The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 Part 35

NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

For new light on the nationalist movement in Egypt and the part which Arabi played in it, the reader should consult _How we defended Arabi_, by A.M. Broadley (London, 1884). The same writer in his _Tunis, Past and Present_ (2 vols. 1882) has thrown much light on the Tunis Question and on the Pan-Islamic movement in North Africa.

CHAPTER XVI

GORDON AND THE SUDAN

What were my ideas in coming out? They were these: _Agreed abandonment of Sudan, but extricate the garrisons_; and these were the instructions of the Government (Gordon's _Journal_, October 8, 1885).

It is one of the peculiarities of the Moslem faith that any time of revival is apt to be accompanied by warlike fervour somewhat like that which enabled its early votaries to sweep over half of the known world in a single generation. This militant creed becomes dangerous when it personifies itself in a holy man who can make good his claim to be received as a successor of the Prophet. Such a man had recently appeared in the Sudan. It is doubtful whether Mohammed Ahmed was a genuine believer in his own extravagant claims, or whether he adopted them in order to wreak revenge on Rauf Pasha, the Egyptian Governor of the Sudan, for an insult inflicted by one of his underlings. In May 1881, while living near the island of Abba in the Nile, he put forward his claim to be the Messiah or Prophet, foretold by the founder of that creed. Retiring with some disciples to that island, he gained fame by his fervour and asceticism. His followers named him "El Mahdi," the leader, but his claims were scouted by the Ulemas of Khartum, Cairo, and Constantinople, on the ground that the Messiah of the Moslems was to arise in the East. Nevertheless, while the British were crushing Arabi's movement, the Mahdi stirred the Sudan to its depths, and speedily shook the Egyptian rule to its base[377].

[Footnote 377: See the Report of the Intelligence Department of the War Office, printed in _The Journals of Major-General C.G. Gordon at Khartum_, Appendix to Bk. iv.]

There was every reason to fear a speedy collapse. In the years 1874-76 the Province of the White Nile had known the benefits of just and tactful rule under that born leader of men, Colonel Gordon; and in the three following years, as Governor-General of the Sudan, he gained greater powers, which he felt to be needful for the suppression of the slave-trade and other evils. Ill-health and underhand opposition of various kinds caused him to resign his post in 1879. Then, to the disgust of all, the Khedive named as his successor Rauf Pasha, whom Gordon had recently dismissed for maladministration of the Province of Harrar, on the borders of Abyssinia[378]. Thus the Sudan, after experiencing the benefits of a just and able government, reeled back into the bad old condition, at the time when the Mahdi was becoming a power in the land. No help was forthcoming from Egypt in the summer of 1882, and the Mahdi's revolt rapidly made headway even despite several checks from the Egyptian troops.

[Footnote 378: See Gordon's letter of April 1880, quoted in the Introduction to _The Journals of Major-General C.G. Gordon at Khartum_ (1885), p. xvii.]

Possibly, if Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues had decided to crush it in that autumn, the task might have been easy. But, far from doing so, they sought to dissuade the Khedive from attempting to hold the most disturbed districts, those of Kordofan and Darfur, beyond Khartum. This might have been the best course, if the evacuation could have been followed at once and without risk of disaster at the hands of the fanatics. But Tewfik willed otherwise. Against the advice of Lord Dufferin, he sought to reconquer the Sudan, and that, too, by wholly insufficient forces. The result was a series of disasters, culminating in the extermination of Hicks Pasha's Egyptian force by the Mahdi's followers near El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan (November 5, 1883).

The details of the disaster are not fully known. Hicks Pasha was appointed, on August 20, 1883, by the Khedive to command the expedition into that province. He set out from Omdurman on September 9, with 10,000 men, 4 Krupp guns and 16 light guns, 500 horses and 5500 camels. His last despatch, dated October 3, showed that the force had been greatly weakened by want of water and provisions, and most of all by the spell cast on the troops by the Mahdi's claim to invincibility. Nevertheless, Hicks checked the rebels in two or three encounters, but, according to the tale of one of the few survivors, a camel-driver, the force finally succ.u.mbed to a fierce charge on the Egyptian square at the close of an exhausting march, prolonged by the treachery of native guides. Nearly the whole force was put to the sword. Hicks Pasha perished, along with five British and four German officers, and many Egyptians of note. The adventurous newspaper correspondents, O'Donovan and Vizetelly, also met their doom (November 5, 1883)[379].

