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The Economist.
by Various.
"If a writer be conscious that to gain a reception for his favourite doctrine he must combat with certain elements of opposition, in the taste, or the pride, or the indolence of those whom he is addressing, this will only serve to make him the more importunate. _There is a difference between such truths as are merely of a speculative nature and such as are allied with practice and moral feeling. With the former all repet.i.tion may be often superfluous; with the latter it may just be by earnest repet.i.tion, that their influence comes to be thoroughly established over the mind of an inquirer._"--CHALMERS.
OUR BRAZILIAN TRADE AND THE ANTI-SLAVERY PARTY.
Since the publication of our article on the Brazilian Treaty, we have received several letters from individuals who, agreeing with us entirely in the free-trade view of the question, nevertheless are at variance with us as to the commercial policy which we should pursue towards that country, in order to coerce them into our views regarding slavery. We are glad to feel called upon to express our views on this subject, to which we think full justice has not yet been done.
We must, however, in doing so, make a great distinction between the two cla.s.ses of persons who are now found to be joined in an alliance against this application of free-trade principles; two cla.s.ses who have always. .h.i.therto been so much opposed to each other, that it would have been very difficult ten years since to have conceived any possible combinations of circ.u.mstances that could have brought them to act in concert: we mean the West India interest, who so violently opposed every step of amelioration to the slave from first to last; and that body of _truly great philanthropists_ who have been unceasing in their efforts to abolish slavery wherever and in whatever form it was to be found. To the latter alone we shall address our remarks.
As far as it can be collected, the argument relied upon by this party appears to be, that having once abolished slavery in our own dominions we ought to interdict the importation of articles produced by slave labour in other countries, in order to coerce them, for the sake of their trade with us, to follow our example.
We trust we shall be among the last who will ever be found advocating the continuance of slavery, or opposing any _legitimate_ means for its extinction; but we feel well a.s.sured that those who have adopted the opinion quoted above, have little considered either the consequences or the tendencies of the policy they support.
The first consideration is, that if this policy is to be acted upon, on principle, it must extend to the exclusion of _all_ articles produced in whatever country by slaves. It must apply with equal force to the _gold_, _silver_, and _copper_ of Brazil, as it does to the _sugar_ and _coffee_ produced in that country;--it must apply with equal force to the _cotton_, the _rice_, the _indigo_, the _cochineal_, and the _tobacco_ of the Southern States of America, and Mexico, as it does to the _sugar_ and _coffee_ of Cuba. To be in any way consistent in carrying out this principle, we must exclude the great material on which the millions of Lancashire, the West of Yorkshire, and Lanarkshire depend for their daily subsistence; we must equally exclude tobacco, which gives revenue to the extent of 3,500,000_l._ annually; we must refuse any use of the precious metals, whether for coin, ornament, or other purposes. But even these form only one cla.s.s of the obligations which the affirming of this principle would impose upon us. If we would coerce the Brazilians by not buying from them, it necessarily involves the duty of not selling to them; for if we sell, we supply them with all the means of conducting their slave labour; we supply the implements of labour, or the materials from which they are made; we supply clothing for themselves and their slaves; we supply part of their foods and most of their luxuries; the wines and the spirits in which the slave-owner indulges; and we even supply the very materials of which the implements of slave punishment or coercion are made;--and thus partic.i.p.ate much more directly in the profits of slavery than by admitting their produce into this country. But if we supply them with all these articles, which we do to the extent of nearly 3,000,000_l._ a year, and are not to receive some of their slave-tainted produce, it must follow that we are to give them without an equivalent, than which no greater encouragement could be given for a perseverance in slave-holding. But the truth is--whatever pretensions we make on this subject--we do, in exchange for our goods, buy their polluted produce; we employ our ships to convey it from their sh.o.r.es, and ourselves find a market for it among other countries already well supplied with cheap sugar, where it is not required, and where it only tends the more to depress the price in markets already abundantly supplied. Nay, we do more; we admit it into our ports, we land it on our sh.o.r.es, we place it in our bonded warehouses, and our busy merchants and brokers deal as freely on our exchanges in this slave produce as in any other, only with this difference--that this cheap sugar is not permitted to be consumed by our own starving population, but can only be sold to be refined in bond for the consumption of the free labourers in our West India colonies and others, or to be re-exported, as it is, for the use of "our less scrupulous but more consistent" neighbours on the continent.
