The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912 Part 4

That there may be no doubt about the motive behind that suggestion, it may be noted here that the Admiral told the Senate Committee in 1902: "I wrote that because I saw in the newspapers that Congress contemplated giving the Cubans independence." [58]

But this is not all. On August 13th, the day after the Peace Protocol was signed, Mr. McKinley wired Admiral Dewey asking about "the desirability of the several islands," the "coal and mineral deposits," and in reply on August 29th, the Admiral wrote:

In a telegram sent the Department on June 23d, I expressed the opinion that "these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races." Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion. [59]

As a result of one year's stay in Cuba, and six in the Philippines--two in the army that subjugated the Filipinos and four as a judge over them--I heartily concur in the above opinion of Admiral Dewey, but with this addition: Whatever of solidarity for governmental purposes the Filipinos may have lacked at the date of the Admiral's communications, they were certainly welded into conscious political unity, as one people, in their war for independence against us.

In the 1609 or Douay (p.r.o.nounce Dewey) version of the Bible, the Latin Vulgate, Luke's version of the Lord's Prayer only says "Lead us not into temptation," while Matthew adds "but deliver us from evil." The Dewey suggestions to the Washington Government in 1898 remind a regretful nation of both the evangelical versions mentioned, for the first seems to say what Luke says, and the second seems to add what Matthew adds.

There is not an American who has known the Filipinos since the beginning of the American occupation who doubts for a moment that but for our intervention a Republic would have been established out there under the lead of Aguinaldo, Mabini, and their a.s.sociates, which would have compared well with the republican governments between the United States and Cape Horn. The writer doubts very much if President Taft is of a contrary opinion. The real issue is, now that we have them, should we keep them in spite of the tariff iniquities which the Trusts perpetrate on them through Congress, until they have received the best possible tuition we can give them, or be content to give them their independence when they are already at least as fit for it as the Republics to the South of us, guaranteeing them independence by international agreement like that which protects Belgium and Switzerland?

Now why did Admiral Dewey repeat to his home government and emphasize on August 29th a suggestion so extremely pertinent to the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government which he had already made in lucid language on June 23d previous? The answer is not far to seek. General Anderson had arrived between the two dates, with the first American troops that reached the islands after the naval battle of May 1st, and brought the Admiral the first intimation, which came somewhat as a surprise of course, that there was serious talk in the United States of retaining the Philippines. "I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey,"

says General Anderson in the North American Review for February, 1900, "that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines if they were captured." He adds: "Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo a.s.surances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at his request."

General Anderson might have added that whenever the Admiral captured prisoners from the Spaniards he would promptly turn them over to the Filipinos--1300 at one clip in the month of June at Olongapo. [60]

These 1300 were men a German man-of-war prevented the Filipinos from taking until Aguinaldo reported the matter to Admiral Dewey, whereupon, he promptly sent Captain Coghlan with the Raleigh and another of his ships to the scene of the trouble, and Captain Coghlan said to the German "Hoch der Kaiser" etc. or words to that effect, and made him go about his business and let our ally alone. Then Captain Coghlan took the 1300 prisoners himself and turned them over to Aguinaldo by direction of Admiral Dewey. The motive for, as well as the test of, an alliance, is that the other fellow can bring into the partnership something you lack. The navy had no way to keep prisoners of war. There can be no doubt that if Admiral Dewey's original notions about meeting the problems presented by his great victory of May 1, 1898, had been followed, we never would have had any trouble with the Filipinos; nor can there be any doubt that he made them his allies and used them as such. They were very obedient allies at that, until they saw the Washington Government was going to repudiate the "alliance,"

and withhold from them what they had a right to consider the object and meaning of the alliance, if it meant anything.

The truth is, as Secretary of War Taft said in 1905, before the National Geographic Society in Washington, "We blundered into colonization." [61] As we have seen, Admiral Dewey repeatedly expressed the opinion, in the summer of 1898, that the Filipinos were far superior in intelligence to the Cubans and more capable of self-government. He of course saw quite clearly then, when he was sending home those commendations of Filipino fitness for self-government, just as we have all come to realize since, that a coaling station would be; the main thing we should need in that part of the world in time of war; that Manila, being quite away from the mainland of Asia, could never supersede Hong Kong as the gateway to the markets of Asia, since neither shippers nor the carrying trade of the world will ever see their way to unload cargo at Manila by way of rehearsal before unloading on the mainland; and that the taking of the islands was a dubious step from a financial standpoint, and a still more dubious one from the strategic standpoint of defending them by land, in the event of war with j.a.pan, Germany, or any other first-cla.s.s power. At this late date, when the pa.s.sions and controversies of that period have long since subsided, is it not perfectly clear that after he destroyed the Spanish fleet, Admiral Dewey not only dealt with the Filipinos, until the army came out, substantially as Admiral Sampson and General Shatter did with the Cubans, but also that he did all he properly could to save President McKinley from the one great blunder of our history, the taking of the Philippine Islands?

