The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 Part 48

Further than this it refused to go; and Mr. Asquith in his speech of October 2, 1914, at Cardiff thus explained the reason:

They [the Germans] wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mark you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea. They asked us (to put it quite plainly) for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate, the European World. To such a demand, but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave[537].

[Footnote 537: See _Times_ of October 3, 1914, and July 20, 1915 (with quotations from the _North German Gazette_). Bethmann-Hollweg declared to the Reichstag, on August 19, 1915, that Asquith's statement was false; but in a letter published on August 26, and an official statement of September 1, 1915, Sir E. Grey convincingly refuted him.]

Thus, efforts for a good understanding with Germany broke down owing to the exacting demands of German diplomacy for our neutrality in all circ.u.mstances (including, of course, a German invasion of Belgium).

Thereupon she proceeded with a new Navy Act (the fifth in fourteen years) for a large increase in construction[538].

[Footnote 538: Castle and Hurd, _German Naval Power_, pp. 142-152.]

Perhaps Germany would have been more conciliatory if she had foreseen the events of the following autumn. As has already appeared, Italy's attack upon the Turks (coinciding with difficulties which their rigour raised up) furnished the opportunity--for which the Balkan States had been longing--to shake off the Turkish yoke. On March 13, 1912, Servia and Bulgaria framed a secret treaty of alliance against Turkey, which contained conditions as to joint action against Austria or Roumania, if they attacked, and a general understanding as to the part.i.tion of Macedonia. Greece came into the agreement later[539]. No time was fixed for action against Turkey; but in view of her obstinacy and intolerance action was inevitable. She precipitated matters by ma.s.sacring Christians in and on the borders of Macedonia. Thereupon the three States and Montenegro demanded the enforcement of the reforms and toleration guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin (see p. 242). The Turks having as usual temporised (though they were still at war with Italy[540]), the four States demanded complete autonomy and the reconstruction of frontiers according to racial needs. Both sides rejected the joint offers of Austria and Russia for friendly intervention; whereupon Turkey declared war upon Bulgaria and Servia (October 17). On the morrow Greece declared war upon her. Montenegro had already opened hostilities. In view of these facts, the later a.s.sertions of the German Powers, that the Balkan League was a Russian plot for overthrowing Turkey and weakening Teutonic influence, is palpably false. Turkey had treated her Christian subjects (including the once faithful Albanians) worse than ever. Their union against Turkey had long been foretold. It was helped on by Ottoman misrule, and finally cemented by ma.s.sacre. Further, Russia and Austria acted together in seeking to avert an attack on Turkey; and the Powers collectively warned the Balkan States that no changes of boundary would be tolerated. Those States refused to accept the European fiat; for the present misrule was intolerable, and the inability of the Turks to cope with either the Italians or the Albanian rebels opened a vista of hope. The German accusations levelled at Russia were obviously part of the general scheme adopted at Berlin and Vienna for exasperating public opinion against the Slav cause.

[Footnote 539: The claim that the Greek statesman, Venizelos, founded the league seems incorrect. So, too, is the rumour that Russia, through her minister, Hartvig, at Belgrade, framed it (but see N. Jorga, _Hist.

des etats balcaniques_, p. 436). Miliukoff, in a "Report to the Carnegie Foundation," denies this. The plan occurred to many men so soon as Turkish Reform proved a sham. Venizelos is said to have mooted it to Mr.

James Bourchier in May 1911. (R. Rankin, _Inner History of the Balkan War_, p. 13.)]

[Footnote 540: Italy made peace on October 15, gaining possession of Tripoli and agreeing to evacuate the Aegean Isles, but on various pretexts kept her troops there. A little later she renewed the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria for five years. This may have resulted from the Balkan crisis then beginning, and from the visits of the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, to Paris and London, whereupon it was officially stated that Russia adhered both to her treaty with France and her Entente with England. He added that the grouping of the great States was necessary in the interests of the Balance of Power.]