[Footnote 379: Gordon's _Journals_, pp. 347-351; also Parl. Papers, Egypt, No. 12 (1884), pp. 85 and 127-131 for another account. See, too, Sir F.R. Wingate's _Mahdism_, chaps. i.-iii., for the rise of the Mahdi and his triumph over Hicks.]

This catastrophe decided the history of the Sudan for many years. The British Government was in no respect responsible for the appointment of General Hicks to the Kordofan command. Lord Dufferin and Sir E. Malet had strongly urged the Khedive to abandon Kordofan and Darfur; but it would seem that the desire of the governing cla.s.s at Cairo to have a hand in the Sudan administration overbore these wise remonstrances, and hence the disaster near El Obeid with its long train of evil consequences[380]. It was speedily followed by another reverse at Tokar not far from Suakim, where the slave-raiders and tribesmen of the Red Sea coast exterminated another force under the command of Captain Moncrieff.

[Footnote 380: J. Morley, _Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii. p. 146; Sir A.

Lyall, _Life of Lord Dufferin_, vol. ii. chap. ii.]

The Gladstone Ministry and the British advisers of the Khedive, among whom was Sir Evelyn Baring (the present Lord Cromer), again urged the entire evacuation of the Sudan, and the limitation of Egyptian authority to the strong position of the First Cataract at a.s.suan. This policy then received the entire approval of the man who was to be alike the hero and the martyr of that enterprise[381]. But how were the Egyptian garrisons to be withdrawn? It was a point of honour not to let them be slaughtered or enslaved by the cruel fanatics of the Mahdi. Yet under the lead of Egyptian officers they would almost certainly suffer one of these fates.

A way of escape was suggested--by a London evening newspaper in the first instance. The name of Gordon was renowned for justice and hardihood all through the Sudan. Let this knight-errant be sent--so said this Mentor of the Press--and his strange power over men would accomplish the impossible. The proposal carried conviction everywhere, and Lord Granville, who generally followed any strong lead, sent for the General.

[Footnote 381: Morley, _Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii. p. 147.]

Charles George Gordon, born at Woolwich in 1833, was the scion of a staunch race of Scottish fighters. His great-grandfather served under Cope at Prestonpans; his grandfather fought in Boscawen's expedition at Louisburg and under Wolfe at Quebec. His father attained the rank of Lieutenant-General. From his mother, too, he derived qualities of self-reliance and endurance of no mean order. Despite the fact that she had eleven children, and that three of her sons were out at the Crimea, she is said never to have quailed during that dark time. Of these sons, Charles George was serving in the Engineers; he showed at his first contact with war an apt.i.tude and resource which won the admiration of all. "We used always to send him out to find what new move the Russians were making"--such was the testimony of one of his superior officers. Of his subsequent duties in delimiting the new Bessarabian frontier and his miraculous career in China we cannot speak in detail. By the consent of all, it was his soldierly spirit that helped to save that Empire from anarchy at the hands of the Taeping rebels, whose movement presented a strange medley of perverted Christianity, communism, and freebooting.

There it was that his magnetic influence over men first had free play.

Though he was only thirty years of age, his fine physique, dauntless daring, and the spirit of unquestionable authority that looked out from his kindly eyes, gained speedy control over the motley set of officers and the Chinese rank and file--half of them ex-rebels--that formed the nucleus of the "ever victorious army." What wonder that he was thenceforth known as "Chinese Gordon"?

