Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 204

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue.

_I answer that,_ It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the princ.i.p.al things to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we subst.i.tute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and pa.s.sions: and this is common to every moral virtue.

Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fort.i.tude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appet.i.te from obeying reason, while fort.i.tude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.

On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appet.i.te from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fort.i.tude, a special matter.

Reply Obj. 1: Man's appet.i.te is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law.

Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and secondly in a sense of excellence.

Reply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).

Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4).

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 3]

Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of l.u.s.t and other wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the pa.s.sions of the soul are called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good"

[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono x.x.xvii, xlii, and De Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby l.u.s.t and desire are kept under control."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 136, A. 1), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the pa.s.sions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's pa.s.sions is twofold, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2), when we were treating of the pa.s.sions: the one, whereby the sensitive appet.i.te pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.

The first of these movements of the sensitive appet.i.te rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive appet.i.te fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those pa.s.sions which denote a pursuit of the good.

On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.

Accordingly, just as the virtue of fort.i.tude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the pa.s.sion, viz.

fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those pa.s.sions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 25, A.

1), when we were treating of the pa.s.sions, those pa.s.sions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the pa.s.sions pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the pa.s.sions of the irascible presuppose the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly moderates the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other pa.s.sions, inasmuch as moderation of the pa.s.sions that precede results in moderation of the pa.s.sions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things he desires.

Reply Obj. 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appet.i.te towards the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. On the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which fort.i.tude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fort.i.tude about fears.

Reply Obj. 3: External acts proceed from the internal pa.s.sions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the internal pa.s.sions.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 4]

Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures of Touch?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that "the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of G.o.d and from the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular praise." Now we are withdrawn from G.o.d's laws not only by the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*_Cupiditas,_ which the Douay version following the Greek _philargyria_ renders 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch.

Obj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.

Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus.

Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.

Obj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on the pa.s.sions. Now sometimes men forsake G.o.d's laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (Gen. 3:5): "Ye shall be as G.o.ds, knowing good and evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.

Obj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of temperance.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fort.i.tude is about fear and daring.

Now fort.i.tude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the s.e.xes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and s.e.xual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch.

Reply Obj. 1: In the pa.s.sage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other pleasures.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.

Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not princ.i.p.ally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.

Hence these pa.s.sions are not of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.

Reply Obj. 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appet.i.te, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding.

Reply Obj. 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 5]

Whether Temperance Is About the Pleasures Proper to the Taste?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which are more necessary to man's life than s.e.xual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4), temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is about the pa.s.sions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to _De Anima_ ii, 3, "the touch is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food, whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch.

Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vii, 4, 7: "temperance and intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as princ.i.p.al and others as secondary. The princ.i.p.al thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.

In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses.

Reply Obj. 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment.

Reply Obj. 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink.