instead the 'high' road: entering on merit the ranks of the Civilians and widening the scope of representative politics. In practice, their 'national' programme needed the British to abdicate voluntarily, allowing the Congress, once installed in power, to 'make a nation' from above. The only principle on which this nation could be made was the 'British' principle: a people unified not by religion or language, but by inst.i.tutions and allegiance. It was not surprising then that the Congress leaders defined their goal as a status equivalent to that of the white dominions; that they protested their loyalty and proclaimed their attachment to British values. Less confidently than their dominion counterparts, these Indian politicians also a.s.serted a claim to be British, in ethos, att.i.tude and allegiance if not by 'race'. They felt all the more keenly the 'racial' antagonism their aspirations aroused. Hence perhaps the heartfelt plea of Surendranath Banerjea, long the most dynamic figure in Indian politics. 'May I be permitted to make an appeal...to...the Government of India', he told the Indian legislative council in 1913, That they may so discharge their exalted duties that this sentiment may be deepened...that we may all feel and realize, no matter whether we are Englishmen or Scotchmen or Irishmen or Indians, that we are Britishers: fellow-citizens, partic.i.p.ating in the privileges and also in the obligations of of a common Empire. That they may so discharge their exalted duties that this sentiment may be deepened...that we may all feel and realize, no matter whether we are Englishmen or Scotchmen or Irishmen or Indians, that we are Britishers: fellow-citizens, partic.i.p.ating in the privileges and also in the obligations of of a common Empire.116 This was scarcely the promise of unconditional obedience to London's wishes. It was more a demand to be treated with respect. But it also suggested how far the pre-war Congress was from contemplating a future outside the Empire. As with the dominions, it was the terms not the fact of membership it was determined to challenge.

The new empire in Africa In the old empire, the central question of imperial politics was how far the dominion peoples and Indian elites would identify their interests with the British world-system. In the 'new' empire, the issue was more fundamental. The buffer zones annexed to defend the mid-Victorian imperium imperium were a jigsaw legacy of part.i.tion. It was hard to imagine their future as loyal imperial communities. Colonial states had to be made before colonial societies could form inside them. In West Africa, British rule before the Scramble had been confined to coastal enclaves. In the part.i.tion era after 1884, each enclave acquired an enormous hinterland (the exception was Gambia). Sovereignty was one thing, authority another. Imposing British control on these vast interiors required considerable force: against the Hut Tax revolt in Sierra Leone; against the Ashanti in 1901; against the Yoruba states and Ibo peoples of Southern Nigeria and the Muslim emirates of the North. With the defeat of this inland resistance (Kano and Sokoto submitted to Lugard in 1902) came the moment of political decision. were a jigsaw legacy of part.i.tion. It was hard to imagine their future as loyal imperial communities. Colonial states had to be made before colonial societies could form inside them. In West Africa, British rule before the Scramble had been confined to coastal enclaves. In the part.i.tion era after 1884, each enclave acquired an enormous hinterland (the exception was Gambia). Sovereignty was one thing, authority another. Imposing British control on these vast interiors required considerable force: against the Hut Tax revolt in Sierra Leone; against the Ashanti in 1901; against the Yoruba states and Ibo peoples of Southern Nigeria and the Muslim emirates of the North. With the defeat of this inland resistance (Kano and Sokoto submitted to Lugard in 1902) came the moment of political decision.

It might have been expected that the British would carry upcountry the political system they had devised for the Coast. This was far from democratic. But it provided for legislative bodies with nominated African members;117 an English legal system with juries, a bar and a separate judiciary; and the beginnings of munic.i.p.al government. A 'creole' elite spreading east from Freetown (the metropole of Creoledom) had grown up along the Coast, fervently conscious of its progressive, Christian and civilised credentials, and eager to share in the imperial advance. an English legal system with juries, a bar and a separate judiciary; and the beginnings of munic.i.p.al government. A 'creole' elite spreading east from Freetown (the metropole of Creoledom) had grown up along the Coast, fervently conscious of its progressive, Christian and civilised credentials, and eager to share in the imperial advance.118 But it soon became clear that the British had other ideas. But it soon became clear that the British had other ideas.

The dominant factor was the need to impose a colonial pax pax as quickly as possible and at minimum cost. With few sources of revenue and heavy military outgoings, the British in the interior were eager to settle with the emirs and chiefs they had defeated or overawed. There was no time to replace them or to reconstruct their conquered polities in the image of the Coast. It was easier and cheaper to restore the old regimes on condition of loyalty, and exert British paramountcy directly through a cadre of 'Residents' backed up by the threat of force. This was the system devised for Northern Nigeria, variations of which were applied in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. It left no room for legislatures, munic.i.p.alities or English law. When Northern and Southern Nigeria were unified in 1914 to relieve the British Treasury of the burden of the impecunious North (annual revenues 210,000 per annum) at the expense of the South (annual revenue 2 million), as quickly as possible and at minimum cost. With few sources of revenue and heavy military outgoings, the British in the interior were eager to settle with the emirs and chiefs they had defeated or overawed. There was no time to replace them or to reconstruct their conquered polities in the image of the Coast. It was easier and cheaper to restore the old regimes on condition of loyalty, and exert British paramountcy directly through a cadre of 'Residents' backed up by the threat of force. This was the system devised for Northern Nigeria, variations of which were applied in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. It left no room for legislatures, munic.i.p.alities or English law. When Northern and Southern Nigeria were unified in 1914 to relieve the British Treasury of the burden of the impecunious North (annual revenues 210,000 per annum) at the expense of the South (annual revenue 2 million),119 Lugard, the architect of 'amalgamation' was careful to restrict coastal inst.i.tutions to the old colony of Lagos. He was determined to spread his favoured system of 'indirect rule' as widely as possible. 'Fixing' the population geographically and socially became the overriding principle of British policy. It meant shoring up, or even inventing, 'traditional' rulers, and excluding the 'interference' of creole lawyers and 'speculators' Lugard, the architect of 'amalgamation' was careful to restrict coastal inst.i.tutions to the old colony of Lagos. He was determined to spread his favoured system of 'indirect rule' as widely as possible. 'Fixing' the population geographically and socially became the overriding principle of British policy. It meant shoring up, or even inventing, 'traditional' rulers, and excluding the 'interference' of creole lawyers and 'speculators'120 from the interior. Not surprisingly, the creole elite became increasingly restive, protesting its loyalty but denouncing the drift towards racial exclusion and arbitrary rule. from the interior. Not surprisingly, the creole elite became increasingly restive, protesting its loyalty but denouncing the drift towards racial exclusion and arbitrary rule.121 But its influence beyond the coastal towns was limited. The conservative bias of British over-rule was congenial to its 'traditional' allies. The cash-crop revolution, bringing rising incomes to an emergent peasantry, eased the strains of conquest. And, with the growth of its customs revenues, the colonial state in British West Africa could afford to govern and tax with a very light hand. Politically, then, the West African colonies were set to become not nations-in-the-making but so many tribal confederacies united only in subjection to their British overlord. But its influence beyond the coastal towns was limited. The conservative bias of British over-rule was congenial to its 'traditional' allies. The cash-crop revolution, bringing rising incomes to an emergent peasantry, eased the strains of conquest. And, with the growth of its customs revenues, the colonial state in British West Africa could afford to govern and tax with a very light hand. Politically, then, the West African colonies were set to become not nations-in-the-making but so many tribal confederacies united only in subjection to their British overlord.122 In East Africa, the onset of colonial rule had been even more abrupt. There were no old enclaves of European rule on the coast. The interior had been a dangerous region, ravaged by the Arab slave trade and endemic warlordism. Once part.i.tion began, the British annexed Uganda in 1894 as the white hope of East African trade and a strategic wedge against French advance across the continent.123 Uganda could be ruled in alliance with Buganda, largest and strongest of the Great Lakes kingdoms. Uganda could be ruled in alliance with Buganda, largest and strongest of the Great Lakes kingdoms.124 But the East African Protectorate ('Kenya' from 1920) was a different story. With no natural rulers, except the Arab sheikhs along the Swahili coast, no revenues, a railway (to Uganda) to maintain and interior populations fiercely resistant to external control, the East African Protectorate was a financial incubus inside an administrative nightmare. The colonial remedy white farmers to develop the temperate highlands of central Kenya and Indians to help build the railway had obvious dangers. The settlers were quick to adopt the programme of their brothers to the south: self-government (only for whites); the throwing open of land to white purchase; a white citizen militia (like the Boer commando) for security; and the exclusion of Indians from political life and the ownership of land. But the East African Protectorate ('Kenya' from 1920) was a different story. With no natural rulers, except the Arab sheikhs along the Swahili coast, no revenues, a railway (to Uganda) to maintain and interior populations fiercely resistant to external control, the East African Protectorate was a financial incubus inside an administrative nightmare. The colonial remedy white farmers to develop the temperate highlands of central Kenya and Indians to help build the railway had obvious dangers. The settlers were quick to adopt the programme of their brothers to the south: self-government (only for whites); the throwing open of land to white purchase; a white citizen militia (like the Boer commando) for security; and the exclusion of Indians from political life and the ownership of land.125 The settlers extracted the 'Elgin pledge' effectively if not formally reserving the Kenya highlands for whites. But they were far too few in number to impose a South African 'solution'. Well before 1914, East African Indians were mobilising against the threat of settler hegemony. The settlers extracted the 'Elgin pledge' effectively if not formally reserving the Kenya highlands for whites. But they were far too few in number to impose a South African 'solution'. Well before 1914, East African Indians were mobilising against the threat of settler hegemony.126 African grievances were beginning to be voiced. African grievances were beginning to be voiced.127 Yet, in this racially segmented society, no group was strong enough to seize control from below. The colonial state was too weak to build its 'nation' from above. Yet, in this racially segmented society, no group was strong enough to seize control from below. The colonial state was too weak to build its 'nation' from above.