Consistency, therefore, requires equally the abandonment of all export trade to slave-producing countries, as it does of the import of their produce; and the effect will carry us even further. We know it is a favourite feeling with Mr Joseph Sturge and others of that truly benevolent cla.s.s, that in eschewing any connexion with slave-producing countries, we have the better reason to urge free-trading intercourse with such countries as use only free labour,--with the Northern States of America, with Java, and other countries similarly circ.u.mstanced. Now of what does our trade to these countries, in common with others, chiefly consist? Of the 51,400,000_l._ of British manufactures and produce which we exported in 1840, upwards of 24,500,000_l._ consisted of cotton goods, nearly the whole of which were manufactured from slave-grown cotton, and partly dyed and printed with the cochineal and indigo of Guatamala and Mexico. Consistency would therefore further require that we abandon at least one-half of our present foreign trade even with free-labour countries, instead of opening any opportunity for its increase.
When men are prepared and conceive it a duty to urge the accomplishment of all these results, they may then consistently oppose the introduction of Brazilian sugar and coffee, and support the present West India monopoly; but not till then.
But now, what effect must this argument have upon slave-producing states, in inducing them to abandon slavery? Has it not long been one of the chief arguments of the anti-slavery party everywhere, that free labour is actually cheaper than slave labour? Now, will the Brazilians give credit to this proposition, so strongly insisted upon, when they see that the anti-slavery party conceive it needful to give support to a system which affirms the necessity of protecting free labour against slave labour, by imposing a prohibitory duty of upwards of 100 per cent.
on the produce of the latter? Will their opinion of the relative cheapness of the two kinds of labour not rather be determined by our actions than our professions?
We firmly believe that free labour, properly exercised, is cheaper than slave labour; but there is no pretence to say that it is so at this moment in our West India colonies; and we undertake to show, in an early number, in connexion with this fact, that _the existence of the high protecting duties on our West India produce has done more than anything else to endanger the whole experiment of emanc.i.p.ation_.
But, moreover, our West India monopoly,--the existence of the high prohibitory differential duty on sugar, is the greatest, strongest, and least answerable argument at present used by slave-holding countries against emanc.i.p.ation. The following was put strongly to ourselves in Amsterdam a short time since by a large slave owner in Dutch Guiana:--"We should be glad," said he, "to follow your example, and emanc.i.p.ate our slaves, if it were possible; but as long as your differential duties on sugar are maintained, it will be impossible. Here is an account sale of sugar produced in our colony, netting a return of 11_l._ per hogshead to the planter in Surinam; and here is an account sale of similar sugar sold in London, netting a return of 33_l._ to the planter in Demerara: the difference ascribable only to your differential duty. The fields of these two cla.s.ses of planters are separated only by a few ditches. Now such is the effort made by the planter in Demerara to extend his cultivation to secure the high price of 33_l._, that he is importing free labourers from the hills of Hindostan, and from the coast of Africa, at great cost, and is willing to pay higher wages than labour will command even in Europe. Let us, then, emanc.i.p.ate our slaves, which, if it had any effect, would confer the privilege of a choice of employer, and Dutch Guiana would be depopulated in a day,--an easy means of increasing the supply of labour to the planters of Demerara, at the cost of entire annihilation of the cultivation of the estates in Surinam. But abandon your differential duties, give us the same price for our produce, and thus enable us to pay the same rate of wages, and I, for one, will not object to liberate my slaves to-morrow."
Whatever amount of credence people may be disposed to place in this willingness to abandon slavery, nothing can be more clear than that the higher rate of wages paid in our colonies, attributable solely to the high and extravagant price which, by our differential duties, their produce commands, must ever form a strong and conclusive reason with these slave-holding countries against their entertaining the question of emanc.i.p.ation.
