The Black Phalanx Part 43

"At 1:30 P. M. the firing had almost ceased and the Federals, overcome with heat, did not expect an attack.

Saunders formed his brigade and moved quietly up the side of the ravine. Hardly a word was spoken, for the Alabamians expected to die or retake that salient. The eye of General Lee was fixed on them. When they caught sight of the works their old feelings came back to them and yell they must.

With the fury of a whirlwind they rushed upon the line they had been ordered to take. The movement was so unexpected and so quickly executed that only one sh.e.l.l was thrown into the brigade. The works gained, they found the enemy on the other side. It was stated that Lee, speaking to Beauregard, said: 'Splendid!' Beauregard spoke with enthusiasm of the brilliant charge.

"In an instant the Federal army was aroused, and batteries opened along the whole line, while the infantry fire was a continuous roar. Only a breastwork divided Wilc.o.x's Brigade from the Federals. A moment was required for Saunders to reform, and his brigade mounted the inner line and forced the enemy backwards to the outer line and the crater. The crater was full of white and negro soldiers. The Confederates, surrounding it on every side, poured volley after volley into this heaped-up ma.s.s of terrified negroes and their brave officers. The negroes ran in every direction and were shot down without a thought. Bayonets, swords and the b.u.t.ts of muskets were used. The deafening roar of artillery and musketry, the yells and imprecations of the combatants, drowned the commands of officers. A negro in the crater attempted to raise a white flag, and it was instantly pulled down by a Federal officer. The Federal colors were planted on a huge lump of dirt, and waved until Sergeant Wallace, of the Eleventh Alabama, followed by others, seized them and tore them from the staff. Instantly a white flag was raised, and the living, who were not many, surrendered.

The crater was won."

With the exception of General Burnside, no commander of the Army of the Potomac was in favor of the Phalanx partic.i.p.ating in a battle. What, then, had the Phalanx to expect of those to whom they had borne the relation of _slave_? The confederates had a right to expect hard fighting when they met the Phalanx, and the Phalanx knew they had to fight hard when they met the confederates. It was the previous a.s.sociations and habits of the negro that kept him from retaliating for the several ma.s.sacres that had been perpetrated upon his brother-soldiers. It was not for a want of courage to do it: it was only necessary for those who commanded them to have ordered it, and they would never have taken a confederate prisoner.

Many of those who commanded them needed but public opinion to sustain them, to give such an order as would have made every battle between the Phalanx and the confederates b.l.o.o.d.y and inhuman. It was but the enlightened sentiment of the North, the religious teaching of the brotherhood of man, the high character and moral training of the statesmen on the side of the Union, that restrained the Phalanx from retaliation, else they possessed none of the characteristics of a courageous, sensitive and high tempered people. The negro is not naturally docile; his surroundings, rather than his nature, have given him the trait; it is not naturally his, but something which his trainers have given him; and it is not a difficult task to untrain him and advance him beyond his apparent unconsciousness of self-duty and self-preservation. Let him feel that he is to be supported in any transaction uncommon to him, and he can act as aggressively as any race of men who are naturally quicker in temperament. It is this characteristic that made the negro what General Grant said he was: in discipline a better soldier than the white man. It was said that he would not fight: there is no man in the South who met him on the battle-field that will say so now.

These are a few of the thoughts that came to me as I listened for an hour, one evening in June, 1883, to the confederate Gen. Mahone, whose acquaintance the writer enjoys, reciting the story of the fight at the crater, where the negro met the confederate, and in a hand-to-hand struggle one showed as much brute courage as the other. It would not be doing the negro justice to accord him less, and yet that courage never led him to acts of inhumanity. It is preferable that the confederates themselves should tell the stories of their butcheries than for me to attempt them. Not the stories told at the time, but fifteen years afterward, when men could reflect and write more correctly. There is one, an orator, who has described the fight, whose reference to the crater so gladdened the hearts of his audience that they reproduced the "yell," and yelled themselves hoa.r.s.e. No battle fought during the war, not even that of Bull Run, elicited so much comment and glorification among the confederates as that of the crater. It was the bloodiest fight on the soil of the Old Dominion, and has been the subject of praise by poets and orators upon the confederate side. Capt. J. B. Hope eulogized "Mahone's brigade" in true Southern verse. Capt. McCabe, on the 1st of November, 1876, in his oration before the "a.s.sociation of the Army of Northern Virginia," in narrating the recapture of the works, said:

"It was now 8 o'clock in the morning. The rest of Potter's (Federal) division moved out slowly, when Ferrero's negro division, the men, beyond question, inflamed with drink, (there are many officers and men, myself among the number, who will testify to this), burst from the advanced lines, cheering vehemently, pa.s.sed at a double quick over a crest under a heavy fire, and rushed with scarcely a check over the heads of the white troops in the crater, spread to their right, and captured more than two hundred prisoners and one stand of colors. At the same time Turner, of the Tenth corps, pushed forward a brigade over the Ninth Corps'

parapet, seized the Confederate line still further to the north, and quickly dispersed the remaining brigades of his division to confirm his successes."