The Balkan States, though waging war with no combined aim, speedily overthrew the Turks in the most dramatic and decisive conflict of our age. The Greeks entered Salonica on November 8 (a Bulgarian force a few days later); on November 18 the Servians occupied Monastir, and the Albanian seaport, Durazzo, at the end of the month. The Bulgar army meanwhile drove the Turks southwards in headlong rout until in the third week of November the fortified Tchataldja Lines opposed an invincible obstacle. There, on December 3, all the belligerents, except Greece, concluded an armistice, and negotiations for peace were begun at London on December 16. Up to January 22, 1913, Turkey seemed inclined towards peace; but on the morrow a revolution took place at Constantinople, the Ministry of Kiamil Pacha being ousted by the warlike faction of Enver Bey. He, one of the contrivers of the revolution of July 1908, had since been attached to the Turkish Emba.s.sy at Berlin; and his successful coup was a triumph of German influence. The Peace Conference at London broke up on February 1. In March the Greeks and Bulgars captured Janina and Adrianople respectively, while Scutari fell to the Montenegrins (April 22). The Powers (Russia included) demanded the evacuation of this town by Montenegro; for they had decided to const.i.tute Albania (the most turbulent part of the Peninsula) an independent State, including Scutari.

In Albania, as elsewhere, the feuds of rival races had drenched the Balkan lands with blood; Greek and Bulgar forces had fought near Salonica, and there seemed slight chance of a peaceful settlement in Central Macedonia. That chance disappeared when the Powers in the resumed Peace Conference at London persisted in ruling the Serbs and Montenegrins out of Albania, a decision obviously dictated by the longings of Austria and Italy to gain that land at a convenient opportunity. This blow to Servia's aspirations aroused pa.s.sionate resentment both there and in Russia. Finally the Serbs gave way, and claimed a far larger part of Macedonia than had been mapped out in their agreement with Bulgaria prior to the war. Hence arose strifes between their forces, in which the Greeks also sided against the Bulgars.

Meanwhile, the London Conference of the Powers and the Balkan States framed terms of peace, which were largely due to the influence of Sir Edward Grey[541].

[Footnote 541: See _Times_ of May 30, 1913; Rankin, _op. cit._ p. 517.]

They may be disregarded here; for they were soon disregarded by all the Balkan States. Seeking to steal a march upon their rivals, the Bulgar forces (it is said on the instigation of their King and his unofficial advisers) made a sudden and treacherous attack. Now, the dour, pushing Bulgars are the most unpopular race in the Peninsula. Therefore not only Serbs and Greeks, but also Roumanians and Turks turned savagely upon them[542]. Overwhelmed on all sides, Bulgaria sued for peace; and again the Great Powers had to revise terms that they had declared to be final.

Ultimately, on August 10, 1913, the Peace of Bukharest was signed. It imposed the present boundaries of the Balkan States, and left them furious but helpless to resist a policy known to have been dictated largely from Vienna and Berlin. In May 1914 a warm friend of the Balkan peoples thus described its effects: "No permanent solution of the Balkan Question has been arrived at. The ethnographical questions have been ignored. A portion of each race has been handed over to be ruled by another which it detests. Servia has acquired a population which is mostly Bulgar and Albanian, though of the latter she has ma.s.sacred and expelled many thousands. Bulgars have been captured by Greeks, Greeks by Bulgars, Albanians by Greeks, and not one of these races has as yet shown signs of being capable to rule another justly. The seeds have been sown of hatreds that will grow and bear fruit[543]." Especially lamentable were the recovery of the Adrianople district by the Turks and the unprovoked seizure of the purely Bulgar district south of Silistria by Roumania. On the other hand, Kaiser William thus congratulated her king, Charles (a Hohenzollern), on the peace, a "splendid result, for which not only your own people but all the belligerent States and the whole of Europe have to thank your wise and truly statesmanlike policy.

At the same time your mentioning that I have been able to contribute to what has been achieved is a great satisfaction to me. I rejoice at our mutual co-operation in the cause of peace."

[Footnote 542: Roumania's sudden intervention annoyed Austria, who had hoped for a longer and more exhausting war in the Balkans.]

