The Army of the Cumberland Part 5

The plans of the enemy not being yet fully developed, and in view of the uncertainty that existed whether he would fall on McCook's front, or ma.s.s on Thomas near Fairfield, Rosecrans issued the following orders for the 25th:

"Major-General Crittenden to advance to Lannon's Stand, six miles east of Beech Grove, and open communications with General Thomas.

"General Thomas to attack the rebels on the flank of his advance position at the forks of the road, and drive the rebels toward Fairfield.

"General McCook to feign and advance, as if in force, on the Wartrace road by the Liberty Gap pa.s.ses.

"General Stanley, with his cavalry, to occupy their attention at Forsterville, and General Granger to support him with his infantry at Christiana."

In the event that Thomas succeeded in his attack and drove the enemy toward Wartrace, he was then to cover that road with a division, and taking the remainder of his troops was to move rapidly on Manchester. McCook was then to move in and take Thomas's place at Beech Grove, holding Liberty Gap with a division, and was finally to withdraw that and follow Thomas with his entire command to Manchester.

The same day that Crittenden's command marched to Holly Springs, Brannan's division reached the main command of Thomas, and went into camp with Rousseau at Hoover's Mills. Reynolds had a slight skirmish with the enemy on his front. On the night of the 25th, Rousseau was ordered up with his division to take position immediately in the rear of Reynolds, preparatory to an attack on the enemy's position at Beech Grove the next morning. Minty's brigade of cavalry pressed forward at all points and drove the enemy to Guy's Gap. Long took position at Lumley's Station. The remainder of Turchin's division moved in the advance with General Crittenden.

The incessant rains that had fallen since the opening of the campaign delayed the advance, by preventing Brannan joining the Fourteenth Corps as soon as was expected. During the night of the 25th it rained so continuously that it was almost impossible for the troops to move, but by extraordinary exertions the divisions were all in position by 10.30 A. M. At 4 o'clock in the morning Brannan's division moved up to take part in the attack. At 8 A. M. Negley's division took position to support the attack of the other divisions. If the enemy's position at Beech Grove was carried, then Rousseau and Brannon were to push on to Manchester that night if possible. At 10.30 A.M. the advance was ordered. Moving forward on the rebels in force on the heights north of Garrison Creek, our army drove them steadily and rapidly toward Fairfield, Rousseau and Brannan operating on their left flank from the hills north of the Fairfield road, while Reynolds advanced against their front and right. The enemy had prepared for an obstinate resistance, and attempted to enfilade Thomas's troops from the high ground on his right. This was effectually prevented by a gallant charge of Walker's brigade and the regulars under Major Coolidge, who drove the enemy from this position. Thomas pushed forward his troops, driving the rebels in the direction of Fairfield, who covered their retreat with two batteries of artillery, occupying positions behind strong lines of skirmishers flanked by heavy cavalry force. The rebels thus retired to Fairfield, near to which place our pickets were advanced. Reynold's division and the baggage moved forward during the night toward Manchester. Late in the afternoon Wilander's brigade seized Matt's Hollow, and thus secured that pa.s.sage. Thomas placed his divisions in line of battle extending from the Fairfield road to within five miles of Manchester. McCook remained in camp at Liberty Gap during the day, while Granger rested at Christiana. Crittenden's command pressed forward as rapidly as possible on toward Manchester, struggling over almost impa.s.sable roads.

Rosecrans's headquarters, on the 27th, reached Manchester. The advanced position secured by Thomas's command rendered the concentration of the whole army on the enemy's left, through Hoover's Gap, at this time an easy matter. With this done, Bragg would either be forced to fight in resisting the further advance of the army under Rosecrans, or abandon Middle Tennessee altogether. Early on the morning of the 27th, Reynolds's advance brigade-Wilder's mounted infantry-took possession of Manchester, capturing forty prisoners, a guard at the railroad depot, and taking the town completely by surprise. Reynolds's entire division reached Manchester during the morning. General Thomas then moved Rousseau's and Brannan's divisions in pursuit of the enemy, driving him as far as Fairfield, and ascertained at that place that the rebels had retreated entirely. These two divisions then turned into the Fairfield and Manchester road, Brannan's reaching the latter place at 10 P.M. and Rousseau's at midnight. Negley's division had, during the day, been moving in support of these two divisions toward the Fairfield road, by way of Noale Fork, and arrived at Manchester at 8 P.M. Thomas's corps being now together, it was manifest that the enemy must leave his intrenchment at Shelbyville, and that our army must be prepared to meet him at Tullahoma, only twelve miles distant. Rosecrans gave the necessary orders at once to the other corps commanders to close up their columns on Manchester, and be prepared for the contest.

On the extreme right our cavalry, on the 27th, did brilliant work. Supported by the reserve corps under Granger, Stanley advanced from Christiana to Guy's Gap, where the advance of the rebel army under Wheeler, with Martin's and a portion of Wharton's divisions, was encountered. Charging down on them with Minty's brigade, closely followed by Mitch.e.l.l's division, Stanley routed and drove them out of the gap into their intrenchments just north of Shelbyville. Here they again made a stand. Dashing ahead, Minty encountered them in their works, and drove them in disorder from their intrenchments into Shelbyville. While Minty was pushing them on the front, Mitch.e.l.l came up, turned their right, cutting off their direct line of retreat, and both forces united in driving them beyond the town, completely defeated. Wheeler lost all his artillery and some five hundred prisoners. A large number of the rebels were driven into Duck River and drowned while attempting to cross. The flight was so hurried that Wheeler himself only escaped by swimming the river. This successful movement established the fact that Bragg had abandoned his strong line of defence at Shelbyville, and the question now to be answered was whether he would accept battle at Tullahoma, or retire with his entire command across the c.u.mberland Mountains and the Tennessee River, fighting as he fell back.

While the concentration of his command at Manchester was being effected, Rosecrans determined to break the line of railroad in the rear of Bragg's army, if possible. On the morning of the 28th Wilder, with his brigade of mounted infantry, started at reveille by way of Hillsboro, to burn Elk River bridge, and to destroy the railroad between Dechard and Cowan. John Beatty, with his brigade of infantry marched to Hillsboro for the purpose of covering and supporting Wilder's movement. The latter reached Elk River and crossed his command, floating his mountain howitzers on a raft made of an old saw-mill. He then moved on to Dechard, where, after a slight skirmish with a detachment of the enemy, he destroyed the depot full of commissary goods, the water tanks, the railroad bridge over the Winchester road, and tore up some three hundred yards of the railroad. Earlier in the day Wilder sent part of his command, under Colonel Munroe, to destroy the railroad bridge over Elk River. Withers's division of Bragg's army reached this point only a few moments ahead of Munroe, and prevented the burning of the bridge. Finding that the enemy was in pursuit of him at all points, Wilder next moved to Tantalon and Anderson with detachments of his command, but was compelled to retire, as these points were strongly guarded by heavy forces of the enemy's infantry. Crossing the mountains that night on his return over the Tracy City road, and so on to Pelham, the troops slept at the foot of the mountains, and started the next morning just in time to escape Forrest, who was in pursuit with ten regiments of cavalry. Wilder reached Manchester at 1 P.M. of the 30th.

Sheridan's division of McCook's corps reached Manchester on the 29th. The command-troops and animals-suffered severely on their march over the heavy roads. Crittenden's command, which had been on the road since the 26th, reached Manchester also on the 29th, after marching with all speed, badly worn, by reason of the terrible rains and fearful roads. The condition of the latter may be inferred from the fact that it required four days of incessant labor for Crittenden to advance the distance of twenty-one miles. The concentration of the entire army being effected, orders were given for the final movement on the 30th, as follows:

"The Fourteenth Corps to occupy the centre at Concord Church and Bobo Cross Roads, with a division in reserve.

"The Twentieth Corps to take the right on Crumpton's Creek, two divisions in echelon retired, one in reserve.

"The Twenty-first Corps to come up on the left near Hall's Chapel, one division in front and one in reserve."

