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"Capt. H. C. Seaman was about the same time commissioned with like authority for that portion of Kansas lying south of the Kansas river.
The work of recruiting went forward with rapidity, the intelligent portion of the colored people entering into the work heartily, and evincing by their actions a willing readiness to link their future and share the perils with their white brethren in the war of the rebellion, which then waged with such violence as to seriously threaten the nationality and life of the Republic.
"Within sixty days five hundred men were recruited and placed in camp, and a request made that a battallion be mustered into the United States service. This request was not complied with, and the reasons a.s.signed were wholly unsatisfactory, yet accompanied with a.s.surances of such a nature as to warrant the belief that but a short time would elapse ere the request would be complied with.
"In the meantime complications with the civil authorities in the Northern District had arisen, which at one time threatened serious results. These complications originated from the following causes, each affecting different cla.s.ses:
"1st.--An active sympathy with the rebellion.
"2nd.--An intolerant prejudice against the colored race, which would deny them the honorable position in society which every soldier is ent.i.tled to, even though he gained that position at the risk of his life in the cause of the nation, which could ill afford to refuse genuine sympathy and support from any quarter.
"3rd.--On the part of a few genuine loyalists who believed that this attempt to enlist colored men would not be approved by the War Department, and that the true interests of the colored man demanded that their time should not be vainly spent in the effort.
"4th.--A large cla.s.s who believed that the negro did not possess the necessary qualifications to make efficient soldiers, and that consequently the experiment would result in defeat, disaster and disgrace.
"Col. Williams, acting under the orders of his military superiors felt that it was no part of his duty to take council of any or all of these cla.s.ses. He saw no course for him to pursue but to follow his instructions to the letter. Consequently, when the civil authorities placed themselves in direct opposition to those of the military, by arresting and confining the men of the command on the most frivolous charges, and indicting their commanders for crime, such as unlawfully restraining persons of their liberty, &c., by enforcing proper military discipline, he ignored the right of the civil authorities to interfere with his military actions in a military capacity and under proper authority.
"On the 28th of October, 1862, a command consisting of detachments from Captain Seaman's and Captain William's recruits, were moved and camped near Butler. This command--about two hundred and twenty-five men, under Captain Seaman,--was attacked by a confederate force of about five hundred, commanded by Colonel c.o.c.krell but after a severe engagement the enemy was defeated with considerable loss. The negro loss was ten killed and twelve wounded, including Captain A. J. Crew; a gallant young officer, being among the first mentioned. The next morning the command was re-enforced by a few recruits under command of Captain J. M.
Williams, when the enemy was pursued a considerable distance but without further fighting. This is supposed to have been the first engagement in the war in which colored troops were actually engaged. The work of recruiting, drilling and disciplining the regiment was continued under the adverse circ.u.mstances until the 13th of January, 1863, when a battallion of six companies, formed by the consolidation of Colonel Williams' recruits with those of Captain Seaman, was mustered into the U. S. service by Lieutenant Sabin, of the regular army. Between January 13th and May 2nd, 1863, the other four companies were organized, when the regimental organization was completed, appears by the roster of the regiment.
[Ill.u.s.tration: PHALANX SOLDIERS REPELLING AN ATTACK.]
"Immediately after its organization, the regiment was ordered to Baxter Springs, where it arrived in May, 1863, and the work of drilling the regiment was vigorously prosecuted.
"Parts of two companies of the regiment, and a detachment of cavalry, and one piece of artillery, made a diversion on Shawnee, Mo. attacked and dispersed a small opposing force and captured five prisoners.
"While encamped here, on the 18th of May, a foraging party, consisting of twenty-five men from the Phalanx regiment and twenty men of the 2nd Kansas Battery, Major R. G. Ward commanding, was sent into Jasper County, Mo. This party was surprised and attacked by a force of three hundred confederates commanded by Major Livingston, and defeated, with a loss of sixteen killed and five prisoners, three of which belonged to the 2nd Kansas Battery and two of the black regiment. The men of the 2nd Kansas Battery were afterwards exchanged under a flag of truce for a like number of prisoners captured by the negro regiment. Livingston refused to exchange the black prisoners in his possession, and gave as his excuse that he should hold them subject to the orders of the confederate War Department. Shortly after this Col. Williams received information that one of the prisoners held by Livingston had been murdered by the enemy. He immediately sent a flag of truce to Livingston demanding the body of the person who committed the barbarous act.
Receiving an evasive and unsatisfactory reply, Col. Williams determined to convince the Major that was a game at which two could play, and directed that one of the prisoners in his possession be shot, and within thirty minutes the order was executed. He immediately informed Major Livingston of his action, sending the information by the same party that brought the despatch to him. Suffice it to say that this ended the barbarous practice of murdering prisoners of war, so far as Livingston's command was concerned.
