Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 256

(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life?

(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of G.o.d?

(6) Of the movements of contemplation a.s.signed by Dionysius (Div.

Nom. iv);

(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;

(8) Of the duration of contemplation.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 1]

Whether the Contemplative Life Has Nothing to Do with the Affections, and Pertains Wholly to the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life." Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now the affective or appet.i.tive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the appet.i.tive power.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of G.o.d and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appet.i.tive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appet.i.tive power.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q.

12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1).

Now the appet.i.tive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is written (Matt. 6:21), "where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the "love of G.o.d," inasmuch as through loving G.o.d we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense.

Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appet.i.tive power.

Reply Obj. 2: We are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely G.o.d, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator."

Reply Obj. 3: The appet.i.tive power moves not only the bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice the act of contemplation, as stated above.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 2]

Whether the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Contemplative Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is to cling to the love of G.o.d and our neighbor with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of G.o.d and of our neighbor, for "love ... is the fulfilling of the Law" (Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life.

Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation of G.o.d; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. Q. 8, A. 7]. For it is written (Matt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see G.o.d": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see G.o.d." Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen. 29:17) that she was "of a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43, 45, 46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.

_On the contrary,_ The moral virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A. 1, Obj. 3]) that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life.

_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues": wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness.

On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the pa.s.sions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the pa.s.sions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the contemplative life.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of G.o.d and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life.

Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.

Reply Obj. 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the pa.s.sions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, according to Isa. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.

Reply Obj. 3: Beauty, as stated above (Q. 145, A. 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a lover of her beauty."

On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by partic.i.p.ation, in so far as they partic.i.p.ate in the order of reason; and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chast.i.ty most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 3]

Whether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat.

Contempl. i, 3, 4] distinguishes between "contemplation,"

"meditation," and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we ...

beholding (_speculantes_) the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.: 'into the same image from glory to glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life.

Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision (_speculatio_) belongs to the contemplative life.

Obj. 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear.

Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.

Obj. 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of St.

Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is signified) "sitting ... at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Luke 10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.

_On the contrary,_ Life signifies here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative lives.

_I answer that,_ We are now speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations. And again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect.

"Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and "consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called "consideration."

But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that "contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is p.r.o.ne to wander."

Reply Obj. 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine on this pa.s.sage, "beholding" (_speculatio_) denotes "seeing in a mirror (_speculo_), not from a watch-tower (_specula_)." Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to meditation.

Reply Obj. 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpa.s.ses our faculties: hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above (A. 1) that contemplation terminates in the affections.

Reply Obj. 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from G.o.d, he needs _prayer,_ according to Wis.

7:7, "I called upon" G.o.d, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs _hearing,_ in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and _reading,_ in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires _meditation._ _______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 4]

Whether the Contemplative Life Consists in the Mere Contemplation of G.o.d, or Also in the Consideration of Any Truth Whatever?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of G.o.d, but also in the consideration of any truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of G.o.d's works is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other.