Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 176

(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 1]

Whether Liberality Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things."

Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8.

Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic.

iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away."

Obj. 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated."

Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue.

Therefore liberality is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers and the pa.s.sions of the soul, but also those that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by G.o.d to some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want."

Reply Obj. 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by any household cares." For this belongs to the state of perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. 184; Q. 186, A. 3).

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed to happiness.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you a.s.sist to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of pity." Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain evil works, are not liberal.

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.

1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i.e. his means, "for it consists, not in the quant.i.ty given, but in the habit of the giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value."

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 2]

Whether Liberality Is About Money?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every moral virtue is about operations and pa.s.sions. Now it is proper to justice to be about operations, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1.

Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about pa.s.sions and not about money.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5, 6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about money.

Obj. 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberality.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money."

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called open-handedness (_largitas_), because that which is open does not withhold things but parts with them. The term "liberality"

seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it (_liberat_), so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term "money."

Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), liberality depends not on the quant.i.ty given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed according to the pa.s.sions of love and desire, and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things given. Hence the interior pa.s.sions are the immediate matter of liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same pa.s.sions.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in his book _De Disciplina Christi_ (Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of _pecunia_ (money), because in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of _pecora_ (flocks). And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name of money to anything that can be valued in currency."

Reply Obj. 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal pa.s.sions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 3]

Whether Using Money Is the Act of Liberality?

Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality.

For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence.

Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably a.s.signed as the proper act of liberality.

Obj. 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself." Therefore not every use of money belongs to liberality.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of liberality.

_I answer that,_ The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain farther on (Q. 134).

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's fort.i.tude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make fitting use of it.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2, ad 1), the internal pa.s.sions whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts.

Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 4]

Whether It Belongs to a Liberal Man Chiefly to Give?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "those who have not earned money, but have received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because they have not experienced the want of it." Therefore it seems that giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.

Obj. 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving.

Obj. 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to give.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it belongs to a liberal man to surpa.s.s in giving."

_I answer that,_ It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of money is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in parting with a thing--for instance, when we throw something--the farther we put it away the greater the force (_virtus_) employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves.

But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect, since "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18).

Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.