The Development of Metaphysics in Persia Part 8

[115:3] Nasafi's Maq?adi Aq?a: fol. 23b.

"O Derwish!" says Nasafi "dost thou think that thy existence is independent of G.o.d? This is a great error."[116:1] Nasafi explains his meaning by a beautiful parable.[116:2] The fishes in a certain tank realised that they lived, moved, and had their being in water, but felt that they were quite ignorant of the real nature of what const.i.tuted the very source of their life. They resorted to a wiser fish in a great river, and the Philosopher-fish addressed them thus:--

"O you who endeavour to untie the knot (of being)! You are born in union, yet die in the thought of an unreal separation. Thirsty on the sea-sh.o.r.e! Dying penniless while master of the treasure!"

[116:1] Nasafi's Maq?adi Aq?a: fol. 3b.

[116:2] Nasafi's Maq?adi Aq?a: fol. 15b.

All feeling of separation, therefore, is ignorance; and all "otherness"

is a mere appearance, a dream, a shadow--a differentiation born of relation essential to the self-recognition of the Absolute. The great prophet of this school is "The excellent Rumi" as Hegel calls him. He took up the old Neo-Platonic idea of the Universal soul working through the various spheres of being, and expressed it in a way so modern in spirit that Clodd introduces the pa.s.sage in his "Story of Creation". I venture to quote this famous pa.s.sage in order to show how successfully the poet antic.i.p.ates the modern concept of evolution, which he regarded as the realistic side of his Idealism.

First man appeared in the clan of inorganic things, Next he pa.s.sed therefrom into that of plants.

For years he lived as one of the plants, Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different; And when he pa.s.sed from the vegetive to the animal state, He had no remembrance of his state as a plant, Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants, Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers; Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers, Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast.

Again the great creator as you know, Drew man out of the animal into the human state.

Thus man pa.s.sed from one order of nature to another, Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.

Of his first soul he has now no remembrance, And he will be again changed from his present soul.

(Mat_h_nawi Book IV).

It would now be instructive if we compare this aspect of ?ufi thought with the fundamental ideas of Neo-Platonism. The G.o.d of Neo-Platonism is immanent as well as transcendant. "As being the cause of all things, it is everywhere. As being other than all things, it is nowhere. If it were only "everywhere", and not also "nowhere", it would _be_ all things."[118:1] The ?ufi, however, tersely says that G.o.d _is_ all things.

The Neo-Platonist allows a certain permanence or fixity to matter;[118:2] but the ?ufis of the school in question, regard all empirical experience as a kind of dreaming. Life in limitation, they say, is sleep; death brings the awakening. It is, however, the doctrine of Impersonal immortality--"genuinely eastern in spirit"--which distinguishes this school from Neo-Platonism. "Its (Arabian Philosophy) distinctive doctrine", says Whittaker, "of an Impersonal immortality of the general human intellect is, however, as contrasted with Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, essentially original."

[118:1] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 58.

[118:2] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 57.

The above brief exposition shows that there are three basic ideas of this mode of thought:--

(a). That the ultimate Reality is knowable through a supersensual state of consciousness.

(b). That the ultimate Reality is impersonal.

(c). That the ultimate Reality is one.

Corresponding to these ideas we have:

(I). The Agnostic reaction as manifested in the Poet 'Umar K_h_ayyam (12{th} century) who cried out in his intellectual despair:--

The joyous souls who quaff potations deep, And saints who in the mosque sad vigils keep, Are lost at sea alike, and find no sh.o.r.e, One only wakes, all others are asleep.

(II). The monotheistic reaction of Ibn Taimiyya and his followers in the 13{th} century.

(III). The Pluralistic reaction of Wa?id Ma?mud[119:1] in the 13{th} century.

[119:1] Dabistan, Chap: 8.