In the years 1865-71, which he spent at Gravesend in supervising the construction of the new forts at the mouth of the river, the religious and philanthropic side of his character found free play. His biographer, Mr. Hake, tells of his interest in the poor and suffering, and, above all, in friendless boys, who came to idolise his manly yet sympathetic nature. Called thereafter by the Khedive to succeed Sir Samuel Baker in the Governorship of the Sudan, he grappled earnestly with the fearful difficulties that beset all who have attempted to put down the slave-trade in its chief seat of activity. Later on he expressed the belief that "the Sudan is a useless possession, ever was so, ever will be so." These words, and certain episodes in his official career in India and in Cape Colony, revealed the weak side of a singularly n.o.ble nature. Occasionally he was hasty and impulsive in his decisions, and the pride of his race would then flash forth. During his cadetship at Woolwich he was rebuked for incompetence, and told that he would never make an officer. At once he tore the epaulets from his shoulders and flung them at his superior's feet. A certain impatience of control characterised him throughout life. No man was ever more chivalrous, more conscientious, more devoted, or abler in the management of inferiors; but his abilities lay rather in the direction of swift intuitions and prompt achievement than in sound judgment and plodding toil. In short, his qualities were those of a knight-errant, not those of a statesman.

The imperious calls of conscience and of instinct endowed him with powers uniquely fitted to attract and enthral simple straightforward natures, and to sway orientals at his will. But the empire of conscience, instinct, and will-power consorts but ill with those diplomatic gifts of effecting a timely compromise which go far to make for success in life. This was at once the strength and the weakness of Gordon's being. In the midst of a _blase_, sceptical age, his personality stood forth, G.o.d-fearing as that of a Covenanter, romantic as that of a Coeur de Lion, tender as that of a Florence Nightingale. In truth, it appealed to all that is most elemental in man.

At that time Gordon was charged by the King of the Belgians to proceed to the Congo River to put down the slave-trade. Imagination will persist in wondering what might have been the result if he had carried out this much-needed duty. Possibly he might have acquired such an influence as to direct the "Congo Free State" to courses far other than those to which it has come. He himself discerned the greatness of the opportunity. In his letter of January 6, 1884, to H.M. Stanley, he stated that "no such efficacious means of cutting at root of slave-trade ever was presented as that which G.o.d has opened out to us through the kind disinterestedness of His Majesty."

The die was now cast against the Congo and for the Nile. Gordon had a brief interview with four members of the Cabinet--Lords Granville, Hartington, Northbrooke, and Sir Charles Dilke,--Mr. Gladstone was absent at Hawarden; and they forthwith decided that he should go to the Upper Nile. What transpired in that most important meeting is known only from Gordon's account of it in a private letter:--

At noon he, Wolseley, came to me and took me to the Ministers. He went in and talked to the Ministers, and came back and said, "Her Majesty's Government want you to undertake this. Government are determined to evacuate the Sudan, for they will not guarantee future government. Will you go and do it?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Go in." I went in and saw them. They said, "Did Wolseley tell you our orders?" I said, "Yes." I said, "You will not guarantee future government of the Sudan, and you wish me to go up to evacuate now?" They said, "Yes," and it was over, and I left at 8 P.M. for Calais.

Before seeing the Ministers, Gordon had a long interview with Lord Wolseley, who in the previous autumn had been named Baron Wolseley of Cairo. That conversation is also unknown to us, but obviously it must have influenced Gordon's impressions as to the scope of the duties sketched for him by the Cabinet. We turn, then, to the "Instructions to General Gordon," drawn up by the Ministry on Jan. 18, 1884. They directed him to "proceed at once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the Sudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country and for the safety of the European population in Khartum." He was also to report on the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Sudan and on measures that might be taken to counteract the consequent spread of the slave-trade. He was to be under the instructions of H.M.'s Consul-General at Cairo (Sir Evelyn Baring). There followed this sentence: "You will consider yourself authorised and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir Evelyn Baring[382]."

[Footnote 382: Parl. Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (1884), p. 3.]