In West and East Africa alike, colonial rule had created 'shallow states' without roots in local society. Freed from the burden of external defence by part.i.tion diplomacy, the British had no need to dig deep. Colonial government became an over-rule concerned mainly to keep the peace between its fractious subjects. The political future of so protean an empire was at best opaque. To many enlightened imperialists (as well as liberal opinion more generally), the greed and brutality of unofficial whites was far more alarming than the political aspirations of (as yet) unorganised blacks. Hence segregation, not integration, seemed the best solution for the medium term. The threat of racial conflict was not ignored by contemporary observers of the imperial system. But they tended to be fatalistic about settler domination and thought African advance would be slow.

Islam Rather less attention was paid (outside official circles) to the other great fissure that ran through the British world-system. By 1914, the British system depended upon the loyalty and cooperation of a vast array of Muslim rulers and notables: in Zanzibar, Nigeria, Egypt, the Sudan, the Persian Gulf, Princely India and British India, and the Malay States. British relations with the Ottoman Empire and Persia (the largest independent Muslim states) were also exceptionally delicate: both were buffer states whose hostility or collapse would threaten the strategic corridor connecting Britain and India. British att.i.tudes to Islam were contradictory, and there was no tradition of studying the contemporary Islamic world as there was for example in the Netherlands.128 Evangelicals and humanitarians, reared on tales of David Livingstone and the Arab slave trade, were deeply unsympathetic. Romantics were attracted by the 'timeless' pre-industrial East and the warrior ethos of desert society. But the most powerful influence on British policy was a wary respect for Islamic 'fanaticism': the supposed ability of Muslim rulers or preachers to arouse intense popular feeling against 'infidel' imperialists. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, Gordon's fate at Khartoum, and b.l.o.o.d.y disasters in Afghanistan had ingrained this deeply in the 'official mind'. Evangelicals and humanitarians, reared on tales of David Livingstone and the Arab slave trade, were deeply unsympathetic. Romantics were attracted by the 'timeless' pre-industrial East and the warrior ethos of desert society. But the most powerful influence on British policy was a wary respect for Islamic 'fanaticism': the supposed ability of Muslim rulers or preachers to arouse intense popular feeling against 'infidel' imperialists. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, Gordon's fate at Khartoum, and b.l.o.o.d.y disasters in Afghanistan had ingrained this deeply in the 'official mind'.

But how dangerous was Islam to the political cohesion of the British system? The Islamic world stretched from Morocco to the Philippines. Islam, remarked the intellectual traveller Gertrude Bell, 'is the electric current by which the transmission of sentiment is effected, and its potency is increased by the fact that there is little or no sense of territorial nationality to counterbalance it'.129 The government of India harped constantly on the danger of a 'pan-Islamic' movement transmitting the grievances of Middle East Muslims to India and beyond. With its chronic anxiety about a second Mutiny, its turbulent borderlands on the Northwest Frontier, and its diplomatic interests in the Persian Gulf, the Indian government's fears were understandable. Its real purpose was to restrain the 'Gladstonian' enthusiasm for liberating the Ottoman Sultan's Christian subjects to which opinion at home seemed all too p.r.o.ne. As the 'great Muhammadan Power', the Civilians insisted, Britain could not be seen to act against the interests of Islam. But few British observers thought pan-Islamism counted for much. 'As a factor in British policy', recalled Ronald Storrs of his time in pre-1914 Egypt, 'the doctrine of the caliphate of pan-Islamic theocracy was mainly the creation of the India Office.' The government of India harped constantly on the danger of a 'pan-Islamic' movement transmitting the grievances of Middle East Muslims to India and beyond. With its chronic anxiety about a second Mutiny, its turbulent borderlands on the Northwest Frontier, and its diplomatic interests in the Persian Gulf, the Indian government's fears were understandable. Its real purpose was to restrain the 'Gladstonian' enthusiasm for liberating the Ottoman Sultan's Christian subjects to which opinion at home seemed all too p.r.o.ne. As the 'great Muhammadan Power', the Civilians insisted, Britain could not be seen to act against the interests of Islam. But few British observers thought pan-Islamism counted for much. 'As a factor in British policy', recalled Ronald Storrs of his time in pre-1914 Egypt, 'the doctrine of the caliphate of pan-Islamic theocracy was mainly the creation of the India Office.'130 It 'can never become a movement of importance', judged Arnold Wilson, then a young consul in Southwest Persia. It 'can never become a movement of importance', judged Arnold Wilson, then a young consul in Southwest Persia.131 Lord Cromer was equally sceptical. Lord Cromer was equally sceptical.132 In a survey of India published shortly before 1914, Bampfylde Fuller, a former Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (a Muslim majority province), contrasted the political and educational backwardness of Muslims with the progress of Hindus the real source of any challenge to the Raj. In a survey of India published shortly before 1914, Bampfylde Fuller, a former Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (a Muslim majority province), contrasted the political and educational backwardness of Muslims with the progress of Hindus the real source of any challenge to the Raj.133 In fact, British opinion, whether sympathetic or not, tended to regard Islam as a culture in decline. It commanded enormous popular piety but had failed intellectually. It was the 'speculative' and 'dogmatic' nature of Islam, argued Fuller, that made Muslims resistant to modern knowledge. 'Swathed in the bands of the Koran', remarked Sir William Muir, the leading academic expert on Islam, 'the Moslem faith, unlike the Christian, is powerless to adapt itself to varying time and place, keep pace with the march of humanity, direct and purify the social life or elevate mankind.'134 Hence the British a.s.sumption that, so long as care was taken not to offend popular religiosity, or the vested interests of the Hence the British a.s.sumption that, so long as care was taken not to offend popular religiosity, or the vested interests of the ulama ulama, the interpreters of Islamic law, a modus vivendi modus vivendi was perfectly possible. British authority should be decently veiled behind Muslim notables: this was the ruling principle of the Cromerian and Lugardian systems. If provocation was avoided, and prestige maintained, there was little danger of Muslim piety turning into nationalist pa.s.sion. was perfectly possible. British authority should be decently veiled behind Muslim notables: this was the ruling principle of the Cromerian and Lugardian systems. If provocation was avoided, and prestige maintained, there was little danger of Muslim piety turning into nationalist pa.s.sion.