Speaking from a purely philosophical standpoint, the last movement is most interesting. The history of Thought ill.u.s.trates the operation of certain general laws of progress which are true of the intellectual annals of different peoples. The German systems of monistic thought invoked the pluralism of Herbart; while the pantheism of Spinoza called forth the monadism of Leibniz. The operation of the same law led Wa?id Ma?mud to deny the truth of contemporary monism, and declare that Reality is not one but many. Long before Leibniz he taught that the Universe is a combination of what he called "Afrad"--essential units, or simple atoms which have existed from all eternity, and are endowed with life. The law of the Universe is an ascending perfection of elemental matter, continually pa.s.sing from lower to higher forms determined by the kind of food which the fundamental units a.s.similate. Each period of his cosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world is decomposed, and the units re-combine to construct a new universe.

Wa?id Ma?mud succeeded in founding a sect which was cruelly persecuted, and finally stamped out of existence by S_h_ah 'Abbas. It is said that the poet ?afiz of S_h_iraz believed in the tenets of this sect.

C. _Reality as Light or Thought._

The third great school of ?ufiism conceives Reality as essentially Light or Thought, the very nature of which demands something to be thought or illuminated. While the preceding school abandoned Neo-Platonism, this school transformed it into new systems. There are, however, two aspects of the metaphysics of this school. The one is genuinely Persian in spirit, the other is chiefly influenced by Christian modes of thought.

Both agree in holding that the fact of empirical diversity necessitates a principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate Reality. I now proceed to consider them in their historical order.

I. Reality as Light--Al-Is_h_raqi.

Return to Persian Dualism.

The application of Greek dialectic to Islamic Theology aroused that spirit of critical examination which began with Al-As_h_'ari, and found its completest expression in the scepticism of Al-G_h_azali. Even among the Rationalists there were some more critical minds--such as Nazzam--whose att.i.tude towards Greek Philosophy was not one of servile submission, but of independent criticism. The defenders of dogma--Al-G_h_azali, Al-Razi, Abul Barakat, and Al-Amidi, carried on a persistent attack on the whole fabric of Greek Philosophy; while Abu Sa'id ?airafi, Qa?i 'Abdal Jabbar, Abul Ma'ali, Abul Qasim, and finally the acute Ibn Taimiyya, actuated by similar theological motives, continued to expose the inherent weakness of Greek Logic. In their criticism of Greek Philosophy, these thinkers were supplemented by some of the more learned ?ufis, such as Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, who endeavoured to substantiate the helplessness of pure reason by his refutation of Greek thought in a work ent.i.tled, "The unveiling of Greek absurdities". The As_h_'arite reaction against Rationalism resulted not only in the development of a system of metaphysics most modern in some of its aspects, but also in completely breaking asunder the worn out fetters of intellectual thraldom. Erdmann[122:1] seems to think that the speculative spirit among the Muslims exhausted itself with Al-Farabi and Avicenna, and that after them Philosophy became bankrupt in pa.s.sing over into scepticism and mysticism. Evidently he ignores the Muslim criticism of Greek Philosophy which led to the As_h_'arite Idealism on the one hand, and a genuine Persian reconstruction on the other. That a system of thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of foreign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was indispensable. The As_h_'arite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma completed the destruction; Al-Is_h_raqi--the child of emanc.i.p.ation--came forward to build a new edifice of thought; though, in his process of reconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is the genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow minded authority, a.s.serts its right of free independent speculation. In his philosophy the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial expression in the writings of the Physician Al-Razi, Al-G_h_azali, and the Isma'ilia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the philosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam.

[122:1] Vol. I, p. 367.

Shaikh S_h_ahabal Din Suhrawardi, known as S_h_aik_h_al Is_h_raq Maqtul was born about the middle of the 12{th} century. He studied philosophy with Majd Jili--the teacher of the commentator Al-Razi--and, while still a youth, stood unrivalled as a thinker in the whole Islamic world.