We believe most sincerely that an equalization of these duties--that an entire free trade would do more than any other act to encourage an adoption of our example everywhere: while the maintenance of monopoly and high prices _as an essential to the carrying out of the experiment of free labour successfully_--must be the strongest reason against its adoption with all those countries who have no means of commanding this accompanying confessed essential.
But now were it otherwise:--have the professors of these opinions ever considered the huge responsibility which they arrogate to themselves by such a course? Let these men remember that, by seeking to coerce the _slave-labour producer_ in distant countries, they inflict a severe punishment on the millions of hard-working, ill-fed _consumers_ among their fellow countrymen; but they seem always to overlook the fact, that there is a _consumer_ to consider as well as a _producer_;--and that this consumer is their own countryman, their own neighbour, whose condition it is their _first_ duty to consult and watch;--duty as well as charity ought to be first exercised at home. That is a very doubtful humanity which exercises itself on the uncertain result of influence indirectly produced upon governments in the other hemisphere of the globe, and neglects, nay sacrifices, the interests of the poor and helpless around our own doors,--not only by placing the necessaries of life beyond their reach, but at the same time destroying the demand for their labour by which alone they can obtain them.
If _individuals_ entertain conscientious scruples against the use of slave produce--let them, if they please, act upon them themselves, but do not let them seek to inflict _certain_ punishment, and the whole train of vice and misery consequent on starvation and want of employment, upon their poorer neighbours, for the purpose of conferring some _speculative_ advantage on the slaves of the Brazils or elsewhere: no man can be called upon as a duty to do so great a present evil, in order to accomplish some distant good, however great--or however certain.
THE FALLACY OF PROTECTION.
All laws made for the purpose of protecting the interests of individuals or cla.s.ses must mean, if they mean anything, to render the articles which such cla.s.ses deal in or produce dearer than they would otherwise be if the public was left at liberty to supply itself with such commodities in the manner which their own interests and choice would dictate. In order to make them dearer it is absolutely necessary to make them scarcer; for quant.i.ty being large or small in proportion to demand, alone can regulate the price;--protection, therefore, to any commodity simply means that the quant.i.ty supplied to the community shall be less than circ.u.mstances would naturally provide, but that for the smaller quant.i.ty supplied under the restriction of law the same sum shall be paid as the larger quant.i.ty would command without such restriction.
Time was when the Sovereigns of England relied chiefly on the granting of patents to individuals for the exclusive exercise of certain trades or occupations in particular places, as the means of rewarding the services of some, and as a provision for others of their adherents, followers, and favourites, who either held the exclusive supply in their own hands on their own terms, or who again granted to others under them that privilege, receiving from them a portion of the gains. In the course of time, however, the public began to discover that these monopolies acted upon them directly as a tax of a most odious description; that the privileged person found it needful always to keep the supply short to obtain his high price (for as soon as he admitted plenty he had no command of price)--that, in short, the sovereign, in conferring a mark of regard on a favourite, gave not that which he himself possessed, but only invested him with the power of imposing a contribution on the public.