Whatever its premises, this sanguine view of Anglo-Muslim relations looked plausible enough before 1914. In India, where most of Britain's Muslim subjects could be found, Muslim political att.i.tudes were coloured by the fact of compet.i.tion with Hindus and fear of Hindu predominance. In Northern Nigeria, the colonial pax pax had helped the emirs against their over-mighty subjects and permitted the extension of Islamic influence over long-resistant 'pagan' peoples. had helped the emirs against their over-mighty subjects and permitted the extension of Islamic influence over long-resistant 'pagan' peoples.135 In Egypt, where the Khedive was usually at odds with the In Egypt, where the Khedive was usually at odds with the ulama ulama of the al-Azhar the greatest centre of learning in the Muslim world an independent Egyptian state held little appeal for the doctors of law and theology. Islamic feeling ran athwart the ideas of nationalism and its religious guardians were suspicious of secular rule. Only in extreme conditions, where secular authority was unusually weak or social disruption exceptionally acute, did Islamic politics seem likely to thrive or pose a real threat to British power. of the al-Azhar the greatest centre of learning in the Muslim world an independent Egyptian state held little appeal for the doctors of law and theology. Islamic feeling ran athwart the ideas of nationalism and its religious guardians were suspicious of secular rule. Only in extreme conditions, where secular authority was unusually weak or social disruption exceptionally acute, did Islamic politics seem likely to thrive or pose a real threat to British power.

Ireland and Empire Ironically, in the last few years before 1914, the main threat to imperial unity lay closest to home in Ireland. There was nothing new in this. Much the same had been true in the 1590s, the 1640s, the 1680s, the 1770s, 1780s and 1790s, the 1820s and the 1880s. But, after 1900, Home Rule 'nationalism' was supposed to have been killed by British 'kindness'.136 The sale and redistribution of land had been expected to create a contented peasantry, immune to the violent rhetoric of the 'land war' that had raged since the 1870s, and shrewdly aware of the economic benefits brought by the Union of Britain and Ireland. Munic.i.p.al and parliamentary politics, not agrarian terror, would be the political vehicle of this farmer cla.s.s and its allies among the small-town tradesmen. In this prosaic new world, 'romantic Ireland' would be dead and gone, 'with O'Leary in the grave'. The sale and redistribution of land had been expected to create a contented peasantry, immune to the violent rhetoric of the 'land war' that had raged since the 1870s, and shrewdly aware of the economic benefits brought by the Union of Britain and Ireland. Munic.i.p.al and parliamentary politics, not agrarian terror, would be the political vehicle of this farmer cla.s.s and its allies among the small-town tradesmen. In this prosaic new world, 'romantic Ireland' would be dead and gone, 'with O'Leary in the grave'.

It failed to happen, at least not on the decisive scale that the architects of 'kindness' had hoped for. Part of the reason was the success of the Irish National Party, once led by Charles Stewart Parnell, in entrenching itself over much of Catholic Ireland outside Ulster and the City of Dublin. The Irish party was a formidable machine. When elected local government was extended to Ireland in 1898 in the form of county councils, the party gained a virtual monopoly of the powers and patronage it gave as Unionist landowners bitterly complained. Its local bosses played a prominent role in the machinery for land sales, the process that was rearing a new breed of wealth in the countryside. The rapid growth of a provincial press gave the party's leaders and their newspaper allies an efficient means of mobilising opinion and exerting pressure. The one thing the party could not do was to force the British government to concede Home Rule. Until 1905, it faced a ma.s.sive Conservative majority at Westminster. After 1906, as one Anglo-Irish landlord remarked, the scale of the Liberal landslide meant that the new government had no reason to risk introducing a third Home Rule bill.137 After all, Home Rule had twice before been the rock on which Liberal governments had been wrecked. After all, Home Rule had twice before been the rock on which Liberal governments had been wrecked.

