Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 91

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.

For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason.

Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives.

But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference; because, as was observed already (Q. 58, A. 5), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appet.i.tive faculty can there be free-will.

Obj. 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.

_On the contrary,_ Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels' dignity surpa.s.ses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.

_I answer that,_ Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man.

As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth.

Reply Obj. 2: As was observed already (A. 2), knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appet.i.tive faculty comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him.

Reply Obj. 3: Free-will exists in a n.o.bler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some qualification.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 4]

Whether There Is an Irascible and a Concupiscible Appet.i.te in the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appet.i.te in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.

iv) that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appet.i.te in the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appet.i.te. But in the Sacred Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appet.i.te in the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appet.i.te and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fort.i.tude are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appet.i.te in the angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appet.i.te in the angels.

_I answer that,_ The intellective appet.i.te is not divided into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appet.i.te is so divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black.

Now it is quite evident from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1), that the object of the intellective appet.i.te, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can there be any appet.i.te except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appet.i.te is not divided according to the distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appet.i.te is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an intellective appet.i.te, their appet.i.te is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the will.

Reply Obj. 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to G.o.d;--on account of the resemblance in the effect.

Reply Obj. 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are pa.s.sions, are in the concupiscible appet.i.te, but in so far as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of pa.s.sions; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix).

Reply Obj. 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appet.i.te, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appet.i.te is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind.

For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appet.i.te; because the object of the irascible appet.i.te is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fort.i.tude regulates daring and fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fort.i.tude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no pa.s.sions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fort.i.tude. But temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fort.i.tude is likewise attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible appet.i.te.

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QUESTION 60

OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (In Five Articles)

The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love or dilection; because every act of the appet.i.tive faculty comes of love.

Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?

(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?

(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice?

(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?

(5) Whether the angel loves G.o.d more than self with natural love?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Natural Love or Dilection in an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.

Obj. 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess free-will, as was shown above (Q. 59, A. 3).

Consequently there is no natural love in them.

Obj. 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no natural love in the angels.

_On the contrary,_ Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love.

_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place natural love in the angels.

In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence.

Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appet.i.te or love. This inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appet.i.te; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.

Reply Obj. 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself, because he has free-will.

Reply Obj. 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature. Yet the rect.i.tude of natural love is different from the rect.i.tude of charity and virtue: because the one rect.i.tude perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 2]

Whether There Is Love of Choice in the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.

Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1). Consequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them.

_On the contrary,_ We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts.

But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of choice in them.