[Footnote 543: Edith Durham, _The Struggle for Scutari_, p. 315.]

This telegram, following the trend of Austro-German policy, sought to win back Roumania to the Central Powers, from which she had of late sheered off. In other respects the Peace of Bukharest was a notable triumph for Austria and Germany. Not only had they rendered impossible a speedy revival of the Balkan League which had barred their expansion towards the Levant, but they bolstered up the Ottoman Power when its extrusion from Europe seemed imminent. They also exhausted Servia, reduced Bulgaria to ruin, and imposed on Albania a German prince, William of Wied, an officer in the Prussian army, who was destined to view his princ.i.p.ality from the quarter-deck of his yacht. Such was the Treaty of Bukharest. Besides dealing a severe blow to the Slav cause, it perpetuated the recent infamous spoliations and challenged every one concerned to further conflicts. Within a year the whole of the Continent was in flames.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE CRISIS OF 1914

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether this country would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history and thus become partic.i.p.ators in the sin."--GLADSTONE:

Speech of August 1870.

The Prussian and German Army Bills of 1860 and onwards have tended to make military preparedness a weighty factor in the recent development of nations; and the issue of events has too often been determined, not by the justice of a cause, but rather by the armed strength at the back of it. We must therefore glance at the military and naval preparations which enabled the Central Powers to win their perilous triumph over Russia and the Slavs of the Balkans. In April 1912 the German Chancellor introduced to the Reichstag Army and Navy Bills (pa.s.sed on May 21) providing for great increases in the navy, also forces amounting to two new army corps, and that, too, though Germany's financial position was admitted to be "very serious," and the proposed measures merely precautionary. Nevertheless, only Socialists, Poles, and Alsatians voted against them. But the events of the first Balkan War were cited as menacing Germany with a conflict in which she "might have to protect, against several enemies, frontiers which are extended and by nature to a large extent open." A new Army Bill was therefore introduced in March 1913 (pa.s.sed in June), which increased the total of the forces by 145,000, and raised their peace strength in 1914 to more than 870,000 men. The Chancellor referred gratefully to "the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation" of Sir Edward Grey during the Conference at London, and admitted that a collision between Germans and Slavs was not inevitable; but Germany must take precautions, this, too, at a time when Russia and Austria agreed to place their forces again on a peace footing. Germany, far from relaxing her efforts after the sharp rebuff to the Slavonic cause in the summer of 1913, continued her military policy. It caused grave apprehension, especially as the new drastic taxes (estimated to produce 50,000,000) were loudly declared a burden that could not long be borne. As to the naval proposals, the Chancellor commended Mr. Churchill's suggestion (on March 26) of a "naval holiday,"

but said there were many difficulties in the way.

The British Naval Budget of 1912 had provided for a six years' programme of 25 _Dreadnoughts_ against Germany's 14; and for every extra German ship two British would be added. In March 1913 this was continued, with the offer of a "holiday" for 1914 if Germany would soon accept. No acceptance came. The peace strength of the British Regular Army was reckoned early in 1914 at 156,000 men, with about 250,000 effective Territorials.

The increases in the German army induced the French Chambers, in July 1913, to recur to three years' military service, that of two years being considered inadequate in face of the new menace from beyond the Rhine[544]. Jaures and the Socialists, who advocated a national militia on the Swiss system, were beaten by 496 votes to 77, whereupon some of them resorted to obstructive tactics, and the measure was carried with some difficulty on July 8. The General Confederation of Labour and the Anarchist Congress both announced their resolve to keep up the agitation in the army against the three years' service. Mutinous symptoms had already appeared. The military equipment of the French army was officially admitted to be in an unsatisfactory state during the debate of July 13, 1914, when it appeared that France was far from ready for a campaign. The peace strength of the army was then reckoned at 645,000 men.