The Irish party leader, John Redmond, understood this. Redmond was from a Catholic landowning family. His strategy was subtle and perhaps given the divisions among his followers deliberately opaque. Raising money in America he spoke of an Irish nation as if complete independence was the plan. But his real aim was to win Ireland the equivalent of dominion autonomy, the same status as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. He liked to compare himself to Louis Botha, who had reconciled Afrikanerdom to self-government under the British Crown. 'Our stake in the Empire', he told a Liberal journalist in 1908, 'is too large for us to be detached from it...[T]he Irish people peopled the waste places of Greater Britain. Our roots are in the Imperial as well as the national.'138 'Once we receive home rule', he told the 'Once we receive home rule', he told the Daily Express Daily Express in 1910, 'we shall demonstrate our imperial loyalty beyond question.' in 1910, 'we shall demonstrate our imperial loyalty beyond question.'139 In In The Framework of Home Rule The Framework of Home Rule (1911), Erskine Childers appealed to the Unionist opponents of Home Rule in similar terms. Ireland had nothing to gain by separation (i.e. complete independence), he claimed. 'Ireland has taken her full share in winning and populating the Empire. The result is hers as much as Britain's.' Indeed, giving Ireland Home Rule was part of the project of imperial unity, 'the indispensable preliminary to the close union of all the English-speaking races'. (1911), Erskine Childers appealed to the Unionist opponents of Home Rule in similar terms. Ireland had nothing to gain by separation (i.e. complete independence), he claimed. 'Ireland has taken her full share in winning and populating the Empire. The result is hers as much as Britain's.' Indeed, giving Ireland Home Rule was part of the project of imperial unity, 'the indispensable preliminary to the close union of all the English-speaking races'.140 Redmond hoped to rea.s.sure the enemies of Home Rule in both Britain and Ireland, to portray the Irish party as sober and responsible, and to appeal to a sense of All-Irish national ident.i.ty, Northern and Protestant as well as Southern and Catholic. Redmond hoped to rea.s.sure the enemies of Home Rule in both Britain and Ireland, to portray the Irish party as sober and responsible, and to appeal to a sense of All-Irish national ident.i.ty, Northern and Protestant as well as Southern and Catholic.

In fact, Redmond's a.n.a.logy between Ireland and South Africa was misplaced and his chances of success were thin. More than half his parliamentary party were 'agrarians' for whom the land struggle was still a political talisman. The party's popular movement, the United Irish League, was implicated in harrying landowners into forced sales and in 'cattle-driving'.141 A vocal part of his following were 'cultural' nationalists, dismayed by the suddenness and intensity with which a Gaelic-speaking and non-literate society had been overwhelmed by anglicisation. A vocal part of his following were 'cultural' nationalists, dismayed by the suddenness and intensity with which a Gaelic-speaking and non-literate society had been overwhelmed by anglicisation.142 Limited opportunities for the new Catholic middle cla.s.s (the comparison with the Bengal Limited opportunities for the new Catholic middle cla.s.s (the comparison with the Bengal bhadralok bhadralok is suggestive) bred fierce impatience with 'Dublin Castle', the seat of British rule in Ireland. By 1913, the Gaelic Athletic a.s.sociation, the seedbed of this revolutionary and culturalist nationalism, had more than 100,000 members. is suggestive) bred fierce impatience with 'Dublin Castle', the seat of British rule in Ireland. By 1913, the Gaelic Athletic a.s.sociation, the seedbed of this revolutionary and culturalist nationalism, had more than 100,000 members.143 When Redmond declared (in October 1910) that he was in favour of a federal solution, making Ireland part of a 'Federal Empire', he was forced to retract and repudiate by the pressure of party opinion. When Redmond declared (in October 1910) that he was in favour of a federal solution, making Ireland part of a 'Federal Empire', he was forced to retract and repudiate by the pressure of party opinion.144 But, if the room for manoeuvre on the nationalist side was limited, the scope for concession by their Unionist opponents seemed even less. But, if the room for manoeuvre on the nationalist side was limited, the scope for concession by their Unionist opponents seemed even less.

If Ireland had been a thousand miles away, Joseph Chamberlain is supposed to have remarked in 1893,145 it would long since have been granted self-government. Inescapable proximity and ineradicable difference were the Irish condition. To British critics of Home Rule, Ireland was too close to be entrusted with self-government: it was part of the Empire's 'central power', not an outlying province. it would long since have been granted self-government. Inescapable proximity and ineradicable difference were the Irish condition. To British critics of Home Rule, Ireland was too close to be entrusted with self-government: it was part of the Empire's 'central power', not an outlying province.146 If Irish autonomy was abused, argued Balfour, there would be little that London could do: yet the strategic stakes if Ireland was disloyal were much too high for the risk to be taken. The champions of tariff reform and imperial federation, like Milner, saw Home Rule as a retrograde step that would delay not encourage imperial unity. But the greatest obstacle to Redmond's programme (and the real difference from South Africa) lay in the extent to which Ireland's affairs were entangled in the party politics of the British mainland. One symptom of this was the fact that perhaps a quarter of Conservative MPs after 1906 were either Irish Unionists, Southern Irish gentry sitting for mainland const.i.tuencies, or married into Southern Unionist families. If Irish autonomy was abused, argued Balfour, there would be little that London could do: yet the strategic stakes if Ireland was disloyal were much too high for the risk to be taken. The champions of tariff reform and imperial federation, like Milner, saw Home Rule as a retrograde step that would delay not encourage imperial unity. But the greatest obstacle to Redmond's programme (and the real difference from South Africa) lay in the extent to which Ireland's affairs were entangled in the party politics of the British mainland. One symptom of this was the fact that perhaps a quarter of Conservative MPs after 1906 were either Irish Unionists, Southern Irish gentry sitting for mainland const.i.tuencies, or married into Southern Unionist families.147 The second, and more serious, was the intensity of 'Britannic' sentiment in Northeast Ireland where religious and cultural antipathy to the Catholic South was rapidly mutating into an 'Ulster' ident.i.ty with 'Britishness' at its core. The second, and more serious, was the intensity of 'Britannic' sentiment in Northeast Ireland where religious and cultural antipathy to the Catholic South was rapidly mutating into an 'Ulster' ident.i.ty with 'Britishness' at its core.148 But, unlike the British minority in South Africa, which was forced to settle with the Afrikaner majority, Ulster (like the rest of Ireland) was represented in the British Parliament. It could rely on powerful allies in mainland politics to obstruct the progress of Home Rule. And, if the worst came to the worst, it could threaten civil war in the heart of the Empire. But, unlike the British minority in South Africa, which was forced to settle with the Afrikaner majority, Ulster (like the rest of Ireland) was represented in the British Parliament. It could rely on powerful allies in mainland politics to obstruct the progress of Home Rule. And, if the worst came to the worst, it could threaten civil war in the heart of the Empire.

