The Concept of Nature Part 9

There can be no question as to the general approximate correctness of the orthodox formulae. It would be merely silly to raise doubts on this point. But the determination of the status of these formulae is by no means settled by this admission. The independence of time and s.p.a.ce is an unquestioned presupposition of the orthodox thought which has produced the orthodox formulae. With this presupposition and given the absolute points of one absolute s.p.a.ce, the orthodox formulae are immediate deductions. Accordingly, these formulae are presented to our imaginations as facts which cannot be otherwise, time and s.p.a.ce being what they are. The orthodox formulae have therefore attained to the status of necessities which cannot be questioned in science. Any attempt to replace these formulae by others was to abandon the _role_ of physical explanation and to have recourse to mere mathematical formulae.

But even in physical science difficulties have acc.u.mulated round the orthodox formulae. In the first place Maxwell's equations of the electromagnetic field are not invariant for the transformations of the orthodox formulae; whereas they are invariant for the transformations of the formulae arising from the third of the four cases mentioned above, provided that the velocity c is identified with a famous electromagnetic constant quant.i.ty.

Again the null results of the delicate experiments to detect the earth's variations of motion through the ether in its...o...b..tal path are explained immediately by the formulae of the third case. But if we a.s.sume the orthodox formulae we have to make a special and arbitrary a.s.sumption as to the contraction of matter during motion. I mean the Fitzgerald-Lorentz a.s.sumption.

Lastly Fresnel's coefficient of drag which represents the variation of the velocity of light in a moving medium is explained by the formulae of the third case, and requires another arbitrary a.s.sumption if we use the orthodox formulae.

It appears therefore that on the mere basis of physical explanation there are advantages in the formulae of the third case as compared with the orthodox formulae. But the way is blocked by the ingrained belief that these latter formulae possess a character of necessity. It is therefore an urgent requisite for physical science and for philosophy to examine critically the grounds for this supposed necessity. The only satisfactory method of scrutiny is to recur to the first principles of our knowledge of nature. This is exactly what I am endeavouring to do in these lectures. I ask what it is that we are aware of in our sense-perception of nature. I then proceed to examine those factors in nature which lead us to conceive nature as occupying s.p.a.ce and persisting through time. This procedure has led us to an investigation of the characters of s.p.a.ce and time. It results from these investigations that the formulae of the third case and the orthodox formulae are on a level as possible formulae resulting from the basic character of our knowledge of nature. The orthodox formulae have thus lost any advantage as to necessity which they enjoyed over the serial group. The way is thus open to adopt whichever of the two groups best accords with observation.

I take this opportunity of pausing for a moment from the course of my argument, and of reflecting on the general character which my doctrine ascribes to some familiar concepts of science. I have no doubt that some of you have felt that in certain aspects this character is very paradoxical.

This vein of paradox is partly due to the fact that educated language has been made to conform to the prevalent orthodox theory. We are thus, in expounding an alternative doctrine, driven to the use of either strange terms or of familiar words with unusual meanings. This victory of the orthodox theory over language is very natural. Events are named after the prominent objects situated in them, and thus both in language and in thought the event sinks behind the object, and becomes the mere play of its relations. The theory of s.p.a.ce is then converted into a theory of the relations of objects instead of a theory of the relations of events. But objects have not the pa.s.sage of events. Accordingly s.p.a.ce as a relation between objects is devoid of any connexion with time. It is s.p.a.ce at an instant without any determinate relations between the s.p.a.ces at successive instants. It cannot be one timeless s.p.a.ce because the relations between objects change.

A few minutes ago in speaking of the deduction of the orthodox formulae for relative motion I said that they followed as an immediate deduction from the a.s.sumption of absolute points in absolute s.p.a.ce. This reference to absolute s.p.a.ce was not an oversight. I know that the doctrine of the relativity of s.p.a.ce at present holds the field both in science and philosophy. But I do not think that its inevitable consequences are understood. When we really face them the paradox of the presentation of the character of s.p.a.ce which I have elaborated is greatly mitigated. If there is no absolute position, a point must cease to be a simple ent.i.ty.

What is a point to one man in a balloon with his eyes fixed on an instrument is a track of points to an observer on the earth who is watching the balloon through a telescope, and is another track of points to an observer in the sun who is watching the balloon through some instrument suited to such a being. Accordingly if I am reproached with the paradox of my theory of points as cla.s.ses of event-particles, and of my theory of event-particles as groups of abstractive sets, I ask my critic to explain exactly what he means by a point. While you explain your meaning about anything, however simple, it is always apt to look subtle and fine spun. I have at least explained exactly what I do mean by a point, what relations it involves and what ent.i.ties are the relata.