The public once awake to the true operation of such privileges, and severely suffering under the injuries which they inflicted, perseveringly struggled against these odious monopolies, until the system was entirely abandoned, and the crown was deprived of the power of granting patents of this cla.s.s. But though the public saw clearly enough that these privileges granted by the sovereign to individuals operated thus prejudicially on the community, they did not see with equal clearness that the same power transferred to, and exercised by, Parliament, to confer similar privileges on cla.s.ses; to do for a number of men what the sovereign had before done for single men, would, to the remaining portion of the community, be just as prejudicial as the abuses against which they had struggled. That like the sovereign, the Parliament, in protecting or giving privileges to a cla.s.s, gave nothing which they possessed themselves, but granted only the power to such cla.s.ses of raising a contribution from the remaining portion of the community, by levying a higher price for their commodity than it would otherwise command. As with individuals, it was equally necessary to make scarcity to secure price, and that could only be done by restricting the sources of supply by prohibiting, or by imposing high duties on, foreign importations. Many circ.u.mstances, however, combined to render the use of this power by Parliament less obvious than it had been when exercised by the sovereign, but chiefly the fact that protection was usually granted by imposing high duties, often in their effect quite prohibitory, under the plea of providing revenue for the state. Many other more modern excuses have been urged, such as those of encouraging native industry, and countervailing peculiar burthens, in order to reconcile public opinion to the exactions arising out of the system, all of which we shall, on future occasions, carefully consider separately. But, above all, the great reason why these evils have been so long endured has been, that the public have believed that all cla.s.ses and interests, though perhaps not exactly to the same extent, have shared in protection. We propose at present to confine our consideration to the effects of protection,--first, on the community generally; and secondly, on the individual cla.s.ses protected.
As it is admitted that protection ought, if granted at all, to be given to all alike, it would follow that the whole produce of the country would be raised to an artificial price; and if this were the case, as far as regarded the exchange or transactions among members of the same community, the effect would be merely nominal, of no advantage to any one, and of little disadvantage beyond the enormous public expense needed to prevent people cheating each other by smuggling and bringing in the cheaper foreign article;--but such a community must forego all notion or idea of a foreign trade;--they must have no desires to be gratified beyond themselves, and they must have within themselves the independent means of supplying every want. For even if the law be strong enough to maintain an artificial high price at home, it has no power of making other countries pay that price; and if everything we possessed commanded a higher price at home than other countries could supply the same for, we should have nothing which we could exchange for the produce of other countries, and thus no more foreign trade could exist, than in a poor country which had no surplus produce. It is therefore essential that every country should bear in mind, in adopting a system of protection to manufactures or other produce, that they thereby effectually debar themselves from all foreign trade to neutral countries in such articles; for if they require high duties at home to protect them from the produce of other countries, which could only come at considerable expense to compete with them at home, how can they withstand that compet.i.tion when they meet on the same terms in every respect in a neutral market? How effectually has France stayed her export linen trade by raising the duties and the price of linen yarn, and by that act, intended as a blow to English trade, given the linen manufacturers of this country a greater advantage over France in the markets of the world than ever. How idle are the efforts of the Belgian government to establish depots and factories for the sale of their manufactures in St Thomas add other places, while the manufacturers in Ghent are only able to maintain their home trade, by high protective duties, against English, French, and German goods, and still cry out for greater protection!
It is, however, abundantly plain, that the state of a country above described could not long exist, when industry and intelligence were in the course of producing wealth; for if there be one law in nature more distinct than another, it is, that while the productions of every country are less or more limited to particular things, the wants of man extend to every possible variety of products over the whole world, as soon as his means can command them. As a country advances in wealth, it will have more and more surplus produce, which under wise laws would always consist of such things as it could produce with greatest facility and profit, whether from the loom or the soil. This surplus produce would be exchanged for the productions of other climates, but it must be quite clear, as soon as we arrive at this stage, that the power of the law to protect price altogether ceases. The surplus exported must sell in the markets of the world, in compet.i.tion with the same article produced under the cheapest circ.u.mstances, and that article in the home market can command only the same price.
Thus the whole attempt to protect all interests equally would immediately fail; every article produced in excess, and exported, would command only the lowest prices of open markets, and the fancied protection of the law would be void; while everything produced in deficiency, and of which we required to import a portion to make up the needful supply, would continue to be protected above the natural price of the world to any extent of import duty that the law imposed upon the quant.i.ty required to make up the deficiency.