The truth is over-reached in the statement of this orator if he intended to convey the idea that the men of the Phalanx division were drunk from strong drink; but it may be looked upon as an excuse offered for the treatment the courageous negro soldiers received at the hands of their captors, who, worse than enraged by strong drink, gave the battle-cry on their way to the front, "_No quarter to n.i.g.g.e.rs!_" This has been admitted by those in a position, at the time, to know what went on. In his "Recollections of the Recapture of the Lines," Colonel Stewart of the 61st Virginia Regiment, says:

"When nearly opposite the portions of our works held by the Federal troops, we met several soldiers who were in the works at the time of the explosion. Our men began ridiculing them for going to the rear, when one of them remarked, 'Ah, boys, you have got hot work ahead,--they are negroes, and show no quarter.' This was the first intimation we had that we were to fight negro troops, and it seemed to _infuse_ the little band with impetuous daring, as they pressed toward the fray. I never felt more like fighting in my life. Our comrades had been slaughtered in a most inhuman and brutal manner, and slaves were trampling over their mangled and bleeding corpses. Revenge must have fired every heart, and strung every arm with nerves of steel, for the herculean task of blood."

On the Monday morning after the a.s.sault of Sat.u.r.day, the Richmond _Enquirer_ said:

"Grant's war cry of 'no quarter' shouted by his negro soldiers, was returned with interest, we regret to hear, not so heavily as ought to have been, since some negroes were captured instead of being shot. Let every salient we are called upon to defend, be a Fort Pillow, and butcher every negro that Grant hurls against our brave troops, and permit them not to soil their hands, with the capture of one negro."

There is no truth in the statement. No such cry was ever made by negro soldiers; and when it is remembered that the confederate congress, in four short months after this declaration, began arming slaves for the defense of Richmond, it is readily seen how deep and with what sincerity such declarations were made. The Southern historian Pollard thus describes the situation after the a.s.sault and the ground had again come into the possession of the confederates:

[ILl.u.s.tRATION: BEFORE PETERSBURG.

Phalanx soldiers, under a flag of truce, burying their dead after one of the terrible battles before Petersburg.]

"The ground all around was dotted with the fallen, while the sides and bottom of the crater were literally lined with dead, the bodies lying in every conceivable position. Some had evidently been killed with the b.u.t.ts of muskets, as their crushed skulls and badly smashed faces too plainly indicated.' Within this crater--this hole of forty by eighty feet--were lying one hundred and thirty-six dead soldiers, besides the wounded. The soil was literally saturated with blood. General Bartlett was here, with his steel leg broken.

He did not look as though he had been at a 'diamond wedding,' but was present at a 'dance of death.' A covered way for artillery was so full of dead that details were made to throw them out, that artillery might be brought in. The dead bodies formed a heap on each side. The Alabamians captured thirty-four officers, five hundred and thirty-six white and one hundred and thirty-nine colored soldiers. The three brigades had seventeen stands of colors, held by seventeen as brave, sweaty, dirty, powder-stained fellows as ever wore the gray, who knew that, when presenting their colors to division headquarters, to each a furlough of thirty days would be granted.

"The crater was filled with wounded, to whom our men gave water. Adjutant Morgan Cleveland, of the 8th Alabama Regiment, a.s.sisted a federal captain who was mortally wounded and suffering intensely. Near him lay a burly, wounded negro. The officer said he would die. The negro, raising himself on his elbow, cried out: 'Thank G.o.d. You killed my brother when we charged, because he was afraid and ran. Now the rebels have killed you.' Death soon ended the suffering of one and the hatred of the other. A darkness came down on the battle-field and the victors began to repair the salient. The crater was cleared of the dead and wounded. Men were found buried ten feet under the dirt.

Twenty-two of the artillery company were missing. Four hundred and ninety-eight dead and wounded confederates were buried or sent to the hospitals. Between the lines lay hundreds of wounded federals, who vainly called for water.

These men had been without water since early morning. Some calling louder than others, their voices were recognized, and as their cries grew fainter, we knew their lives were ebbing away. Our men, risking their lives, carried water to some.

"I find in my diary these lines: 'Sunday, July 31, 1864.

Everything comparatively quiet along the lines. Hundreds of federal soldiers are lying in front of the crater exposed to a scorching sun; some are crying for water. The enemy's fire is too heavy for a soldier to expose himself.' Late on Sunday evening a flag of truce was sent in and forwarded to General Lee. General Grant had asked permission to bury his dead and remove his wounded. The truce was granted, to begin on Monday at 5 A. M. and conclude at 9 A. M. Punctual to the hour the federal details came on the field and by 9 A. M.

had buried about three hundred. The work was hardly begun and the truce was extended. Hour after hour was granted until it was evening before the field was cleared."

With these selections from the ma.s.s of confederate testimony before us, of their "daring, b.l.o.o.d.y work," given by partic.i.p.ants, it is well to read some of the statements of those who battled for the Union on that occasion.

Many of the correspondents at the seat of war, ignorant of the real facts regarding the a.s.sault, attributed the failure, not to General Meade's interference with General Burnside's plan, but to the Phalanx division, the men who bore the brunt of the battle and gained for themselves a fame for desperate fighting. But some of those who _were_ acquainted with the facts have left records that tell the true story and give honor to whom honor is due. Gen. Grant is among the number; he perfectly understood the whole matter, knew that General Burnside, not being allowed to carry out his own plans, but at the last moment compelled to act contrary to his judgment, could not fight with that enthusiasm and confidence that he would have done had he been allowed to carry out his own ideas. In his "Memoirs," General Grant gives an account of the explosion of the mine and the a.s.sault after placing the blame for the "stupendous failure" where it belongs. I quote a few preliminary words which not only intimate where the trouble lies, but gives the key to the whole matter. Speaking of General Burnside's command, he says:

"The four divisions of his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Wilc.o.x, Ledlie and Ferrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to make the a.s.sault.

Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took Ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been.

* * * * Ledlie, besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualifications less common among soldiers."

A correspondent of the New York _Evening Post_ says:

"We have been continually notified for the last fortnight, that our sappers were mining the enemy's position. As soon as ready, our division was to storm the works on its explosion. This rumor had spread so wide we had no faith in it. On the night of the 29th, we were in a position on the extreme left. We were drawn in about nine P. M., and marched to General Burnside's headquarters, and closed in ma.s.s by division, left in front. We there received official notice that the long-looked-for mine was ready charged, and would be fired at daylight next morning. The plan of storming was as follows: One division of white troops was to charge the works immediately after the explosion, and carry the first and second lines of rebel intrenchments. Our division was to follow immediately, and push right into Petersburg, take the city, and be supported by the remainder of the Ninth and Twenty-eighth corps. We were up bright and early, ready and eager for the struggle to commence. I had been wishing for something of this sort to do for some time, to gain the respect of the Army of the Potomac. You know their former prejudices. At thirty minutes after five, the ball opened.

The mine, with some fifty pieces of artillery, went off almost instantaneously; at the same time, the white troops, according to the plan, charged the fort, which they carried, for there was nothing to oppose them; but they did not succeed in carrying either of the lines of intrenchments.

"We were held in rear until the development of the movement of the white troops; but, on seeing the disaster which was about to occur, we pushed in by the flank (for we could go in in no other way to allow us to get in position); so you see on this failure we had nothing to do but gain by the flank. A charge in that manner has never proved successful, to my knowledge; when it does, it is a surprise.

"Our men went forward with enthusiasm equal to anything under different circ.u.mstances; but, in going through the fort that had been blown up, the pa.s.sage was almost impeded by obstacles thrown up by the explosion. At the same time, we were receiving a most deadly cross-fire from both flanks.

At this time, our lieutenant-colonel (E. W. Ross) fell, shot through the left leg, bravely leading the men. I immediately a.s.sumed command, but only to hold it a few minutes, when I fell, struck by a piece of sh.e.l.l in the side. Capt.

Robinson, from Connecticut, then took command; and, from all we can learn, he was killed. At this time, our first charge was somewhat checked, and the men sought cover in the works.

Again our charge was made, but, like the former, unsuccessful. This was followed by the enemy making a charge. Seeing the unorganized condition and the great loss of officers, the men fell back to our own works. Yet a large number still held the fort until two P. M., when the enemy charged again, and carried it. That ended the great attempt to take Petersburg.