His great admirer Al-Malik-al-Zahir--the son of Sultan ?ala?-al Din--invited him to Aleppo, where the youthful philosopher expounded his independent opinions in a way that aroused the bitter jealousy of contemporary theologians. These hired slaves of bloodthirsty Dogmatism which, conscious of its inherent weakness, has always managed to keep brute force behind its back, wrote to Sultan ?ala?-al Din, that the S_h_aik_h_'s teaching was a danger to Islam, and that it was necessary, in the interest of the Faith, to nip the evil in the bud. The Sultan consented; and there, at the early age of 36, the young Persian thinker calmly met the blow which made him a martyr of truth, and immortalised his name for ever. Murderers have pa.s.sed away, but the philosophy, the price of which was paid in blood, still lives, and attracts many an earnest seeker after truth.

The princ.i.p.al features of the founder of the Is_h_raqi Philosophy are his intellectual independence, the skill with which he weaves his materials into a systematic whole, and above all his faithfulness to the philosophic traditions of his country. In many fundamental points he differs from Plato, and freely criticises Aristotle whose philosophy he looks upon as a mere preparation for his own system of thought. Nothing escapes his criticism. Even the logic of Aristotle, he subjects to a searching examination, and shows the hollowness of some of its doctrines. Definition, for instance, is genus plus differentia, according to Aristotle. But Al-Is_h_raqi holds that the distinctive attribute of the thing defined, which cannot be predicated of any other thing, will bring us no knowledge of the thing. We define "horse" as a neighing animal. Now we understand animality, because we know many animals in which this attribute exists; but it is impossible to understand the attribute "neighing", since it is found nowhere except in the thing defined. The ordinary definition of horse, therefore, would be meaningless to a man who has never seen a horse. Aristotelian definition, as a scientific principle is quite useless. This criticism leads the S_h_aik_h_, to a standpoint very similar to that of Bosanquet who defines definition, as "Summation of qualities". The S_h_aik_h_ holds that a true definition would enumerate all the essential attributes which, taken collectively, exist nowhere except the thing defined, though they may individually exist in other things.

But let us turn to his system of metaphysics, and estimate the worth of his contribution to the thought of his country. In order fully to comprehend the purely intellectual side of Transcendental philosophy, the student, says the S_h_aik_h_, must be thoroughly acquainted with Aristotelian philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and ?ufiism. His mind should be completely free from the taint of prejudice and sin, so that he may gradually develop that inner sense, which verifies and corrects what intellect understands only as theory. Unaided reason is untrustworthy; it must always be supplemented by "D_h_auq"--the mysterious perception of the essence of things--which brings knowledge and peace to the restless soul, and disarms Scepticism for ever. We are, however, concerned with the purely speculative side of this spiritual experience--the results of the inner perception as formulated and systematised by discursive thought. Let us, therefore, examine the various aspects of the Is_h_raqi Philosophy--Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology.

Ontology.

The ultimate principle of all existence is "Nur-i-Qahir"--the Primal Absolute Light whose essential nature consists in perpetual illumination. "Nothing is more visible than light, and visibility does not stand in need of any definition."[127:1] The essence of Light, therefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute superadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no visibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in itself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence, that something other than light is more visible than light. The Primal Light, therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible.

The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities created by two distinct creative agencies. The ancient Philosophers of Persia were not dualists like the Zoroastrian priests who, on the ground of the principle that the one cannot cause to emanate from itself more than one, a.s.signed two independent sources to Light and Darkness. The relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own negation--Darkness which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not change of place; it is due to the _love_ of illumination which const.i.tutes its very essence, and stirs it up, as it were, to quicken all things into life, by pouring out its own rays into their being. The number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations of intenser brightness become, in their turn, the sources of other illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these illuminations are mediums, or in the language of Theology, angels through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance from the Primal Light. The followers of Aristotle erroneously restricted the number of original Intellects to ten. They likewise erred in enumerating the categories of thought. The possibilities of the Primal Light are infinite; and the Universe, with all its variety, is only a partial expression of the infinitude behind it. The categories of Aristotle, therefore, are only relatively true. It is impossible for human thought to comprehend within its tiny grasp, all the infinite variety of ideas according to which the Primal Light does or may illuminate that which is not light. We can, however, discriminate between the following two illuminations of the original Light:--

[127:1] S_h_arh Anwariyya--Al-Harawi's commentary on Al-Is_h_raqi's Hikmat al-Is_h_raq, fol. 10a.