"Colonel Williams says:
'I visited the scene of this engagement the morning after its occurrence, and for the first time beheld the horrible evidences of the demoniac spirit of these rebel fiends in their treatment of our dead and wounded. Men were found with their brains beaten out with clubs, and the b.l.o.o.d.y weapons left by their sides and their bodies most horribly mutilated.'
"It was afterwards ascertained that the force who attacked this foraging party consisted partially of citizens of the neighborhood, who, while enjoying the protection of our armies, had collected together to a.s.sist the rebel forces in this attack. Colonel Williams directed that the region of country within a radius of five miles from the scene of conflict should be devastated, and is of opinion that this effectually prevented a like occurrence in the same neighborhood.
"Subsequently, while on this expedition, the command captured a prisoner in arms who had upon his person the evidence of having been paroled by the commanding officer at Fort Scott, Kansas, he was shot on the spot.
"The regiment remained in camp at Baxter Springs until the 27th of June, 1863, when it struck tents and marched for Fort Gibson in connection with a large supply train from Fort Scott _en route_ to the former place.
"Colonel Williams had received information that satisfied him that the train would be attacked in the neighborhood of Cabin Creek, Cherokee Nation. He communicated this information to Lieutenant-Colonel Dodd, of the 2nd Colorado Infantry, who was in command of the escort, and volunteered to move his regiment in such manner as would be serviceable in case the expected attack should be made. The escort proper to the train consisted of six companies of the 2nd Colorado Infantry, a detachment of three companies of cavalry from the 6th and 9th Kansas, and one section of the 2nd Kansas Battery. This force was joined, on the 28th of June, by three hundred men from the Indian Brigade, commanded by Major Foreman, making altogether a force of about eight hundred effective men.
"On arriving at Cabin Creek, July 1st, 1863, the rebels were met in force--under command of Gen. Cooper. Some skirmishing occurred on that day, when it was ascertained that the enemy occupied a strong position on the south bank of the creek, and upon trial it was found that the stream was not fordable for infantry, on account of a recent shower, but it was supposed that the swollen current would have sufficiently subsided by the next morning to allow the infantry to cross. The regiment then took a strong position on the north side of the stream and camped for the night. After a consultation of officers, it was agreed that the train should be parked in the open prairie and guarded by three companies of the 2nd Colorado and a detachment of one hundred men of the 1st Colorado, and that the balance of the troops, Col. Williams commanding, should engage the enemy and drive him from his position.
"Accordingly, the next morning, July 2nd, 1863, the command moved, which consisted of the 1st Kansas Volunteer Colored Infantry, three companies of the 2nd Colorado Infantry, commanded by the gallant Major Smith, of that regiment, the detachments of cavalry and Indian troops before mentioned and four pieces of artillery, making altogether a force of about twelve hundred men. With this force, after an engagement of two hours duration, the enemy was dislodged and driven from his position in great disorder, with a loss of one hundred killed and wounded and eight prisoners. The loss on our side was eight killed and twenty-five wounded, including Major Foreman, who was shot from his horse while attempting to lead his men across the creek under the fire of the enemy, and Captain Ethan Earl, of the 1st Colored, who was wounded at the head of his company. This was the first battle in which the whole regiment had been engaged, and here they evinced a coolness and true soldiery spirit which inspired the officers in command with that confidence which subsequent battle scenes satisfactorily proved was not unfounded.
"The road being now open, the entire command proceeded to Fort Gibson, where it arrived on the evening of the 5th of July, 1863. On the 16th of July the entire force at Fort Gibson, under command of Gen. Blunt, moved upon the enemy, about six thousand strong, commanded by Gen. Cooper, and encamped at Honey Springs, twenty miles south of Fort Gibson. Our forces came upon the enemy on the morning of the 17th of July, and after a sharp and b.l.o.o.d.y engagement of two hours' duration, the enemy was totally defeated, with a loss of four hundred killed and wounded, and one hundred prisoners. At the height of the engagement, Gen. Blunt ordered Colonel Williams to move his regiment against that portion of the enemy's line held by the 29th and 30th Texas regiments and a rebel battery, with directions to charge them if he thought he could carry and hold the position. The regiment was moved at a shoulder arms, pieces loaded and bayonets fixed, under a sharp fire, to within forty paces of the rebel lines, without firing a shot. The regiment then halted and poured into their ranks a well directed volley of 'buck and ball' from the entire line, such as to throw them into perfect confusion, from which they could not immediately recover. Col. Williams' intention was, after the delivery of this volley, to charge their line and capture their battery, which the effect of this volley had doubtless rendered it possible for him to accomplish. But he was at that instant rendered insensible from gunshot wounds, and the next officer in rank, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowles, not being aware of his intentions, the project was not fully carried out. Had the movement been made as contemplated, the entire rebel line must have been captured. As it was, most of the enemy escaped, receiving a lesson, however, which taught them not to despise on the battle field the race they had long tyrannized over as having 'no rights which a white man was bound to respect.'
