Summa Theologica Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 8

(2) Whether He a.s.sumed a person?

(3) Whether He a.s.sumed a man?

(4) Whether it was becoming that He should a.s.sume human nature abstracted from all individuals?

(5) Whether it was becoming that He should a.s.sume human nature in all its individuals?

(6) Whether it was becoming that He should a.s.sume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam?

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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 1]

Whether Human Nature Was More a.s.sumable by the Son of G.o.d Than Any Other Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of being a.s.sumed by the Son of G.o.d than any other nature. For Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cx.x.xvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." Now the power of G.o.d Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is not limited to one nature, since the power of G.o.d is infinite.

Therefore human nature is not more capable of being a.s.sumed than any other creature.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated (Q. 3, A. 8). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the irrational creature was as capable of a.s.sumption as human nature.

Obj. 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.; x.x.xiv in Ev.), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: "Thou wast the seal of resemblance." And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness."

Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of a.s.sumption as the nature of man.

Obj. 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to G.o.d, the more like to G.o.d a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being a.s.sumed than human nature.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of G.o.d with human nature.

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be a.s.sumable as being capable of being a.s.sumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural pa.s.sive power, which does not extend to what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with G.o.d transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be a.s.sumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things, viz.

according to its dignity, and according to its need. According to its dignity, because human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing and loving Him. According to its need--because it stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was a.s.sumable.

Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured by G.o.d, but that it cannot be cured by the proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not a.s.sumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of G.o.d, but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no capability for this.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of G.o.d, viz. by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a likeness is, can attain to G.o.d by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is the union with G.o.d in personal being than the union by operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with G.o.d by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being.

Reply Obj. 3: Some say that angels are not a.s.sumable, since they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence they cannot be a.s.sumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one a.s.suming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the creature a.s.sumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for being a.s.sumed. For G.o.d by producing a new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is irremediable, as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 4: The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of a.s.sumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of being a.s.sumed.

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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 2]

Whether the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed a Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed a person. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of G.o.d "a.s.sumed human nature _in atomo,"_ i.e. in an individual. But an individual in rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab.

Nat.). Therefore the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed a person.

Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Son of G.o.d "a.s.sumed what He had sown in our nature." But He sowed our personality there. Therefore the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed a person.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent III [*Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that "the Person of G.o.d absorbed the person of man." Therefore it would seem that the person of man existed previous to its being a.s.sumed.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii) that "G.o.d a.s.sumed the nature, not the person, of man."

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be a.s.sumed inasmuch as it is taken into another. Hence, what is a.s.sumed must be presupposed to the a.s.sumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion.

Now a person in human nature is not presupposed to a.s.sumption; rather, it is the term of the a.s.sumption, as was said (Q. 3, AA. 1, 2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted--in which case it was useless; or it remains after the union--and thus there would be two persons, one a.s.suming and the other a.s.sumed, which is false, as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 6). Hence it follows that the Son of G.o.d nowise a.s.sumed a human person.

Reply Obj. 1: The Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed human nature _in atomo,_ i.e. in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person of the Son of G.o.d. Hence it does not follow that a person was a.s.sumed.

Reply Obj. 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature a.s.sumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something which is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.

Reply Obj. 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have been. For if the human nature had not been a.s.sumed by a Divine Person, the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed the person," inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature from having its personality.

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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 3]

Whether the Divine Person a.s.sumed a Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Divine Person a.s.sumed a man. For it is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed a man, and in him bore things human."

Obj. 2: Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed a human nature. Therefore He a.s.sumed a man.

Obj. 3: Further, the Son of G.o.d is a man. But He is not one of the men He did not a.s.sume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any other man. Therefore He is the man whom He a.s.sumed.

_On the contrary,_ Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of G.o.d, and not a man a.s.sumed by G.o.d, in such sort that there is another besides Him. For the Son of G.o.d did not a.s.sume a man, so that there be another besides Him."

_I answer that,_ As has been said above (A. 2), what is a.s.sumed is not the term of the a.s.sumption, but is presupposed to the a.s.sumption.

Now it was said (Q. 3, AA. 1, 2) that the individual to Whom the human nature is a.s.sumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of the a.s.sumption. Now this word "man" signifies human nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4, 11), this word G.o.d signifies Him Who has human nature.

And hence it cannot properly be said that the Son a.s.sumed a man, granted (as it must be, in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants that a man was a.s.sumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Q. 2, A.

6).

Reply Obj. 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man was a.s.sumed, inasmuch as his nature was a.s.sumed; and because the a.s.sumption terminated in this--that the Son of G.o.d is man.

Reply Obj. 2: The word "man" signifies human nature in the concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was a.s.sumed, so we cannot say a man was a.s.sumed.

Reply Obj. 3: The Son of G.o.d is not the man whom He a.s.sumed, but the man whose nature He a.s.sumed.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 4]

Whether the Son of G.o.d Ought to Have a.s.sumed Human Nature Abstracted from All Individuals?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of G.o.d ought to have a.s.sumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the a.s.sumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful." But nature as it is in individuals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of G.o.d ought to have a.s.sumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.

Obj. 2: Further, what is n.o.blest in all things ought to be attributed to G.o.d. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of G.o.d ought to have a.s.sumed self-existing (_per se_) man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore the Son of G.o.d ought to have a.s.sumed this.

Obj. 3: Further, human nature was not a.s.sumed by the Son of G.o.d in the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above (A.

3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain from what has been said (A. 3). Therefore the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed human nature as it is separated from individuals.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "G.o.d the Word Incarnate did not a.s.sume a nature which exists in pure thought; for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fict.i.tious Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11).

Therefore the Son of G.o.d did not a.s.sume human nature, as it is separated from individuals.