Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 107

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for Parents to Strike Their Children, or Masters Their Slaves?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4): "You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on (Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened.

Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters their slaves.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their children.

Obj. 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2).

If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from h.e.l.l." Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave."

_I answer that,_ Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice.

Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.

Reply Obj. 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion.

Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father and the master who preside over the family household, which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irreparable harm.

Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastis.e.m.e.nt by blows.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Lawful to Imprison a Man?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is unlawful to imprison a man.

Obj. 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, "G.o.d left man in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or prisons.

Obj. 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

_On the contrary,_ We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy.

_I answer that,_ In the goods of the body three things may be considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.

Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil.

Reply Obj. 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom G.o.d sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job 5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He allows them to do what they will." In like manner, according to human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones.

Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him from doing not only evil but also good deeds.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 4]

Whether the Sin Is Aggravated by the Fact That the Aforesaid Injuries Are Perpetrated on Those Who Are Connected with Others?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.

Obj. 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): "He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her complaint." Now the widow and the orphan are not connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.

Obj. 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own just as the princ.i.p.al person has, so that something may be voluntary for him and yet against the will of the princ.i.p.al person, as in the case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 28:32) as though indicating an aggravating circ.u.mstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons and thy daughters be given,' etc.]."

_I answer that,_ Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole community, as stated above (I-II, Q. 73, A. 9).

Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view of certain circ.u.mstances, a sin committed against one who is not connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury.

Reply Obj. 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in himself.

Reply Obj. 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have no one to turn to for relief.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. Of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chast.i.ty, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance (Q. 154, A. 8).

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QUESTION 66

OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (In Nine Articles)

We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.

Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?

(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?

(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?

(5) Whether every theft is a sin?

(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?

(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?

(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?

(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 1]