[Footnote 544: The _Temps_ of March 30, 1913, estimated that Germany would soon have 500,000 men in her first line, as against 175,000 French, unless France recurred to three years' service. See M. Sembat, _Faites un Roi, si non faites la Paix._]

In Russia in 1912 the chief efforts were concentrated on the navy. As regards the army, it was proposed in the Budget of July 1913 to retain 300,000 men on active service for six months longer than before, thus strengthening the forces, especially during the winter months. Apart from this measure (a reply to that of Germany) no important development took place in 1912-14. The peace strength of the Russian army for Europe in 1914 exceeded 1,200,000[545]. That of Austria-Hungary exceeded 460,000 men, that of Italy 300,000 men. Consequently the Triple Entente had on foot just over 2,000,000 men as against 1,590,000 for the Triple Alliance; but the latter group formed a solid well-prepared block, while the Triple Entente were separate units; and the Russian and British forces could not be speedily marshalled at the necessary points on the Continent. Moreover, all great wars, especially from the time of Frederick the Great, have shown the advantage of the central position, if vigorously and skilfully used.

[Footnote 545: G. Alexinsky, _La Russie et la guerre_, pp. 83-88.]

In these considerations lies the key to the European situation in the summer of 1914. The simmering of fiscal discontent and unsated military pride in Germany caused general alarm, especially when the memories of the Wars of Liberation of 1813-14 were systematically used to excite bellicose ardour against France. Against England it needed no official stimulus, for professors and teachers had long taught that "England was the foe." In particular preparations had been made in South-West Africa for stirring up a revolt of the Boers as a preliminary to the expulsion of the British from South Africa. Relations had been established with De Wet and Maritz. In 1913 the latter sent an agent to the German colony asking what aid the Kaiser would give and how far he would guarantee the independence of South Africa. The reply came: "I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately[546]." The reason for the delay is not known. Probably on further inquiry it was found that the situation was not ready either in Europe or in South Africa. But as to German preparations for a war with England both in South-West Africa and Egypt there can be no doubt. India and probably Ireland also were not neglected.

[Footnote 546: General Botha's speech at Cape Town, July 25, 1915.]

In fact a considerable part of the German people looked forward to a war with Great Britain as equally inevitable and desirable. She was rich and pleasure-loving; her Government was apt to wait till public opinion had been decisively p.r.o.nounced; her sons, too selfish to defend her, paid "mercenaries" to do it. Her scattered possessions would therefore fall an easy prey to a well-organised, warlike, and thoroughly patriotic nation. Let the world belong to the ablest race, the Germanic. Such had been the teachings of Treitschke and his disciples long before the Boer War or the Anglo-French Entente. Those events and the Morocco Question in 1905 and 1911 sharpened the rivalry; but it is a superficial reading of events to suppose that Morocco caused the rivalry, which clearly originated in the resolve of the Germans to possess a World-Empire. So soon as their influential cla.s.ses distinctly framed that resolve a conflict was inevitable with Great Britain, which blocked their way to the Ocean and possessed in every sea valuable colonies which she seemed little able to defend. The Morocco affair annoyed them because, firstly, they wanted that strategic position, and secondly, they desired to sunder the Anglo-French Entente. But Morocco was settled in 1911, and still the friction continued unabated. There remained the Eastern Question, a far more serious affair; for on it hung the hopes of Germany in the Orient and of Austria in the Balkans.

The difficulty for Germany was, how to equate her world-wide ambitions with the restricted and diverse aims of Austria and Italy. The interests of the two Central Empires harmonised only respecting the Eastern Question. _Weltpolitik_ in general and Morocco in particular did not in the least concern Austria. Further, the designs of Vienna and Rome on Albania clashed hopelessly. An effort was made in the Triple Alliance, as renewed in 1912, to safeguard Italian interests by insisting that, if Austria gained ground in the Balkans, Italy should have "compensation."

The effort to lure the Government of Rome into Balkan adventures prompted the Austrian offer of August 9, 1913, for joint action against Servia. Italy refused, alleging that, as Servia was not guilty of aggression, the Austro-Italian Alliance did not hold good for such a venture. Germany also refused the Austrian offer--why is not clear.