If you admit the relativity of s.p.a.ce, you also must admit that points are complex ent.i.ties, logical constructs involving other ent.i.ties and their relations. Produce your theory, not in a few vague phrases of indefinite meaning, but explain it step by step in definite terms referring to a.s.signed relations and a.s.signed relata. Also show that your theory of points issues in a theory of s.p.a.ce. Furthermore note that the example of the man in the balloon, the observer on earth, and the observer in the sun, shows that every a.s.sumption of relative rest requires a timeless s.p.a.ce with radically different points from those which issue from every other such a.s.sumption. The theory of the relativity of s.p.a.ce is inconsistent with any doctrine of one unique set of points of one timeless s.p.a.ce.

The fact is that there is no paradox in my doctrine of the nature of s.p.a.ce which is not in essence inherent in the theory of the relativity of s.p.a.ce. But this doctrine has never really been accepted in science, whatever people say. What appears in our dynamical treatises is Newton's doctrine of relative motion based on the doctrine of differential motion in absolute s.p.a.ce. When you once admit that the points are radically different ent.i.ties for differing a.s.sumptions of rest, then the orthodox formulae lose all their obviousness. They were only obvious because you were really thinking of something else. When discussing this topic you can only avoid paradox by taking refuge from the flood of criticism in the comfortable ark of no meaning.

The new theory provides a definition of the congruence of periods of time. The prevalent view provides no such definition. Its position is that if we take such time-measurements so that certain familiar velocities which seem to us to be uniform are uniform, then the laws of motion are true. Now in the first place no change could appear either as uniform or non-uniform without involving a definite determination of the congruence for time-periods. So in appealing to familiar phenomena it allows that there is some factor in nature which we can intellectually construct as a congruence theory. It does not however say anything about it except that the laws of motion are then true. Suppose that with some expositors we cut out the reference to familiar velocities such as the rate of rotation of the earth. We are then driven to admit that there is no meaning in temporal congruence except that certain a.s.sumptions make the laws of motion true. Such a statement is historically false. King Alfred the Great was ignorant of the laws of motion, but knew very well what he meant by the measurement of time, and achieved his purpose by means of burning candles. Also no one in past ages justified the use of sand in hour-gla.s.ses by saying that some centuries later interesting laws of motion would be discovered which would give a meaning to the statement that the sand was emptied from the bulbs in equal times.

Uniformity in change is directly perceived, and it follows that mankind perceives in nature factors from which a theory of temporal congruence can be formed. The prevalent theory entirely fails to produce such factors.

The mention of the laws of motion raises another point where the prevalent theory has nothing to say and the new theory gives a complete explanation. It is well known that the laws of motion are not valid for any axes of reference which you may choose to take fixed in any rigid body. You must choose a body which is not rotating and has no acceleration. For example they do not really apply to axes fixed in the earth because of the diurnal rotation of that body. The law which fails when you a.s.sume the wrong axes as at rest is the third law, that action and reaction are equal and opposite. With the wrong axes uncompensated centrifugal forces and uncompensated composite centrifugal forces appear, due to rotation. The influence of these forces can be demonstrated by many facts on the earth's surface, Foucault's pendulum, the shape of the earth, the fixed directions of the rotations of cyclones and anticyclones. It is difficult to take seriously the suggestion that these domestic phenomena on the earth are due to the influence of the fixed stars. I cannot persuade myself to believe that a little star in its twinkling turned round Foucault's pendulum in the Paris Exhibition of 1861. Of course anything is believable when a definite physical connexion has been demonstrated, for example the influence of sunspots. Here all demonstration is lacking in the form of any coherent theory. According to the theory of these lectures the axes to which motion is to be referred are axes at rest in the s.p.a.ce of some time-system. For example, consider the s.p.a.ce of a time-system a. There are sets of axes at rest in the s.p.a.ce of a. These are suitable dynamical axes. Also a set of axes in this s.p.a.ce which is moving with uniform velocity without rotation is another suitable set. All the moving points fixed in these moving axes are really tracing out parallel lines with one uniform velocity. In other words they are the reflections in the s.p.a.ce of a of a set of fixed axes in the s.p.a.ce of some other time-system . Accordingly the group of dynamical axes required for Newton's Laws of Motion is the outcome of the necessity of referring motion to a body at rest in the s.p.a.ce of some one time-system in order to obtain a coherent account of physical properties. If we do not do so the meaning of the motion of one portion of our physical configuration is different from the meaning of the motion of another portion of the same configuration. Thus the meaning of motion being what it is, in order to describe the motion of any system of objects without changing the meaning of your terms as you proceed with your description, you are bound to take one of these sets of axes as axes of reference; though you may choose their reflections into the s.p.a.ce of any time-system which you wish to adopt. A definite physical reason is thereby a.s.signed for the peculiar property of the dynamical group of axes.

