Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 138

Obj. 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26, 28), it is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive t.i.thes from the people, but also that they should themselves pay t.i.thes to the high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay t.i.thes to the Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay t.i.thes to the clergy.

Obj. 4: Further, t.i.thes should serve not only for the support of the clergy, but also for the a.s.sistance of the poor. Therefore, if the clergy are exempt from paying t.i.thes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.

_On the contrary,_ A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand t.i.thes from the clergy" [*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.].

_I answer that,_ The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of pa.s.sion; yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes and from different points of view. Now t.i.thes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as having ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay t.i.thes; whereas from some other cause through holding property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound to the payment of t.i.thes.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy like anyone else are bound to pay t.i.thes on their own lands to the parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church, because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same as possessing it in common. But church lands are not t.i.thable, even though they be within the boundaries of another parish.

Reply Obj. 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls, and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay t.i.thes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay t.i.thes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam, de Decimis, etc.].

Reply Obj. 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests, and t.i.thes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the high-priest "the tenth part of the tenth" [*Num. 18:26] instead of first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now to pay t.i.thes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of a mult.i.tude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.

Reply Obj. 4: t.i.thes should be employed for the a.s.sistance of the poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no reason for accepting t.i.thes, but they are bound to pay them.

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QUESTION 88

OF VOWS (In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to G.o.d.

Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) What is a vow?

(2) What is the matter of a vow?

(3) Of the obligation of vows;

(4) Of the use of taking vows;

(5) Of what virtue is it an act?

(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than without a vow?

(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;

(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?

(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?

(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?

(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence?

(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation from a vow?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 1]

Whether a Vow Consists in a Mere Purpose of the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.

Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before G.o.d to do or not to do a certain thing." But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.

Obj. 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from _voluntas_ (will), for one is said to do a thing _proprio voto_ (by one's own vow) when one does it voluntarily. Now to _purpose_ is an act of the will, while to _promise_ is an act of the reason.

Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.

Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of G.o.d." Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of G.o.d.

Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before G.o.d, even without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed anything to G.o.d, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise.

_I answer that,_ A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be made to G.o.d by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer (Q. 83, A. 12), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of G.o.d, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation; the second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely, p.r.o.nouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to G.o.d and about things relating to G.o.d": although the "witnessing" may strictly refer to the inward protestation.

Reply Obj. 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a promise.

Reply Obj. 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.

Reply Obj. 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 2]

Whether a Vow Should Always Be About a Better Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation.

But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps.

75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your G.o.d"; and Jacob vowed (Gen.

28:21) that the Lord should be his G.o.d. Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better good.

Obj. 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32).

Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges 11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only about a better good, but also about something unlawful.

Obj. 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good.

Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always about a better good.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 23:22): "If thou wilt not promise thou shalt be without sin."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to G.o.d. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that one would do something against someone. In like manner it would be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as every sin is against G.o.d, and since no work is acceptable to G.o.d unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.

On the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely but on the supposition of an end--for instance if salvation be unattainable without it--it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.

But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.

Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.

Reply Obj. 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his G.o.d, by giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance by offering t.i.thes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same pa.s.sage.

Reply Obj. 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30, 31, "made a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace ... the same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an a.s.s or a human being. Hence Jerome says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii: Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.

Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges 11:29) that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something good.