Austria was annoyed with the gains of Servia in the Peace of Bukharest, for which Kaiser William was largely responsible. Probably, then, they differed as to some of the details of the Balkan settlement. But it is far more probable that Germany checked the Austrians because she was not yet fully ready for vigorous action. The doctrine of complete preparedness was edifyingly set forth by a well-informed writer, Rohrbach, who, in 1912, urged his countrymen to be patient. In 1911 they had been wrong to worry France and England about Morocco, where German interests were not vital. Until the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways had neared their goals, Turkish co-operation in an attack on Egypt would be weak. Besides, adds Rohrbach, the Kiel-North Sea Ca.n.a.l was not ready, and Heligoland and other coast defences were not sufficiently advanced for Germany confidently to face a war with England. Thanks to the Kaiser, the fleet would soon be in a splendid condition, and then Germany could launch out boldly in the world. The same course was urged by Count Reventlow early in 1914. Germany must continue to arm, though fully conscious that she was "constructing for her foreign politics and diplomacy, a Calvary which _nolens volens_ she would have to climb[547]."

[Footnote 547: Rohrbach, _Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt_ (1912), p.

216 (more than 10,000 copies of this work were sold in a year); Reventlow, _Deutschlands auswartige Politik,_ p. 251.]

Other evidence, especially from Bernhardi, Frobenius, and the works of the Pan-German and Navy Leagues, might be quoted in proof of Germany's design to begin war when she was fully prepared. Now, the immense sums voted in the War Budget of 1913 had not as yet provided the stores of artillery and ammunition that were to astonish the world. Nor had Turkey recovered from the wounds of 1912. Nor was the enlarged Kiel-North Sea Ca.n.a.l ready. Its opening at Midsummer 1914 created a naval situation far more favourable to Germany. A year earlier a French naval officer had prophesied that she would await the opening of the ca.n.a.l before declaring war[548].

[Footnote 548: _Revue des questions diplomatiques_ (1913), pp. 417-18.]

At Midsummer 1914 the general position was as follows. Germany had reached the pitch of perfection in armaments, and the Kiel Ca.n.a.l was open. France was unready, though the three years' service promised to improve her army. The Russian forces were slowly improving in number and cohesion. Belgium also, alarmed by the German menace both in Europe and on the Congo, had in 1912-13 greatly extended the principle of compulsory service, so that in 1914 she would have more than 200,000 men available, and by 1926 as many as 340,000. In naval strength it was unlikely that Germany would catch up Great Britain. But the submarine promised to make even the most powerful ironclads of doubtful value.

Consequently, Germany and her friends (except perhaps Turkey) could never hope to have a longer lead over the Entente Powers than in 1914, at least as regards efficiency and preparedness. Therefore in the eyes of the military party at Berlin the problem resembled that of 1756, which Frederick the Great thus stated: "The war was equally certain and inevitable. It only remained to calculate whether there was more advantage in deferring it a few months or beginning at once." We know what followed in 1756--the invasion of neutral Saxony, because she had not completed her armaments[549]. For William II. in 1914 the case of Belgium was very similar. She afforded him the shortest way of striking at his enemy and the richest land for feeding the German forces. That Prussia had guaranteed Belgian neutrality counted as naught; that in 1912 Lord Haldane had warned him of the hostility of England if he invaded Belgium was scarcely more important. William, like his ancestor, acted solely on military considerations. He despised England: for was she not distracted by fierce party feuds, by Labour troubles, by wild women, and by what seemed to be the beginnings of civil war in Ireland?

All the able rulers of the House of Hohenzollern have discerned when to strike and to strike hard. In July 1914 William II.'s action was typically Hohenzollern; and by this time his engaging personality and fiery speeches, aided by professorial and Press propaganda, had thoroughly Prussianised Germany. In regard to _moral_ as well as _materiel_, "the day" had come by Midsummer 1914.

[Footnote 549: Frederic, _Hist. de la guerre de sept Ans_, i. p. 37.]