"Colonel Williams says:
'I had long been of the opinion that this race had a right to kill rebels, and this day proved their capacity for the work. Forty prisoners and one battle flag fell into the hands of my regiment on this field.'
"The loss to the regiment in this engagement was five killed and thirty-two wounded. After this, the regiment returned to Fort Gibson and went into camp, where it remained until the month of September, when it again moved with the Division against the confederate force under General Cooper, who fled at our approach.
"After a pursuit of one hundred miles, and across the Canadian river to Perryville, in the Choctaw Nation, all hopes of bringing them to an engagement was abandoned, and the command returned to camp on the site of the confederate Fort Davis, situated on the south side of the Arkansas river, near its junction with Grand river.
"The regiment remained in this camp, doing but little duty, until October, when orders were received to proceed to Fort Smith, where it arrived during the same month. At this point it remained until December 1st, making a march to Waldron and returning via Roseville, Arkansas, and in the same month went into winter quarters at the latter place, situated fifty miles east of Fort Smith, on the Arkansas river. The regiment remained at Roseville until March, 1864, when the command moved to join the forces of Gen. Steele, then about starting on what was known as the Camden Expedition. Joining Gen. Steele's command at the Little Missouri river, distant twenty-two miles northeast of Washington, Arkansas, the entire command moved upon the enemy, posted on the west side of Prairie de Anne, and within fifteen miles of Washington. The enemy fled, and our forces occupied their works without an engagement.
"The pursuit of the enemy in this direction was abandoned. The command arrived at Camden on the 16th of April, 1864, and occupied the place with its strong fortifications without opposition. On the day following, Colonel Williams started with five hundred men of the 1st Colorado, two hundred Cavalry, detailed from the 2nd, 6th and 14th, Kansas regiments, and one section of the 2nd Indian Battery, with a train to load forage and provisions at a point twenty miles west of Camden, on the Washington road. On the 17th he reached the place and succeeded in loading about two-thirds of the train, which consisted of two hundred wagons. At dawn the command moved towards Camden, and loaded the balance of the wagons from plantations by the wayside. At a point fourteen miles west of Camden the advance encountered a small force of the enemy, who, after a slight skirmishing, retreated down the road in such a manner as to lead Col. Williams to suspect that this movement was a feint intended to cover other movements or to draw the command into an ambuscade.
"Just previous to this he had been re-enforced by a detachment of three hundred men of the 18th Iowa Infantry, and one hundred additional cavalry, commanded by Capt. Duncan, of the 18th Iowa.
"In order to prevent any surprise, all detached foraging parties were called in, and the original command placed in the advance, leaving the rear in charge of Captain Duncan's command, with orders to keep flankers well out and to guard cautiously against a surprise. Colonel Williams at the front, with skirmishers and flankers well out, advanced cautiously to a point about one and a half miles distant, sometimes called Cross Roads, but more generally known as Poison Springs, where he came upon a skirmish line of the enemy, which tended to confirm his previous suspicion of the character and purpose of the enemy. He therefore closed up the train as well as possible in this thickly timbered region, and made the necessary preparations for fighting. He directed the cavalry, under Lieutenant Henderson, of the 6th, and Mitch.e.l.l, of the 2nd, to charge and penetrate the rebel line of skirmishers, in order to develop their strength and intentions. The movement succeeded most admirably in its purposes, and the development was such that it convinced Colonel Williams that he had before him a struggle of no ordinary magnitude.
"The cavalry, after penetrating the skirmish line, came upon a strong force of the enemy, who repulsed and forced them back to their original line, not, however, without hard fighting and severe loss on our part in killed and wounded, including in the latter the gallant Lieutenant Henderson, who afterwards fell into the hands of the enemy.
"The enemy now opened on our lines with ten pieces of artillery--six in front and four on the right flank. From a prisoner Colonel Williams learned that the force of the enemy was from eight to ten thousand, commanded by Generals Price and Maxey. These developments and this information convinced him that he could not hope to defeat the enemy; but as there was no way to escape with the train except through their lines, and as the train and its contents were indispensable to the very existence of our forces at Camden, who were then out of provisions, he deemed it to be his duty to defend the train to the last extremity, hoping that our forces at Camden, on learning of the engagement, would attack the enemy in his rear, thus relieving his command and saving the train.
"With this determination, he fought the enemy's entire force from 10 A.
M. until 2 P. M., repulsing three successive a.s.saults and inflicting upon the enemy severe loss.
"In his report Colonel Williams says:
'The conflict during these four hours was the most terrific and deadly in its character of any that has ever fallen under my observation.'
