The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume XI Part 31

TO MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, } January 31st, 1782. }

Dear Sir,

I was this day favored with yours of the 13th ultimo. I need not tell you, that the intelligence it conveyed, and the spirit in which it was written, afforded me the most sensible pleasure. The idea it holds forth of an attempt upon Charleston, and the prospect of success in it, is one that we dare not indulge here, more especially as troops have sailed from New York, and as we presume to Charleston, but you have taught us rather to measure your success by your genius than by your means.

I wish it were in my power to tell you, that our accounts from Europe were proportionate to our expectations. The combined fleets, as you know, have returned and separated, without having effected anything.

The British are again masters of the ocean. Gibraltar is a rock, on which all the exertions of Spain seem to split, and the siege of fort St Philip seems to be carried on in the most energetic manner. We have no prospect of forming an alliance, either with Spain or Holland, who both appear to sigh for peace. Our loan on the guarantee of France with the last, is nearly completed. But what is not a little unsatisfactory, it is also nearly expended by advances, which France has made us on the credit of it. From Spain we are likely to get nothing.

The negotiations for a peace are entirely, at a stand; the mediating powers have no interest in wishing it, and the belligerent nations are neither of them sufficiently weakened to request their interposition.

The Count de Vergennes a.s.sures us, that Britain will still make the most vigorous exertions. I mention these circ.u.mstances not only for your information, but that you may make the proper use of them in animating the exertions of the Southern States. It is the misfortune of America to presume too much upon each dawning of success, and to believe that peace must tread upon the heels of every little advantage, instead of being taught by her own struggles and difficulties, that every nation has resources, that surpa.s.s the expectations of its enemies.

Would to G.o.d that you could be enabled, by the animated efforts of the Southern States, to expel the enemy from them without the aid of our allies. This would re-establish our character for activity in Europe, where I am sorry to say, it has for some time past been upon the decline, and I do sincerely believe, that co-operating with the brilliant successes of the last fall, it would incline the enemy to peace, without which I have no expectations of it. But I fear this is rather to be wished for than expected.

Domestic news we have none, but what Colonel Ternant will give, or you may collect from the enclosed papers.

If anything turns up worth your notice, you shall hear from me. I flatter myself that you will think with me, that our distance is too great to wait for the ceremony of answer and reply, and favor me with a line as occasion offers.

I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.

Philadelphia, February 18th, 1782.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency several resolutions of Congress, which having a reference to the Department of Foreign Affairs, are in course to go through this office. The necessity of carrying them into effect is too obvious to need observations.

While we hold an intercourse with civilised nations, we must conform to laws, which humanity has established, and which custom has consecrated among them. On this the rights, which the United States or their citizens may claim in foreign countries must be founded.

One of the resolutions pa.s.sed Congress in consequence of a convention about to be concluded between his Most Christian Majesty and the United States of America, which affords an additional reason for paying it the earliest attention. Your Excellency and the Legislature will see the propriety of rendering the laws on these subjects as simple, and the execution of them as expeditious, as possible, since foreigners, who are the great object of them, are easily disgusted at complex systems, which they find a difficulty in understanding, and the honor and peace of a nation are frequently as much wounded by a delay as by a denial of justice.

Another resolution relates to your boundaries, and is designed as one means of ascertaining the territorial rights of the United States collectively, which can only be accurately known by each State's exhibiting its claims, and the evidence on which they found them. Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to direct, authentic copies from your records of all grants, charters, maps, treaties with the natives, and other evidences, to be transmitted to this office, as soon as you can conveniently collect them. I could wish, that the copies might be proved, by having the great seal of your State annexed.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

TO GOVERNOR RUTLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, } February 19th, 1782. }

Dear Sir,

I wish to avail myself of the opportunity Colonel Ternant affords me, to convey the agreeable intelligence contained in the enclosed letter from Mr Harrison, our agent at Cadiz. Many other objects present themselves, on which I would write could I do it without detaining Colonel Ternant, who only waits for this.

I propose to have the honor of writing more at large by the next safe conveyance. In the meanwhile, I should consider it as a favor, which might be rendered useful to the public, as well as agreeable to me, if your Excellency would open a correspondence with this office, in which an exact state of affairs in the government, over which you preside ought to be detailed, which could not fail to have some influence in the direction of our foreign affairs.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.

Philadelphia, February 19th, 1782.