Moreover, her generally pa.s.sive partner, Austria, was then excited to frenzy by the murder of the heir to the throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The criminals were Austrian Serbs; but no proof was then or has since been forthcoming as to the complicity of the Servian Government. Nevertheless, in the state of acute tension long existing between Servia and Austria-Hungary, the affair seemed the climax of a series of efforts at wrecking the Dual Monarchy and setting up a Serbo-Croatian Kingdom. Therefore German and Magyar sentiment caught flame, and war with Servia was loudly demanded. Dr. Dillon, while minimising the question of the murder, prophesied that the quarrel would develop into a gigantic struggle between Teuton and Slav[550]. In this connection we must remember that the Central Empires had twice dictated to the rest of Europe: first, in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9; secondly, in the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Bukharest (August 1913).

On other occasions Kaiser William had bent the will of Tsar Nicholas II., notably in the Potsdam interview of November 1910. It is therefore possible that Berlin reckoned once more on the complaisance of Russia; and in that event Austria would have dragooned Servia and refashioned the Balkan lands at her will, Germany meanwhile "keeping the ring." This explanation of the crisis is, however, open to the objection that the questions at issue more vitally affected Russia than did those of 1908-10, and she had nearly recovered normal strength. Unless the politicians of Berlin and Vienna were blind, they must have foreseen that Russia would aid Servia in resisting the outrageous demands sent from Vienna to Belgrade on July 23. Those demands were incompatible with Servia's independence; and though she, within the stipulated forty-eight hours, acquiesced in all save two of them, the Austrian Government declared war (July 28). In so doing it relied on the a.s.surances of the German Amba.s.sador, von Tchirsky, that Russia would not fight. But by way of retort to the Austrian order for complete mobilisation (July 31, 1 A.M.), Russia quite early on that same day ordered a similar measure[551].

[Footnote 550: _Daily Telegraph_, July 25, 1914.]

[Footnote 551: _J'accuse_, pp. 134-5 (German edition). The partial mobilisations of Austria and Russia earlier were intended to threaten and protect Servia. The time of Austria's order for complete mobilisation is shown in French Yellow Book, No. 115. That of Russia in Austrian "Rotbuch," No. 52, and Russian Orange Book, No. 77.]

The procedure of Austria and Germany now claims our attention. The policy of Count Berchtold, Austria's Foreign Minister, had generally been pacific. On July 28 he yielded to popular clamour for war against Servia, but only, it appears, because of his belief that "Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his a.s.surance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandis.e.m.e.nt." On July 30 and 31 he consented to continue friendly discussions with Russia. Even on August 1 the Austrian Amba.s.sador at Petrograd expressed to the Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, the hope that things had not gone too far[552]. There was then still a hope that Sir Edward Grey's offer of friendly mediation might be accepted by Germany, Austria, and Russia. But on August 1 Germany declared war on Russia.

[Footnote 552: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 50-56; British White Papers, Miscellaneous (1914), No. 6 (No. 137), and No. 10, p. 3; French Yellow Book, No. 120.]

It is well to remember that by her action in August 1913 she held back Austria from a warlike policy. In July 1914 some of Germany's officials knew of the tenor of the Austrian demands on the Court of Belgrade; and her Amba.s.sador at Vienna stated on July 26 that Germany knew what she was doing in backing up Austria. Kaiser William, who had been on a yachting cruise, hurriedly returned to Berlin on the night of July 26-27. He must have approved of Austria's declaration of war against Servia on July 28, for on that day his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, finally rejected Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a Peace Conference to settle that dispute. The Chancellor then also expressed to our Amba.s.sador, Sir Edward Goschen, the belief that Russia had no right to intervene in the Austro-Serb affair. The Austrian Amba.s.sador at Berlin also opined that "Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war." This belief was widely expressed in diplomatic circles at Berlin.

Military men probably viewed matters from that standpoint; and in all probability there was a struggle between the civilians and the soldiers, which seems to have ended in a victory for the latter in an important Council meeting held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29. Immediately afterwards the Chancellor summoned Sir Edward Goschen and made to him the "infamous proposals" for the neutrality of Great Britain in case of a European War, provided that Germany (1) would engage to take no territory from the mainland of France (he would make no promise respecting the French colonies); (2) would respect the neutrality of Holland; (3) would restore the independence of Belgium in case the French menace compelled her to invade that country.