From these rigidities sprang the crisis of 191014. Its origins, and Redmond's opportunity, lay in the travails of the Liberal government. By 1909, its social programme (and electoral credibility) were at risk from blocking tactics in the House of Lords and the scale of its spending on the Navy. Its counter-stroke, the budget of 1909 and the consequential bill to limit the powers of the House of Lords, brought a const.i.tutional crisis and a general election. The levelling up of Liberal and Unionist (or Conservative) strength in the House of Commons forced the Liberal cabinet into the arms of the Irish party while the pa.s.sage of the Parliament Act (removing the veto of the House of Lords) erased their excuse for not honouring the long-standing commitment to Irish autonomy. A third Home Rule bill was drafted. In January 1913 it pa.s.sed its last stage in the Commons with a majority of 110.149 While offering Redmond much less than he wanted, especially in Irish control over revenue and spending, it included Ulster in the Home Rule scheme. The result was an explosion. Predictably, the bill was rejected in the House of Lords. The Unionists demanded a general election, or a referendum, before the bill could be turned into law. In Ulster, preparations went ahead for armed resistance to a Home Rule government with the open encouragement of Unionist leaders like Milner. Elsewhere in Ireland, the resort to force began to be seen as inevitable: gun-running followed drilling. Compromise was elusive since all sides glimpsed the chance of triumph and feared the divisions that concession might bring. Even the belated acceptance by the Liberal government (at the instigation of Churchill and Lloyd George) of Ulster's exclusion from Home Rule brought further insoluble differences over the boundaries of the excluded area and the question of temporary or permanent exemption from the operation of the bill. At the moment when the shootings at Sarajevo and the prospect of a far more terrible crisis in Europe suspended domestic hostilities over Ireland, a descent into civil war in Ireland and (at best) const.i.tutional impa.s.se in Britain seemed all too likely. While offering Redmond much less than he wanted, especially in Irish control over revenue and spending, it included Ulster in the Home Rule scheme. The result was an explosion. Predictably, the bill was rejected in the House of Lords. The Unionists demanded a general election, or a referendum, before the bill could be turned into law. In Ulster, preparations went ahead for armed resistance to a Home Rule government with the open encouragement of Unionist leaders like Milner. Elsewhere in Ireland, the resort to force began to be seen as inevitable: gun-running followed drilling. Compromise was elusive since all sides glimpsed the chance of triumph and feared the divisions that concession might bring. Even the belated acceptance by the Liberal government (at the instigation of Churchill and Lloyd George) of Ulster's exclusion from Home Rule brought further insoluble differences over the boundaries of the excluded area and the question of temporary or permanent exemption from the operation of the bill. At the moment when the shootings at Sarajevo and the prospect of a far more terrible crisis in Europe suspended domestic hostilities over Ireland, a descent into civil war in Ireland and (at best) const.i.tutional impa.s.se in Britain seemed all too likely.

The astonishing case of Irish Home Rule mocks the argument that the British world-system owed its strength and cohesion to the shrewd pragmatism and liberal instincts of the governing elite in London. Confronted by the twofold challenge of Irish nationalism and Ulster Unionism, that elite was at sixes and sevens. Both Liberals and Conservatives hoped to exploit Home Rule to win the party battle in mainland Britain. Neither dared alienate the Irish factions with whom they were allied. The Irish crisis throws into relief the chronic weakness to which the imperial centre was often subject. For London was only rarely capable of decisive intervention in local politics. Its usual role was to adjust the balance between the local parties: to regulate, encourage or obstruct. Its freedom of action was often constrained by the numerous and vocal colonial lobbies active in Britain though these also were usually too weak to impose their will. Where (as in the Irish case) the local parties were finely balanced, could exert almost equal pull inside British politics and came to symbolise rival notions of imperial power, the strain became almost unbearable.

