Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 182

(4) Of the third;

(5) Of the fourth;

(6) Of the other six.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 1]

Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Precepts of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. Wherefore, according to _Ethic._ v, 1, "the law prescribes about all acts of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.

Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3). Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong to justice.

Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of G.o.d and the love of our neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.

_On the contrary,_ Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.

_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the Law: and the natural reason a.s.sents to them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.

Reply Obj. 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to G.o.d. Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.

Reply Obj. 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways according to the difference of men.

Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.

Reply Obj. 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 2]

Whether the First Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to G.o.d than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulg.: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live?" Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all honor G.o.d, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation.

Obj. 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange G.o.ds before Me"; secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them."

Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the first precept forbids the sin of superst.i.tion." But there are many wicked superst.i.tions besides idolatry, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 2).

Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed to G.o.d, Who is the last end of man's will.

The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns." Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false G.o.d, according to Matt. 6:24, "You cannot serve G.o.d and mammon." Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of false G.o.ds is excluded.

Reply Obj. 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day."

Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning G.o.d, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).

Reply Obj. 2: People worshiped strange G.o.ds in two ways. For some served certain creatures as G.o.ds without having recourse to images.

Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped G.o.ds without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange G.o.ds." Among others the worship of false G.o.ds was observed by using certain images: and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship of those same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.

Reply Obj. 3: All other kinds of superst.i.tion proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange G.o.ds."

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 3]

Whether the Second Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the name of thy G.o.d in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: "Thou shalt not deem the Son of G.o.d to be a creature," so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut.

5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of ... thy G.o.d in vain," adds, i.e. "by giving the name of G.o.d to wood or stone," as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superst.i.tion, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby superst.i.tion is forbidden.

Obj. 2: Further, the name of G.o.d is taken for many purposes--for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col.

3:17, "All whatsoever you do in word or in work ... do ye in the name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of G.o.d's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superst.i.tion, and thus should have preceded it.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou shalt not take the name of ... thy G.o.d in vain," namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden them.

Obj. 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to G.o.d is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.

Obj. 5: Further, G.o.d's names are many. Therefore it should not have been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of ... thy G.o.d in vain."

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superst.i.tion. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, G.o.d is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above (Q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now superst.i.tion hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging G.o.d so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to G.o.d, according to Isa. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out," i.e. either the true G.o.d or a false G.o.d must fall out from man's heart, "and a short covering cannot cover both."

On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from honoring G.o.d after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge G.o.d with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged.

For this reason the precept forbidding superst.i.tion is placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is that which is given Deut. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take the name of ... thy G.o.d in vain," namely, "by swearing on that which is not [*Vulg.: 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing']."

Reply Obj. 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of G.o.d, but properly the taking of G.o.d's name in confirmation of a man's word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take G.o.d's name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the explanation quoted in the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury, as stated above (Q. 98, A. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the swearer.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: "Thou shalt not take the name of ... thy G.o.d in vain": since it matters not in which of G.o.d's names perjury is committed.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 4]

Whether the Third Precept of the Decalogue, Concerning the Hallowing of the Sabbath, Is Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed.