Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 231

QUESTION 159

OF CRUELTY (In Two Articles)

We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 1]

Whether Cruelty Is Opposed to Clemency?

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 4, ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Obj. 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 1): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17, "But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred." Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment."

_I answer that,_ Cruelty apparently takes its name from _cruditas_ (rawness). Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (Q. 157, A. 3, ad 1; A. 4, ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment.

Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.

Reply Obj. 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it belongs to mercy [*Cf. Q. 30, A. 1] to relieve another's unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness.

Reply Obj. 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punishment.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 2]

Whether Cruelty Differs from Savagery or Brutality?

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.

Obj. 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency, which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency." Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."

_I answer that,_ "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under b.e.s.t.i.a.lity: for such like pleasure is not human but b.e.s.t.i.a.l, and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other b.e.s.t.i.a.l emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from b.e.s.t.i.a.lity, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 5.

Reply Obj. 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under b.e.s.t.i.a.lity, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "G.o.d-like," which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.

Reply Obj. 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.

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QUESTION 160

OF MODESTY (In Two Articles)

We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

(2) What is the matter of modesty?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 1]

Whether Modesty Is a Part of Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance.

For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order."

Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.

Obj. 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24, 25, "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men ... with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 1).

Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4; Q. 157, A. 3), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (Q.

134, A. 3, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its princ.i.p.al.

Reply Obj. 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.

Reply Obj. 2: Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong pa.s.sions, and modesty about weaker pa.s.sions.

Reply Obj. 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 2]

Whether Modesty Is Only About Outward Actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the pa.s.sions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.

Obj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the pa.s.sions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward pa.s.sions.

Obj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appet.i.te--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about things pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual virtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.