The rain had rendered the roads over which this movement was to be made as soft and spongy as a swamp, into which the wagons cut to the hubs, and even horses could only pa.s.s over with the greatest exertion. The troops on the 30th were compelled to drag along the artillery through the mud into position. While the orders for the movements of the troops were being executed on the 30th, Thomas sent Steedman's brigade of Brannan's division, and two regiments of Negley's division on separate roads to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and Sheridan sent Bradley's brigade of his own division on another road, for the same purpose. These reconnoissances all returned, and reported having found the enemy in force within a mile or two of Tullahoma, on all roads except the one leading to Estill Springs. Scouts coming in confirmed this, adding that it was the general belief that Bragg would not leave his intrenchments at Tullahoma without a fight.

On the same day Rosecrans ordered his topographical engineers to ascertain the nature of the ground, in order to determine the practicability of moving by columns in ma.s.s in line of battle from the position in front, to gain the rear of the rebel position. Their report being favorable, all arrangements were completed, and the second division of Crittenden's corps was moved into position.

On July 1st, Thomas, hearing from a citizen that the enemy were evacuating Tullahoma, ordered Steedman with his brigade, supported by two regiments of Reynolds's division on the left, to advance cautiously and ascertain if the report was true. Pushing forward his advance, Steedman, meeting with no opposition, entered the place at noon, capturing a few prisoners. Rosecrans being at once notified of this, immediately ordered Rousseau's and Negley's divisions in pursuit. Pressing forward with all possible haste by Spring Creek, these divisions overtook the rear guard of the enemy late in the afternoon at Bethpage Bridge, two miles above the railroad crossing, where, after a sharp skirmish, in which a good many of our men were wounded, the rebels were driven steadily back, until darkness prevented further pursuit. The enemy, occupying the heights south of the river, commanded the bridge with their artillery, which they had placed behind epaulements.

On the 2d, the ammunition was brought forward, and McCook, with Sheridan's and Davis's divisions, was ordered in pursuit on the roads west of the railroad. Sheridan, on arriving at Rock Creek Ford, found Elk River so swollen with the heavy rains of the past week as to be barely fordable for cavalry. On the south bank of the river the enemy had posted a force of cavalry to resist the crossing. Sheridan opened fire at once on them, drove them away, and occupied the ford. During the night the enemy burned the bridge on the line of advance of Thomas, who found equal difficulty in crossing. Here the river was very deep, and he ordered Rousseau's, Brannan's, and Reynolds's divisions up the river to Jones's Ford. Hambright's brigade was thrown across the river, and the other troops went into camp on the north bank. Hambright captured several rebel prisoners, who told him that Bragg's army was in full retreat by way of Pelham and Cowan, across the c.u.mberland Mountains. Turchin, with a small brigade of cavalry, moved forward from Hillsboro on the Dechard road. On reaching the fords of Elk River at Morris Ferry he found the rebel cavalry strongly posted. He attacked them at once, re-enforced by Mitch.e.l.l's command, and forced a pa.s.sage of the river after a sharp fight. Night closed the pursuit.

On the 3d, Sheridan succeeded in crossing Elk River, supported by Davis's division, and pursued the enemy to Cowan, where he learned that Bragg had crossed the mountains with part of his artillery and infantry by the University and Sweden's Cove, sending Hardee's corps into Sequatchie Valley, and covering his retreat with his cavalry. Thomas crossed Rousseau's and Brannan's divisions at Jones's Ford and ordered them to take position on the Winchester and Hillsboro road. He directed Negley and Reynolds to cross their divisions at the ford on the Winchester and Manchester pike. On the 4th, Rousseau was ordered to march to the Dechard and Pelham roads, and to take up position at Brackenfield's Point toward the University. Reynolds encamped at Penningtown, and Brannan's division at Taite's. The cavalry sent from Sheridan's position, and by Stanley from the main column, developed the fact that the enemy was entirely across the mountains, and the troops were now ordered into camp to await supplies from the depot at Murfreesboro.

Bragg's army reached Chattanooga the first week in July. Here he established his headquarters with Polk's corps retained in and around town for the purposes of observation, with the exception of Anderson's brigade of Withers's division, which was ordered to Bridgeport, at the crossing of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad over the Tennessee River. Hardee's corps was distributed along the line of the Knoxville Railroad, with Tyner's Station as the centre. At Chattanooga Bragg at once commenced fortifying his position, which work he steadily prosecuted for some weeks, awaiting the development of Rosecrans's plans. He also threw up defensive works at each of the crossings of the Tennessee as far north as Blyth's Ferry. Forrest was sent to Kingston, on the north bank of the Tennessee River, with orders to picket the approaches to the river from Sequatchie Valley, as well as the various crossings of the river, and to maintain a watchful observation of Burnside's movements in East Tennessee.

The Tullahoma campaign, with the exception of the one immediately following, which placed the Army of the c.u.mberland across the Tennessee and terminated in the battle of Chickamauga, was the most brilliant of the great strategic campaigns carried to a successful issue by General Rosecrans. The movements of the army occupied nine days, during which time the enemy was driven from two strongly fortified positions, with a loss in prisoners captured of 1,634, eleven pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores and supplies. The result of this campaign gave to Rosecrans possession of Middle Tennessee, and placed the armies back in the relative positions occupied by them prior to Bragg's advance into Kentucky, a little less than one year previous. The campaign was conducted throughout, in one of the most extraordinary series of rain-storms ever known in Tennessee at that season of the year. This, with the resistance interposed by Bragg at our advance at Hoover's Gap, r.e.t.a.r.ded operations thirty-six hours, and in front of Manchester a detention of sixty hours occurred. These delays and the storms prevented us getting possession of Bragg's communication and forcing him to a very disastrous battle. General Rosecrans in his official report of this campaign says: "These results were far more successful than were antic.i.p.ated, and could only have been obtained by a surprise as to the direction and force of our movements."

Bragg made no official report of the Tullahoma campaign, but in a statement to General J. E. Johnston of his operations at that time, he says that he offered battle behind his works at Shelbyville to Rosecrans, which was refused; that the latter pa.s.sed to his, Bragg's, right on two occasions, threatening his rear. He being not able to cope with the Federal army retreated to the Tennessee. Bragg adds: "The Tennessee will be taken as our line."

During these nine days of active campaigning the Army of the c.u.mberland, numbering less than sixty thousand effective men, with a loss of 560 killed, wounded, and missing, compelled the army under Bragg, numbering something less than forty-five thousand effective men, to retreat a greater distance and out of far stronger positions than the united armies under Sherman were able to compel the same army with but slight additional strength under General Joe Johnston, to fall back, in four months of active field campaigning, with a very much larger relative loss. The proportion of the forces of the opposing armies during the Tullahoma campaign was far nearer equal than that on to Atlanta, while the natural and military obstacles to be overcome were largely the greater in the Tullahoma campaign. To Bragg the forward movement of the Federal army in full strength was a surprise, but to find that army so far in his rear and so near to cutting his line of communications was a much greater surprise. These might not have been guarded against, but nothing displayed the marked superiority of Rosecrans over his opponent, as a great strategist, so much as the grand success of the final movement of the campaign, from Manchester south. The general who-as even the rebels, in their worship of their leader General Lee, admitted-was able in Western Virginia to completely outgeneral Lee, on the Tullahoma campaign again demonstrated his ability as the greatest strategic general of the war.

Brilliant campaigns, however, without battles, do not accomplish the destruction of an army. A campaign like that of Tullahoma always means a battle at some other point. This was true after the Atlanta campaign, where Sherman got the glory and Thomas did the fighting. This was equally true as to the Tullahoma, and the fact that these two armies were yet somewhere to meet and engage in deadly strife, was apparent to the commanders of both armies. Where and when that meeting was to be was the problem that engaged the minds of both these commanders. In the Tullahoma campaign the elements were on the side of Bragg's army, both in preventing the rapid movements of the Federal army, and in furnishing a perfect barrier to a successful pursuit when the retreat was under way, by the high water in the swollen streams, the bridges over which Bragg destroyed as he fell back.

