Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 71

For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars.

Reply Obj. 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes G.o.d Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients a.s.serted.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 4]

Whether G.o.d Is the Final Cause of All Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But G.o.d needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.

Obj. 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70), because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But G.o.d is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause of all things.

Obj. 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire G.o.d, for all do not even know Him. Therefore G.o.d is not the end of all things.

Obj. 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, G.o.d is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all things for Himself."

_I answer that,_ Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.

Reply Obj. 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to G.o.d, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more n.o.ble than the generator, since the end is more n.o.ble than the means to the end.

Reply Obj. 3: All things desire G.o.d as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it partic.i.p.ates in the likeness to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 4: Since G.o.d is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.

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QUESTION 45

THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (In Eight Articles)

The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points of inquiry:

(1) What is creation?

(2) Whether G.o.d can create anything?

(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?

(4) To what things it belongs to be created?

(5) Whether it belongs to G.o.d alone to create?

(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?

(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?

(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 1]

Whether to Create Is to Make Something from Nothing?

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already."

Obj. 2: Further, the n.o.bility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore n.o.bler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most n.o.ble action, and first among all actions.

Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.

Obj. 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from bra.s.s. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.

_On the contrary,_ On the text of Gen. 1, "In the beginning G.o.d created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing."

_I answer that,_ As said above (Q. 44, A. 2), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is G.o.d; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," and white from "not-white." Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing."

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.

Reply Obj. 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term _wherefrom,_ but from the term _whereto._ Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term _whereto_ of the change is more n.o.ble and excellent, although the term _wherefrom,_ corresponding to the term _whereto,_ may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply n.o.bler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is n.o.bler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term _wherefrom_ in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term _wherefrom_ in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the term _whereto_ is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term _wherefrom_ is simply not-being.

Reply Obj. 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made from nothing--i.e. it is not made from anything"--as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does not speak of anything.

And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition "from" [ex]

implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 2]

Whether G.o.d Can Create Anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of G.o.d does not extend to the contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that G.o.d could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore G.o.d cannot make anything from nothing, or create.

Obj. 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time.

Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.

Obj. 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth."

_I answer that,_ Not only is it [not] impossible that anything should be created by G.o.d, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by G.o.d, as appears from what has been said (Q. 44, A. 1). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or bra.s.s, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore G.o.d did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that nothing can be, unless it is from G.o.d, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that G.o.d brings things into being from nothing.

Reply Obj. 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Q. 44, A. 2), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing."

But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things.

Reply Obj. 2: Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quant.i.ty, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and pa.s.sion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20, 21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (Q. 13, A. 1), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made"

are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.