CHAPTER III

ANDERSON AND AGUINALDO

Well, honor is the subject of my story.

Julius Caesar, Act. I, Sc. 2.

The destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, ten days after the outbreak of the war with Spain, having necessitated sending troops to the Philippines to complete the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter, Major-General Wesley Merritt was on May 16th selected to organize and command such an expedition.

"The First Expedition," as it was always distinguished, by the officers and men of the Eighth Army Corps, there having been many subsequent expeditions sent out before our war with the Filipinos was over, was itself subdivided into a number of different expeditions, troops being hurried to Manila as fast as they could be a.s.sembled and properly equipped in sufficient numbers. The first batch that were whipped into shape left San Francisco under command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, on May 25th, and arrived off Manila, June 30th. General Merritt did not arrive until July 25th. It was General Anderson, therefore, who broke the ice of the American occupation of the Philippines.

In his annual message to Congress of December, following, [62]

summing up the War with Spain and its results, Mr. McKinley gives a brief account of the First Expedition. After recounting Admiral Dewey's victory of May 1st previous, he states that "on the seventh day of May the Government was advised officially of the victory at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of the fleet what troops would be required." President McKinley does not give the Admiral's answer, though he does state that it was received on the 15th day of May. The Admiral's answer appears, however, in the Report of the Navy Department for 1898, Appendix, page 98. It was: "In my best judgment, a well-equipped force of 5000 men." But the President's message does state that he at once sent a "total force consisting of 641 officers and 15,058 enlisted men."

The difference of view-point of the Admiral and the President is clear from the language of both. In recommending 5000 troops, the Admiral had said they would be necessary "to retain possession [of Manila]

and thus control Philippine Islands." This counted, of course, on the friendship of the people, as in Cuba. "I had in view simply taking possession of the city." said Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee in 1902. [63]

The purpose of the President in sending three times as many troops as were needed for the purpose Admiral Dewey had in mind is indicated in his account of what happened. After describing the taking of Manila by our troops on August 13th, the presidential message says:

By this the conquest of the Philippine Islands, virtually accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance was destroyed by Admiral Dewey's victory of May 1st, was formally sealed. [64]

Admiral Dewey contemplated that we should merely remain masters of the situation out where he was until the end of the war. President McKinley set about to effect "the conquest of the Philippine Islands." The naval victory of Manila Bay having made it certain that at the conclusion of our war against a decadent monarchy we would at last have an adequate coaling station and naval base in the Far East, the sending of troops to the Philippines, in appropriate prosecution of the war, to reduce and capture Manila, the capital and chief port, raised the question at once "And then what?"

The genesis of the idea of taking over the archipelago is traceable to within a few days after the destruction of the Spanish fleet.

Within a few days after the official news of the battle of Manila Bay reached Washington, the Treasury Department set a man to work making a "Report on Financial and Industrial Conditions of the Philippine Islands." [65] The Interior Department also awoke, about the same time to possibilities of an El Dorado in the new overseas conquest. "In May, 1898," says Secretary of the Interior, C. N. Bliss, in a letter intended for the Peace Commissioners who met at Paris that fall, "by arrangement between the Secretary of War with this Department"--Mr. Bliss's grammar is bad, but his meaning is plain--"a geologist of the United States Geological Survey accompanied the military expedition to the Philippines for the purpose of procuring information touching the geological and mineral resources of said islands." [66] This report, which accompanies the Bliss letter, reads like a mining stock prospectus. That summer an a.s.sistant Secretary of the Treasury, presumably echoing the sentiments of the Administration, came out in one of the great magazines of the period, the Century, with an article in which he said: "We see with sudden clearness that some of the most revered of our political maxims have outlived their force. * * * A new mainspring * * * has become the directing force * * * the mainspring of commercialism." [67] Of course, the writer did not mention that Manila is an out-of-the-way place, so far as regards the main-travelled routes across the Pacific Ocean, and also forgot that, as has been suggested once before, the carrying trade of the world, and the shippers on which it depends, in the contest of the nations for the markets of Asia, would never take to the practice of unloading at Manila by way of rehearsal, before finally discharging cargo on the mainland of Asia, where the name of the Ultimate Consumer is legion. Nevertheless "Expansion"--of Trade, mainly--was the slogan of the hour, and any one who did not catch the contagion of exuberant allusion to "Our New Possessions" was considered crusty and out of date. People who referred back to the political maxims of Washington's Farewell Address, and the cognate set represented by the Monroe Doctrine, were regarded merely as not knowing a good thing when they saw it. So on rode the country, on the crest of the wave of war. When President McKinley sent the troops to the Philippines, their job was to hurry up and effect what his subsequent message to Congress describing their work called "the conquest of the Philippine Islands." That is, they were to effect a constructive conquest of the archipelago before Spain should sue for peace. It never seemed to occur to anybody at home that the Filipinos would object. If the country had, through some divine interposition, gotten it into its head that the Filipinos were quite a decent lot and really did object very bitterly, it would have risen in its wrath and smitten down any suggestion of forcing a government on them against their will. But n.o.body knew anything about them. They were a wholly new proposition.