After receiving these instructions, Gordon started at once for Egypt, accompanied by Colonel Stewart. At Cairo he had an interview with Sir Evelyn Baring, and was appointed by the Khedive Governor-General of the Sudan. The firman of Jan. 26 contained these words: "We trust that you will carry out our good intentions for the establishment of justice and order, and that you will a.s.sure the peace and prosperity of the people of the Sudan by maintaining the security of the roads," etc. It contained not a word about the evacuation of the Sudan, nor did the Khedive's proclamation of the same date to the Sudanese. The only reference to evacuation was in his letter of the same date to Gordon, beginning thus: "You are aware that the object of your arrival here and of your mission to the Sudan is to carry into execution the evacuation of those territories and to withdraw our troops, civil officials, and such of the inhabitants, together with their belongings, as may wish to leave for Egypt. . . ." After completing this task he was to "take the necessary steps for establishing an organised Government in the different provinces of the Sudan for the maintenance of order and the cessation of all disasters and incitement to revolt[383]." How Gordon, after sending away all the troops, was to pacify that enormous territory His Highness did not explain.

[Footnote 383: Parl. Papers, Egypt, No. 12 (1884), pp. 27, 28.]

There is almost as much ambiguity in the "further instructions" which Sir Evelyn Baring drew up on January 25 at Cairo. After stating that the British and Egyptian Governments had agreed on the necessity of "evacuating" the Sudan, he noted the fact that Gordon approved of it and thought it should on no account be changed; the despatch proceeds:--

You consider that it may take a few months to carry it out with safety. You are further of opinion that "the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mohammed Ali's conquest, and whose families still exist"; and that an endeavour should be made to form a confederation of those Sultans. In this view the Egyptian Government entirely concur. It will of course be fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be kept in the Sudan merely with a view to consolidating the powers of the new rulers of the country. But the Egyptian Government has the fullest confidence in your judgment, your knowledge of the country, and your comprehension of the general line of policy to be pursued. You are therefore given full discretionary power to retain the troops for such reasonable period as you may think necessary, in order that the abandonment of the country may be accomplished with the least possible risk to life and property. A credit of 100,000 has been opened for you at the Finance Department[384]. . . .

[Footnote 384: Parl. Papers, Egypt, No. 6 (1884), p. 3.]

In themselves these instructions were not wholly clear. An officer who is allowed to use troops for the settlement or pacification of a vast tract of country can hardly be the agent of a policy of mere "abandonment." Neither Gordon nor Baring seems at that time to have felt the incongruity of the two sets of duties, but before long it flashed across Gordon's mind. At Abu Hammed, when nearing Khartum, he telegraphed to Baring: "I would most earnestly beg that evacuation but not abandonment be the programme to be followed." Or, as he phrased it, he wanted Egypt to recognise her "moral control and suzerainty" over the Sudan[385]. This, of course, was an extension of the programme to which he gave his a.s.sent at Cairo; it differed _toto caelo_ from the policy of abandonment laid down at London.

[Footnote 385: Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 133.]

Even now it is impossible to see why Ministers did not at once simplify the situation by a clear statement of their orders to Gordon, not of course as Governor-General of the Sudan, but as a British officer charged by them with a definite duty. At a later date they sought to limit him to the restricted sphere sketched out at London; but then it was too late to bend to their will a nature which, firm at all times, was hard as adamant when the voice of conscience spoke within. Already it had spoken, and against "abandonment."

There were other confusing elements in the situation. Gordon believed that the "full discretionary power" granted to him by Sir E. Baring was a promise binding on the British Government; and, seeing that he was authorised to perform such other duties as Sir Evelyn Baring would communicate to him, he was right. But Ministers do not seem to have understood that this implied an immense widening of the original programme. Further, Sir Evelyn Baring used the terms "evacuation" and "abandonment" as if they were synonymous; while in Gordon's view they were very different. As we shall see, his nature, at once conscientious, vehement, and pertinacious, came to reject the idea of abandonment as cowardly and therefore impossible.

Lastly, we may note that Gordon was left free to announce the forthcoming evacuation of the Sudan, or not, as he judged best[386]. He decided to keep it secret. Had he kept it entirely so for the present, he would have done well; but he is said to have divulged it to one or two officials at Berber; if so, it was a very regrettable imprudence, which compromised the defence of that town. But surely no man was ever charged with duties so complex and contradictory. The qualities of Nestor, Ulysses, and Achilles combined in one mortal could scarcely have availed to untie or sever that knot.

[Footnote 386: _Ibid_. p. 27.]

The first sharp collision between Gordon and the Home Government resulted from his urgent request for the employment of Zebehr Pasha as the future ruler of the Sudan. A native of the Sudan, this man had risen to great wealth and power by his energy and ambition, and figured as a kind of king among the slave-raiders of the Upper Nile, until, for some offence against the Egyptian Government, he was interned at Cairo. At that city Gordon had a conference with Zebehr in the presence of Sir E.

Baring, Nubar Pasha, and others. It was long and stormy, and gave the impression of undying hatred felt by the slaver for the slave-liberator.

This alone seemed to justify the Gladstone Ministry in refusing Gordon's request[387]. Had Zebehr gone with Gordon, he would certainly have betrayed him--so thought Sir Evelyn Baring.

[Footnote 387: _Ibid_. pp. 38-41.]

Setting out from Cairo and travelling quickly up the Nile, Gordon reached Khartum on February 18, and received an enthusiastic welcome from the discouraged populace. At once he publicly burned all instruments of torture and records of old debts; so that his popularity overshadowed that of the Mahdi. Again he urged the despatch of Zebehr as his "successor," after the withdrawal of troops and civilians from the Sudan. But, as Sir Evelyn Baring said in forwarding Gordon's request to Downing Street, it would be most dangerous to place them together at Khartum. It should further be noted that Gordon's telegrams showed his belief that the Mahdi's power was overrated, and that his advance in person on Khartum was most unlikely[388]. It is not surprising, then, that Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir E. Baring on February 22 that the public opinion of England "would not tolerate the appointment of Zebehr Pasha[389]." Already it had been offended by Gordon's proclamation at Khartum that the Government would not interfere with the buying and selling of slaves, though, as Sir Evelyn Baring pointed out, the re-establishment of slavery resulted quite naturally from the policy of evacuation; and he now strongly urged that Gordon should have "full liberty of action to complete the execution of his general plans[390]."

[Footnote 388: Egypt, No. 12 (1884), pp. 74, 82, 88.]

[Footnote 389: _Ibid_. p. 95.]

[Footnote 390: _Ibid_. p. 94.]

Here it is desirable to remember that the Mahdist movement was then confined almost entirely to three chief districts--Kordofan, parts of the lands adjoining the Blue Nile, and the tribes dwelling west and south-west of Suakim. For the present these last were the most dangerous. Already they had overpowered and slaughtered two Egyptian forces; and on February 22 news reached Cairo of the fall of Tokar before the valiant swordsmen of Osman Digna. But this was far away from the Nile and did not endanger Gordon. British troops were landed at Suakim for the protection of that port, but this step implied no change of policy respecting the Sudan. The slight impression which two brilliant but costly victories, those of El Teb and Tamai, made on the warlike tribes at the back of Suakim certainly showed the need of caution in pushing a force into the Sudan when the fierce heats of summer were coming on[391].

[Footnote 391: For details of these battles, see Sir F. Wingate's _Mahdism_, chap, iii., and _Life of Sir Gerald Graham_ (1901).]

The first hint of any change of policy was made by Gordon in his despatch of Feb. 26, to Sir E. Baring. After stating his regret at the refusal of the British Government to allow the despatch of Zebehr as his successor, he used these remarkable words:--

You must remember that when evacuation is carried out, Mahdi will come down here, and, by agents, will not let Egypt be quiet. Of course my duty is evacuation, and the best I can for establishing a quiet government. The first I hope to accomplish. The second is a more difficult task, and concerns Egypt more than me. If Egypt is to be quiet, Mahdi must be smashed up. Mahdi is most unpopular, and with care and time could be smashed. Remember that once Khartum belongs to Mahdi, the task will be far more difficult; yet you will, for safety of Egypt, execute it. If you decide on smashing Mahdi, then send up another 100,000 and send up 200 Indian troops to Wady Haifa, and send officer up to Dongola under pretence to look out quarters for troops. Leave Suakim and Ma.s.sowah alone. I repeat that evacuation is possible, but you will feel effect in Egypt, and will be forced to enter into a far more serious affair in order to guard Egypt. At present, it would be comparatively easy to destroy Mahdi[392].