The concluding line of Bragg's letter to Johnston, that "The Tennessee will be taken as our line," demonstrated that, to his mind at least, his Kentucky movement of the year before did not meet with the success he antic.i.p.ated. Here now he was waiting his opportunity to contest his last foothold on the State of Tennessee at the far corner in Chattanooga. With Rosecrans, his army required after these days of hard campaigning a rest to repair the wear and tear of the heavy marching, and the resupplying of his entire command. The railroads in his rear required his attention first. These were placed in order up to his army, and the repairs on the road to the front were then to be pushed to the Tennessee River. In three weeks time these were completed, and on the 25th, the first supply train was pushed through to the Tennessee River. Then Rosecrans established his new depot of supplies at Stevenson, Alabama, and hastened, as rapidly as he could, the acc.u.mulation of supplies at that point.

Chapter XI.

The Movement to Chickamauga.

The withdrawal of the army under Bragg to Chattanooga again made that point the objective of a campaign. But several things had to be taken into consideration before this was entered into. Burnside had been ordered from Cincinnati to East Tennessee through Kentucky, and it was necessary to know the force and position of his command. If Knoxville and c.u.mberland Gap were under his control, then it would be reasonably safe to follow out a plan of operations looking to flank Bragg's left by a movement across the Tennessee over the ranges of mountains of Northern Georgia. But to do this, part of the force under Grant, now inactive after Vicksburg, should be ordered up at least as far east as the Tennessee, to protect the line of supplies and prevent any movement of the enemy to the rear on that flank of Rosecrans's army. Another weighty consideration was that of forage for the animals of the command. By the middle of August, corn in the valleys of Southern Tennessee and Northern Alabama would be ripe, and subject to the wants of the army. It was General Rosecrans's plan to wait until these movements could be accomplished and until the corn had ripened, and knowing the difficulties in the way at the best, of his successfully accomplishing his plans for the campaign, he wished at least to have that best in his favor.

In making his final preparations for his operations against Chattanooga, General Rosecrans considered two plans. One was to appear on the front of Chattanooga and attempt a direct attack on the town and reduce it by a lengthy siege. The other was to flank Bragg out of Chattanooga, as he had been compelled by the movement on the Tullahoma campaign to abandon his strongholds one by one.

The first plan could hardly be entertained, as Bragg was at his base, with but short lines to all important points under control of the rebel government, and at a place where in a very short time heavy reinforcements could be sent him, while Rosecrans in front of Chattanooga would be in a rough, sterile country, far away from his base of supplies, with a long wagon-haul over rocky mountain ranges from his nearest depot. To attempt the movement on the left, or through Sequatchie Valley, would concentrate Bragg's entire army at the contemplated point of crossing the Tennessee. This plan Bragg was prepared for, and was resting, quietly awaiting the movements of our army carrying it into effect. But it was not the purpose of Rosecrans to meet this expectation of his opponent. The genius of Rosecrans contemplated one of the most brilliant military movements of the war to obtain possession of this great stronghold of Nature, the gateway to East Tennessee and Northern Georgia, Chattanooga. At that time this place was of the utmost importance to each of the contending forces, and the highest prize in a military point of view that the Army of the c.u.mberland ever contended for.

To properly understand the magnitude and importance of the campaign that Rosecrans was now entering on, it is necessary that the topography of the country should be considered. The position of our army after the Tullahoma campaign was on the northwester base of the c.u.mberland range, in camp occupying McMinnville, Tullahoma, Dechard, and Winchester, with Chattanooga south of east. Immediately in front was the first great barrier in the advance movement-the c.u.mberland Mountains-a lofty range of rocks dividing the waters flowing into the c.u.mberland and Tennessee Rivers. The range rises far to the north and extends to the southwest into Alabama. North of Chattanooga the mountains are much bolder, more difficult to cross, with almost sheer declivities on each of the sides.