General Anderson was of course furnished with a copy of the President's instructions to his chief, General Merritt. They are quite long, and go into details about a number of administrative matters that would necessarily come up after the city should surrender, such as the raising of revenue, the military commander's duty under the law of nations with regard to the seizure of transportation lines by land or sea, the protection of places of worship from desecration or destruction, and the like. The only portion of them that is essential to a clear understanding of subsequent events is now submitted: They are dated Executive Mansion, May 18, 1898, and read in part [68]:

PRESIDENT McKINLEY'S INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL MERRITT

The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by the taking of the naval station at Cavite, the paroling of the garrisons, and acquisition of control of the bay, have rendered it necessary, in the further prosecution of the measures adopted by this Government for the purpose of bringing about an honorable and durable peace with Spain, to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter, and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States.

For the command of this expedition I have designated Major-General Wesley Merritt, and it now becomes my duty to give instructions as to the manner in which the movements shall be conducted.

The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are ent.i.tled to security in their persons and property and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the people of the Philippines should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the expedition, immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish a proclamation declaring that we come not to make war upon the people of the Philippines nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible. Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the munic.i.p.al laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are to be considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerents; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. * * *

The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so.

While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, to subst.i.tute new courts of his own const.i.tution for those that now exist, or to create such supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and experience and a high sense of justice.

While this doc.u.ment declares the purpose of our government to be a "two fold purpose," viz., first, to make an appropriate move in the game of war, and, second, to police the Islands "while in the possession of the United States," it is wholly free from inherent evidence of any intention out of harmony with the policy as to Cuba. In fact when the city of Santiago de Cuba surrendered to our forces in July thereafter, and it became necessary to issue instructions for the guidance of the military commander there, exactly the same instructions were given him, [69] verbatim et literatim. But in respect of the Cuban instructions there was never any concealment practised or necessary because the Cubans had been a.s.sured by the Teller amendment to the resolutions declaring war against Spain that we had no ulterior designs on their country, and that, as soon as peace and public order were restored, we intended "to leave the government and control of the island to its people." The Cuban instructions were therefore frankly and promptly published in General Orders No. 101 by the War Department, July 18, 1898, five days after they were received from the President, and were then translated into Spanish and spread broadcast over Santiago province without unnecessary delay. I remember poring over a Spanish copy of General Orders 101, at Santiago de Cuba, shortly after the fall of that city, which copy was one of many already posted about that city by direction of General Wood. The words "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately upon the political condition of the inhabitants" never disturbed the Cuban leaders in the least, because they were read in the light of the disclaimer contained in the declaration of war. On the other hand, the proclamation which the military commander in the Philippines was enjoined by his instructions to publish "immediately upon his arrival in the islands," which arrival occurred July 25th, was not so published until after we had taken Manila, August 13th, and then it copied only the glittering generalities of the instructions themselves, such as the part a.s.suring the people that we had not come to make war on them and that vested rights would be respected, but it carefully omitted the words about the powers of the military occupant being absolute and supreme, because when the army arrived it found a native government that had already issued its declaration of independence, was making wonderful progress against the common enemy, and was able to put up a right good fight against us also, in case we should deny them independence. [70]

General Anderson arrived in Manila Bay, June 30, 1898, with about 2500 men, and when General Merritt arrived, July 25th, we had about 10,000 all told, while the Filipinos had half again that many, and there were 12,000 Spanish soldiers in Manila. General Anderson had not been long camped on the baysh.o.r.e, under cover of the Navy's guns and in the neighborhood of Aguinaldo's headquarters, before he understood the whole situation clearly and wrote the War Department as follows:

Since reading the President's instructions to General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the establishment of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in conflict with insurgents.

This letter is dated July 18, 1898. [71]

When General Anderson arrived in the islands on June 30th, the Washington Government was still wrestling with the angel of its announced creed about "Forcible Annexation" being "criminal aggression," and Mr. McKinley had to get both that angel's shoulders on the mat and put him out of business before he could get his own consent to giving any instructions to his generals which might sanction their killing people for objecting to forcible annexation. Hence his early anxiety to avoid a rupture with the Filipino leaders. The first stage of this wrestling coincides in point of time with General Anderson's tenure as the ranking military officer commanding our forces in the Philippines, which was from June 30th until the date of General Merritt's arrival, July 25th. As already made plain, the President's instructions for the guidance of the military commander were entirely free from any land-grabbing suggestion. On the other hand, when General Anderson left San Francisco for Manila, May 25th, there was already talk in the United States about retaining the Islands, if they were captured, for he so informed Admiral Dewey in the first interview they had after the transports which brought his command cast anchor near our squadron in Manila Bay on the last day of June. "I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey," says he, in the North American Review for February, 1900, "that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The current opinion was setting that way when the expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had no reason to surmise."

Relegated by the circ.u.mstances to his own discretion as to how he should act until Washington knew its mind, General Anderson's att.i.tude in the outset represented a "peace-at-any-price" policy, suffused with benevolent pride at championing the cause of the oppressed, but secretly knowing from the beginning that it might become necessary later to slaughter said "oppressed," should they seriously object to a change of masters.

"On July 1st," says General Anderson, in the North American Review article above quoted, "I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey." Of the Admiral's dealings with the insurgent chief prior to this time, the General says in this same article:

"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo a.s.surances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their statements." This last quoted pa.s.sage was read to Admiral Dewey by a member of the Senate Committee in 1902, along with other parts of the magazine article cited, and he was asked to comment on the same. He said:

"These are General Anderson's statements. They are very interesting, indeed; I am here to make my own statements."

He had stated that he never did specifically promise Aguinaldo independence, and the questioner was trying to show that his acts had amounted to a.s.surances and therefore had committed the Government to giving the Filipinos their independence. Then Senator Patterson began another question, and had gotten as far as "I want to know whether your views--" when out came this, as of a sailor-man clearing decks for action:

"I do not like your questions a bit. I did not like them yesterday and I do not like them to-day." So the Admiral's feelings were respected and the question was not pressed. There is no doubt at all that in the Philippines in the summer of 1898 the army turned the back of its hand to Aguinaldo as soon as it got there and baldly repudiated what the navy had done in the way of befriending the Filipinos. But both had acted under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy--the President. The Admiral's sensitiveness on the subject ought to have been respected. And it was.

By the time Admiral Dewey and General Anderson decided to call on "Don Emilio," the day after the General's arrival, the unexpected intimations which the latter brought, as to the Washington programme for the Philippine revolutionists being different from that as to Cuba, had begun to get in its work on the former. Not being a politician, the gallant Admiral was there ready and able to carry out any orders his government might send him, whenever the politicians should decide what they wanted to do. But in the absence of orders, he began to trim his sails a bit, so as to be prepared for whatever might be the policy. Accordingly, before he and the General started out to pay their call on "Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines and General in Chief of its Army"--as he had styled himself in his proclamation of June 23d,--the Admiral said, "Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." And says he, in telling this, "We went in that way." [72] The reason of thus avoiding too much ceremony toward our "ally" claiming to represent an existing government which had lately declared its independence, is explained by an expression of the Admiral's concerning said Declaration of Independence itself: "That was my idea, not taking it seriously." At that same hearing the Admiral explained with much genuine feeling that from the day of the naval battle of May 1st until the arrival of the army "these great questions" were coming up constantly and he simply met them as they arose by acting on his best judgment on the spot at the time. But what a terrible mistake it was not to take that Declaration of Independence of June 23d, seriously, backed as it was by an army of 15,000 men flushed with victory, and under the absolute control of the author of the Declaration! Of course the Declaration had been published to the army. Could its author have checked them by repudiating it even if he had wanted to? As Aguinaldo himself expressed what would happen in such a contingency, "They would fail to recognize me as the interpreter of their aspirations and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by another more careful of his own honor and dignity." [73]