"It will be thus seen that the colored troops did not compose the first a.s.saulting, but the supporting column; and they were not ordered forward until white troops in greater numbers had made a desperate effort to carry the rebel works, and had failed. Then the colored troops were sent in; moved over the broken ground, and up the slope, and within a short distance of the parapet, in order, and with steady courage; but finally broke and retreated under the same fire which just before had sent a whole division of white regiments to the right-about. If there be any disgrace in that, it does not belong exclusively nor mainly to the negroes. A second attack is far more perilous and unlikely to succeed than a first; the enemy having been encouraged by the failure of the first, and had time to concentrate his forces. And, in this case, there seems to have been a fatal delay in ordering both the first and second a.s.sault."

An officer in the same engagement says:

"In regard to the bravery of the colored troops, although I have been in upwards of twenty battles, I never saw so many cases of gallantry. The 'crater,' where we were halted, was a perfect slaughter-pen. Had not 'some one blundered,' but moved us up at daylight, instead of eight o'clock, we should have been crowned with success, instead of being cut to pieces by a terrific enfilading fire, and finally forced from the field in a panic. We had no trouble in rallying the troops and moving them into the rifle-pits; and, in one hour after the rout I had nearly as many men together as were left unhurt.

"I was never under such a terrific fire, and can hardly realize how any escaped alive. Our loss was heavy. In the Twenty-eighth (colored) for instance, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Russell (a Bostonian), he lost seven officers out of eleven, and ninety-one men out of two hundred and twenty-four; and the colonel himself was knocked over senseless, for a few minutes, by a slight wound in the head; both his color-sergeants and all his color-guard were killed. Col. Bross, of the Twenty-ninth, was killed outright, and nearly every one of his officers. .h.i.t. This was nearly equal to Bunker Hill. Col. Ross, of the Thirty-first, lost his leg. The Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth (colored), all charged over the works; climbing up an earthwork six feet high, then down into a ditch, and up on the other side, all the time under the severest fire in front and flank. Not being supported, of course the storming party fell back. I have seen white troops run faster than these blacks did, when in not half so tight a place. Our brigade lost thirty-six prisoners, all cut off after leaving the 'crater.' My faith in colored troops is not abated one jot.'"

The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated the affair, before which General Grant testified. He was severe upon General Ledlie, whom he regarded as an inefficient officer; he blamed himself for allowing that officer to lead the a.s.sault. General Grant also testified:

"General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in front; I believe if he had done so it would have been a success."

On the morning of the 13th of August, 1864, a brigade of the Phalanx, consisting of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 29th Regiments, crossed from Bermuda Hundreds to the north side of the James river, on pontoons, near Jones'

landing, and bivouacked for the night. General Grant was led to believe that General Lee had sent a portion of his troops, at least three divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, from the front of Petersburg, to re-enforce Gen. Early, then operating in the valley. Consequently he thought it a favorable opportunity to threaten Richmond, and ordered Hanc.o.c.k with the 2nd, and Birney with a part of the 10th Corps, with Gregg's Cavalry, to attack the confederate works on the north side of the James. The object was two-fold: to prevent Lee from re-enforcing Early, confronted by Sheridan's troops; and likewise to drive the confederates from out their works. The troops crossed the James on the 13th, the 2d Corps going to Deep Bottom by transports, the other troops crossing the river by pontoons, and advancing, found the enemy in force.

Several spirited engagements took place, after which the main forces withdrew again across the river, to the front of Petersburg. The following account applies to the brigade as well as the 7th Phalanx Regiment, from whose record it is extracted:

"During the forenoon of the 14th the (7th) Regiment acted as reserve, moving forward occasionally as the line advanced.

Most of the work of the day was done to the right, little being done in the immediate front except skirmishing. About 5 P. M. a portion of the Seventh and Ninth, forming line in the edge of some timber, moved across an open field and charged upon reaching the farther side and captured the enemy's line of rifle-pits. The companies of the Seventh pushed on some distance further toward their second line, but were met with so severe a fire that they fell back to the captured line; which was held. This charge, known as the action of Kingsland Road, was made in fine style. The battalion of the Seventh was commanded by Capt. Weiss--Col.

Shaw having been detailed as Corps Officer of the day, and Lieut.-Col. Haskell being temporarily in command of the brigade. Our losses were two men killed, and one officer (Lieut. Eler) and thirty-two men wounded.