Sir,

Where a Government is composed of independent States, united not by the power of a sovereign but by their common interest, the Executive Departments form a centre of communication between each State and their Chief Council, and are so far links of the chain, which should bind them together, as they render to each similar views of great national objects, and introduce uniformity in their measures for the establishment of general interests. A mistaken idea of our own importance to other nations, of their attachment to us, and of the weakness of our common enemy, having lulled us into a very imprudent security, I beg leave to state to your Excellency the information last received from Europe. Our success in this important war, under the favor of Heaven, must be built upon the weakness of our enemy, the strength and perseverance of her foes in Europe, and our own exertions.

It is an undeniable fact, that Britain has not, in the course of the last campaign, gained any advantage of her enemies, but, on the contrary, has seen their fleets ride triumphant in the seas, she proudly called her own, and an army, in which she placed her fondest hopes, made captive. But, on the other hand, we are compelled to admit, that she has met with no such reverse of fortune as materially to debilitate her, or weaken her resources for another campaign. Her trade has, for the most part, returned in safety. Her fleets have blocked up those of the Dutch, and, upon the separation of the combined fleets, recovered the superiority in the European seas. The army taken in America is only so far decidedly ruinous to her affairs here, as we know how to avail ourselves of the advantage it affords.

That her pride is not humbled, that she did not wish for peace prior to this advantage, is obvious, 1st. From her refusing to make a separate treaty with the Dutch, who, under the mediation of the Empress of Russia, seemed anxiously to wish it; 2dly. From her neglect to notice the last proposals of the mediating powers, which yet remain unanswered; so that if any alteration is made in their sentiments oh this subject, they must originate in their ill success in America, for in every other quarter their defensive war seems to have been supported with advantage. How far this will operate admits of a doubt, which prudence directs us not to rely upon. Money, the great support of modern wars, has been raised with more facility in England, than in any country in the world; and we find the minority last year censuring Lord North for giving the advantage of lending to his friends. Their losses may indeed render subscriptions more expensive to the public; but there is no well grounded room to suppose they will not fill up; and still less reason to believe, if the means for carrying on the war are attainable, that the vindictive spirit of the King and his ministry, and the overweening pride of the nation, will soon yield to make a peace, which involves their disgrace and humiliation. But as strength or weakness are mere comparative terms, we can form no judgment of the measures of Britain but by attending to the force and disposition of her enemies.

The United Provinces were evidently dragged into the war, and have prosecuted it as if they momentarily expected a peace. The Colonies in the West Indies have been taken, without being in a state to make the smallest resistance, and the active interposition of France alone saved those in the East from sharing the same fate. Our last letters from Holland place the distress of their commerce in a strong point of view. They are unhappily rent by parties, which clog the wheels of government; though it is said the party opposed to England are the most numerous and growing in strength, so that at some future day we may reasonably hope they will a.s.sume the entire ascendency; yet we can build very little on this, till the close of another year. This much is certain, they are not yet allied to us, nor have they given us reason to believe, that they intend to be so. They wish for peace, and will take no measures that can obstruct it. They have lent us no money, nor are they likely to do it; from whence we may presume, either that they doubt our success, or do not much interest themselves in it.

Our expectations from Spain are scarcely more flattering. Some little aids of money have been received after long solicitation, hardly so much as paid the expense of soliciting. We have reason to suppose that no more will be granted. They are still cold with regard to our alliance; nothing but brilliant success can bring it to a conclusion.

Nor have we the smallest reason to expect any pecuniary aid from her, even if she should confederate with us in time to be of use for the next campaign. She has at this moment very many and very expensive operations on hand; and, till she has allied herself to us, we have no certainty that she will choose to continue the war for the attainment of our independence, if Britain should be sufficiently humbled to sacrifice to her the objects which led her into the war.

To France, then, we turn, as the only enemy of Great Britain, who is at the same time our ally, who will persevere in the war for the attainment of our independence. She has already done so much for us, in order to afford us the means of doing something for ourselves, that she may reasonably hope to find the effects of her benevolence. Her fleets have protected our coasts, her armies have fought our battles; she has made various efforts to restore our finances, by paying the interest of our loans, by obtaining credit in Europe on our account for clothing, arms, and necessaries; by advancing money, and by opening and guaranteeing a loan for us, to a considerable amount in Holland, when, by the abolition of paper, our finances were totally deranged. These sums are nearly expended, and another campaign is about to be opened. France a.s.sures, that it is not in her power to make us any further grants of money, her ministers repeat this to us in every letter, in a tone that persuades us of their determination on that point.

What then is to be done? Are we to relinquish the hopes, which the present debility of the enemy affords us of expelling them by one decided effort, and compensating all our losses by the enjoyment of an active commerce? Are we to return to the wretched, oppressive system we have quitted? Are we to carry on a weak defensive war with an unpaid army, whose precarious subsistence must depend upon what can be torn by violence from the industrious husbandman? Shall we vainly, and I think disgracefully, supplicate all the powers of Europe for those means, which we have in our own hands, if we dare call them forth, and which, after all, must be called forth if we continue the war, (and upon that subject there can be no doubt, till the end for which we took up arms is attained.) The only question is, whether each State shall fairly and regularly contribute its quota, or whether that which happens to be the seat of war shall (as has too often been the case) bear the whole burden, and suffer more from the necessities of our own troops, than the ravages of the enemy. Whether we shall drive the enemy from their posts with a strong body of regular troops, or whether we shall permit them to extend their devastations, while, with our battalions and fluctuating corps of militia, we protract a weak defensive war, till our allies are discouraged, and some unfavorable change takes place in the system of Europe.

Your Excellency, I am persuaded, will pardon the freedom with which I write. You see the necessity which dictates my letter, and were it in my power to communicate all that our friends in Europe think of our inactivity, I am persuaded you would urge your State to exertion in much stronger terms than I dare venture to use.

When Congress call upon a State for supplies, they are usually answered by pleas of disability, urged, too, by the State with good faith, and a firm persuasion that they speak their real situation, a recurrence to facts, that have pa.s.sed under their own observation, will convince them that they are deceived.

From the time that the depreciation of the Continental bills of credit began, till they were no longer current, the States that received them paid a tax equal to all the expenditures of the army, and a very considerable one beyond it; for if we suppose ten millions of dollars, in specie, a year, to be necessary for their support, then the expense, till the close of the campaign of 1779, must have amounted to upwards of fifty millions, exclusive of the supplies from Europe; and yet, in March, 1780, the whole national debt contracted in America did not, in fact, amount to five millions; so that forty five millions were paid by the United States in those five years of the war, when they had the least commerce and agriculture, and when they were most distressed by the enemy; and this tax, too, was the most unjust and partial that can be conceived, unless we except that, by which we have since raised much more from the people, without giving so much to the public; I mean the laws for impressing, &c., which placed the greatest burden of the war upon the shoulders of a particular order of men in particular States only.

Now surely, if by partial and unjust measures, for which necessity alone can plead, we have been able to draw from every State, a tax more than equal to the present demand, no State can say, that it cannot afford its proportion of a more equitable tax. Those who have hitherto borne the weight of the war, must warmly espouse a measure, which is so greatly calculated for their relief. Those who have hitherto been eased from the burden, must be more able to take it up at this time, when they have the most promising expectation of relinquishing it soon.

It is certain, that if we put ourselves in a state to take advantage of circ.u.mstances early in the ensuing spring, we have the best grounded reason to hope, that a few months will remove the war from our doors. Whereas if we delay to enable Congress to say to their allies, "we are ready for an effectual co-operation with any force you may send," they will turn their attention to other objects, and leave us to lament in vain the opportunities we have lost. Every motive then, national honor, national interest, public economy, private ease, and that love of freedom, which pervades every Legislature on the Continent, call loudly not only for a compliance with the requisitions of Congress, but for so early a compliance as to render it effectual.

It is true we are at present in such a situation as to have no apprehensions for the final establishment of our independence; but surely it is a matter of some moment to us, whether we shall obtain it, or at least be freed from the ravages of the enemy and the burden of the war in the course of six months at the expense of eight millions of dollars, or whether we shall wait for it till a general and perhaps a distant peace, and be subject in the meanwhile to infinitely more expense, and all the distress that attends a country which is the seat of war.

But, Sir, it is time to dismiss a subject, which wants no arguments to ill.u.s.trate it. I am confident that you will use every means to convince the State over which you preside, of the danger which will result from relying more upon the weakness of the enemy than their own strength, more upon the aid of their allies than their own exertions, more upon unjust, partial, hazardous, and expensive expedients, than upon an equal and regular support of the measures, which Congress, upon the most mature deliberation have recommended to their attention.

I have the honor to be, &c.