Thus, for example, we export a large portion of the woollen, and the largest portion of the cotton goods which we manufacture, to all parts of the world, which we must sell at least as cheap as they can be bought in any other country. The same articles can only command the same price in the home market, and though the law imposed an import duty, by way of pretended protection, to any extent, upon similar foreign goods, it would not have the effect of raising the price one fraction. On the other hand, we do not produce as much wool or food as we consume, and have every year to import large quant.i.ties of each to make up the deficiency. Whatever duty, therefore, is put on the import of the quant.i.ty thus required, will enable the producers at home to maintain their price so much above the natural level of the world. By this state of things the country at large is injured in two distinct and prominent ways:--first,--those articles which we can make in excess, and export, must ever be the chief means of absorbing the increasing capital and labour of the country; and the impediment thrown in our way, of importing those things which we have in deficiency, must necessarily check our power of extending the demand for the produce of such increasing labour and capital; and, secondly,--the price of such articles as we produce in deficiency, will always be maintained much above the level of the world, to the great disadvantage of the other great cla.s.s of producers, the price of whose labour, and whose profits, will be regulated by compet.i.tion with those who have food, &c., at the lowest price.
So much as to the effect on the community at large. We will now shortly consider the effect on individual interests, which are thought to enjoy protection, and we believe we can show that there never was a condition so fraught with mischief and disappointment, with such unmitigated delusion, deception, and exposure to ruin, than is to be found in every case where protection operates. We think it can be clearly shown _that such occupations can never be more profitable; that they must usually be less profitable; and that they are always more exposed to vicissitudes than any other cla.s.s_.
They never can be more profitable, because capital and enterprise will always be attracted to any occupation which offers a larger profit than the usual rate, till it is reduced to a level with others; they will usually be less profitable, indeed always in a community of increasing numbers, because the price being maintained by restriction above the price of the world, prevents an extension of such trades in the same proportion as those who naturally belong to them, and look to them for occupation, increase in numbers: they will be exposed to greater vicissitudes, because, being confined to the supply of only one market, any accidental circ.u.mstance, which either increases the usual supply, or diminishes the usual demand, will cause an infinitely greater depression than if they were in a condition to avail themselves of the markets of the whole world, over which they could spread an accidental and unusual surplus.
Thus, previous to 1824, the silk manufacturers of this country were protected to a greater extent than any other trade, and the price of silk goods was maintained much above the rate of other countries; our silk trade was therefore necessarily confined almost exclusively to the home market and our colonies, and though they had a monopoly of those markets, it was at the cost of exclusion (on account of higher price) from all other markets.
Notwithstanding this monopoly, the silk manufacturers could never command at any time larger _profits_ than other trades; for had they done so, compet.i.tion would have increased until the rate was reduced to the common level of the country: on the contrary, the tendency was for profits and rates of wages to be smaller than in other great manufacturing branches, requiring equal capital and skill; because, with the increasing numbers who belonged to the silk trade,--the sons of manufacturers and of weavers, who naturally, in the first instance, look to the trade of their parents for their occupation,--the trade did not proportionably increase, from the fact of our being unable to extend our exports; and, lastly, it was exposed to much greater vicissitudes than other trades; for when, either from a temporary change of fashion or taste, or from a temporary stagnation of trade in this country, the accustomed demand was lessened, the silk manufacturers were unable to obtain any relief by extending their trade in the great neutral markets of the world, being excluded by price, and the whole surplus quant.i.ty remained a dead weight on this market only; whereas other branches of manufactures, practically enjoying no protection, in the case of depressed trade at home, had an opportunity of immediate relief, by spreading the surplus thereby created, at a very trifling sacrifice, over the wide markets which they supplied.
In this way the extent and duration of the vicissitudes and depressions in the silk trade were without parallel in any other; but since 1824, since this trade has been placed in a natural position by the removal of monopoly, the whole aspect of it has changed, and these peculiar evils have all disappeared.