"At 2 P. M. nearly one-half of our force engaged had been placed _hors de combat_, and the remainder were out of ammunition. No supplies arriving, the Colonel was reluctantly compelled to abandon the train to the enemy and save as much of the command as possible by taking to the swamps and canebrakes and making for Camden by a circuitous route, thereby preventing pursuit by cavalry. In this manner most of the command that was not disabled in the field reached Camden during the night of the 18th. For a more specific and statistical report of this action, in which the loss to the 1st Colored alone was 187 men and officers, the official report of Colonel J. M. Williams is herewith submitted:
'CAMDEN, ARKANSAS. April 24, 1867.
'CAPTAIN:--I have the honor to submit the following report of a foraging expedition under my command:
'In obedience to verbal orders received from Brigadier-General Thayer, I left Camden, Arkansas on the 11th instant with 695 men and two guns, with a forage train of 198 wagons.
'I proceeded westerly on the Washington road a distance of eighteen miles, where I halted the train and dispatched part of it in different directions to load; one hundred wagons with a large part of the command, under Major Ward, being sent six miles beyond the camp. These wagons returned to camp at midnight, nearly all loaded with corn.
'At sunrise on the 18th, the command started on the return, loading the balance of the train as it proceeded, there being but a few wagon loads of corn to be found at any one place. I was obliged to detail portions of the command in different directions to load the wagons, until nearly all of my available force was so employed.
'At a point known as Cross Roads, four miles west of my camping ground, I was met by a re-enforcement of three hundred and seventy-five men of the 18th Iowa Infantry, commanded by Capt. Duncan, twenty-five men of the 6th Kansas, Lieut. Phillips commanding, forty-five men of the 2nd Kansas Cavalry, Lieut. Ross commanding, twenty men of the 14th Kansas Cavalry, Lieut. Smith commanding, and two mountain howitzers from the 6th Kansas Cavalry, Lieut.
Walker commanding,--in all, 465 men and two mountain howitzers. These, added to my former command, made my entire force consist of eight hundred and seventy-five, two hundred and eighty-five cavalry, and four guns. But the excessive fatigue of the preceeding day, coming as it did at the close of a toilsome march of twenty-four hours without halting, had so affected the infantry that fully one hundred of the 1st Kansas Colored were rendered unfit for duty. Many of the cavalry had, in violation of orders, straggled from their command, so that at this time my effective force did not exceed one thousand men.
'At a point one mile east of this, my advance came upon a picket of the enemy, which was driven back one mile, when a line of the enemy's skirmishers presented itself. Here I halted the train, formed a line of the small force I then had in advance, and ordered that portion of the 1st Kansas Colored which had previously been guarding the rear of the train to the front, and gave orders for the train to be packed as closely as the nature of the ground would permit.
I also opened a fire upon the enemy's line from the section of the 2nd Indiana Battery, for the double purpose of ascertaining if possible if the enemy had artillery in position in front, and also to draw in some foraging parties which had previously been dispatched upon either flank of the train. No response was elicited save a brisk fire from the enemy's skirmishers.
'Meanwhile, the remainder of the first Kansas Colored had come to the front, as also three detachments, which formed part of the original escort, which I formed in line facing to the front, with a detachment of the 14th Kansas Cavalry, on my right, and detachments of the 2nd and 6th Kansas Cavalry on the left flank. I also sent orders to Capt.
Duncan, commanding the 18th Iowa Infantry, to so dispose of his regiment and the cavalry and howitzers which came out with him as to protect the rear of the train, and to keep a sharp lookout for a movement upon his rear and right flank.
'Meanwhile a movement of the enemy's infantry toward my right flank had been observed through the thick brush which covered the face of the country in that direction. Seeing this, I ordered forward the cavalry on my right, under Lieuts. Mitch.e.l.l and Henderson, with orders to press the enemy's line, force it if possible, and at all events to ascertain his position and strength, fearing as I did that the silence of the enemy in front was but for the purpose of drawing me on to the open ground which lay in my front. At this juncture, a rebel rode into my lines and inquired for Col. DeMorse. From him I learned that General Price was in command of the rebel force and that Col. DeMorse was in command of the force on my right.
'The cavalry had advanced but four hundred yards, when a brisk fire of musketry was opened upon them from the brush, which they returned with true gallantry, but were forced to fall back. In this skirmish many of the cavalry were unhorsed, and Lieut. Henderson, of the 6th Kansas Cavalry, fell, wounded in the abdomen, while bravely and gallantly urging his command forward.
'In the meantime I formed five companies of the 1st Kansas Colored, with one piece of artillery, on my right flank, and ordered up to their a.s.sistance four companies of the 18th Iowa Infantry. Soon my orderly returned from the rear with a message from Captain Duncan, stating that he was so closely pressed in the rear by the enemy's infantry and artillery that the men could not be spared.