Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 260

Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich ..."

Reply Obj. 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in contemplation."

Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things." And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): "The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things." Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly command the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the active life is bondage, whereas the contemplative life is freedom."

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the active life. "If no one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us." Hence it is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 2]

Whether the Active Life Is of Greater Merit Than the Contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to G.o.d must first of all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative.

Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on John 21:22, "So I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): "This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me conformed to the example of My pa.s.sion, and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the character of reward.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to G.o.d than zeal for souls." Now by the zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than the active.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), charity consists in the love of G.o.d and our neighbor, the love of G.o.d is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of G.o.d is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for G.o.d's sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of G.o.d; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (Q. 181, A. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is "busy about much serving" (Luke 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover a.s.serted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The contemplative life surpa.s.ses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of a.s.sisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of G.o.d.

Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life.

For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time being, that G.o.d's will may be done and for His glory's sake.

Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ."

Reply Obj. 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.

Reply Obj. 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.

Reply Obj. 3: A sacrifice is rendered to G.o.d spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, G.o.d specially accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to G.o.d, in the first place, his soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing G.o.d"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more closely a man unites his own or another's soul to G.o.d, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to G.o.d; wherefore it is more acceptable to G.o.d that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to G.o.d than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to G.o.d one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 3]

Whether the Contemplative Life Is Hindered by the Active Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I am G.o.d"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to Luke 10:41, "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.

Obj. 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it "is blear-eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work, sees less." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.

Obj. 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another, since the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the camp of action."

_I answer that,_ The active life may be considered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting and directing the internal pa.s.sions of the soul; and from this point of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal pa.s.sions.

Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order to explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior pa.s.sions which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect which is the quelling of the pa.s.sions.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 4]

Whether the Active Life Precedes the Contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the love of G.o.d; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now the love of G.o.d precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our neighbor for G.o.d's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life also precedes the active life.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active is not simply prior to the contemplative.

Obj. 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to contemplate G.o.d so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are killed by the sword of their inaction."

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active life. For the higher reason which is a.s.signed to contemplation is compared to the lower reason which is a.s.signed to action, and the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3, 7, 12).

Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 181, A. 1, ad 3); and, in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and according to its nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of G.o.d, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do."

From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect.

Reply Obj. 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 7.

Reply Obj. 3: He that is p.r.o.ne to yield to his pa.s.sions on account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others, on the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very outset." Yet, as he adds further on, "often ... love stimulates slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed in contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.

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TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ. 183-189) _______________________

OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL (In Four Articles)

We must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall consider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the perfect in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What const.i.tutes a state among men?

(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?

(3) Of the diversity of duties;

(4) Of the diversity of states.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 1]

Whether the Notion of a State Denotes a Condition of Freedom or Servitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote a condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its name from "standing." Now a person is said to stand on account of his being upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To fall by speaking harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness." But a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to G.o.d; wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," says: "The upright are those who direct their heart according to G.o.d's will." Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments suffices alone for the notion of a state.

Obj. 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast (_stabiles_) and immovable"; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): "The stone is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall." Now it is virtue that enables us "to act with immobility," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a state is acquired by every virtuous action.