(1). The Abstract Light (e.g. Intellect Universal as well as individual). It has no form, and never becomes the attribute of anything other than itself (Substance). From it proceed all the various forms of partly-conscious, conscious, or self-conscious light, differing from one another in the amount of l.u.s.tre, which is determined by their comparative nearness or distance from the ultimate source of their being. The individual intellect or soul is only a fainter copy, or a more distant reflection of the Primal Light. The Abstract Light knows itself through itself, and does not stand in need of a non-ego to reveal its own existence to itself. Consciousness or self-knowledge, therefore, is the very essense of Abstract light, as distinguished from the negation of light.

(2). The Accidental light (Attribute)--the light that has a form, and is capable of becoming an attribute of something other than itself (e.g.

the light of the stars, or the visibility of other bodies). The Accidental light, or more properly sensible light, is a distant reflection of the Abstract light, which, because of its distance, has lost the intensity, or substance-character of its parent. The process of continuous reflection is really a softening process; successive illuminations gradually lose their intensity until, in the chain of reflections, we reach certain less intense illuminations which entirely lose their independent character, and cannot exist except in a.s.sociation with something else. These illuminations form the Accidental light--the attribute which has no independent existence. The relation, therefore, between the Accidental and the Abstract light is that of cause and effect. The effect, however, is not something quite distinct from its cause; it is a transformation, or a weaker form of the supposed cause itself. Anything other than the Abstract light (e.g. the nature of the illuminated body itself) cannot be the cause of the Accidental light; since the latter, being merely contingent and consequently capable of being negatived, can be taken away from bodies, without affecting their character. If the essence or nature of the illuminated body, had been the cause of the Accidental light, such a process of disillumination could not have been possible. We cannot conceive an inactive cause.[131:1]

[131:1] S_h_arh Anwariyya fol. 11b.

It is now obvious that the S_h_aik_h_ al-Is_h_raq agrees with the As_h_'arite thinkers in holding that there is no such thing as the Prima Materia of Aristotle; though he recognises the existence of a necessary negation of Light--darkness, the object of illumination. He further agrees with them in teaching the relativity of all categories except Substance and Quality. But he corrects their theory of knowledge, in so far as he recognises an active element in human knowledge. Our relation with the objects of our knowledge is not merely a pa.s.sive relation; the individual soul, being itself an illumination, illuminates the object in the act of knowledge. The Universe to him is one great process of active illumination; but, from a purely intellectual standpoint, this illumination is only a partial expression of the infinitude of the Primal Light, which may illuminate according to other laws not known to us. The categories of thought are infinite; our intellect works with a few only. The S_h_aik_h_, therefore, from the standpoint of discursive thought, is not far from modern Humanism.

Cosmology.

All that is "not-light" is, what the Is_h_raqi thinkers call, "Absolute quant.i.ty", or "Absolute matter". It is only another aspect of the affirmation of light, and not an independent principle, as the followers of Aristotle erroneously hold. The experimental fact of the transformation of the primary elements into one another, points to this fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of grossness, const.i.tutes the various spheres of material being. The absolute ground of all things, then, is divided into two kinds:--

(1). That which is beyond s.p.a.ce--the obscure substance or atoms (essences of the As_h_'arite).

(2). That which is necessarily in s.p.a.ce--forms of darkness, e.g. weight, smell, taste, etc.