Then again with regard to the products of land, which the law attempts to protect more highly than any other. Here again, though the price to the community is maintained much above the prices of other countries, no one person connected with raising the produce can command a higher rate of profit, or higher wages for labour, than other trades having no protection whatever; for if they did, compet.i.tion would soon reduce them to the same level; but, on the contrary, the wages, of agricultural labourers, and the profits of farmers, are always rather below than above the common rate, and simply from this fact, that the children of farm labourers, and of farmers, who first naturally look to the pursuits of their parents for a trade or occupation, increase in numbers without any corresponding extension of the means of employment, and the compet.i.tion among them is therefore always greater than in other trades which have the power of extension; and the vicissitudes to which the farmer is exposed are notoriously greater than any other trade. His rent and expenses throughout are fixed by an artificial price of produce, which price can only be maintained as long as a certain scarcity exists; but the moment the markets are plentifully supplied, either from a want of demand owing to a depression of trade, or from the result of a good harvest, he finds that plenty takes out of his hand all control of price, which quickly sinks to the natural rate.
With a free trade the farmer would never be exposed to such reverses. In that state, if the demand and price increased, it would be checked by an increase of imports from other countries; if the demand and price diminished, that would also be checked by a reduction or cessation of the usual imports, and, if necessary, by an export of any surplus which pressed upon the market;--and, if our s.p.a.ce allowed, it would not be difficult to show that, with prices at the natural rate, all parties connected with land would not only be in a safer but a much better condition.
No cautious man who well understands the subject will ever hazard his capital in any trade exposed to so many evils and to so much uncertainty as restriction and protection infallibly introduce into it:--but the great error which misleads all men in cherishing such trades is, that they mistake _high prices_ for _high profits_, which usually, instead of being synonymous terms, are quite the reverse.
AGRICULTURE.
No. II.
ON THE INDICATIONS WHICH ARE GUIDES IN JUDGING OF THE FERTILITY OR BARRENNESS OF THE SOIL.
BY THE REV. WILLIAM THORP.
(_Continued from No. 2._)
These three signs, viz., colour, consistence, and vegetation, are named by the Royal Agricultural Society as being pre-eminently indications of the value of lands; yet there are others of equal if not of greater consequence. For example:--
_A knowledge of the geology of the land_ is of the first importance; that is, not only a knowledge of the range and extent of each formation and its subdivisions, which may be called geographical geology, but also how far and to what extent the various lands do depend upon the substratum for their soil, and the local variations in the chemical or mineralogical character of the substrata themselves, and which may be called the differential geology of soils. For not only do the qualities of land vary from one formation to another, but upon the same formation there is frequently considerable difference in the quality of land depending upon chemical difference in the substratum, or upon an intermixture of foreign debris derived from other strata.
_A chemical investigation_ of the soil and subsoil will frequently afford most useful indications respecting the value of land. It may be laid down as an axiom that a soil to be fertile must contain all the chemical ingredients which a plant can only obtain from the soil, and chemistry ought to be able to inform us in unproductive soils what ingredients are wanting. It also is able to inform us if any poisonous substance exists in the soil, and how it may be neutralized; when lime, marl, and chalk are to be used, &c.[1]
The Royal Agricultural Society say that chemistry is unable to explain the productiveness of soils. But why is it unable? One reason is, that supposing everything required by the plant to be present in the soil, yet if the soil be either too wet, or too dry, too cohesive, or loose, the plant will not flourish; and chemical a.n.a.lysis does not declare this, for it affords no information respecting the mechanical division in which substances exist in the soil. Again, the chemical a.n.a.lysis of soils, to be worth anything, must be conducted with more rigid accuracy than those published by English writers. To detect one cwt. of gypsum in an acre there would be only one quarter of a grain in a pound of soil, or in 100 grains only three and a half thousandth of a grain (35/10000 or,00035 grs.), or to discover if sufficient alumina existed in a field for the production of red clover there must be ascertained if it contained (one hundred thousandth),00001 per cent. The a.n.a.lyses even by Sprengel do not afford us the quant.i.ty of nitrogen in each soil, or the capacity of the soil for this substance; while it is well known that most manures, as well as the different kinds of food, are valuable in proportion to the quant.i.ty contained by them, and it is highly probable, _ceteris paribus_, that the quant.i.ty of nitrogen found existing in soil, and the soil's capacity for containing that substance, would afford an easy indication of its immediate fertility, and also of its requiring great or small quant.i.ties of nitrogenous manures in its future cultivation.[2]