Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 188

Obj. 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the integrity of chast.i.ty is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chast.i.ty will gain me a twofold crown."

Obj. 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fort.i.tude. But it belongs to fort.i.tude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.

Obj. 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A.

2, ad 1; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.

Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom.

_On the contrary,_ Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living without faith."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb.

11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: 'life'] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.

Reply Obj. 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.

Reply Obj. 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chast.i.ty. Wherefore in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of G.o.d, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5), fort.i.tude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death.

Reply Obj. 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 5]

Whether Faith Alone Is the Cause of Martyrdom?

Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For it is written (1 Pet. 4:15, 16): "Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify G.o.d in this name." Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.

Obj. 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.

Obj. 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:10): "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this pa.s.sage.

Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice.

Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are so called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with G.o.dliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith.

But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works, my faith." Hence it is written of certain people (t.i.tus 1:16): "They profess that they know G.o.d but in their works they deny Him." Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to G.o.d, are professions of the faith whereby we come to know that G.o.d requires these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.

Reply Obj. 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according to Rom. 8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins, according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences." Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the head of witnessing to the faith.

Reply Obj. 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection with the worship of the G.o.dhead: hence it is not called truth according to G.o.dliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q. 110, AA. 3, 4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin against the Divine Law.

Reply Obj. 3: The good of one's country is paramount among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to G.o.d, it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to G.o.d, may be the cause of martyrdom.

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QUESTION 125

OF FEAR*

(In Four Articles) [* St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or 'timidity.' The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the connection with the pa.s.sion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a better rendering.]

We must now consider the vices opposed to fort.i.tude: (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fort.i.tude?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 1]

Whether Fear Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a pa.s.sion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 42). Now we are neither praised nor blamed for pa.s.sions, as stated in _Ethic._ ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is commanded in G.o.d's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling." Therefore fear is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words."

_I answer that,_ A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 114, A. 1). Now this due order requires that the appet.i.te be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided.

Accordingly when the appet.i.te shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the appet.i.te fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appet.i.te is neither inordinate nor sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or evil: and the same applies to every other pa.s.sion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that pa.s.sions call for neither praise nor blame, because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate manner.

Reply Obj. 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters.

Reply Obj. 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing.

Hence there is no sin in fearing them.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 2]

Whether the Sin of Fear Is Contrary to Fort.i.tude?

Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fort.i.tude: because fort.i.tude is about dangers of death, as stated above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all they that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods." Again a gloss on Matt. 27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that "evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fort.i.tude.

Obj. 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for fort.i.tude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fort.i.tude instead of being opposed thereto.

Obj. 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not to fort.i.tude but to hope, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1; I-II, Q.

40, A. 4). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fort.i.tude.