In the last resort, then, the cohesion of the British system was less a matter of British policy policy than of the complex workings of imperial politics. The theoretical paramountcy of the Imperial government was exercised under demanding conditions. It was hemmed in by the free trade convictions of the British working cla.s.s, unmoved by the argument for tariff reform. than of the complex workings of imperial politics. The theoretical paramountcy of the Imperial government was exercised under demanding conditions. It was hemmed in by the free trade convictions of the British working cla.s.s, unmoved by the argument for tariff reform.150 It was checked by the strength of the two old-established 'garrisons' in Ireland and India and of their allies and supporters in British opinion. It was wary of the militant appeal of Britannic nationalism that Milner had invoked so successfully in 1899. It dared not coerce the self-governing colonies. A determined proconsul with the press in his pocket, like Lord Lugard in Nigeria, was hard to restrain. It was the incoherence and improvisation to which all this gave rise that fuelled the ambition of the self-styled imperialists in Edwardian politics. To free 'imperial' questions from the messy entanglement in domestic politics, and to discipline the lobbies and factions whose influence loomed large, they wanted to create an Empire-wide public opinion and an Empire-wide parliament. Before 1914, they made little headway. But with the crash of the old order they thought they saw their chance. It was checked by the strength of the two old-established 'garrisons' in Ireland and India and of their allies and supporters in British opinion. It was wary of the militant appeal of Britannic nationalism that Milner had invoked so successfully in 1899. It dared not coerce the self-governing colonies. A determined proconsul with the press in his pocket, like Lord Lugard in Nigeria, was hard to restrain. It was the incoherence and improvisation to which all this gave rise that fuelled the ambition of the self-styled imperialists in Edwardian politics. To free 'imperial' questions from the messy entanglement in domestic politics, and to discipline the lobbies and factions whose influence loomed large, they wanted to create an Empire-wide public opinion and an Empire-wide parliament. Before 1914, they made little headway. But with the crash of the old order they thought they saw their chance.

Part II

'The great liner is sinking': the British world-system in the age of war

8

THE WAR FOR EMPIRE, 19141919

The longer war 1914 was the watershed between two ages of empire. In the long nineteenth century after 1815, the British world-system had developed as if there were no danger of a general war in Europe or across the world. Despite the Crimean War, the wars of Italian and German unification and the Franco-Prussian War, this had proved a reasonable a.s.sumption. The results can be seen from a glance at the map. Britain's settlements, possessions, spheres and commercial property were scattered broadcast across the globe. Whatever the const.i.tutional niceties, in the 'formal' empire colonial rule was highly devolved: to settler politicians in the white dominions; to imperial officials in the rest. Devolution a.s.sumed that their defence would fall to the Royal Navy, or be made redundant by its global reach. The exception was India which paid for its own standing army and much more beside (two-thirds, in fact, of the Empire's regular army). Imperial rivalry was real, and posed a threat to Britain's interests. But the threat was usually more regional (and Near Eastern) than general. Much of its force was deflected by the part.i.tion diplomacy of the 1880s and 1890s. As a consequence, across large parts of the world, British influence could be maintained by the 'soft power' of commerce and culture. This had made possible the coexistence of imperialism and liberalism in Britain, in the settler colonies and even, more fitfully, in India. For all its hard coercive face, colonial rule retained the power to engage local sympathy by its liberal promise however sparingly fulfilled of individual freedom and material progress. The imperialism of free trade, variously interpreted, frequently modified, often abused, remained the Leitmotif Leitmotif of a system whose protean ideology was a c.o.c.ktail: global and cosmopolitan as much as racial and territorial. of a system whose protean ideology was a c.o.c.ktail: global and cosmopolitan as much as racial and territorial.

The geopolitical foundations of the Victorian and Edwardian world-system rested in the last resort upon two sets of equations at the opposite ends of the Old World. In East Asia where a local great power might have challenged British influence, there had seemed little to fear before the mid-1890s. Thereafter, disintegration not self-a.s.sertion was the most likely prognosis for China. j.a.pan was a different story. After 1895, when it seized Taiwan, it became a cadet imperialist. Ten years later, it became the strongest military power in East Asia, defeating the Russians. But j.a.pan was still a 'country power': fearful of a European combination against it. Up to 1914, its local strength seemed to work to Britain's advantage. The Anglo-j.a.panese alliance, twice renewed, held the ring in East Asia while British efforts were concentrated on the deterrence of Germany.

In Europe, the geopolitical equation was very different. Europe was active, not pa.s.sive. In Churchill's expressive phrase, it was 'where the weather came from'. Commercially, territorially and demographically, nineteenth-century Europe was in a phase of hyper-expansion. Towards the end of the century, the pace and scale of this European 'enlargement' rose sharply on a tide of trade and capital. International tensions stoked by private interests grew more acute. But only to a certain point. Dynamic though the continent had become in its social and economic character, politically it remained in the grip of the long conservative reaction that set in generally after 1815. The old regime persisted. No great power government dared contemplate kicking over the European chessboard with the possible exception of Napoleon III in 1859. All had too much to lose, or were too uncertain of ultimate victory. Nor were they driven into general war by the threat to their survival. Nationalism exerted a potent appeal as the instrument of state-building ('official nationalism') and as an equal and opposite claim for the liberation of 'submerged nationalities' from the chains of dynastic Europe. Both versions could have volatile consequences. But, until the end of the century, great power governments seemed more than capable of restraining their disruptive potential.