Beyond the main range, in the direct road to Chattanooga, running south, flows the Sequatchie River through the valley of that name, formed by another range jutting off slightly to the east from the main range, and between it and the Tennessee River. This spur is known by the name of Walling's Ridge [NOTE from Brett and Bob: This is probably what is now known as Walden's Ridge which was named after a Mr. Walling or Wallen as subsequently described. This Ridge was quite spa.r.s.ely populated with an estimate of 11 families at the time of the civil war, so it's history is not exactly well doc.u.mented. Subsequent references use Walling's Ridge to be consistent with the original text.], after an early settler and Indian hunter. It abuts close on the Tennessee in precipitous rocky bluffs.

South of the Tennessee, and separated from the mountain ranges north by this river, are the two ranges known as Sand and Lookout Mountains. The northern extremity of the former is called Racc.o.o.n Mountain. Here the river cuts its channel as a great chasm through these mountain ranges, so sharply defined that the ma.s.ses abut directly upon the water in heavy palisades of rock.

The tops of all these mountain ranges are of poor soil but generally with considerable timber; rough, with but few roads, and these almost impa.s.sable for wagons and nearly dest.i.tute of water. The western slope of Sand Mountain reaches nearly to the Tennessee River. Between this latter range and Lookout Mountain is Lookout Valley with the creek of that name flowing through it into the Tennessee a short distance below Chattanooga. This valley is also known as Wills Valley, and at that time was traversed by a railroad branching from the Nashville road at Wauhatchie, terminating at Trenton.

Beyond this was Lookout range, 2,400 feet above the sea, with almost perpendicular sides, heavily wooded and with little water, ab.u.t.ting abruptly on the Tennessee, some two miles south of the town, with only three practical wagon roads over it-one close to the river, one at Johnson's Crook, and the third at Winston's Gap, twenty-six and forty-two miles respectively south of Chattanooga.

To the east of Lookout Mountain is Chattanooga Valley with the town at the head of it and the creek of that name flowing through, with Dry Creek as a branch emptying its waters into the Tennessee just south of the town. Beyond this to the east is Missionary Ridge, and parallel to it and just beyond is Chickamauga Valley, with the creek of that name running through it emptying into the river above Chattanooga, formed by East, Middle, and West Chickamauga Creeks, uniting with Pea Vine Creek between the latter two as a tributary. Chattanooga and West Chickamauga Creeks have a common source in McLemore's Cove, which is formed by Pigeon Mountain on the east, jutting to the north as a spur of Lookout Mountain, with the latter on the west, Missionary ridge running out as it enters this cove. The wagon road from Chattanooga to Rome, known as the La Fayette road, crosses Missionary Ridge into Chickamauga Valley at Rossville and proceeds thence nearly due south, crossing Chickamauga Creek at Lee and Gordon Mills, thence to the east of Pigeon Mountain, pa.s.sing through La Fayette some twenty-two miles south of Chattanooga; it then continues on to Summerville, within twenty-five miles of Rome, and so on to the latter place.

Beyond these ranges is Taylor's ridge, with a number of lesser ranges between it and the Atlanta Railroad, running through Dalton. Both Pigeon Mountain and Taylor's Ridge are very rough mountain ranges, with but few roads, and these only through gaps. At Dalton is the junction of the East Tennessee with the Atlanta Railroad, in the valley of the head waters of the Coosa River, which valley is here some ten miles wide and is the great natural pa.s.sage-way into East Tennessee from the south.

To follow Bragg to Chattanooga and to cross the Tennessee above that place involved moving the army either to the north of the Sequatchie Valley by Dunlap or by Therman and Walling's Ridge, some sixty-five to seventy miles through a country poorly supplied with water, with no forage, and by narrow and difficult wagon roads. This route would take Rosecrans further away from his base of supplies and line of communication than that south of the river. It was over this northern route that Bragg antic.i.p.ated the onward movement of the Army of the c.u.mberland. This would enable him to make a protracted defence of the town and r.e.t.a.r.d the advance for weeks, if not months. But Rosecrans's plan of the campaign contemplated a much more hazardous movement and a far speedier one for the possession of Chattanooga. To accomplish this, however, it was necessary to cross the c.u.mberland Mountains with subsistence, ammunition, a limited supply of forage, and a bridge train; then to cross his army over the Tennessee River, after that over Sand or Racc.o.o.n Mountain into Lookout Valley, and from there to cross Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges-Missionary Ridge-if he went directly to Chattanooga, or to cross Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor's Ridge, if he struck the railroad at Dalton or south of it. This involved the carrying by his army of ammunition for two great battles and twenty-five days' subsistence.

As soon as the repairs were made on the main line to Stevenson, Rosecrans ordered Sheridan's division to make an advance movement with two brigades to Bridgeport and one to Stevenson. Van Cleve had been ordered up with his divisions from Murfreesboro and was posted at McMinnville. On August 8th, stores being acc.u.mulated at the front, orders were issued to corps commanders to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage sufficient for the general advance.

The movement over the c.u.mberland Mountains began on August 16th, and the troops were ordered to move as follows:

"Crittenden's corps in three columns to move through the Sequatchie Valley. Minty's cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, and after covering the left flank of Van Cleve to proceed to Pikesville.

"Thomas to move Reynolds and Brannan from University by way of Battle Creek, where they were to take post, concealed near its mouth. Negley and Baird to go by way of Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek between Anderson and Stevenson.

"McCook to move Johnson by Salem and Larkin's Ford to Bellefont. Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson. The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up."

These orders were complied with, and the movements completed by the evening of August 20th. Crittenden sent Hazen's brigade on a reconnoissance to Harrison's Landing, where he found the enemy throwing up works. On the next day Hazen took post at Poe's cross-roads. Wilder was sent to reconnoitre from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga. On reaching Chattanooga, he was supported by Wagner's brigade, and both commands opened fire on the next day, sh.e.l.ling the town from across the river. This bombardment of the place caused it to be evacuated by the rebel troops, to points beyond range outside, and the withdrawal by Bragg of his stores to points of convenience on the railroad to the rear. Bragg then ordered Anderson's brigade to withdraw from Bridgeport.

The feint under Crittenden was so well timed that Bragg concentrated his immediate command at and above Chattanooga, leaving the crossing of the river by the main portion of our army later, un.o.bstructed. Rosecrans had posted his army so that demonstrations were made simultaneously from Whitesburg to Blythe's Ferry, a distance of one hundred and fifty miles, and Bragg did not know just where to look for his real advance, but definitely concluded that it would NOT be made anywhere in the vicinity of Bridgeport. On the 26th, five days after the surprise at Chattanooga, Burnside's advance into East Tennessee was announced by the presence of his cavalry in the vicinity of Knoxville. Bragg then ordered Buckner to evacuate Knoxville, and occupy Loudon. The demonstration at Blythe's Ferry on the Tennessee, opposite the mouth of the Hiawa.s.se, caused Bragg to order him to retire to Charleston, and soon thereafter to Chattanooga. On the 30th, information was given General Thomas that Johnston, with 15,000 men from Mississippi, had re-enforced Bragg.

Under cover of the apparent activity of the left of our army in front of and above Chattanooga, Rosecrans effected safely the crossing of the first great barrier to the objective point, and reached the banks of the Tennessee opposite the enemy, concealing as far as he could the movements of his troops, and the position of his pontoons and trains. He then had the river reconnoitered, that the best points might be selected and the means at once provided for the crossing. As soon as the crossings had been determined on, the proper dispositions were made to begin the movement.

The Tennessee River, at the various points where our army was to cross, is very wide; and, swollen by recent rains, was quite high for that season of the year. The troops crossed the river at four points. As there were not enough pontoons for two bridges, Sheridan had commenced trestlework for part of one at Bridgeport. Reynolds advanced to Sh.e.l.lmound, seizing the place. Here he captured a number of boats, and with these and other material picked up, he was enabled to cross at that point, while Brannan crossed his division from the mouth of Battle Creek on rafts. The main crossing of McCook's corps was at Caperton's Ferry, about forty miles below Chattanooga, where the pontoon bridge was laid by Davis's division, after driving a detachment of rebel cavalry from the opposite side.

The movement across the river was commenced on August 29th, and completed on September 4th. Baird, in command of a division of Thomas's corps, crossed the river at Bridgeport after the repairs were completed to the bridge. Negley's division crossed at Caperton's Ferry. The four divisions of Thomas's corps with great difficulty crossed Sand Mountain, and concentrated near Trenton in Will's Valley, east of Sand Mountain. On September 6th Negley's division, being in the advance, reached Johnson's Crook where Beatty's brigade was sent at once up the mountain to seize Steven's Gap. Before proceeding far he met the enemy's pickets, and, night coming on, he went into camp just west of the gap. The Eighteenth Ohio went a short distance on the road to the top of Lookout Mountain, met the enemy's pickets and withdrew. The next day, Baird's division supporting Negley, the latter with two brigades, moved forward, and with his advance gained possession of the top of the mountain, and secured the forks of the road. The entire of Negley's division reached this point on the 9th, at the head of Johnson's Crook, and with one brigade held the pa.s.s while another was sent a short distance north on the mountain to seize Cooper's Gap, with a regiment in the advance to occupy and hold the entrance on the east. Another regiment was sent forward to hold Stevens's Gap, which was found heavily obstructed with fallen timber. Negley still being in the advance, moved the day following across Missionary Ridge, and took up a position in McLemore's Cove on the road through Dug Gap. Here he found the enemy's cavalry drawn up in line, and learned from citizens that the rebels were in strong force concentrated in his front in Dug Gap, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Baird's division was in supporting distance of Negley.

Early in the morning of the 9th Reynolds sent the Ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry) to make a reconnoissance along the top of Lookout Mountain, to discover the enemy's movements and to determine the rumors in regard to the evacuation of Chattanooga. At 11 A.M. the regiment entered the town as the rear of the enemy's column was leaving the place. The next day the four divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were in supporting distance of each other, with Negley still in front of Dug Gap, the enemy holding the east entrance with a heavy force, and the Gap full of obstructions. Negley discovered early on the following day that his situation was critical, and that he was in danger of losing his train. He determined to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap, which movement he proceeded to execute, and succeeded in the face of the enemy by his energy and skill, with the prompt co-operation of Baird, in securing his position in front of the gap without the loss of a single wagon. The next day the location of Bragg's army at La Fayette with Johnston's reinforcements was fully determined, and Thomas's corps now awaited the movements of the other troops with reference to the concentration of the army.

In the meantime Davis's and Johnson's divisions of McCook's corps, crossing the river at Caperton's Ferry, moved over Sand Mountain into Will's Valley, and thence-Davis being in the advance-moved into and seized Winston's Gap, some twenty-five miles from Caperton's Ferry, and about forty-two from Chattanooga. Sheridan's division crossed the river at the railroad bridge, moved through Trenton, and on the 6th encamped twelve miles from Winston's Gap. McCook sent several detachments on the 8th and 9th to different points, reconnoitering the enemy. One went to Alpine and two into Broomtown Valley, but nothing was discovered of Bragg's whereabouts. On the evening of the 9th Rosecrans sent orders to McCook, stating that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga and were retreating southward, and directing him to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville in pursuit, to intercept his line of retreat, and to attack on his flank. The day following McCook reached Alpine, where he discovered the situation. The enemy had not retreated very far from Chattanooga, the exact location as yet unknown. McCook learned that he could not communicate with Thomas, as his couriers could not pa.s.s through the valley, occupied as it was by the enemy in force, and that his corps was entirely isolated at Alpine. That, had he gone to Summerville, he would have been exposed to an attack from the entire rebel army, which his reconnoissance later determined was concentrated in force near La Fayette. On the following day McCook remained in camp waiting for Thomas to move up on him. He, however, sent his wagon-train back to the summit of Lookout Mountain. On the 12th McCook waited in camp for reports from the cavalry as to the position and movements of the enemy.