"About 10 o'clock P. M., the troops moved down the road to the right, and at 1 o'clock Col. Shaw withdrew the pickets of the corps, re-crossed the pontoons, where we had crossed in the morning, and moved down the neck. Then followed four hours of the most wearisome night-marching--moving a few rods at a time and then halting for troops ahead to get out of the way; losing sight of them and hurrying forward to catch up; straggling out into the darkness, stumbling and groping along the rough road, and all the time the rain coming down in a most provoking, exasperating drizzle. About daylight crossed back to the north side and halted for coffee, and then moved forward some four miles and rejoined the corps, taking position behind the crest of a hill. The Eighth and Twenty-ninth were left in a work on the hill.

"About 3:30 P. M. orders came to pile knapsacks and be ready to march immediately. A little after 4 o'clock the brigade moved to the right, some three-quarters of a mile, into an open cornfield, and, after halting a few moments, turned down a road through the woods to the left with Gen. Wm.

Birney, who ordered Col. Shaw to throw out skirmishers and advance with his brigade down a road which he pointed out, find the enemy and attack vigorously, and then rode away.

Finding the road turning to the left, Col. Shaw sent word to Gen. Birney that the designated road would probably bring him back on our own line. The order came back from Gen.

Birney to go ahead. The road still bearing to the left, word was again sent that we should strike our own line if we continued to advance in the direction we were going. A second time the answer came to move on. A third messenger having brought from Gen. Birney the same reply, Col. Shaw decided to disobey the order and call in the skirmishers.

Before it could be done firing commenced and continued briskly for several minutes, before the men recognized each other, and it was discovered that we had been firing into our own Second Brigade--Col. Osborn's. This sad affair, which would not have occurred had Col Shaw's caution been heeded, resulted in the killing of the lieutenant commanding the picket-line and the wounding of many men on both sides.

After this _fiasco_ the brigade moved out into the cornfield, where it had halted earlier in the day, and bivouacked for the night. The regiment had been more or less exposed all day to sh.e.l.l-fire, but lost from it only four or five men wounded, in addition to the ten or twelve men wounded in the skirmish with Osborn's brigade.

"Early on the morning of the 16th, the regiment marched back to its knapsacks and halted for breakfast. About 10 o'clock it was ordered out to support two batteries, and remained on this duty until 3 P. M., changing position frequently, in the meantime Gen. Terry, with the First Division of the Tenth Corps, had charged the rebel line, near Fuzzel's mills, and captured it, together with three colors and some three hundred prisoners. But the enemy rallied, and with reinforcements, soon compelled Gen. Terry to relinquish the captured line. About dark Gen. Wm. Birney came up, and taking the left wing of the Seventh--the right wing, under Col. Shaw, was in support of a battery--and two companies of the Ninth, placed them under command of Lieut.-Col. Haskell, and ordered him with this handful of men to take an earthwork in his front which a division a short time before had failed to carry. The timely arrival of Gen. Terry put an end to this mad scheme. The regiment lost during the day eight or ten men wounded.

"The general results of the day's fighting had been unsatisfactory, for not only had Terry's attack failed in its object, but the advance on the right, along the Charles City road, by the troops of the Second Corps and Gregg's cavalry division, had been equally unsuccessful. The rebel General Chambliss was among the killed.

"About 2:30 A. M. of the 17th, the left wing of the regiment was sent back to a line of rifle-pits that had been thrown up some two hundred yards to the rear, where it was joined by the right wing in the morning after breakfast.

Picket-firing continued during the day and heavy artillery firing was heard in the direction of Petersburg. At 4 P. M.

a flag of truce was sent out and two hours given to bring in the dead from between the lines. Gen. Chambliss' body was delivered, and we received that of Capt. Williams, of the Thirty-ninth Illinois. Early in the evening the regiment was ordered on picket. Considerable picket-firing occurred during the night and day, the men being with difficulty restrained from it. We were relieved about noon of the 18th by the One Hundred and Fifteenth New York and Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania. * * *

"Early in the morning the Eighth and the Twenty-ninth Connecticut rejoined the regiment, and after the regiment was relieved from picket, it, with the Twenty-ninth, fell back a quarter of a mile, leaving the Eighth and Ninth on the line. Rations having been drawn, the men got supper and prepared for a good night's sleep. Suddenly a heavy musketry fire broke out toward the left which rapidly extended to the right and the entire line was soon under fire. The regiment moved forward at double-quick, but by the time it reached the front and formed line, darkness set in and the enemy fell back. About 11 P. M. our forces were withdrawn, and, after several hours spent in marching and halting, the regiment went into camp two miles from the pontoons. Here it lay all day of the 19th. The following congratulatory order was received from corps headquarters, in which the brigade was spoken of in very flattering terms by Maj.-Gen. D. B.

Birney, commanding: