The British Navy Book Part 16

Individuals of the first-mentioned cla.s.s are intended to fight in large groups, that is to say, in fleet actions; those of the second cla.s.s are intended for solitary service, or, at any rate, to fight only in small groups; while those of the third are intended, according to the subdivision to which they belong, for a variety of special purposes." So writes Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge in his _Art of Naval Warfare_, and his definitions are clear and compact.

With the battleship cla.s.s we have already dealt, both as regards its evolution and present-day pitch of perfection; but want of s.p.a.ce has precluded any attempt to trace the evolution of the cruiser in the same way. It is therefore necessary, before going on to describe the cruisers of our modern navy, to glance, in the briefest possible manner, at their predecessors of days gone by. Perhaps we may take the viking _skuta_, or fast scouting vessel, as its first prototype, scouting being one of the most important duties of a cruiser. Possibly the galleys and balingers of mediaeval times may be regarded as the _skuta's_ successors, while the low-lying _Tiger_ and other ships of her cla.s.s in Tudor reigns may be considered as the immediate precursors of the famous frigates and corvettes which figured so largely and did such yeoman service in our eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century maritime campaigns. Our first frigates were the _Satisfaction_, _Adventure_, _Nonsuch_, _a.s.surance_, and _Constant Warwick_, all built in the year 1646; and from that time up to about 1870 a constant succession of ships of this useful type were added to the navy, the latest ones being, of course, steam frigates.

A frigate, according to an old work of 1771, was defined as "a light nimble ship built for the purposes of sailing swiftly. These vessels mount from twenty to thirty-eight guns, and are esteemed excellent _cruisers_." The name was derived from _fregata_, a Mediterranean vessel propelled both by sails and by oars. It is said the British navy was the first to adopt frigates for use in war, but the French, and afterwards the Americans, were generally successful in building the finest vessels of this cla.s.s. These ships were full-rigged, with three masts, and carried all their princ.i.p.al guns in one battery on the main deck. The corvette may be regarded as a smaller frigate, but was not square-rigged on her mizzen-mast, and carried her main battery on her upper deck. This later type of cruiser outlasted the frigate by some years, and the last of them, such as the _Opal_ and other corvettes of the "Jewel" cla.s.s, were very handsome vessels, though by no means so formidable as the pole-rigged cruisers which took their place.

The frigates in the old French War were considered "the eyes and ears of the fleet". They sought out and reported the enemy, they attacked his cruisers and commerce and protected our own, and fully justified their name and the general reputation for smartness which they were accorded.

The duties of our cruisers of to-day are of a very similar kind, although the invention of wireless telegraphy and the aeroplane has supplemented and to some extent superseded their scouting work.

As for what they have actually done, we have only to recollect the various incidents of the Great War as regards its aspects at sea. Acting in unison with those of France and j.a.pan, they have swept German commerce and German cruisers from the face of the ocean, and so far, except for sh.o.r.e bombardments and submarine attacks, have been the only war-vessels engaged on either side. At the time of writing no battleships have as yet been in action against one another, for we may regard all those ships which have been reported in action at sea as cruisers, from the big battle-cruiser _Lion_ down to the destroyers--and even, perhaps, our submarines, which are very useful scouts.

Cruisers proper in our navy are now officially cla.s.sed in three main divisions--"battle-cruisers", "cruisers", and "light cruisers", though a very short time ago they were subdivided into "armoured cruisers", "first-cla.s.s protected cruisers", "second-cla.s.s protected cruisers", "third-cla.s.s protected cruisers", "unarmoured cruisers", "lightly-armoured cruisers", and "scouts".

The battle-cruiser is a hybrid and, as this war has proved, a most useful war-vessel. She is not so heavily armed or armoured as a battleship of equivalent age, but has much greater speed. She is as big or bigger, and costs just about as much. Thus the _Lion_ was launched in the same year as the battleship _Orion_--1910. Note the comparison below:--

Thickest Displacement. Guns. Speed. Armour. Cost.

_Orion_ 22,300 Ten 135 in. 21 knots 12 in. 1,900,000 _Lion_ 26,350 Eight 135 in. 28 knots 10 in. 2,100,000

Thus it will be seen that of these two contemporary ships the battle-cruiser is the bigger, cost 200,000 more, has two less big guns, 2 inches less protection, but steams at least 7 knots faster than the battleship. Indeed, it is hard to say whether she is or is not, on the whole, the more useful ship, even as a battleship. The Admiralty and naval constructors would seem to incline to this opinion, for, as we have seen in the latest battleship--the _Queen Elizabeth_--two guns have been sacrificed for the sake of 4 knots more speed than the _Orion_.

The cruiser-battleship or battle-cruiser, then, not only has almost precisely the same appearance as a battleship, though probably of rather greater length, but has special battle duties as well as cruiser duties.

Thus, if working with battleships, it is her business to pursue an enemy's battle squadron in retreat, and, by bringing its rearmost ships to action, try to induce their consorts to stand by them till her own slower but more powerfully gunned consorts can come up and take a hand.

As for her cruising duties, we have had conspicuous examples during the course of the war, both as to the right and wrong way of such ships'

employment. The unexpected and opportune intervention of the _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ in the Falkland Islands battle, whose mere appearance convinced von Spee that his "game was up"; and the way in which Sir David Beatty was "on the spot" and swooped down on the German North Sea raiders, are both excellent examples of the way these formidable fighting-cruisers should be used. If you want to see "how not to do it" you have only got to consider the misuse of the _Goeben_ in the Mediterranean, where, after a useless bombardment of one or two not very important Algerian towns, she fled for shelter to the Dardanelles, instead of trying to break out into the Atlantic. It is claimed, of course, that, but for her appearance at Constantinople, Turkey would not have been drawn into the war on the side of Germany, but it is hard to believe that the long-pursued German intrigues in Turkey would have all gone for nothing without the arrival of the somewhat discredited _Goeben_. Nor was the use of battle-cruisers to bombard a few defenceless coast towns a sound method of strategy. As it was, they were within an ace of being lost--and for what result? Absolutely _nil_ from a military point of view. The battle-cruiser has a great future before it, and it does not seem unlikely that, now that the enormous advantages of high speed have been so clearly demonstrated, it will altogether supersede the slower and heavier armed and armoured battleship proper.

After battle-cruisers we come to cruisers. Our typical modern cruisers may be taken to be represented by the "_Defence_" and "_Achilles_"

cla.s.ses, the latest of which dates from 1909. The former cla.s.s have a displacement of 14,600 tons apiece, and carry four 92 and ten 75 guns.

The latter are about 1000 tons smaller, and have an armament of six 92 and four 75 guns. Both types have 6- to 8-inch armour, and about 23 knots speed. They are exceedingly smart-looking vessels, with their numerous turrets or gun-houses, four funnels, and two lightly-rigged masts. They sit comparatively low in the water, and present an appearance of both speed and war-like efficiency.

The "County" cla.s.s of cruisers, which immediately preceded those just mentioned, are considerably smaller, though to some minds but weakly gunned for their size. None of them have heavier guns than 75-inch, and most only 6-inch weapons. Neither have they a great deal of armour protection or an extraordinary high rate of speed. As none have been built within recent years, we may fairly a.s.sume that they are not considered quite what we want at the present time, though many or most of them have done excellent work in the present war. You will remember how the _Kent_ and _Cornwall_ fought at the battle off the Falklands.

The "Town" cla.s.s, of not much more than half the size, would appear to have superseded the "Counties", and they, too, have been very much in evidence in the hostilities which have been carried on afloat. The biggest of these are of 5400 tons displacement, and carry eight 6-inch guns, and as these are the latest cruisers built, with the exception of the monster battle-cruisers, it seems likely that it is not intended to have any cruisers of intermediate size. Big spa.r.s.ely-armoured cruisers, like the unfortunate _Good Hope_, which did not steam faster than smaller ones, and which carried but a poor armament considering her size and cost, cannot be considered a good investment. The "Town" cla.s.s have done splendidly in the war at sea. The _Birmingham_ had the distinction of sinking the first German submarine; the plucky little _Gloucester_ hung closely on the heels of the giant _Goeben_ and her consort the _Breslau_ during their flight to Constantinople, though one well-directed shot from the former would have put her out of action and probably sent her to the bottom. The _Glasgow_, _Carnarvon_, and _Bristol_ were of great use in the Falklands fight, the first-named having already fought against the heavy batteries of the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ off the coast of Chile, while later on she sank the Dresden; while the _Sydney_ won undying fame by defeating and driving on sh.o.r.e the notorious commerce-destroyer _Emden_.

Another distinctly modern type of cruiser is the "light cruiser", a fast unprotected vessel with light guns of 4-inch calibre, which has proved of immense value in the area of "liveliness" in the North Sea. The _Amphion_ opened the ball by sinking the German mine-layer _Konigin Luise_ at the very opening of hostilities, but was very soon after herself blown up by a mine the latter had laid. She, like her sisters, was almost exactly like a big destroyer in appearance. The "Saucy"

_Arethusa_ has proved a worthy descendant of the famous frigate after which she was named, and has more than once particularly distinguished herself, notably in the fight off Heligoland. But s.p.a.ce forbids more than the mere mention of the smallest cla.s.s of cruiser, the "scouts", of just under 3000 tons, which are also extremely useful little vessels, since it is necessary to give some account of destroyers and submarines.

The destroyer was originally built to "destroy" the torpedo-boat, which, from its small size, had its limitations in anything of a sea-way. The earliest torpedo-boats were ordinary steamboats, such as are carried by most ships of any size, fitted with a long spar with a tin of gun-cotton at the end of it, which could be run out some way over the bows. The idea was to approach an enemy's ship under cover of the darkness, lower the outer end of the spar with its "torpedo" below the water-line, place it in contact with the enemy's ship, and explode the charge by means of an electric current. This seems a crude way of going to work, but several ships have been sunk by its means, notably the Confederate ram _Albemarle_, which was attacked by Lieutenant Cushing of the United States navy in this way in the course of the Civil War in America.

Special boats were then made for this purpose, but the advent of the "Whitehead" automobile torpedo provided them with a much more formidable weapon. Naval powers built these "torpedo-boats" in considerable numbers, and they were considered such a menace to bigger ships that the destroyer, an almost exactly similar boat, but of larger size, was designed to cope with them. In point of fact it did destroy them, for it was found to be so much better an "all-round craft", not only for attacking torpedo-boats, but to act as one itself, that the smaller craft before long were entirely superseded by the destroyers. Beginning about 1897 with boats of about 180 tons, armed with 6-pounder guns, we have now improved our destroyers till at the present day our latest types are more than twice as big, and are armed with 4-inch guns, which give them a decided advantage over less heavily-gunned destroyers, as has been amply demonstrated in more than one encounter with German destroyers. The destroyer is used, generally speaking, for scouting purposes, and especially to attack an enemy's submarines, which, if caught at the surface, may be approached in a swift destroyer and sunk by gun-fire before they are able to dive, or, with luck, may even be rammed. Destroyers, too, may be used to attack at night as torpedo-boats, or even in the course of a naval action if a favourable opportunity offers; it will be remembered that the _Goliath_ was torpedoed by a Turkish destroyer.

"Vessels of stealth", as submarines have been called, have now taken the place of the obsolete torpedo-boat. The latter relied on torpedoing her enemy under cover of the darkness, but the submarine is most dangerous in day-time. At night it is almost impossible for her to find her target or to estimate the speed at which she is travelling if under way, without which knowledge it is extremely difficult to arrange for a torpedo to intercept her course unless fired at very close quarters indeed. As the particulars of our submarines are wisely kept secret, no more can be said about them than is already public property.

The "E" cla.s.s, our latest improved "Hollands", are 176 feet long, with a beam of a little over 22 feet, and have a displacement--when submerged--of 800 tons. When at the surface their heavy oil-engines, of something like 2000 horse-power, enable them to travel at a speed of from 16 to 20 knots. When under water the electric engines are brought into play, but owing to the increased friction and larger area of the vessel to be forced through the water the speed of the boat drops to 10 knots. Moreover, travelling at the most economical rate of speed, not more than 140 knots can be negotiated when submerged, while at the surface an "E" submarine can travel for no less than 5000 miles without refilling her oil-tanks.

These boats preserve the "porpoise" shape, are equipped with wireless apparatus, and provided with panoramic periscopes to enable them to sight their target when submerged. There is no necessity nowadays to describe the principle of a periscope, since little portable patterns of this optical instrument, of various types, made for use in the trenches, can be seen exposed for sale almost anywhere. But, of course, those in use on a submarine are of a large and highly perfected type. The conning-tower of the "E" boats is armoured, and they carry a couple of quick-firing guns of 3 inches calibre in recesses on their decks, closed in by folding doors. These little weapons can be quickly raised into position by an arrangement of hydraulic machinery, and by merely pressing a lever they sink down and are boxed in again in a second or two.[71] They are so mounted as to be able to fire at a very high elevation, in order to defend the boat against bomb-dropping air-ships or aeroplanes, but, of course, can be used against surface vessels in the same way as those of the German submarines, which have made several attempts to sink merchantmen. As a modern Whitehead has a range of something like 3 miles, travels at a speed of 50 miles an hour, and carries a heavy charge of high explosive in its head, we need not dwell on its formidable nature, which has been amply proved in the course of the war. It has also been equally proved that it is almost impossible for a submarine to torpedo a fast and well-handled vessel once it has located the position of its attacker.

[Ill.u.s.tration: _Photo. Cribb, Southsea_

THE BRITISH SUBMARINE _E 2_

It was a boat of this cla.s.s, _E9_, by which the German cruiser _Hela_ and a destroyer were sunk by Lieutenant Max Horton; and another, _E11_, specially distinguished herself at the Dardanelles.]

"The modern submarine has every comfort commensurate with the size and service of the vessel. The princ.i.p.al item making for comfort is, of course, properly-prepared food.... As time pa.s.sed, electric cooking-apparatus was installed. This was always subject to the many troubles inherent in early electrical heating-apparatus. However, the idea was a step in advance. To-day there is installed a well-arranged oven, four or five independent plates for cooking meats and vegetables, and an urn for keeping coffee constantly hot and on tap when cruising.

All of these things, though small in themselves, make for contentment in the crew."[72] Whether or not such cooking appliances are installed in our own submarines I am unable to say, but there is no doubt that everything necessary for the comfort of their crews has been provided by the Admiralty, and the boats themselves are very like the American submarines which are referred to above.

"Monitors" are novel vessels in our navy, and at present we have only three of them--the _Humber_, _Mersey_, and _Severn_--which were originally built for Brazil, but were acquired from their builders, Vickers, Maxim, & Co., immediately on the outbreak of war. They proved their usefulness by standing close insh.o.r.e and attacking the flank of the German advance on Nieuport in the fighting between that place and Ostend which took place in the autumn of 1914. Their light draught of water--under 9 feet--enabled them to do this, and rendered them very difficult targets for the German submarines, which, moreover, could not operate in such shoal water.

The appearance of the original _Monitor_ in the Civil War in America has already been referred to. The United States Navy had a considerable number of such vessels during and after that campaign. Russia also purchased several of a similar type. But for many years, if we except a few of an improved type which were built for the United States Navy between 1885 and 1895, they fell quite into disuse, except for river work. The Austrians have a small flotilla of such vessels on the Danube, and Brazil has had others for use on the Amazon before the ones we took over were ordered. It is, however, one would imagine, not without the bounds of probability that there may be some return to the shallow-draught "Monitor" type among the battleships of the future, as being less vulnerable to torpedo attack. A battleship design put forward some years ago by a Russian inventor, which he claimed to be nearly torpedo-proof, certainly approximated somewhat to a "Monitor".

The three "Monitors" which were added to our own navy as described, are of only 1200 tons displacement apiece. They are 265 feet long, with a beam of 49 feet, and have a speed of 11-1/2 knots only. But it is obvious that speed was of very secondary consideration for the purposes for which they were designed. They have thin armour-plating on their sides, and carry two 6-inch guns in a turret at the bows. Aft are a couple of 47-inch howitzers under revolving shields, while half a dozen machine-guns are mounted on their upper works. They are smart-looking little craft, with one funnel and a single military mast with a search-light platform.

Having described the various cla.s.ses of our fighting-ships, we may for a moment or two consider the subject of fighting tactics afloat. In the old sailing-ship days it was the object of the commander of a fighting-ship to get what was known as the "weather-gage" of his opponent. Put into sh.o.r.e-going English, this meant that, as far as possible, he kept his own ship between the direction of the wind and his enemy, which enabled him to manoeuvre more easily, close in upon him or not as he considered more advantageous to himself. The French were not so keen in seeking for the weather-gage, since in that position it was not so easy to break off the engagement and get away. This remark must not be necessarily taken as imputing any want of courage to our then gallant enemy, for whereas the Admiralty orders to our captains were to find the enemy and "sink, burn, or destroy" him, those given to the French naval officers impressed upon them that it was their first duty to save their ships. The result was that though as a general rule our sea-captains took the weather-gage whenever they could get it, there were some of them who, according to a pamphlet published in 1766, were fond of "engaging to leeward", to prevent an enemy from running away!

In fleet actions in Nelsonian times our object was to break the enemy's line in one or more places, and, having effected this, to set upon the broken portions with all the strength available and defeat them in detail. This was the principle followed so successfully at Trafalgar.

Of course the leading ships of our two lines suffered severely from the broadsides of the enemy as they approached him at right angles, but it must be remembered that the range and efficiency of the guns of those days was so limited that the leading and rear ships of the combined French and Spanish fleets could not damage any of our rear ships very much, nor even our leading ones. As for our own ships, we were prepared to take this preliminary pounding and not really to begin our offensive till we had broken their line and got within close range of that portion of their fleet we intended to destroy first. If, as at the Nile, the enemy foolishly chose to await our attack at anchor, it simplified matters for us pretty considerably. We could, as we did, move towards one end of their line at an angle on which we could exchange broadsides as we advanced on equal terms, and as soon as one-half of our ships had pa.s.sed the flank selected for attack, both halves altered course so as to move parallel to the line of anch.o.r.ed Frenchmen and engage half their line with a superiority of two to one. Each French ship had to fight two British ones, one on either side. The ships farther down the line could do nothing to a.s.sist them unless they weighed anchor, made sail, and broke their formation, and so simply lay there waiting their turn to be dealt with.

Steam has, of course, put all this cla.s.s of manoeuvring long out of date, though as long as naval warfare endures on this earth the main principle of attempting to take the enemy at a disadvantage must always remain. In the early days of ironclads there were various theories as to the best fighting-formations. There were advocates of "line ahead", that is to say, each ship following the other in "Indian file"; of "line abreast", in which ships advanced like a line of soldiers in "extended order", and which necessitated that each ship should have a very powerful "right ahead" fire; and various group formations. At the battle of Lissa, in 1866, practically the only fleet engagement during the ironclad period prior to the Chino-j.a.panese and Russo-j.a.panese wars, the victorious Austrians attacked the Italian fleet in a wedge-shaped formation; but they intended to use their rams and to fight at absolutely close quarters, a procedure which in the present days of long-range guns of tremendous power and extraordinary accuracy would be almost, if not quite, impossible. The ram, moreover, is now practically obsolete. In the naval actions in the Far East, to which reference has been made, the generally adopted battle-formation was that of "line ahead", the first of those explained above, and the ideal manoeuvre was considered to be what was known as "crossing the T"--that is to say, to get one's line of ships into such a position with regard to the enemy's line that, while his represented the perpendicular part of the "T", one's own would be in the place of the horizontal line forming the top of the letter: in fact, to be in the same relative position as were the enemy's fleet at Trafalgar to our advancing lines. With modern guns and gunnery the whole fleet could concentrate on and smash up the leading ships one after the other, those following in rear not being able to do very much to a.s.sist them. Obviously it is the object of every fleet commander to avoid being caught in this way. If he sees the enemy's line are steering so as to cross his course at right angles, he will alter course to one parallel to theirs. If within range, broadsides will doubtless be exchanged while pa.s.sing, but each opposing line will then try to turn and cross the enemy's "T" for him by pa.s.sing in rear of his line. Both will be awake to this manoeuvre, so that if the manoeuvre continues on normal lines the battle will resolve itself into two curved lines of ships chasing each other round the circ.u.mference of a circle.

But varieties of speed, the disabling of some ships, and the menace of destroyers or submarines will probably throw any such regular sequence entirely out of gear, and, other things being equal, victory will incline to the fleet whose commander is quickest to adapt its formation to meet the sudden emergencies of the fighting and to turn them to his own advantage. But he will not be able to do this unless his fleet is well drilled in manoeuvre, and at least as capable of carrying out his orders and signals with smartness and efficiency as that of the enemy.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Squadron in "Line on a Bearing" or "Bow and Quarter Line"

Observe the first position of the five battleships A, B, C, D, E (shaded). Each can fire right ahead, right astern, and on both broadsides. They are steering due west. Now suppose they all turn directly south. They will then be in similar formation, as indicated by a, b, c, d, e (unshaded).]

At the present time, perhaps what is known as the "line on a bearing"--i.e. compa.s.s bearing--or "bow and quarter line" as it is sometimes called, is the favourite formation, and there is a very great deal to be said in its favour. It is what is known as an "echelon"

formation when applied to the manoeuvres of soldiers. The word "echelon"

is derived from the French _ech.e.l.le_, a ladder, and the ships in this case are disposed in a way suggestive of the steps of a ladder or stair.

Thus, suppose the flagship leading, the next ship would follow her on a parallel course, not immediately in her wake but some way astern on her port or starboard quarter, the next in a corresponding position with regard to the second ship, and so on, as indicated in the annexed diagram.

If you look at this you will at once see its advantages over "line ahead". Every ship can bring its broadside to bear either to port or starboard, as in that formation, but, in addition, every ship can fire directly ahead or astern as well. If ships in "line ahead" all turn together to the right or left, or, to use the correct wording, alter course together eight points to starboard or port, only the leading and rear ship could use their broadsides, and only one of them at that. But a similar turn in "bow and quarter line" can be made without any loss of fire effect.

In the Great War we have not, at the time of writing, yet had a fleet action. The German Navy has shown itself most determined--to take no risks. It seems to be imbued with the principles impressed by the French Government on its sea commanders in the old wars with us.[73] Never, on any account, are ships to be hazarded against superior force, or, in other words, the ships of the "admiral of the Atlantic" are not to fight unless in very superior force to their antagonists, as was the case in the action off Chile. The German squadron, starting out on the second raid on our coasts, no sooner clapped eyes on Admiral Beatty's ships--which only numbered one more ship than the German squadron--than it turned tail and made off for all it was worth. So the British had no chance of crossing the "T", or of any manoeuvre other than a stern chase. Such a chase is proverbially a long one, but in this case it was long enough to enable our seamen and marines to sink one German and badly damage at least two others, who only got away "by the skin of their teeth", thanks to the intervention of their mine-fields and submarines.

FOOTNOTES:

[68] Engineer-Commander Chas. E. Eldred, R.N., _Everybody's Book of the Navy_.

[69] "The Progress of Dreadnoughts", _Journal of Commerce_, 4th March, 1915.

[70] "Your Navy as a Fighting Machine." Fred. T. Jane.

[71] Particulars from _Submarines, Mines, and Torpedoes in the War_. C.

W. Domville Fife.

[72] Paper by Lieutenant C. N. Hinkamp, United States Navy, reprinted in _Journal of Commerce_, 29th April, 1915.

[73] German ships, by the way, are often provided with a heavier astern fire than a forward one, so that apparently they have long decided to fight a retreating action. The opposite system is pursued in our navy.