For the British, this pattern of continental politics was highly convenient. They could not hope to prevent the overflow of European trade, influence and territorial ambition into the wider world. But there were good grounds to think that the distribution of power in continental Europe between four and a half great powers (the half being Italy) would persist indefinitely. No single power, nor any likely combination of powers, could hope for a durable hegemony over all the rest. The mutual antipathy of the continental states neutralised their resentment at Britain's vast share of imperial booty. Fearing that they would be dragged into war by the antics of their frontiersmen in Afro-Asia (or the furore of their admirers at home), continental statesmen accepted the part.i.tion diplomacy through which Salisbury and his successors hoped to stabilise (and maximise) the British share. Thus, for all the intensity of Europe's engagement with the wider world after 1870, there were few signs before 1914 of a coming revolution in world politics. In a 'closed system' in which the global 'commons' had been all but shared out, international politics were bound to be stressful. Zones of insecurity would wax and wane. But, while the East remained pa.s.sive, and the West was locked in the defensive diplomacy of the 'balance of power', the British world-system strung out between the two could guard its networks at bearable cost.

In retrospect, of course, we can see that the pre-war decade contained the omens of catastrophic change. German economic power was growing rapidly. Nationalism in East and Central Europe was becoming more violent. Urbanisation and agrarian hardship screwed up the social tensions. Most dangerous of all, as it turned out, were the volcanic nationalisms of Southeastern Europe. The Balkan Wars of 191213 and 191314, and the struggle of Serbian nationalists against Austrian over-rule in Bosnia, were symptomatic of a region where the writ of the great powers hardly ran, but where their rivalries were fuelled by the ethnic conflict of would-be clients. In July 1914, the Habsburg government tried to use the Sarajevo murders to crush Serbian nationalism, and humiliate Russia, Serbia's great power sponsor. It was a colossal blunder. Southeastern Europe was not a remote colonial region where the stakes were low and compromise easy. Its fate was thought crucial to the balance of Russian, Austrian and German power. So the statesmen who had part.i.tioned half the world fell out over the most backward corner of their own continent.

The First World War was the violent rupture of the nineteenth-century world in which the vast scale of British expansion had been possible. It was the murderous first act of a conflict that was to last until the 1950s, or (by some criteria) until 1990. It helped blow apart the world economy and reversed the first 'globalisation' in a wave of economic nationalism. The collapse of the old imperial order in East and Central Europe wrecked the pre-war basis of great power diplomacy and sanctified the nation-state as the ideal form of territorial polity. In post-imperial Europe, ethnic conflict became even more bitter and much more wide-ranging. It was soon entangled in the ideological warfare between communism and its enemies, with drastic consequences for regional stability. Nor in the closed system the world had become could the war's effects be confined to Europe. By its end, almost every state had become a belligerent or been drawn w.i.l.l.y-nilly into the fighting. In East Asia the consequences were especially dramatic. In this unpart.i.tioned corner of the semi-colonial world, the wartime abdication of the European powers had been a golden opportunity for local ambition. 'Pa.s.sive' East Asia entered its revolutionary phase in the triangular struggle of nationalists, communists and j.a.panese imperialists. Western interests could no longer be protected by a gunboat and a corporal's guard. By the mid-1930s, it seemed increasingly likely that the turbulence in East Asia would spill over into the 'colonial' lands of the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and even India.

The impact of these vast changes on the British system was profound and ultimately devastating. It is tempting in hindsight to see the First World War as the first and longest step towards its eventual disintegration. But that may be too simple a judgment. The war imposed huge strains on the British system. It permanently altered the external setting. It badly damaged the international economy with which British power had grown symbiotically. But the British were also the princ.i.p.al victors in this war of empires. They lost less and gained more than all the other original combatants. In the post-war world, with its corrosive frictions and shattered finances, this 'victory' won them a crucial breathing-s.p.a.ce. It bought strategic gains and political time: to entrench their empire militarily and reform it const.i.tutionally. It was a vital respite before the long war of the twentieth century resumed its course.

The Imperial Armageddon Before the war, British leaders (and their strategic advisers) had a.s.sumed that the Royal Navy would be Britain's princ.i.p.al weapon in any Great Power conflict in Europe. The pre-war scheme for a small expeditionary force (the 'BEF') to fight on the continent alongside France had not altered this view: there were no plans to increase the size of the army even after a war had begun.1 The reasoning behind this 'navalist' strategy was simple. The British expected that, in a war fought to maintain the European balance of power against German aggression, the great conscript armies of France and Russia would bear the brunt of the fighting on land. The BEF would be a useful reinforcement in the critical opening phase and a gesture of solidarity. But Britain's real contribution would be maritime and economic. The navy would sweep the seas clear of enemy warships (and safeguard vital lanes of supply), gobble up the German colonies and impose the blockade that would steadily strangle the German economy. Meanwhile, British finance, industrial output and inexhaustible coal would sustain the war effort of the Entente. A war fought on these terms until the Germans gave in would have a minor impact on British interest