On the orthodox theory the position of the equations of motion is most ambiguous. The s.p.a.ce to which they refer is completely undetermined and so is the measurement of the lapse of time. Science is simply setting out on a fishing expedition to see whether it cannot find some procedure which it can call the measurement of s.p.a.ce and some procedure which it can call the measurement of time, and something which it can call a system of forces, and something which it can call ma.s.ses, so that these formulae may be satisfied. The only reason--on this theory--why anyone should want to satisfy these formulae is a sentimental regard for Galileo, Newton, Euler and Lagrange. The theory, so far from founding science on a sound observational basis, forces everything to conform to a mere mathematical preference for certain simple formulae.

I do not for a moment believe that this is a true account of the real status of the Laws of Motion. These equations want some slight adjustment for the new formulae of relativity. But with these adjustments, imperceptible in ordinary use, the laws deal with fundamental physical quant.i.ties which we know very well and wish to correlate.

The measurement of time was known to all civilised nations long before the laws were thought of. It is this time as thus measured that the laws are concerned with. Also they deal with the s.p.a.ce of our daily life.

When we approach to an accuracy of measurement beyond that of observation, adjustment is allowable. But within the limits of observation we know what we mean when we speak of measurements of s.p.a.ce and measurements of time and uniformity of change. It is for science to give an intellectual account of what is so evident in sense-awareness.

It is to me thoroughly incredible that the ultimate fact beyond which there is no deeper explanation is that mankind has really been swayed by an unconscious desire to satisfy the mathematical formulae which we call the Laws of Motion, formulae completely unknown till the seventeenth century of our epoch.

The correlation of the facts of sense-experience effected by the alternative account of nature extends beyond the physical properties of motion and the properties of congruence. It gives an account of the meaning of the geometrical ent.i.ties such as points, straight lines, and volumes, and connects the kindred ideas of extension in time and extension in s.p.a.ce. The theory satisfies the true purpose of an intellectual explanation in the sphere of natural philosophy. This purpose is to exhibit the interconnexions of nature, and to show that one set of ingredients in nature requires for the exhibition of its character the presence of the other sets of ingredients.

The false idea which we have to get rid of is that of nature as a mere aggregate of independent ent.i.ties, each capable of isolation. According to this conception these ent.i.ties, whose characters are capable of isolated definition, come together and by their accidental relations form the system of nature. This system is thus thoroughly accidental; and, even if it be subject to a mechanical fate, it is only accidentally so subject.

With this theory s.p.a.ce might be without time, and time might be without s.p.a.ce. The theory admittedly breaks down when we come to the relations of matter and s.p.a.ce. The relational theory of s.p.a.ce is an admission that we cannot know s.p.a.ce without matter or matter without s.p.a.ce. But the seclusion of both from time is still jealously guarded. The relations between portions of matter in s.p.a.ce are accidental facts owing to the absence of any coherent account of how s.p.a.ce springs from matter or how matter springs from s.p.a.ce. Also what we really observe in nature, its colours and its sounds and its touches are secondary qualities; in other words, they are not in nature at all but are accidental products of the relations between nature and mind.

The explanation of nature which I urge as an alternative ideal to this accidental view of nature, is that nothing in nature could be what it is except as an ingredient in nature as it is. The whole which is present for discrimination is posited in sense-awareness as necessary for the discriminated parts. An isolated event is not an event, because every event is a factor in a larger whole and is significant of that whole.

There can be no time apart from s.p.a.ce; and no s.p.a.ce apart from time; and no s.p.a.ce and no time apart from the pa.s.sage of the events of nature. The isolation of an ent.i.ty in thought, when we think of it as a bare 'it,'

has no counterpart in any corresponding isolation in nature. Such isolation is merely part of the procedure of intellectual knowledge.

The laws of nature are the outcome of the characters of the ent.i.ties which we find in nature. The ent.i.ties being what they are, the laws must be what they are; and conversely the ent.i.ties follow from the laws. We are a long way from the attainment of such an ideal; but it remains as the abiding goal of theoretical science.

CHAPTER VII

OBJECTS

The ensuing lecture is concerned with the theory of objects. Objects are elements in nature which do not pa.s.s. The awareness of an object as some factor not sharing in the pa.s.sage of nature is what I call 'recognition.' It is impossible to recognise an event, because an event is essentially distinct from every other event. Recognition is an awareness of sameness. But to call recognition an awareness of sameness implies an intellectual act of comparison accompanied with judgment. I use recognition for the non-intellectual relation of sense-awareness which connects the mind with a factor of nature without pa.s.sage. On the intellectual side of the mind's experience there are comparisons of things recognised and consequent judgments of sameness or diversity.

Probably 'sense-recognition' would be a better term for what I mean by 'recognition.' I have chosen the simpler term because I think that I shall be able to avoid the use of 'recognition' in any other meaning than that of 'sense-recognition.' I am quite willing to believe that recognition, in my sense of the term, is merely an ideal limit, and that there is in fact no recognition without intellectual accompaniments of comparison and judgment. But recognition is that relation of the mind to nature which provides the material for the intellectual activity.

An object is an ingredient in the character of some event. In fact the character of an event is nothing but the objects which are ingredient in it and the ways in which those objects make their ingression into the event. Thus the theory of objects is the theory of the comparison of events. Events are only comparable because they body forth permanences.

We are comparing objects in events whenever we can say, 'There it is again.' Objects are the elements in nature which can 'be again.'

Sometimes permanences can be proved to exist which evade recognition in the sense in which I am using that term. The permanences which evade recognition appear to us as abstract properties either of events or of objects. All the same they are there for recognition although undiscriminated in our sense-awareness. The demarcation of events, the splitting of nature up into parts is effected by the objects which we recognise as their ingredients. The discrimination of nature is the recognition of objects amid pa.s.sing events. It is a compound of the awareness of the pa.s.sage of nature, of the consequent part.i.tion of nature, and of the definition of certain parts of nature by the modes of the ingression of objects into them.

You may have noticed that I am using the term 'ingression' to denote the general relation of objects to events. The ingression of an object into an event is the way the character of the event shapes itself in virtue of the being of the object. Namely the event is what it is, because the object is what it is; and when I am thinking of this modification of the event by the object, I call the relation between the two 'the ingression of the object into the event.' It is equally true to say that objects are what they are because events are what they are. Nature is such that there can be no events and no objects without the ingression of objects into events. Although there are events such that the ingredient objects evade our recognition. These are the events in empty s.p.a.ce. Such events are only a.n.a.lysed for us by the intellectual probing of science.

Ingression is a relation which has various modes. There are obviously very various kinds of objects; and no one kind of object can have the same sort of relations to events as objects of another kind can have. We shall have to a.n.a.lyse out some of the different modes of ingression which different kinds of objects have into events.

But even if we stick to one and the same kind of objects, an object of that kind has different modes of ingression into different events.

Science and philosophy have been apt to entangle themselves in a simple-minded theory that an object is at one place at any definite time, and is in no sense anywhere else. This is in fact the att.i.tude of common sense thought, though it is not the att.i.tude of language which is navely expressing the facts of experience. Every other sentence in a work of literature which is endeavouring truly to interpret the facts of experience expresses differences in surrounding events due to the presence of some object. An object is ingredient throughout its neighbourhood, and its neighbourhood is indefinite. Also the modification of events by ingression is susceptible of quant.i.tative differences. Finally therefore we are driven to admit that each object is in some sense ingredient throughout nature; though its ingression may be quant.i.tatively irrelevant in the expression of our individual experiences.

This admission is not new either in philosophy or science. It is obviously a necessary axiom for those philosophers who insist that reality is a system. In these lectures we are keeping off the profound and vexed question as to what we mean by 'reality.' I am maintaining the humbler thesis that nature is a system. But I suppose that in this case the less follows from the greater, and that I may claim the support of these philosophers. The same doctrine is essentially interwoven in all modern physical speculation. As long ago as 1847 Faraday in a paper in the _Philosophical Magazine_ remarked that his theory of tubes of force implies that in a sense an electric charge is everywhere. The modification of the electromagnetic field at every point of s.p.a.ce at each instant owing to the past history of each electron is another way of stating the same fact. We can however ill.u.s.trate the doctrine by the more familiar facts of life without recourse to the abstruse speculations of theoretical physics.

The waves as they roll on to the Cornish coast tell of a gale in mid-Atlantic; and our dinner witnesses to the ingression of the cook into the dining room. It is evident that the ingression of objects into events includes the theory of causation. I prefer to neglect this aspect of ingression, because causation raises the memory of discussions based upon theories of nature which are alien to my own. Also I think that some new light may be thrown on the subject by viewing it in this fresh aspect.

The examples which I have given of the ingression of objects into events remind us that ingression takes a peculiar form in the case of some events; in a sense, it is a more concentrated form. For example, the electron has a certain position in s.p.a.ce and a certain shape. Perhaps it is an extremely small sphere in a certain test-tube. The storm is a gale situated in mid-Atlantic with a certain lat.i.tude and longitude, and the cook is in the kitchen. I will call this special form of ingression the 'relation of situation'; also, by a double use of the word 'situation,' I will call the event in which an object is situated 'the situation of the object.' Thus a situation is an event which is a relatum in the relation of situation. Now our first impression is that at last we have come to the simple plain fact of where the object really is; and that the vaguer relation which I call ingression should not be muddled up with the relation of situation, as if including it as a particular case. It seems so obvious that any object is in such and such a position, and that it is influencing other events in a totally different sense. Namely, in a sense an object is the character of the event which is its situation, but it only influences the character of other events. Accordingly the relations of situation and influencing are not generally the same sort of relation, and should not be subsumed under the same term 'ingression.' I believe that this notion is a mistake, and that it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between the two relations.

For example, Where was your toothache? You went to a dentist and pointed out the tooth to him. He p.r.o.nounced it perfectly sound, and cured you by stopping another tooth. Which tooth was the situation of the toothache?

Again, a man has an arm amputated, and experiences sensations in the hand which he has lost. The situation of the imaginary hand is in fact merely thin air. You look into a mirror and see a fire. The flames that you see are situated behind the mirror. Again at night you watch the sky; if some of the stars had vanished from existence hours ago, you would not be any the wiser. Even the situations of the planets differ from those which science would a.s.sign to them.

Anyhow you are tempted to exclaim, the cook is in the kitchen. If you mean her mind, I will not agree with you on the point; for I am only talking of nature. Let us think only of her bodily presence. What do you mean by this notion? We confine ourselves to typical manifestations of it. You can see her, touch her, and hear her. But the examples which I have given you show that the notions of the situations of what you see, what you touch, and what you hear are not so sharply separated out as to defy further questioning. You cannot cling to the idea that we have two sets of experiences of nature, one of primary qualities which belong to the objects perceived, and one of secondary qualities which are the products of our mental excitements. All we know of nature is in the same boat, to sink or swim together. The constructions of science are merely expositions of the characters of things perceived. Accordingly to affirm that the cook is a certain dance of molecules and electrons is merely to affirm that the things about her which are perceivable have certain characters. The situations of the perceived manifestations of her bodily presence have only a very general relation to the situations of the molecules, to be determined by discussion of the circ.u.mstances of perception.

In discussing the relations of situation in particular and of ingression in general, the first requisite is to note that objects are of radically different types. For each type 'situation' and 'ingression' have their own special meanings which are different from their meanings for other types, though connexions can be pointed out. It is necessary therefore in discussing them to determine what type of objects are under consideration. There are, I think, an indefinite number of types of objects. Happily we need not think of them all. The idea of situation has its peculiar importance in reference to three types of objects which I call sense-objects, perceptual objects and scientific objects. The suitability of these names for the three types is of minor importance, so long as I can succeed in explaining what I mean by them.

These three types form an ascending hierarchy, of which each member presupposes the type below. The base of the hierarchy is formed by the sense-objects. These objects do not presuppose any other type of objects. A sense-object is a factor of nature posited by sense-awareness which (i), in that it is an object, does not share in the pa.s.sage of nature and (ii) is not a relation between other factors of nature. It will of course be a relatum in relations which also implicate other factors of nature. But it is always a relatum and never the relation itself. Examples of sense-objects are a particular sort of colour, say Cambridge blue, or a particular sort of sound, or a particular sort of smell, or a particular sort of feeling. I am not talking of a particular patch of blue as seen during a particular second of time at a definite date. Such a patch is an event where Cambridge blue is situated.

Similarly I am not talking of any particular concert-room as filled with the note. I mean the note itself and not the patch of volume filled by the sound for a tenth of a second. It is natural for us to think of the note in itself, but in the case of colour we are apt to think of it merely as a property of the patch. No one thinks of the note as a property of the concert-room. We see the blue and we hear the note. Both the blue and the note are immediately posited by the discrimination of sense-awareness which relates the mind to nature. The blue is posited as in nature related to other factors in nature. In particular it is posited as in the relation of being situated in the event which is its situation.

The difficulties which cl.u.s.ter around the relation of situation arise from the obstinate refusal of philosophers to take seriously the ultimate fact of multiple relations. By a multiple relation I mean a relation which in any concrete instance of its occurrence necessarily involves more than two relata. For example, when John likes Thomas there are only two relata, John and Thomas. But when John gives that book to Thomas there are three relata, John, that book, and Thomas.

Some schools of philosophy, under the influence of the Aristotelian logic and the Aristotelian philosophy, endeavour to get on without admitting any relations at all except that of substance and attribute.

Namely all apparent relations are to be resolvable into the concurrent existence of substances with contrasted attributes. It is fairly obvious that the Leibnizian monadology is the necessary outcome of any such philosophy. If you dislike pluralism, there will be only one monad.

Other schools of philosophy admit relations but obstinately refuse to contemplate relations with more than two relata. I do not think that this limitation is based on any set purpose or theory. It merely arises from the fact that more complicated relations are a bother to people without adequate mathematical training, when they are admitted into the reasoning.

I must repeat that we have nothing to do in these lectures with the ultimate character of reality. It is quite possible that in the true philosophy of reality there are only individual substances with attributes, or that there are only relations with pairs of relata. I do not believe that such is the case; but I am not concerned to argue about it now. Our theme is Nature. So long as we confine ourselves to the factors posited in the sense-awareness of nature, it seems to me that there certainly are instances of multiple relations between these factors, and that the relation of situation for sense-objects is one example of such multiple relations.

Consider a blue coat, a flannel coat of Cambridge blue belonging to some athlete. The coat itself is a perceptual object and its situation is not what I am talking about. We are talking of someone's definite sense-awareness of Cambridge blue as situated in some event of nature.

He may be looking at the coat directly. He then sees Cambridge blue as situated practically in the same event as the coat at that instant. It is true that the blue which he sees is due to light which left the coat some inconceivably small fraction of a second before. This difference would be important if he were looking at a star whose colour was Cambridge blue. The star might have ceased to exist days ago, or even years ago. The situation of the blue will not then be very intimately connected with the situation (in another sense of 'situation') of any perceptual object. This disconnexion of the situation of the blue and the situation of some a.s.sociated perceptual object does not require a star for its exemplification. Any looking gla.s.s will suffice. Look at the coat through a looking gla.s.s. Then blue is seen as situated behind the mirror. The event which is its situation depends upon the position of the observer.

The sense-awareness of the blue as situated in a certain event which I call the situation, is thus exhibited as the sense-awareness of a relation between the blue, the percipient event of the observer, the situation, and intervening events. All nature is in fact required, though only certain intervening events require their characters to be of certain definite sorts. The ingression of blue into the events of nature is thus exhibited as systematically correlated. The awareness of the observer depends on the position of the percipient event in this systematic correlation. I will use the term 'ingression into nature' for this systematic correlation of the blue with nature. Thus the ingression of blue into any definite event is a part statement of the fact of the ingression of blue into nature.

In respect to the ingression of blue into nature events may be roughly put into four cla.s.ses which overlap and are not very clearly separated.

These cla.s.ses are (i) the percipient events, (ii) the situations, (iii) the active conditioning events, (iv) the pa.s.sive conditioning events. To understand this cla.s.sification of events in the general fact of the ingression of blue into nature, let us confine attention to one situation for one percipient event and to the consequent _roles_ of the conditioning events for the ingression as thus limited. The percipient event is the relevant bodily state of the observer. The situation is where he sees the blue, say, behind the mirror. The active conditioning events are the events whose characters are particularly relevant for the event (which is the situation) to be the situation for that percipient event, namely the coat, the mirror, and the state of the room as to light and atmosphere. The pa.s.sive conditioning events are the events of the rest of nature.